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Abstract:  
On 7 July 2005, Britain suffered its first ever suicide attack. Four young British-born 
Muslims, apparently well-educated and from integrated backgrounds, killed their fellow 
citizens, including other Muslims. The incident raised the vision that British Muslims 
would be seen as the ‘enemy within’ and a ‘fifth column’ in British society. To examine 
how this view emerged, this thesis investigates the representation of British Muslims in 
two major British broadsheets, The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, over a two-year 
period (7 July 2005-8 July 2007). A corpus of 274 news items, including editorials, 
comments, interviews, and news reports on the London bombings, has been collected 
and analysed using the inductive approach based upon thematic analysis. The thesis 
asks a significant question: How did these broadsheets present British Muslims in the 
wake of the London bombings? This thesis aims to present a narrative of how the 
London bombings (hereafter 7/7) emerged in these broadsheets based on their reaction 
to an interpretation and perception of the 7/7 event.  
This research indicates that the two broadsheets shared a similar cultural approach in 
combating Islamist terrorism, by encouraging the embracing of British values, although 
their different political orientations led to them differing attitudes over the precise 
manner in which this should be achieved. The Guardian was more concerned about 
individual liberty and human rights, while The Daily Telegraph emphasised the 
adaptation of tough legislation to combat terrorism.  Given modern Britain’s secular 
moral fibre, the supremacy of British values dominated the debates on British Muslims 
which somehow reflected a manifestation of a systematic campaign to redefine Islam as 
a religion that fits into secular Western society, validating terms such as ‘Moderate 
Muslim’, ‘Islamic terrorists’, ‘Islamic extremists’, ‘Islamic militants’ and ‘Islamic 
terrorism’. Although both newspapers argue that radicalisation is a foreign-imported 
14 
 
dilemma that has its roots in “Islamic ideology”, they differ in their attitudes on how to 
deal with it.   
This thesis uses Cohen’s (1972) text, which suggests that the media often portray 
certain groups within society as “deviant” and “folk devils” and blames them for crimes. 
This research into the reactions of two broadsheets permits a contemporary discussion 
of the London bombings and British Muslims in the light of Cohen’s concept. It aims to 
locate the presence of a nexus of the four Ps - political parties, pressure groups, the 
press, and public bodies - that influence reporting and shape the debates (Ost, 2002; 
Chas, 2006, p.75). It is evident that the reporting of the two broadsheets blends three 
significant components: the views of self-proclaimed Islamic scholars, experts and hate 
preachers; the use of out-of-context verses of the Quran; and the use of political 
language to represent British Muslims. Arguably, the press transformed the 7/7 event, 
suggesting that it was driven by religious theology rather than being a politically 
motivated act.  
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1.1-Introduction:  
The London bombings on 7 July 2005 have emerged as one of the biggest crises in the 
history of British Muslims. On that morning Londoners were celebrating their victory 
over Paris, Madrid and New York in their bid to host the Olympic Games for the third 
time. At 8:45, during the rush hour, four young British-born-and-bred Muslim suicide 
bombers killed 52 innocent civilians along with themselves and injured over 700, 
including Muslims. Shockingly, Hasib Hussain became Britain’s youngest suicide 
bomber and murderer of many victims including a teenage Muslim girl, Shahara Islam 
(The Guardian, 15 July 2005). The incident generated shockwaves globally but within 
Britain it became the cause of increasing societal tensions and an extraordinary rise in 
anti-Muslim sentiments among the British public.  
Two weeks after the Thursday 7 July attacks, the British security agencies fortunately 
disrupted four more attempted bomb attacks on Thursday 21 July 2005 and saved 
hundreds of lives. These two deplorable incidents provided some right-wing 
commentators and politicians with an excuse to spark hatred of British Muslims, whom 
they began to see as problematic ‘others’ and eventually  a ‘threat’ and ‘security risk’ to 
British society (Shaw, 2012, p.510-515; Poole, 2002, p.84 and 2011, p.54). Furthermore, 
calls for the integration of young Muslims to prevent their radicalisation became louder 
at government and public levels (see Ratcliffe and Scholder, 2013). 
Despite calls for unity and condemnation of the bombings by Muslim and non-Muslim 
organisations alike, anti-Muslim feelings rose rapidly across Britain, and ordinary 
people began to see Islam as the source of problems. Several opinion polls conducted 
before and after the 7/7 attack affirmed that anti-Muslim feelings had increased; for 
instance, ‘TNS Global’ and Kent University findings published in The Yorkshire Post on 8 
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September 2006 reveal that 77 per cent of 1,100 people admitted to holding a negative 
view of Islam. Regrettably, this trend has continued, obviously because of a series of 
terror incidents such as the attempted Glasgow bombing in 2007, attempted bombings 
in Exeter in 2008, and the murder of Lee Rigby on 22 May 2013. Following the latter 
incident, the ‘Tell Mama’ study revealed that there had been ‘582 anti-Muslim cases 
from March 2012 to March 2013’ (The Guardian, 26 December, 2013).   
These shocking trends further escalated after a Ukrainian student, Pavlo Lapshyn, killed 
Mohammed Saleem, detonating bombs close to mosques in Wolverhampton and Tipton 
and admitting that he wanted to start a “racial war” (Birmingham Mail, 21 October 
2013). Recent studies note that anti-Muslim hate crimes have been rising progressively 
since the 7/7 attack (Copsey et al., 2013; Awan, 2014). Further, since the Woolwich 
incident, 43 mosques at different locations in Britain have been vandalised and attacked 
and been the subject of attempted bombings (Tell Mama, 2013). 
At worst, eleven years on, the anti-Muslim bigotry and racial profiling remains a 
challenge to British society. Although this thesis only covers the two-year period after 
the London bombings, to observe the presence of anti-Muslim sentiments it also 
considers the latest developments. According to the Huffington Post’s tenth anniversary 
special edition, anti-Muslim feelings are at a record high. 
 A Jack Sommers report in the Huffington Post, published on 3 July 2015, reveals that 
“More than half of Britons now regard Muslims as a threat to the UK, far more than in 
the immediate aftermath of the 7/7 bombings a decade ago”. It further notes that “56% 
of people think Islam is a “major” or “some” threat to Western liberal democracy - a 
notable rise from just 46% of people who said the same thing in a poll taken the day 
after the attacks on London’s transport network on July 7, 2005” (Huffington Post, 3 July 
2015), although this may have been fuelled by events in the Middle East.  
Some sections of the press and polity see the acts of 7/7 as a reaction of religious 
ideology, whilst others view them as a response to Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq. 
Without making any conclusions, it is important to note that three of the four bombers 
were of Kashmiri origin, which has been a disputed territory between India and 
Pakistan since 1947, as a result of British policy at that time. Similarly, the bombers did 
not talk about Palestine, another long-standing unresolved issue that is also closely 
linked with British politics. The atrocities of 7/7 cannot be justified; whatever the 
17 
 
reasons for them, but some sections of the press are misrepresenting British Muslims 
(see Amel et al., 2007).  
This thesis recognises that both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph explanations of 
the 7/7 event consider the driving force behind the London bombings to have been 
mainly a religious ideology. This may be because the British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
took the view that the bombings occurred because of an “evil ideology”. On the other 
hand, the perpetrators’ possible associations with al-Qaeda suggest that it may have 
been a religiously motivated action because al-Qaeda and its associates often use 
religion as a pretext for their attacks. Besides, the coverage of 7/7 also suggests a 
fundamental difference in the interpretations of these newspapers with regard to their 
views on Britain’s foreign policy and its link with 7/7. Evidently, The Guardian 
described the incident as a reaction to British foreign policy and to an anti-Islamic 
campaign conducted by the British government. Despite these diverse views and 
regardless of whether it was a political or a religious act of terror, one thing is obvious: 
British Muslims are equally the victims of this attack. Clearly, the attackers did not 
differentiate between Muslims and non-Muslims but in fact attacked Edgware Road, 
which is predominantly an Arab Muslim neighbourhood. 
Indeed, the 7/7 and 21/7 incidents have gravely damaged British Muslims’ reputation 
and questioned their loyalty to British society. However, even before the London 
bombings, British Muslims were already struggling to overcome the stigma of being 
seen as ‘extremists’ and ‘fundamentalists’ because of the Iranian Revolution (1979) and 
the Rushdie affair (1989), which pushed them into marginalised spaces of the 
multicultural society and caused them to be viewed as ‘outsiders’ and ‘others’ (Sides 
and Gross, 2014, p.5; Downing and Husband, 2005; Karim, 2000, p.111). 
Despite all its difficulties and, to some extent, a bad press, Islam still flourishes in 
Britain, and Muslims have not experienced any bans on veils or minarets, unlike in 
neighbouring European countries. Moreover, the British media did not publish the 
infamous cartoons of the Prophet of Islam that first appeared in a Danish newspaper 
Jyllands-Posten on 30 September 2005. Notably, the European press had republished 
those controversial cartoons in solidarity with the Danish newspaper, suggesting that it 
was exercising its right to freedom. But despite all these positive signs, since the 7/7 
attacks a number of studies have shown that the demonising of Islam and British 
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Muslims has been a continuous phenomenon, particularly in the British media. This 
thesis will discuss and provide evidence of the emergence of the problem, the way it has 
developed, newspapers’ responses to and interpretations of the phenomenon, and the 
way it tends to broaden misunderstandings on both sides.    
1.2-Significance of this Thesis:  
Since 9/11 and 7/7, many texts have been written to discuss the fundamental problems, 
such as an increase in extremism and radicalisation among young Muslims (Greene, 
2013, p.167; Kundnani, ‎2015). Most of these studies begin with the notion that they 
(extremists/radicals) misinterpret sacred text (Juergensmeyer, 2003; Price, 2012; 
Stern, 2003 and 2015).  On the other hand, most press reports usually employ out-of-
context verses of the Quran to establish or prove links with extremism and radicalism 
among British Muslims. This thesis will primarily focus on the interpretations of 7/7 in 
two British broadsheets, The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph; however, it is also 
important to examine the development of misunderstandings that may contribute to 
misrepresentations of Muslims. An example of this is an article by Jason Burke in which 
he quotes two verses from the Quran: “There shall be no compulsion in religion” and 
“Slay the unbeliever ... wherever you find him” (The Guardian, 17 July 2005). 
Most sections of the press frequently use these two verses of the Quran out of context 
and half-finished to prove the assertion that Islam sanctions violence and terrorism. The 
fact of the matter is that the complete verse simply offers a different meaning: “since the 
revelation has through explanation, clarification, and repetition, clearly distinguished 
the path of guidance from the path of misguidance, it is now up to people to choose the 
one or the other path” (see Mir, 2008, p.54; Esposito, 2015, p.1069). This indicates the 
ignorance of most sections of the press and their reporters and how they often avoid 
incorporating theological concepts and frameworks of religious teachings.  
The Quran, like the Bible, is one of the most misunderstood sacred theological 
references in the contemporary period. Arguably, there is still a gap that needs to be 
filled in this field of study. Given the abundance of different Christian denominations, 
the Bible also has various interpretations. Similarly, the Quran has been interpreted 
differently by different Muslim and non-Muslim scholars, particularly in the 
contemporary period. Thus, the problem lies not in the sacred text but in the precise 
interpretation of its meaning. Therefore, one might say that there is still a gap in the 
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field of agreed interpretations of both the holy Quran and the Bible, which needs to be 
filled.  
On 7 July 2005, sound-bites, images, discussions, debates, and commentaries were 
channelled through television screens, whilst on-air talk shows on the radio and 
newspaper websites attempted to link ‘Islam’ and “Muslims” with acts of “terrorism”, all 
of which, in fact, resembled the media coverage of the tragic events of the New York and 
Madrid bombings. Most importantly, the schools, colleges, mosques, markets and streets 
of Leeds were associated with terror because the perpetrators had lived in these places.  
This thesis suggests that the suffix “ism” has become a synonym for Islam, which has 
become a serious matter. Similarly, words ending in “istan” denote the origin of 
radicalisation; for example, “Londonistan” during the 1990s and “Walthamstan” in the 
aftermath of the 7/7 attacks are suggestive of radicalisation. Moreover, this particular 
suffix deliberately refers to Afghanistan and Pakistan and the notion that radicalisation 
in Europe has its roots in Muslim countries. Of course, a tiny proportion of Muslims 
themselves provide Western media and politicians with a reason to discuss and debate 
their religion and place in secular societies.  
(i)-Original Contributions:  
The literature covering Islam and Muslims is extensive and well-established, covering a 
range of relevant discourses such as Orientalism (a mainly Western way of representing 
‘other’ or its perception of people in distant lands such as the Middle East), terrorism, 
religious ideology and jihad. This thesis examines one aspect of this literature, formal 
and informal terrorism, and investigates it within the context of the London bombings 
of 7/7 in 2005. 
Apart from the formal literature available on Islam and Muslims, there are also rich 
sources of alternative references and publications on social networking sites and 
platforms. In addition, leading sources and popular discourses were essential parts of 
the literature-searching process, as manifested in the literature review and other 
sections of this thesis.  
Within this broad discourse, this thesis examines the 7/7 event, which is associated 
with British Muslims in general and Islam in particular. Hence, in view of inevitable time 
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constraints it has not been possible to review every single theoretical piece written in 
discourses of Orientalism and terrorism.  
Admittedly, overall the 7/7 topic has been discussed in books and articles but there has 
been little or no attempt to assess press reaction at the time. Moreover, the discourse of 
terrorism related to the topic has not yet moved into informal publications such as 
newspapers and social networking sites. In turn, within the reviewed literature there is 
little on this topic with a special focus on the relationship between British Muslims and 
terrorism (the 7/7 incident) that examined the views expressed in broadsheet 
newspapers. Yet, it is also important to note that there was emerging discourse on 
terrorism is evident in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph in the immediate wake of 
the 7/7 bombings. The terrorism discourse in the newspapers is informal because it 
largely consists of contributions by non-specialists on Islam and the associated 
phenomenon of terrorism.  
This thesis also includes a proportional breakdown of articles examined within a 
specified period (8 July 2005-7 July 2007) to examine the themes of terrorism. The 
method of analysis in this thesis (inductive reasoning which is essentially an analysis 
based upon an examination of the evidence drawn from data) has emerged out of the 
discussions and debates of newspapers. Therefore, while this terrorism discourse may 
be well established in the formal field of study (academia), it is not obvious in the 
informal field of study (newspapers). This thesis seeks to remedy that omission and 
contributes to our existing knowledge.  
(ii)-Reliability and Validity:   
Most accounts of the 7/7 incident are personal narratives of the event (Debnam, 2007; 
North, 2007; Tulloch, 2006). There are considerable accounts of the 7/7 attacks in 
academic research (Ahmed, 2006; Black, 2005; Rai, 2006; Kollesrstrom, 2012). Yet, the 
British press’s depiction of the 7/7 event and the resulting focus on the representation 
of British Muslims is evidently limited (see Crockett, 2008; Dunning, 2014; Kabir, 2010). 
Keeping this gap in mind, this thesis has adopted a different method of inquiry, using 
inductive thematic analysis of two broadsheets, The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph 
(8 July 2005-7 July 2007). The aim is to focus on the representation of British Muslims 
resulting from the 7/7 event but mainly from these newspapers’ perspectives in their 
interpretation and presentation of the event. More specifically, the coding scheme, 
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which is applied to a total of 274 articles including editorials, features, comments and 
news reports, represents the strength of the data. Thus the timeframe, approach and 
unique set of combined newspapers dictate the key themes in the dataset.  
A number of aspects of this thesis make it valid and reliable, including the way in which 
the data was collected, analysed and presented, the uniqueness of its time period, the 
rationale for the selection of newspapers and the justification of the applied 
methodology. Considering the technical difficulties of the initial data collection 
procedure, such as the authenticity and accuracy of collected items and repetitive 
occurrences of articles in the same data, this thesis used three search engines - Lexis-
Nexis, ProQuest and micro-film records. Each type of journalism, be it an editorial or a 
comment piece, is tested for its accuracy. To achieve this also integrated the 
broadsheets’ websites and double-checked that each article collected matched the 
original text in that newspaper. Hence, it traced a few examples of news items that were 
published twice in the same newspaper using different headlines. It is also assumed that 
this is a procedure that can be repeated by others. Further, it anticipates that other 
researchers may be able to use the same procedure for similar work. Therefore, the 
above-mentioned fundamentals make this thesis research process reliable, as can be 
seen in more detail in the methods chapter.  
(iii)-The Initial Idea:   
This thesis project is an extension of my research MA dissertation in International 
Journalism, which focused on British Muslims in Bradford and Leeds in the aftermath of 
the London bombings. Using in-depth interviews with first- and second-generation 
British Muslims (South Asian Muslims), I examined the impacts of the bombings on the 
lives of these British Muslims. Thus, my MA dissertation allowed me to probe the 
sentiments of British Muslims and views on the bombings and, in particular, to record 
the difference in attitudes of two generations of Muslims on the same issue (7/7).  
This project gave me the opportunity to become involved in the local Leeds branch of 
the National Union of Journalists. There, I met Michelle Stanistreet, elected vice-
president of the NUJ, who visited the Leeds branch as part of her ‘thank you’ tour of 
England and Wales in 2006. While talking about the role of the British press in peace 
and war and, in particular, its influence in multicultural Britain, she provided me with a 
copy of a page called Daily Fatwa (which was purposely designed for publication by the 
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Daily Star). Stanistreet, along with her colleagues, stopped it before the original copy 
could be sent to the printing press (please see the attached copy under heading 1.7- The 
Polemic Media of this chapter). I learned that, on the one hand, there is considerable 
criticism of the British press for its failure to deal with the issues of ethnic minority 
portrayals but, on other hand its members are devoted to quality journalism.   
1.3-Initiating the Debate:   
This thesis mainly offers a narrative of three “M’s”: Media (the British press), Muslims 
(British Muslims including European Muslims), and the Middle East (a region where 
Orientalism studies originate and the centre of present political activities). These are 
significant components of an equation that is interlinked and hence it provides an 
understanding of the representation of British Muslims in the British media. Nadia Abu 
El-Haj (2013) writes that the American “political present has become ever more 
fundamentally entangled with ‘radical Islam’ and the ‘war on it’, the Middle East having 
emerged as its most central locale” (Abu El-Haj, 2013, p.75). Britain and America have 
played a part in the destabilising of the Middle East and large parts of the Muslim world, 
thus bringing these three ‘Ms’ into play.  
Lockman (2004) states that, after the Second World War, American academics and 
officials became involved in studying foreign policy issues, especially the Middle East, 
because of its massive resources and strategic importance (Lockman, 2004, p.121). 
Although this thesis examines the 7/7 event reporting in two newspapers, The Guardian 
and The Daily Telegraph, it occasionally also incorporates current and relevant 
illustrations of the representations of British Muslims to comprehend different 
interpretations of the press.    
As a starting point, it considers a few common assumptions. Some sections of the British 
media often misrepresent Islam and Muslims by assuming that British Islamists want to 
impose Sharia Law and destroy Britain’s secular values. It is also assumed that young 
British Muslims are more inclined to radicalisation and extremism compared to other 
faith groups in British society, and that in recent years a few young British Muslims 
have joined Jihadists abroad, particularly in the Middle East. Of course there is no 
denying these problems within Muslim communities but this whole issue seems to be a 
matter of coincidence since the media report events that are current occurrences.  
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Nevertheless, evidence shows that the media often consider some events more 
newsworthy than others even though they may have similar significance; for example, 
the 11th of September 2001 attacks received worldwide media attention compared to 
the 9 September 1973 incident when jets attacked Chile’s presidential palace, or even 
everyday terrorist attacks in the Middle East and elsewhere. Of course, beheading is 
barbaric; it has long been practised in Europe and is now a visible act by so-called 
Islamic militants such as ISIS. Throughout the last decade, the British media have 
focused on the beheadings of Western journalists or people who were ‘worthy victims’ 
but they covered up a number of beheadings in other countries including Saudi Arabia, 
where Britain safeguards its economic interests (The Guardian, 31 August 2014). It is 
fair to say that the British press has said very little about the economic and political 
interests of Britain and the USA. 
This scenario illustrates the words of British journalist Alfred Harmsworth: “When a 
dog bites a man that is not news, because it happens so often. But if a man bites a dog, 
that is news” (Ivancheva, 2011). Some commentators view this dictum as referring to an 
unusual and infrequent event that becomes newsworthy. Often British cities that have 
sizeable Muslim populations such as Birmingham, Rotherham, Leeds and Bradford have 
been given inappropriate labels. A few examples of such labels include: “failing schools”; 
“Sharia Bradfordistan”; “Londonistan” and “Totally Muslim City” (see Boyd, 2015; 
Leiken, 2012; Shrama, 2006; The Guardian, 1 December 2015 and 11 January 2015). 
There are of course reasons for this, such as the London bombers’ origins in Yorkshire 
towns and cities such as Leeds and Dewsbury.  
These cities have been associated with social disturbances, social ghettos, the Rushdie 
Affair, violence, grooming, forced marriages, child sex abuse, benefit frauds and social 
housing problems even though similar sorts of problems also exist in other British cities 
such as Doncaster and inner city boroughs such as Southall in London. An example of 
the misrepresentation of Bradford would be the title of a recent British TV Channel 4 
documentary “Make Bradford British” (2012). This seems to imply that Bradford is not 
British when it is clearly British. 
Such portrayals began with an infamous ITV comedy series Mind Your Language, which 
presented a Muslim character, Ali Nadeem from Lahore, initially as a benefit cheat and 
as intolerant of his fellow student Ranjeet Singh who initially refuses to sit next to him 
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because Ranjeet is Sikh. The next scene shows them being hostile to each other on the 
basis of their religious beliefs. Ali labels him ‘infidel’ and Ranjeet threatens him in turn 
with a Kirpan (knife), saying “I will disrespect your holy messenger (Prophet 
Muhammad, P.B.U.H) with this (knife)”, at which point Mr. Brown (the teacher) jumps in 
and asks Ranjeet how he feels about Roman Catholics? He replies, “Oh! I treat them like 
my brothers” and then he turns around whilst looking at Ali and says, “You are here to 
learn English, not to start a holy war” (ITV, 1977). This trend still continues in films, 
documentaries, dramas, sitcoms and media, such as Yasmeen (2004), Citizen Khan 
(2012), and Four Lions (2010), which show Muslims as a problem.  
Unfortunately, to an extent, this unpopular trend still continues because disrespecting 
Muslims' prophet (P.B.U.H) is not covered by blasphemy laws in many western 
countries in the same way they cover Jews and Sikhs. Notably, Britain has demolished 
its ancient laws of blasphemy whilst the Irish constitution prohibits on insulting religion 
(see The Daily Telegraph, 10 May 2008; The Guardian, 11 April 2016).  
Nicolas Walter (1990) acknowledges that blasphemy is a fundamental part of 
Christianity as well as Judaism because of the “very nature” of these religions (Walter, 
1990, p.10). Walter writes that the Jewish God is considered so scared that “it was 
blasphemous not only to deny his uniqueness or insult his nature but even to say or 
write his name (Yahweh or Jehovah)” (Walter, 1990, p.10). According to Joss Marsh 
(1998), the term ‘blasphemy’ cannot be explained by a single theory because it is a 
multidimensional concept that has different meanings in different contexts and cultures 
(Marsh, 1998, p.7). In brief, Marsh states that “Blasphemy is the speaking of the 
unspeakable” (Marsh, 1998, p.7). 
During different periods of the history of England blasphemy was seen as a crime and 
serious offence declared in the state laws. A few examples include the ‘Act of 1414’, the 
‘Act of 1515’, the ‘Blasphemy Act of 1698’, and ‘The Mosaic law’ that forbid “showing 
disrespect for God, doubting his powers, even disobeying his commandments” (Nash, 
1999, p.21-26). Further, England has prosecuted several writers and journalists for 
blasphemy such as Nicolas Atwood (1617), John Taylor (1676), Thomas Emlyn (1703) 
and Peter Annet 1763) (Walter, 1990, p.29-34). Other writers such as David Nash 
(1999) also provide accounts of those writers, poets and other individuals who faced 
trials under the blasphemy laws in England (Nash, 1999, p.167-191). However, in the 
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more open and secular society that Britain has now become, such punishments no 
longer exist.  
In modern Britain, The Rushdie Affair (1989) is a significant example of disrespect for 
Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) which caused disturbing protests across Britain and 
abroad. This incident also inspired contemporary scholars to discuss the very nature of 
blasphemy laws in modern Britain. Some British scholars demanded the renewal of 
blasphemy laws to protect British Muslims, For example, Richard Webster (1990) 
suggests that “Islam is now in danger of becoming the most important of all the West’s 
modern apocalyptic enemies” because of the fall of the “evil empire of the Soviet Union” 
(Webster, 1990, p.148). Webster sees the Rushdie Affair as a test example of anti-Islam 
feelings and thinks that because of this incident “thousands of British Muslims will 
continue to live under the shadow of an ancient religious hatred” (Webster, 1990, 
p.148). Andrew Anthony brands the incident a “Cultural War” (The Observer, 11 January 
2009). Since then, the British city of Bradford has received several labels and the word 
“Fatwa” has become a synonym for outdated theology. 
The incident, known as the Rushdie Affair (1989), opened a Pandora’s Box of questions 
about British Muslims and their cultural and religious identity. Perhaps an editorial in 
The Observer best described British Muslims’ situation: “The Rushdie affair became a 
rallying cause for Muslim consciousness. It was the point at which British Muslims 
became politicised and hitched their faith to a violent star.” (The Observer, 28 May 2006) 
Subsequently, the key debate appears to have revolved around modernity and Islam, 
particularly the perception that Islam does not allow freedom of expression or endorse 
democracy. In debates on Islam and Muslims, the media along with the polity too often 
miss the notions of freedom and liberty.  
Also, to an extent, both the press and politicians fail to differentiate between 
questioning matters of interest and disrespecting sacred texts when discussing Islam 
and its teachings. Other popular debates have centred on the veil (2006) and Sharia 
(2008) and currently these are reforming Muslims, their identity and place in secular 
Europe, radicalisation and extremism (Bryan, 2014; Jackson, 2009; Ramadan, 2008). 
Mostly, the media reporting is based on information from various sources, including 
politicians, clergy and government officials, and such debates have an impact on the 
overall representation of Muslims. Clinton Bennett (2005) offers an account of current 
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debates, starting with some important questions: Can democracy flourish in Muslim 
society? Are Islam and the West on a collision course? In many ways these disturbing 
questions seem crucial for an understanding of Islam and Muslims, their representation 
in the media and the conflict between West and the Rest (Muslim world).  
One of the reasons why British Muslims are the subject of problematic media portrayals 
is the fact that the media report events occurring in the Muslim world that involve social 
unrest, civil wars and other related issues. Thus, a picture of Muslims emerges in the 
media that suggests that the roots of social problems within Muslim societies are 
perhaps a result of their religion. It is argued that such an approach tends to overlook 
political aspects of the social issues. Moreover, the press reporting of social issues often 
seems to focus more on religion and is less inclined to discuss political and economic 
factors responsible for social ills among Muslim and non-Muslim societies. 
Given the political turmoil and social unrest in a few Muslim-dominated countries such 
as Libya, Syria and Somalia, where rebels, radicals and extremists often use religion as 
an excuse for their actions, the press reporting is sometimes arguably less investigative 
and more dependent on official sources to highlight the problematic image of some 
Muslims as violent extremists and rebels. However, it is evident that sections of the 
British press have revealed hypocritical standards in both their own government and 
Muslim countries’ governments. For example, The Guardian and a few other British 
newspapers have campaigned against US-led intrusions (in Vietnam and the Iraq to 
repel Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Muslim-populated Kuwait).  
In addition, sections of the British press also mentioned the toppling of a 
democratically-elected government of Mohammad Mosaddeq in Iran in 1953 in which 
the American and British governments had admitted their involvement (The Guardian, 
19 August 2013). On other hand, the British press also reported how Saudi Arabia and 
Iran intervene in the internal matters of other Muslim countries such as Egypt. Overall, 
however, it is evident that most media reporting often raises concerns about 
dictatorships and autocratic rule in Muslim countries but in comparison pays little 
attention to the role of Western governments.   
Besides, Said’s inquiry is based on case-studies such as the Iranian revolution (1979) 
and media representation of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Party in which the 
media provided one-sided information under “Us” and “Them” and “Ours” and “Theirs” 
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labels; this is the central focus of Said’s previous studies on Muslims.  Although Said 
wrote his book more than three decades ago, it seems highly relevant today and also 
suggests that little has changed in the media mindset, which has always represented the 
Muslim Brotherhood as a problematic party, even though it won through fair elections; 
it was denounced as a terrorist organisation by the military leadership in 2014. As Said 
concludes, “the canonical, orthodox coverage of Islam… in the academy, in the 
government, and in the media is all interrelated and has been more diffused, has seemed 
more persuasive and influential, in the West than any other “coverage” or 
interpretation” (Said, 1979, p.161).   
Undeniably, Britain has experienced a sequence of terror incidents following the 7/7 
attacks including the failed 21/7 terror plot, the failed bombing attempt at Glasgow 
Airport (2007), and Lee Rigby’s brutal murder in 2013. Moreover, according to The 
Guardian report, which was published on 7 July 2015, on the occasion of the tenth 
anniversary of the London bombings, a senior British counter-terrorism police officer 
revealed that fifty deadly terror plots of “different scales and sizes” have been stopped 
that involved young British Muslims. Worryingly, in these years several British-born 
and converted Muslims have joined Jihadists abroad. These events have provided the 
British media with the opportunity to discuss and debate security issues significant for 
British people’s safety. To be fair, it is the media’s responsibility to raise concerns on 
security and other issues essential to maintaining harmony within society.   
Yet, as well as this necessary role played by the British media, their purpose should also 
be to reflect on a number of other questions of our times. Why have young British 
Muslims become so angry in contemporary Britain? What makes them different from 
their parents’ generation? Why have a few Muslim converts become radicalised? Are 
these issues the product of religious events? Or is it the political, socio-economic 
structure that turns young people towards radicalisation? Has Britain’s relationship 
with Muslims changed? And, finally, what is the role of the media in the current 
circumstances and what should it be?  
These fundamental questions are the essence of a fair debate on British Muslims and 
their representation in the British media. Notably, there are several key factors that play 
a significant role in the manufacturing of news, such as socio-economic factors, business 
and political interests of news organisations, and governments and political parties’ 
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influence.  Another important point is that there is more reporting of events and less 
journalism, which limits the ability of the press to produce a more balanced view of any 
particular event. 
This thesis reflects upon the narrative of the 7/7 event and the resulting 
representations of British Muslims in two of the main British broadsheet newspapers, 
The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, over a period of two years (8 July 2005 - 7 July 
2007). In subsequent sections, it will explain how these newspapers interpreted the 
event, why they constructed issues such as terrorism and radicalisation among young 
British Muslims in a particular manner, and how they arrived at specific views of 7/7 
and British Muslims.      
1.4-British Press Power and its Impact on Society:   
Being the oldest and most advanced press organisation in the world, the role, power, 
and impact of the British press is widely discussed and debated in media studies (Fyfe, 
1949; Conboy, 2010; Temple, 2008). On its first day of publication on 6 July 1828, The 
Spectator wrote, “The principal object of a newspaper is to convey intelligence” (cited in 
Harris, 1946, p.3). Hence, the current debate is about how the press uses its leverage in 
transforming a multicultural society. Roy Greenslade wrote in The Guardian, on 14 
December 2010, that “The power of the British press is not an illusion, and it is 
obviously not a thing of the past”. 
Marshall McLuhan’s famous phrase ‘The Medium is the Message’ (1964) suggests the 
importance of the medium through which a message travels to the receiver. In other 
words, it acknowledges the significance of a medium in producing an influential 
message. It is also congruent with the slogan of the French weekly pictorial magazine 
Paris Match: the weight of words, the shock of photos that indicate how words and photos 
shape and channel a message. Tuchman (1978) wrote that the “news is a window on the 
World” and a ‘frame’ that helped Americans not only to know themselves and others in 
distant lands but to understand lifestyles, institutional systems, and peoples (Tuchman, 
1978, p.1). 
Long before the invention of digital means of communication the traditional press was a 
popular and powerful tool of manipulation. Walter Lippmann (1921) refers to news 
media as the “Manufacturing of Consent”, a notion later endorsed and revised by Noam 
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Chomsky who considers it an “Engineering of Consent” (cited in Barsamian, 1992, p.5). 
George Orwell (in his novel 1984) states that it is “Thought Control”, and to Chomsky 
“media are corporations that have a market: other businesses that advertise through 
media. The media are selling their advertisers a product, namely readers and 
audiences.” (sic) (Barsamian, 1992, p.1) 
Drawing on several media studies his viewpoint is factual as in both peacetime and 
wartime the media’s role has been recognised. Along with the British broadsheets, 
which represent serious and quality journalism, some tabloids also claim their influence 
on British society, such as the famous headline in The Sun: “It’s the Sun Wot Won It” 
(The Sun, 11 April 1992). In the current era, Charlotte Crockett (2008) provides two 
examples of the media’s influence in instigating civil war in Yugoslavia and genocide in 
Rwanda. During the former, Slobodan Milošević used television to propagate his 
nationalist campaign whilst, during the latter, Radio Milles Collines was used to spread 
hatred in Rwanda (Crockett, 2008, p.6). 
Correspondingly, sections of the British media misled the public about the Iraq War, 
which was fought in response to a presumed threat of weapons of mass destruction that 
in reality was fictitious. They were reporting on statements made in Parliament at the 
time and have since been very bitter at being misled. Intellectuals have various opinions 
on the media’s role in the Iraq War as the media were surely reporting the statements of 
the US President and the British Prime Minister. Some therefore feel that it was the 
latter two, rather than the media, who were doing the deceiving. Of course, these 
examples do not discredit the media’s constructive role; for example, they provided 
successful opposition in the case of the Vietnam War. 
Despite this leverage, some of the British press coverage of British Muslims in the post-
7/7 period has raised further concerns about their identity and place in British society.  
Several scholars also point out that the magnification of events in the media reporting 
suggests that “Muslims” are presented as “New Folk Devils”, like the Jews and the Irish 
in earlier times, and their beliefs and cultural norms are associated with modern-day 
“Moral Panics”  (Archer, 2009; Shain, 2011; Sian, 2012). Current examples of such 
panics include linking the veil with security and oppression and associating mosques 
with the spreading ideology of radicalisation which in turn abruptly constructs a 
negative image of British Muslims. Evidence also shows that the media are not alone in 
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shaping people’s opinions of certain political and social issues; in fact, this is also 
achieved by a nexus of corporate power comprising five “P’s”: politicians, pressure 
groups, peers, press and police (see Ost, 2002; Chas, 2006, p.75).  
1.5-Problem and Reaction:   
What happened on 7 July 2005 was appalling and indeed condemnable by every religion 
and civilised society. Worryingly, the subsequent reaction to an extent put the whole 
Muslim community under surveillance, new terrors laws were introduced, police stop-
and-search procedures increased and calls for detention without charge became louder 
in a country that prides itself on human rights and individual liberties (HMIC, 2013; 
Gies, 2014;  The Daily Telegraph, 2014). Despite some of these unpleasant laws, it is fair 
to say that, had a Christian group been responsible for a spate of bombings in a Muslim 
state, that group would probably have been targeted in a similar manner. However, 
given the British ‘tolerance’ and press coverage of past acts of terrorism, the reaction to 
7/7 was slightly unusual (see Barnett and Reynolds, 2009). Because of the pluralistic 
nature of British society, sections of the press have different views on different issues; 
hence, not all broadsheet newspapers are the same.  
Consequently, the distrust of Muslims among the British pubic has become a matter of 
concern. Relevantly, a BBC survey published on 25 September 2013 found that a 
quarter of young British people ‘don’t trust Muslims’. This is more worrying because 
these young people are growing up with negative perceptions of their fellow British 
Muslims. Moreover, ‘Stop and Search’ is seen as a discriminatory practice among many 
young Muslims although they have been recorded as cooperative with the police 
(Wilson, 2002; Field, 2011).   
The then British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, said, ‘The rules of the game have changed’, 
and latterly the British government has introduced several measures and new laws to 
deal with the threat of home-grown terrorism including, as Phillips Lewis (2007) notes, 
“introducing wide ranging discretionary powers to deport non-nationals believed to be 
promoting or glorifying terrorism” (Phillips, 2007, p.6). The threat of home-grown 
extremism existed long before the events of 7/7. After the Rushdie Affair, for example, 
the British parliament passed several acts to deal with anticipated problems: Terrorism 
Act (2000); Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (2001); Prevention of Terrorism Act 
(2005); Terrorism Act (2006); and Counter Terrorism Bill (2008).  
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Nevertheless, from an intellectual point of view, one might wonder why the ‘rules of the 
game have changed’: is it because of the actions of a few Muslims? Undeniably, Britain 
did not experience terror, violence and extremism for the first time on 7/7; in fact, it has 
a long history of shootings, killings, bomb blasts, violence and terror. These events 
include the following: The Hungerford massacre, 19 August 1987; The Dunblane School 
Massacre, 13 March 1996; The Cumbria shootings, 2 June 2010; The Angry Brigade 
bomb attacks during the 1970s; and the IRA terrorists’ activities. All of these resulted in 
the imposition of restrictions.  
Despite these examples, Cole and Cole (2009) and Philips (2012) believe that the 
growing radicalisation and extremism among British Muslims is a consequence of 
‘Islam’ and has less to do with British society or Britain’s foreign policy; other scholars, 
such as Curtis (2012), Rees (2006) and Rogers (2008) reject this thesis. Recently, 
Teresa May and David Cameron have vowed to make more changes to the legal and 
judicial systems to deal with “Jihadists” and are assuming that this problem will last for 
generations (The Daily Telegraph, 14 September 2014). This echoes George Bush’s 
allusion to “Crusades”, referring to the eleventh-century conflict between Christianity 
and Islam that lasted over 100 years. Since the start of the War on Terror, Muslim lands 
have faced continuing political unrest and chaos. 
In addition, radicalisation and extremism have increased from the threat of al-Qaeda to 
al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and now Isis and different new terrorist groups in Pakistan. In 
Britain, English and Black converts’ participation in the 7/7 attack, the failed Exeter 
bombing of 22 May 2008 and the London beheading of a non-combatant solider suggest 
that something is wrong within the political system. In John Pilger’s view, “Britain 
remains powerful but in a subsidiary role to the United States and the two act imperially 
to benefit their economic empires, Britain retaining its status as a world power” (Pilger, 
2003, p.5).  
This is probably true of many nations, including several Muslim nations. In the post-
colonial period, in an effort to retain its status as an influential power in the world, 
Britain has been directly and indirectly involved in supporting foreign operations and 
invasions, especially in Muslim lands. Indeed, every nation has set of priorities that 
often reflect a contradictory stance on issues such as human rights and liberties. 
Relevantly, for some scholars British government foreign policy, particularly in the 
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Middle East, is somewhat self-contradictory (Abbas, 2007; Rai, 2006; White, 2012). 
Opposing views suggest that the British government may see such actions as necessary 
to defend liberal values in an international conflict. Now, let us consider the case of 
Britain’s War on Iraq, which later turned out to be a misleading and violent act 
(according to Bruke, 2004, p.287-89; Gates, 2014; and Tumber and Palmer, 2006, p.139-
141).  
A series of books and research papers published on the representation of Islam and 
Muslims in the media before and after the 7/7 attack suggests that it is discriminatory 
and biased (Poole, 2002; Richardson, 2004; Petley and Richardson, 2011).  In the last 
decade several studies have raised questions over the recurring biased coverage of 
Islam and Muslims and the role of the media in turning certain events into Muslim 
problems such as the Norway bombing. Even before the occurrence of the 7/7 attack, 
Muslims did not have a particularly positive image in the British media. Ron Geaves 
(2010) offers a chronological record of Abdullah Quilliam’s life, achievements and 
services for the Queen of England. However, despite all these narratives, Quilliam, after 
opening his first mosque in 1895 in Liverpool, became the victim of ‘Islamophobic 
vandalism’ and the hostile crowd shouted slogans such as ‘down with Turks’, 
‘remember Armenia’, and ‘to hell with the Muhammadans’ (Geaves, 2010, p.65-66).  
Then came the 7/7 incident, as a result of which the image of Muslims received further 
negative portrayal in the media. Subsequently, the Veil issue in Britain (2006), the 
Sharia debate (2008), Phil Woolas’ in-breeding controversy (2008), Bishop Michael 
Nazir Ali’s “No-Go Area” remarks (2008), Jack Straw’s ‘easy meat’ (grooming) debate 
(2011), British universities being declared “hotbeds of Islamic extremism” (2011), the 
Woolwich murder of a British soldier (2013), and the Rotherham sexual abuse case 
(2014) are a few examples of Muslims’ constant derogatory portrayal in the press 
reporting. Of course, history shows that tragic events become the source of increased 
problems of social segregation, racial discrimination and interfaith relations.  
Winder (2005) notes that being an immigrant in another land is not simple: “People 
have seldom been treated according to their wishes, demands or merits. Furthermore 
fear, suspicion and animosity have always escorted mingling peoples who meet 
strangers” (Winder, 2005, p.18-19). His thoughts are similar to those of many other 
scholars such as Anderson (1991), Parekh (2000) and Solomos (2003) who believe that 
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ethnic minorities often become subject to racial discrimination, economic deprivation 
and institutional disparity.  
Notably, several other scholars support a similar notion in relation to ethnic minorities’ 
representation and place in a multi-ethnic society, such as Allen (2005), Cottle (2004) 
and Wykes (2001). Perhaps representation and cohesion are the two most important 
disciplines in which ethnic minorities are seen in the media and public sphere, 
particularly Muslims (Poole and Richardson, 2006; Modood, 2007). Logically, looking at 
these citations in the media, one might conclude that Muslims are contributors to the 
news stories in a way, since the London bombers and the Woolwich terrorists claimed 
to be Muslims. Poole’s (2002) investigation into the reporting of Islam in the post-9/11 
period reveals an important factor, which is the increasing use of problematic phrases 
such as “home-grown extremists”, “radical Muslims”, “Muslim rebels”, “Muslim and 
Islamic terrorists”, “The Islamic community” or similar labels suggesting that “any 
Muslim” could be “a potential terrorist” (Poole, 2002, p. 4-42).  
Apart from Poole’s work, around a dozen major analytical studies have traced similar 
impressions of Muslims in the British media (Said, 1997; Morey and Yaqin, 2010, 2012; 
Rane et al., 2014). Arguably, most of the British media’s reporting of Islam and Muslims 
is of a hostile nature; consequently, Muslims are widely seen as fundamentalists, 
extremists, troublemakers, backwards, incompatible, dangerous, security risks, others, 
outsiders, and violent. Poole and Richardson note: “Islam and the activities of certain 
Muslims are newsworthy subjects” (Poole and Richardson, 2006, p.1). Clearly, the 
media have a responsibility to report events and perpetrators fairly, but broadening 
them to include all Muslims is unfair.  
In addition, Omaar views this situation as a turning point in ‘Muslim’ reporting and 
assumes that the “Coverage of issues continues to focus on what divides us rather than 
what unites us” (Omaar, 2006, p.234). He gives the example of a middle-aged white 
woman’s remark following the Forest Gate incident in 2006 that ended in the shooting 
of an innocent Muslim.  She said, “I live on Lansdowne Road, not far from where the two 
young boys live. Now, the newspapers make out that I live in some sort of ghetto. I 
don’t!” (ibid, p.236)  
Based on recent studies in the same field it is obvious that the representation of 
Muslims in the media following 9/11 and 7/7 has become more biased and 
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inflammatory. Although this thesis inquires into British Muslims’ representation in 
broadsheets, it also finds it useful to illustrate an insight of British tabloids, which 
provides a glimpse of British Muslims’ portrayal in the British press. One of the debates 
on British Muslims concerns their growing population, which is seen as a threat.  
According to ‘PEW Research’, by the year 2030, it is estimated that the world’s total 
population will have reached around 8.3 billion and Muslims will constitute 26.4 per 
cent of the aggregate total (Pew Research, 2010). In Britain, the Muslim population is 
expected to rise from 2.9 million at present to 5.6 million in 2030. Several recent studies 
have discussed the growing size of the Muslim population (Lewis, 2002, p.14-15 and 
2007, p.18-19). 
Today, Islam is Britain’s second biggest religion with over 1,000,000 English Muslims 
who are actively involved in debating and shaping the future of Islam in Britain (Daily 
Mail, 5 January 2011; Kose, 2010). An investigative report based on Kevin Brice’s study 
published in The Economist on 29 September 2013 shows ‘that around 5,200 Britons 
turn to Islam every year, and that the total number of converts is about 100,000’. 
Various other sources also confirm these statistics (The BBC, 22 May, 2013; The 
Guardian, 11 October 2013). 
However, evidence shows that, among the British public, be they Muslims, Christians, 
Jews, Hindus and Sikhs, faith is constantly in a crisis situation. An ICM poll What World 
thinks of God (2004) conducted for the BBC found that Britain has become one of the 
most secular nations in the world (BBC, 26 February 2004). Among those embracing 
secularism are a few cases of British Muslims young children who are no longer being 
raised in the faith or reverts turning away from Islam (The Observer, 17 May 2015). 
Nevertheless, among these new converts are scholars and professionals who have 
begun to record their experiences and accounts of life, thus providing different 
narratives and reinterpretations of Islam. These narratives also discuss issues such as 
the veil and women’s status and place in Islam (Anway, 1996, p.145-196; Bushill and 
Matthews, 2008, p.127-171; Zebiri, 2008, p.250).  
This increase in the number of Muslims raises fears and worries among secular Western 
governments, giving way to widespread perceptions such as ‘Eurabia’, ‘Islamisation’,  or 
Muslims ‘taking over Britain and Europe’ (Bawer, 2006, p.171 and 2010, p.30-84; 
Caldwell, 2009, p.174;  Wilders, 2012). Evidently the growing use of the phrase ‘Eurabia’ 
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appears frequently in all media spheres but some studies dismiss this notion of fear and 
hostility on the basis of statistical analysis (De Vries, et al., 2006; Mishra, 2009; Moten, 
2012). 
In an article in The Guardian published on 11 February 2011, Esposito and Lalwani 
argue that this perception is a ‘product of hysteria’ since France will not become an 
“Islamic Republic” by 2048 nor will Germany be a “Muslim State” by 2050; in reality, 
“Commentators seem more focused on ringing false alarm bells than on presenting 
facts. The reality is that there is no takeover, but that there is a danger of intolerance 
that threatens the very fabric of British and European society”. 
Conjointly, Ramadan (2002) also dismisses the fabricated propagation that Islam is 
placing secular Europe at risk, claiming instead that “the practice of Islam, by its very 
nature, exemplifies the community’ (Ramadan, 2002, p.162). In sum, the discrimination 
against and hatred of Muslims has increased mainly because of the 7/7 attack and 
related events. Notably, several campaigning organisations such as “Hope Not Hate” and 
“Stop the War Coalition” have emerged to confront destructive thinking about Islam and 
Muslims.  
1.6- The Notion of Representation in the Context of British Muslims:  
According to several theorists such as Pitkin (1967) and Vieira and Runciman (2008), 
the concept of “representation” is comprehensive, multifaceted and intricate in both its 
meaning and application. Pitkin thinks it is elusive because “it may sometimes be one 
thing, sometimes the other,” and it can also be “used in various senses in different 
connections” (Pitkin, 1967, p.5). Moreover, Pitkin also considers it an “essentially 
modern concept mainly in the case of human beings” (ibid, p.5).  
These authors also recognise the wide-ranging presence of different forms of 
representations in various situations and levels. For instance, governments, individuals, 
and social and religious groups all have their representatives as ambassadors, lawyers, 
activists and clergymen who, to a certain extent, have a degree of responsibility as 
agents (Vieira and Runciman, 2008, p.68). 
Morey and Yaqin (2011) show that a notable characteristic of Muslims’ representation 
is the fact that it is grounded to a great extent in the much vaunted “clash of civilisation” 
thesis or “the Muslim World versus the West”, “Muslim Other”, “the West”, “Save the 
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Muslim women”, “Our civilisation under threat”, “Muslim issues”, “Threatening”, 
“Dangerous”, “Hostile”, and other notions which they term “structures of 
representation”, all of which have emerged with renewed force since 9/11.  
Both the media and Muslims, especially in their relationship, have become attention-
grabbing subjects for academic inquiry, suggesting that both receive criticism and 
sympathy, which generates a visible divide among scholars. Perhaps the media and 
Muslims will diverge in the near future. For example, the media may become more 
technologically advanced while, conversely, Muslims may turn out to be non-
newsworthy.  
This has happened in the past with almost every single community living in Britain, 
such as Jews, Scots, Irish, Caribbean people, Ghurkhas, Gypsies and, now, Muslims. At 
some point, every community has come under scrutiny and in other instances they have 
left space for others. Equally, Muslims, Jews, Christians, Sikhs, Hindus, and Buddhists 
are representatives of their religions just as journalists are representatives of their 
media organisations.  
This also implies that individuals or groups, be they religious, social, or political groups, 
do have a certain moral responsibility to their religion, government and society. The 
representation in the British media revolves around the power and status of those who 
appear in the news, as Gans illustrates: “News from Russia and China is considered 
almost entirely with those governments’ problems and failures…political unrest in 
communist countries is news, whereas similar kinds of unrest in other countries is not” 
(Gans, 2004, p.33). 
Mick (2008) suggests that, in Britain, newspapers often proclaim that they cater for the 
needs of the General public, Indeed, the Sun newspaper frequently uses words such as 
“us”, denoting itself and its readers, “who are represented as sharing the same 
preferences and opinion” (Mick, 2008, p.193). For critics such as Hargeaves and Thomas 
(2002, p.80), this assertion is factually untrue because they find that “much of the news 
is not relevant to me”, i.e. an ordinary citizen (cited in Mick, 2008, p.194). 
Factually, the history of the British press as reviewed by Mick reveals that a few 
powerful proprietors of the press have exercised incredible influence in the public 
sphere (ibid., p. 28). Several other media critics have similar opinions (Curran, 2002, 
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p.82; Marjoribanks, 2003, p.65; Potter, 2004, p.19). In addition, Gillian Doyle (2002) 
provides several references to acknowledge the assumption that media owners 
influence the news-making process. On the positive side she also provides the example 
of The Guardian, which is owned by the Scott Trust and is therefore relatively more 
independent in its editorial policies (Doyle, 2002, p.19). To an extent, the role of an 
editor in a newspaper remains significant and influential.  
Given the media representations of British Muslims at large, it is evident that British 
Muslims are often tagged with racial stereotypes, extremism, terrorism, and violence. 
One obvious reason is that those past and present-day perpetrators of horrible acts of 
terrorism were members of the British Muslim community. However despite this 
bonding, it is logically inaccurate to relate these to the entire British Muslim community. 
Of course, there can be no denying the problem of radicalisation among young British 
Muslims, some of whom have been involved in terrorism.  
But the point is that, in some cases, the media coverage exhibits duplicity in 
representing people of different or similar faiths for committing similar acts and crimes. 
For example, the IRA was all over the newspapers in the years of ‘The Troubles’, but 
there was a bias in the media coverage because the Catholic IRA, who murdered about 
3,000 people, received more attention than the Protestant paramilitaries who murdered 
about 3,500. Similarly, in some parts of the Muslim world such as Syria, acts committed 
by Shia and Sunnis are seen differently in some sections of the media. In brief, the IRA 
terrorists and “Islamist” terrorists’ profiles are generally exposed while acts of violence 
and terrorism by Christians, Jews and Hindus are given a lower profile; for example, the 
“Saffron terror” in August 2010 in India and a series of shooting incidents in America 
have been presented as different from the acts of Muslim suspects (see Kumar, 2012; 
Huffington Post 14 August 2014).     
1.7-The Polemic Media: A Few Illustrations of British Journalism.  
The British media are divided into three main categories that mirror their political 
orientations: left-wing, right-wing and the centre. However, a few writers, such as Janet 
Daley, believe that there is not much of a left-wing presence in the British media (The 
Daily Telegraph, 10 October 2015). Nevertheless, British media organisations also have 
unique business models; for example, The Guardian is run by the ‘Scott Trust’ and the 
BBC is funded by a licence fee rather than advertising, thus making these organisations 
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less dependent on other forms of financial support. Yet, evidence shows that even these 
models are not completely free of government influence. There are three important 
aspects of British media: firstly, they are polemic; secondly, they are constantly evolving 
in political, technological, economic, and sociological terms; and, thirdly, the British 
media’s attitudes to minority groups are not uniform (Van Dijk, 1991).  
After all, the media have clients such as institutions, governments, businesses and 
pressure groups and they also have end users in the shape of readers, viewers and 
audiences. It is therefore argued that, despite all these recorded in-discrepancies in 
media studies, it would be unfair to blame ‘the media’ for every problem around us 
because the alternative flow of information and radical thoughts is also channelled 
through and emerges from the same media, such as pictures and stories of torture and 
human rights abuses in Abu-Ghraib, Bagram Airfield and Guantanamo Bay.   
It is also appropriate to look back at the recent history of British media portrayals of 
various political and social groups to understand the media system. However, before 
making any concrete argument, it is also fair to acknowledge that the media themselves 
are polemic and express different attitudes to numerous issues and event. Evidence 
shows that Jews were presented and framed in the media in a similar way to present-
day Muslims. The established notions of Jews controlling money and business and 
influencing the media can be equated to Muslims bringing Sharia and conquering 
Europe, if not by force then by population, and their hatred of Jews and vice versa.  
Evidently, the history of Britain shows that not only the media but also politicians and 
even to an extent the government law enforcement agencies have collectively singled 
out, inflated and presented one particular group as problematic, be they Jews, Scots, 
Irish, Caribbean people, Gypsies, Ghurkhas, Tamils or Muslims (Campbell, 1995; Cottle, 
2000; Jones, 2012).  
Going back to the 1960s and 1970s, a number of studies have witnessed the ill-
treatment of Caribbean people and Tamils. Even before that, Irish and Scots had 
experienced a bad press that created hatred of these groups and identified them as 
“others”. Now, Romanians and Bulgarians are being presented in a similar way on the 
assumption that they are taking jobs and exploiting the British benefits system. Further 
extending this to the British themselves, it is well-documented in studies that the 
working class has always been demonised but then the working-class press (which is 
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geared towards working-class readers) has demonised aristocrats, bankers, and the 
like. 
The framing and portrayal of mods and rockers, hippies, gipsies, chavs, coalminers and 
even political groups on the right and left saw them presented as troublemakers, 
problematic, others and dangerous. None of these groups remains forever in the news 
as “bad guys”; for example, Jews are fairly represented nowadays. It is worth looking at 
the demonising of the working classes in Britain and their present relationship with 
Muslims.  
This state of affairs reflects that the ruling elites often identify a group within a society 
as “other”. They then frame and present such groups as security risks, disintegrated and 
sometimes as a threat to liberal values of society at large. In this way, governments 
often use such groups as an “enemy within” and a political means of controlling the 
public. Moreover, such groups might be used to reassure the public that their (the 
people’s) safety is being safeguarded by ‘Us’, the government. A classic example would 
be the ‘mods’ and ‘rockers’ during the mid-1960s and 1970s. Similarly, a trade union 
may be a threat because traditionally it has been aiming to take over the state and make 
it serve the interests of ordinary people (the working class).  
Given the British Muslims’ media portrayal, is it perhaps worth asking what purpose 
their portrayal serves for the state and its institutions. Is demonising a form of racism? 
Despite the negative representations of Islam and British Muslims that have been 
evident since the publication of an “iconic photograph” of Bradford Muslims in relation 
to The Satanic Verses, there are also signs of positive reporting of Muslims. Stephen 
Pritchard’s opinion column in The Observer published on 27 September 2015 suggests 
that, despite the broadsheets’ focus on war and violence-related stories overseas in 
relation to Islam, there is also evidence of some positive coverage of Muslim women’s 
veils (The Observer, 27 September, 2015).  
Pritchard’s analysis shows that the key argument suggesting “oppression of women” 
has shifted “to difficulties surrounding communication with the veil wearer” (ibid). 
Another illustration is The Guardian’s coverage of the Iraq War and its criticism of 
British foreign policy which it argues is associated with the London Bombings. In this 
way, The Guardian in fact supported British Muslims’ longstanding complaint that the 
British government’s involvement in Iraq and other Muslim countries is fuelling 
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discomfort among British Muslims. In a series of editorials, news articles, comment 
pieces and cartoons, The Guardian has maintained its stance that the British 
government’s foreign policy is damaging and a cause of alienation among young British 
Muslims. In the following cartoon, Steve Bell sketches the British involvement in the 
Iraq War which has had a damaging impact on both Muslim and non-Muslim British 
citizens and also on the “counter terrorism campaign”.  
 
Image 1: In this image, cartoonist Steve Bell was raising concerns over British 
government involvement in the Iraq War and its link with the London bombings (The 
Guardian, 19 July 2005). 
Moreover, on Friday 4 March 2011, The Guardian reported that Daily Star reporter 
Richard Peppiatt had resigned over the paper’s fabrication of stories relating to 
Muslims. At the peak of the veil debate, after it was banned in France, thus putting the 
Muslim faith under scrutiny, the London Evening Standard published an article on 11 
December 2012 suggesting that it is not something that worries ordinary British people. 
Likewise, in the 2011 UK riots, three young Muslims were racially murdered; at this 
point, a Muslim father, Tariq Jahan, urged people to forgive the racist murderers of his 
son and strengthen community cohesion. Jahan received positive press coverage 
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overall, even in the tabloids, which called him the ‘riot Hero’. Later, however, he was 
sentenced to 12 months in jail after being found guilty of causing a road accident. The 
relevance of these illustrations shows that the media reporting mainly depends on 
circumstances, the roles of people as actors, and their importance and place in society; 
thus, it might be impartial, accurate or unfair.  
 
Image 2: An Unpublished copy of (The Daily Star 18 October 2006), courtesy Michelle 
Strainstreet, general secretary National Union of Journalist UK.  
Now, on the negative side, an illustration of unethical and irresponsible tabloid 
journalism is visible in above unpublished copy of The Daily Star that showed its anti-
Muslim mindset that has increased particularly since 7/7. The paper designed a 
scurrilous front page on 18 October 2006, bearing the main headline the ‘Daily Fatwa: 
How Britain’s fave newspaper would look under Muslim rule’ while beneath readers 
were asked ‘Do you prefer your usual Daily Star?’ (Call Yes: 09010311521- No: 
09010311522).  
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The newspaper included a picture of a covered woman on the left-hand side with the 
caption ‘Page 3 Burka Babes Picture Special’ and the word CENSORED in bold while on 
the right-hand side was a box entitled Inside Today carrying announcements such as No 
News, No Pic, No Fun, No Goss, No Sport, No Nothing. All of this suggested that Islam 
disapproves of any sort of entertainment and that it would ban all these activities.  
Further to the right in the middle of the newspaper’s front page under the main 
headline was a picture of the Muslim cleric Abu Hamza with the caption ‘WIN Hooks just 
like Hamza’s’. Next to it, another box carrying a picture of Osama bin Laden and a 
heading ‘Free Beard For Every Bomber’ adjoined a third box ‘Burn a flag & WIN a Corsa’. 
Another heading was ‘Sharia Law…You can’t live with it, but you can live without it’. 
This front page underlines two important aspects of the tabloids’ coverage of Islam and 
Muslims. First, it speaks for all tabloids that consider Sharia, Burkha, Fatwa, and other 
related material comical but do not employ a scholarly manner to debate these issues 
that they view as problematic. Some may argue that this is the style of tabloid 
journalism which focuses on ‘S’ stories including Sex, Scandals, Sports, Soap and Scoops.  
In the same way, Frederick James writes, “… Sex outside marriage carries a penalty of 
stoning to death or flogging...some extremists want the world to be turned into a single 
Islamic state. Some of those radicals are living in tolerant Britain” (The Daily Star, 2006). 
Here James misses a fundamental point that sex outside marriage is considered an 
undesirable and sinful act not only in Islam but also in almost all other religions. 
However, in secular societies such as Britain such trends are probably fairly common 
practice in the eyes of most tabloids, mid-market, free and a few broadsheet 
newspapers. Others point out that the Christian and Muslim religions may dislike it but 
it is not against the law and is apparently common practice. Most people in Britain do 
not think it sinful in the way that they thought it was, say, 50 years ago. In addition, 
recent estimates suggest that a majority of sexual relationships in Britain now take 
place outside marriage (The Observer, 28 September 2014).  
The above illustration is indicative of a widespread idea that tabloids usually spread 
sensationalism and cause discomfort and distortion among members of society who 
sometimes becomes visible in their stories. This impression of tabloids may not be 
surprising because this is what a tabloid press is about; i.e. a less serious form of 
journalism. Despite these thoughts, a notable point here is that The Daily Star has been 
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stopped by British journalists who have themselves sent a message that a ‘blanket 
approach’ to describe everyone in British journalism is unfair and unwise. These tabloid 
newspapers declined to offer any apology for misrepresenting the issues in relation to 
Islam. For instance, in the above illustration the portrayal of a beard-man and Burkha 
women misinform the ordinary reader about these concepts. Hence, all this suggests 
that the recurring irresponsible reporting is a serious issue. However, at the same time, 
the role of Daily Star journalists also shows that, while the newspaper tried to cause 
controversy, it was white non-Muslim journalists who stopped it.  
1.8-The British Press Representation of British Muslims before 7/7:  
For several scholars and media critics the British press representations of British 
Muslims have been problematic over the last three decades. Indeed, one of the key 
reasons for Muslims’ problematic press image is the lack of understanding of their faith 
and culture. Rageh Omaar (2006) argues that “The image that you have been given of us 
British Muslims is only half of us” (Rageh Omaar, 2006, p.19). Prior to the occurrence of 
the 7/7 incident, the media representations of British Muslims were evidently 
problematic even though they were not seen as a serious threat to internal security. The 
recorded history of Britain shows that after, World Wars I and II, a considerable number 
of migrants came to the UK from former British colonies in Africa and Asia. Some of 
these came to fight for Britain and later decided to stay behind whilst others were 
economic workers who were brought to rebuild the war-torn cotton industry and 
others, particularly in the North of England. Hence, Britain became a destination for 
people of different backgrounds, nationalities and religions.  
During the 1960s, migrant populations continued to increase, a trend that caused some 
panic and led to race riots including the Notting Hill race riots (1958), the Dewsbury 
riots (1989), the Bradford riots (2001), the Chapeltown riots in Leeds (1981, 1987 and 
2001), the  Oldham riots in 2001, and the Birmingham riots in 2005. The riots occurred 
for a wide range of reasons including poverty, unequal opportunities and racial tensions 
among various communities, including Caribbean and Asian ones. It is evident that 
during the 1950s and 1960s “Muslims and other ‘immigrants’ were described as ‘aliens’ 
suggesting ‘otherness’ that is based on difference such as ‘colour, accent and general 
demeanour of ‘immigrants’”; this became ‘the source of fear expressed so vividly’ in 
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Enoch Powell’s controversial ‘rivers of blood’ speech in 1968 (Sardar and Ahmad, 2012, 
p.2).  
For these authors, the ‘call for assimilation’ thus “gave way to integration in the 1970s, 
which in turn was replaced by multicultural pluralism in the 1980s, leading to the 
celebration of difference and diversity  under New Labour in the 1990s” (ibid., p.12). 
They conclude that “Muslims are generally seen as law abiding, docile folks”, during the 
1950s and 1960s, and “it was their colour and ethnicity that were a problem” (ibid). 
These scholarly references demonstrate that, overall, British Muslims were seen as 
positive contributors in the making of a post-war society.  
Obviously, with the passage of time, British society began to adopt and absorb social 
and cultural changes that made it more of a modern secular society. At this stage, many 
people in the host community began to see religion as a problematic and somewhat old-
fashioned phenomenon that contradicted their modern thinking. Jorgen S. Nielsen 
(2004) notes that, in the 1970s, immigrants’ origins, their religion and its place in 
secular Europe appear in various writings (Nielsen, 2004, p. vii). Later, “the second half 
of the 1980s has, in consequence, seen a substantial increase in the number of 
publications dealing specially with the aspect of the Muslim presence in Western 
Europe” (ibid., p. viii).  
This may have been a concern due to a series of terrorist and violent incidents involving 
Muslims that occurred during 1980s and 1990s. The media reported these events in 
which coincidently a few Muslims were acting badly. Apart from the media, such 
discussion of Muslims also appeared in the literature. According to Gillat-Ray (2010, p. 
xiii), Muslims were referred to as ‘Potential Violent Extremists” but all this happened 
because those involved in the taking of American hostages in 1980 in Lebanon, the 
hijacking of a TWA flight in 1985, the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 in 1988 over 
Lockerbie, Scotland, and a bomb attack in Lebanon in 1983 that killed 240 US Marines 
were Muslim (ibid).  
In addition, since 1979, the taking of American hostages by Iranian students in the US 
Embassy in Tehran and eleven other incidents of extremism against American and 
Western governments have been carried out by extremists claiming to be Muslims (PBS, 
2014). These unfortunate incidents associated Muslims in general with violent acts. As a 
result of the reporting of terrorist and violent extremist incidents, Muslims in different 
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parts of the world became the subject of academic inquiry. There are two obvious 
reasons for the Muslims’ bad press and their relationship with horrific incidents. Firstly, 
those perpetrators used Islam as an excuse for their acts and, secondly, some 
opportunists in the media and politics suggested that Islam teaches violence.   
This situation then became a prime reason for a substantial increase in writings on 
Islam.  Nielsen notes that the mentioning of Muslims increased massively during the 
1990s (Nielsen, 2004, p. xi). Similarly, in his lecture “Media and Islam War or Peace” 
(2012), Zakir Naik discloses that the Plain Truth magazine article, which was published 
in February 1984, in its 50th anniversary issue, has taken quotes from the “World 
Almanac and Book of Facts 1935, and the Reader’s Digest Almanac and Year Book 
1983”, finding that during the period 1934-1984 the mentioning of Islam increased by 
235 per cent (Naik, 2012). Lori Peek (2011) notes that “more than twenty books on the 
‘Islamic Menace’ were published in a one-year period following the 9/11 attacks” (Peek, 
2011, p.6). Moreover, Gillat-Ray refers to Reddre (2009, p.140) who assumes that the 
large number of books published in the last few years discuss ‘Islamic Terrorism’.  
Given these media and scholarly commentaries on Islam, it is evident that discussions 
and debates on Islam predominate in comparison to other religious groups’ 
representations and references. Past records of the media reporting of troublesome 
events show that the perpetrators’ actions were mostly associated with their beliefs. As 
discussed earlier, even though only a tiny minority of Catholics and Protestants were 
involved in terrorism, a whole sect of Christianity, i.e. Catholics, came under scrutiny. In 
the same manner, the acts of a few Muslim extremists and terrorists brought Islam into 
discussions and debates occurring in the media and academia.    
According to Edward Said (1997), “After 1983, Muslims declaring their faith in Islam 
were everywhere in the news” (Said, 1997, p. iii). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, one 
can see a rise in public concern relating to ‘Islamic Fundamentalism’ as a global 
movement that was ‘characterised by terrorist methods, anti-western rhetoric, and anti-
modern, anti-liberal’, which brought ‘The Muslim Community’ into the spotlight 
(Vertovec, 2002, p.23).  
Van Dijk (1991) uses this to examine the British tabloid press, which provided a 
massive amount of time and space to protesting parents, many of whom were Muslims, 
and in turn allocated little space to informing people about the outcome of Honeyford’s 
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writings that dismiss the working of multiculturalism in schools (Van Dijk, 1991, p.101). 
Another event, the Rushdie Affair (1985), produced an overwhelmingly negative 
portrayal of British Muslims. Vertovec states that ‘The Rushdie Affair’ (1989) 
“transformed Muslims from a law-abiding, compliant community into a volatile group” 
further worsening the situation in 2001 which “introduced a new dimension: Muslims 
now came to be widely seen as the danger within” (Vertovec, 2002, p.23). In addition, 
Poole (2011) argues that “The Rushdie affair was the catalyst for the struggles around 
identity that are currently being played out across Europe” (Poole, 2011, p.51). 
Sections of the British press published pictures of protesters in cities throughout 
Britain, particularly in Bradford, where demonstrators burnt the book outside a police 
station, an incident that later became a label and a trademark of Bradford Muslims. 
Perhaps, for some sections of the British media, the action of Bradford Muslims was 
complicit. A number of scholars see the Rushdie Affair as a notable event in British 
history, casting suspicion on all British Muslims (Allen 2005; Modood 2010, 2012; Saeed 
2007). Given the history of the media coverage of protests in Britain from the “Jarrow 
Crusade against poverty in 1936” to British students protesting against the rise in  
tuition fees in 2010 and 2012, it is evident that most sections of the press focus on the 
negative features of protests, rendering them sensitive and violent in their descriptions.   
With regard to The Satanic Verses, whilst displaying outrage many British Muslim 
protestors in Bradford and other cities had forgotten the idealistic teachings of their 
Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) who had forgiven his worst enemies even on the 
battlefields, particularly on the occasion of the conquest of Makkah (Gülen, 2006; 
McCullough et al., 2000). Commentators across the world have different opinions on 
this incident; even Imran Khan, a Pakistani cricketer turned politician, famous for his 
liberal views, denounced the book as an “immeasurable hurt” to Muslims (The Guardian, 
26 March 2012).  
However, it is evident that sections of the press and politicians had portrayed the 
protestors as violent and a security risk to Britain based on their actions. Dominic 
Casiani’s explanation of the six stages of “How social media changed protest” broadcast 
on the BBC is perhaps the best example of the mainstream attitude and reporting of 
protests (9 December 2010). Besides, for some Western authors who supported 
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Rushdie against the actions of Muslim protestors, it was an attempt to curb free speech 
to which many of them adhered (see Vanity Fair, 29 April 2014).  
Notably, for several scholars free speech in the contemporary period has become 
contested in both Muslim and non-Muslim countries because of its practices in different 
situations. This thesis will explain this concept in the following chapters but a few 
examples will be provided here to give an idea of how free speech has now become a 
controversial concept. The world has witnessed worse forms of press restriction in Iran 
during the tenth Iranian presidential elections whilst the same media outlets also 
misrepresented the Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (Raja, 2013, p.251-253).  
Similarly, rather poorer forms of press freedom are evident in relation to the Israeli 
government in different periods during its assaults on the Gaza strip (Bayoumi, 2010; 
Nossek and Limor, 2011). Moreover, in the West, which cherishes freedom of 
expression, several journalists and academics have lost their jobs in the last few years 
for their criticism of the Israeli government, including Helen Thomas (2010) and Steven 
Salaita (2014). The same is true of the freedom of expression practices in some Muslim 
countries including Azerbaijan and Egypt. Of course these are just a few of the many 
examples of restricted freedom of expression in the media, while there were also 
occasions on which the press coverage was deemed to be irresponsible and 
controversial, such as the publication of photos of a semi-clad Duchess of Cambridge 
over which the media faced trials.  
These situations allow scholars to assert that the exaggerated use of the word ‘Muslim’ 
in the media resembles the British media’s attitude to Jewish, Irish, Scottish, Caribbean, 
and Roma communities in previous decades. Modood writes that “…Muslims often 
remark that if in such articles either the words ‘Jew’ or ‘black’  were substituted for the 
word ‘Muslim’ the newspaper in question would be attacked as racist, and indeed risk 
legal proceedings (cited in Larsson, 2005, p. 38; Modood, 2002, p.126-127). A number of 
other scholars (Allen, 2010; Esposito and Lean, 2012; Malik, 2008) also endorse 
Modood’s notion of Muslims in the press.  
In addition, McGhee (2005) believes that in the post-9/11 period in Britain there has 
been a shift in the “focus of bigotry from race to religion” (McGhee, 2005, p.91). After 
the occurrence of 9/11, scholars such as Peek have reviewed the representation of 
Islam and Muslims and concluded that “The Islamic faith has long been misunderstood, 
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misrepresented, and viewed with suspicion in the United States and throughout much 
of the Western World” (Peek, 2011, p.5).  
An increasing number of academic studies claim that ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslims’ came into the 
media spotlight in the aftermath of the New York Bombings (Brown 2010; Saeed 2007, 
p.443; Klausen 2009). Evidence shows that anti-Muslim feelings of hostility had existed 
long before the present-day problems of extremism, violence, fundamentalism and 
terrorism for which most sections of the Western media regularly blame ‘Islam’.  Said 
writes, “...The idea that Islam is medieval and dangerous, as well as hostile and 
threatening to ‘us’, for example, has acquired a place both in culture and in polity that is 
very well defined…” (Said, 1997, p. iii)  
This situation seems to have been steadily worsening since 2000. Nafeez Mosaddeq 
Ahmed refers to Richardson’s thesis (2004) and argues that “The most significant shift 
in the coverage of British Muslims post 9/11 was in the association with terrorism” 
(Ahmed, 2012, p.27). According to Ali (2008), there is evidence of the increasing use of 
words such as ‘Islamic’ and ‘Islamist’ in “conjunction with the term ‘threat’” and also 
that “by combining  the words ‘Islamic’ and ‘terrorism’ (a crime), the religion aspect has 
been signified as the chief factor of influence”; hence “associating ‘Islam’ with 
‘terrorism’ suggests to readers that ‘Islam’ is the root cause of the problems” (Ali, 2008, 
p.22-33). 
Such hostile reporting fuels damaged feelings among the British Muslims, who think 
that they have been demonised, marginalised, disintegrated, singled out, rendered 
outsiders and labelled a threat to the larger community. Several scholars note that the 
media present Muslims as ‘Others’ (Pintak, 2006, p.190; Hellyer, 2009, p.160). The 
worrying aspect is that ‘Islam’ has become a synonym for social ills in the media, polity, 
policy-making institutions and other public spheres. In the current circumstances the 
representation of Islam and Muslims revolves around a ‘climate of threat, fear and 
misunderstanding’ whereas most sections of the British press view Islam as a ‘threat to 
the western interests’ and its modern way of life (see Poole and Richardson, 2006; 
Elgamri, 2010, p.39). 
This is reinforced by media campaigns such as The Sun’s cartoon published on 12 of 
April 2009 with the distorted headline, “Exposing Islam. University of Bombs, 
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Explosives, and Terrorism”, together with the caption “Isn’t Britain wonderful, giving us 
visas and the opportunity to improve our education?” 
 
Image 3: Source (The Sun, 12 April 2009; Cartoonist, Tom Johnston), 
This cartoon demonstrates the media’s contextualising of Islam and Muslims and the 
extent to which their representation has increased in recent times. Collectively, the 
media coverage has refreshed the 9/11 tragedy, during which American, European and 
other media organisations around the world have linked ‘Islam’ with terrorism and 
presented it as a violent and out-dated religion which has threatened secular values and 
Western societies’ way of life. Several recent studies have detected the growing 
connection of ‘Islam’ with terrorism in the media (Flood et al., 2012, p.177; Miller, 2006, 
p.47).  
Francois Debrix’s (2008) work is an interesting example of how the press takes note of 
official lines in covering ‘terror’ which has now been reserved for ‘Muslims’ in the post-
9/11 and 7/7 era in particular. Promptly, the question arises of whether the British 
media have also linked other religions with terrorism. 
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Consider, for example, incidents such as the bombing of the King David hotel on 22 July 
1946, the Oklahoma City bombings on 19 April 1995, the Norway massacre on 22 July 
2011, the destruction of Babri mosque on 6 December 1992 by Hindu fundamentalists 
who were involved in a series of assassinations including Mohandas Karamchand 
Ghandi and attacks on Sikhs, and the Sikh involvement in the assassinations of Indira 
Gandhi in (1984) and her son Rajiv Gandhi on 21May 1991. In none of these cases were 
entire religions blamed for the acts of their followers. 
These illustrations are evidence that Islam and Muslims have received disproportionate 
coverage in the media compared to other religions. It is evident that the actions of a few 
violent extremists and terrorists who declared themselves to be Muslims predominate 
in the media files in comparison to those non-Muslim perpetrators mentioned above. 
Legitimately, the discussion of terrorism at present is mostly about so-called “Islamic” 
militants and radicals. Why, then, does Islam get a bad press? Is it because of the 
inhuman acts of those perpetrators in their avowal of their Islamic beliefs? 
Alternatively, is it because of British Muslims’ failure to demonstrate the true nature of 
Islam?  
The most reputable surveys show that there are a disproportionate number of British 
Muslims in prison; for instance, the London Evening Standard report published on 28 
March 2014 reveals that “27% of London’s prisoners are Muslim” although the nature of 
the crimes and punishments may be questionable. This means that, evidently, ethnic 
minorities including British Muslims receive harsh punishments for certain crimes in 
comparison to other members of British society (see The Guardian, 26 November 2011 
and Ministry of Justice Report, October 2011).  
Arguably, the fact that the remaining 73 per cent of prisoners in London are non-Muslim 
suggests that societal problems are not the result of people’s religious affiliations. But, 
in fact, the causes of wrongdoings in society have roots in economic, political, social and 
cultural settings. Therefore, it is unfair to link the Islamic faith with these British 
Muslims’ bad behaviour, assuming that their faith is responsible for their immoral acts.  
Deepa Kumar (2012), at the beginning of her book, writes about how she encountered a 
colleague of hers on the first day after the ‘Twin Towers’ tragedy, who asked her 
whether she was happy about the incident. Although Kumar herself is neither Muslim 
nor Arab, she was forced to apologise. But she reminded him of “Timothy McVeigh and 
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the other Christian fundamentalists who had similarly murdered innocent people” and 
asked him whether he considered that “all Christians were responsible” for their acts 
(Kumar, 2012, p.1). 
Following such incidents, the media did not hold all Christians responsible, nor did they 
view them as terrorists and fundamentalists. However, in the case of Muslims the 
apportioning of blame was selective. Here, a few questions arise: Do the media reports 
link ‘Muslims’ as a plural entity with troubles? Does the problem lie at the heart of the 
religion and its followers or inside the community? Surely, the comparison here doesn’t 
mean advocating one particular religion or set of people but, rather, pointing out the 
disparity in the media reporting that still largely exits in many ways (see Ameli et al., 
2007; Moore et al., 2008;  and Sian et al., 2012).  
With reference to Britain and its neighbouring Western countries, it has been evident 
for several decades, and today, that violent and fundamentalist groups and 
organisations have had a long history of terrorising people through a series of 
bombings, poisonings, assassinations, kidnapping and torture. The members of these 
groups, including the Angry Brigade and the IRA in Britain, ETA in Spain, the Red Army 
Faction in Germany and many other organisations worldwide, are not Muslims. Robert 
Pape’s (2006) study is a complete guide to understanding the long history of religious 
and other groups of terrorists. Certainly, the purpose of including this citation is to 
highlight the disparity in media reporting that ties ‘Islam’ as a religion with terrorism 
while failing to expose several other terrorist organisations, groups and even 
governments.  
1.9-The British Press Representation of British Muslims after 7/7:   
Given the earlier explanations, it has been established that, after the 7/7 attack, the 
representation of British Muslims worsened to an extent that is recognisable in several 
studies. It important to note that, throughout history, when certain groups have been 
framed in a particular manner, i.e. as a threat, the end result has been more than simple 
discrimination; rather, it has resulted in genocide and expulsion. An example includes 
“The Bosnian Genocide’ during 1995 at the hands of Serbian forces at Srebrenica and 
Žepa. Evidently, the Muslim and Christian communities in this part of the world had 
lived together for centuries and were considerably well-integrated.  
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In that sense, it is worrying to see British Muslims collectively presented as a problem 
that symbolised the Jews in the recent past. Rachel North, a survivor of 7/7 and the 
author of ‘Out of the Tunnel’ (2007) said, “As a vicar’s daughter and a former theology 
student, I am asked about evil. I think the bombers were not born evil: it is because they 
fell into a trap of hate and despair and alienation…” (Rai, 2006).  
Recalling the media coverage, it in fact recalls the discourses of Edward Said’s 
Orientalism (1978), Stanley Cohen’s Folk Devils and Moral Panics (1972) and Stuart 
Hall’s The West and the Rest (1992) because of the way in which ‘Islam’ as a religion and 
‘Muslims’ as its followers were tagged with terrorism. Jonathan Laurence and Justin 
Vaisse (2006) suggest re-examining the “precise link between Islam and Terrorism…in 
order to understand” whether it happens because of “integration failure, identity crisis, 
and political and religious motives” (Laurence and Justin, 2006, p.245).  
Reviewing various authors about the representation of British Muslims in the wake of 
7/7, it appears that terrorism is a key reason for British Muslims’ bad press. The 
fundamental idea emerging from these scholarly references is that British Muslims have 
been framed in a specific manner that presents them as an internal security risk. In a 
way such representation is disproportionate given that only a few Muslims were 
involved in a major terror attack in Britain. In fact, so far non-Muslims have carried out 
far more terror attacks in Europe and America than Muslims have (see Hewitt, 2008; 
Global Research, 1 May 2013).  
Bernard Lewis writes that “At no point do the basic texts of Islam enjoin terrorism and 
murder” while he dismisses such linkage of ‘Islam’ as a religion with terrorism (Lewis, 
2003, p.30-33). In short, as a result of this terrifying event growing radicalisation and 
extremism have become a serious matter. Numerous notable studies have discussed the 
rising level of extremism in Britain after the London bombings (for example, Herrala, 
2008; Cole and Cole, 2009; Curtis, 2012).   
In the post-7/7 period some sections of the media continue to display what Said 
described as a ‘blanket approach’ toward British Muslims. Take, for example, the cases 
of the police shooting of a young Brazilian man, Jean Charles de Menezes, on 22 July 
2005, the Forest Gate police raid and shooting on 2 June 2006, the Anti-Terror police 
raids on Liverpool John Moores University on the basis of ‘suspicion’ in 2009, and the 
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case of a ‘suspected’ Ph.D. student, Rizwan Sabir, at Nottingham University where his 
supervisor, Rod Thornton, also faced discrimination and suspension from his job. 
In the case of Jean Charles de Menezes, the media exposed the police mistake and The 
Guardian in particular was explicit about the action taken by the police. The BBC also 
interviewed people who said that the man had been shot without offering resistance. 
The above example of the John Moores University students demonstrates that suspicion 
can damage one’s career and affect one’s personal life. This happened in the case of 
these students who were found not guilty in court. Later on, The Guardian and BBC 
investigative units, upon interviewing a number of people in remote villages in Pakistan 
and a few locations in Manchester, concluded that, because of the ‘terrorism’ tag, these 
youngsters have no future.  
Poole asserts that the 7/7 “perpetrators are seen as products of a fanatical strain of 
Islam” because news reporting renders “any Muslim a potential terrorist” (Poole, 2002, 
p.4). Indeed, the way the media reporting focuses on the event suggests that perhaps 
the entire community is under the media spotlight (ibid). She detects the use of phrases 
such as “Muslim rebels”, “radical Muslims” and “Muslims and Islamic terrorists” (Poole, 
2002, p.8).  
At the outset, it is a valid and challenging strategy to probe the broadsheets’ reporting of 
the 7/7 event to determine whether the press has moved away from its attitude to 
reporting terrorism incidents. The broadsheet press narrative of 7/7 also helps to 
reveal any pertinent shift in the patterns of reporting on British Muslims and sheds light 
on whether or not the press can bind a fragmented society afflicted by terrorism.   
1.10-Chapters Overview:  
Based on previous and more recent studies, this thesis assumes that since the 7/7 
terror attacks the media representations of British Muslims are still categorised as 
mistrusted. Given the current circumstances, it is essential to ask this fundamental 
question: In what ways did the British press represent British Muslims in the wake of 
7/7 and what has been their impact? In the subsequent chapters, consideration of this 
question is intertwined with logical explanations of the 7/7 press reporting.  The thesis 
also provides evidence that the press is not alone in producing a misleading, distorting 
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or unconstructive image of British Muslims but in fact works with the four “P’s” (press, 
politicians, police and public bodies) as described earlier in this chapter.  
In brief, this thesis comprises three sections and nine chapters; these are knotted 
together through theoretical concepts and philosophies and are chronologically 
arranged. The second chapter sets the scene by presenting The Guardian’s and The Daily 
Telegraph’s immediate responses to the event and how these newspapers reported it 
the following day. The literature review, chapter three, presents the structure of the 
debate and the views of major thinkers in the field of media and the representations of 
Islam and Muslims. Admittedly, the study of Islam and Muslims in the context of 
terrorism is a vast field of academic inquiry in the contemporary period; therefore, the 
literature review takes into account mainstream theoretical frameworks but also 
consults different traditional and contemporary approaches in the following sections of 
this thesis.  
The methodology chapter provides details of established conceptual approaches, data 
collection techniques, the coding scheme and the rationale for using inductive reasoning 
and thematic analysis. An inductive reasoning begins with a specific set of observations 
and is considered free of the researcher’s personal influence. Next, the discussion and 
analysis section, comprising chapters five, six and seven, details the emergence of three 
key themes in the dataset. Furthermore, these themes are reflective of contextual 
debates as well as the original findings of the dataset. In the third section, chapter eight 
provides a justification of the theoretical framework of moral panic and its relevance, 
significance and criticism. Finally, the last chapter sets out the conclusions and 
implications of the findings for news organisations and news production values. This 
thesis intends to argue that news events such as 7/7 are often reported in a way that 
suggest that news is a somewhat “constructed reality”. Moreover, the media reporting is 
reflective of a power nexus including politicians, police and public bodies.     
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Chapter 2: The Context:  London Bombings and the Press Response.   
The incident of the London Bombings on 7 July 2005 took 52 innocent lives and is 
considered one of the saddest moments in the history of multicultural Britain. Three of 
the four perpetrators, Mohammad Sidique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer and Hasib Hussian, 
were born and raised in Britain and had cherished all their privileges and opportunities, 
like their fellow British citizens, such as education, health, wellbeing and work. The 
fourth bomber, Germaine Lindsay, had been born in Jamaica and was a Christian 
convert to Islam.  
Instantly, the event gained global attention, and only a few days later international 
media teams landed in Leeds in the North of England to cover the story. In search of 
thrilling stories, journalists and reporters of leading media organisations visited every 
street in the Beeston area, which became known as a “hotbed of terrorism”. Several 
narratives of those suicide bombers emerged along with the reasons for the attacks. 
Some viewed the incident as a reaction to Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq whilst other 
rushed to associate it with Islamic ideology.  
It became a watershed moment for British Muslims, who were starting to be seen as a 
potential threat and ‘enemy within’. A decade has passed but 7/7 remains a significant 
topic of academic inquiry that authors are still investigating in the search for answers to 
a series of questions: What was the driving force behind the London bombers? Were 
they reacting to Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq or were they inspired by a religious 
ideology? This chapter sets the scene for broader discussions surrounding the press 
reporting of British Muslims with reference to 7/7. It contextualises and explains The 
Guardian’s and The Daily Telegraph’s interpretations of the event. It argues that the 
media reporting of the London bombings shows that the news is a “constructed reality” 
and that it makes certain similar events more newsworthy than others. The following 
sections present an analysis of the 7/7 reporting to provide a basis for the subsequent 
chapters.         
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2.1-The Making of the Term ‘7/7’:   
The term ‘7/7’ is a shortened form of the 7 July 2005 London Bombings, sometimes also 
referred to as ‘Seven-Seven’ and ‘July seventh’ (Truth Campaign, 2005). The London 
bombings quickly became known as 7/7, just as the attack on the World Trade Centre in 
New York in 2001 became known as 9/11, marking it as a memorable event in history 
(see Seidler, 2007). On a deeper level, I would suggest that the term ‘7/7’ signifies 
Britain and America’s shared victimhood. Further, the similar numeric emblems reflect 
the American and British alliance established to fight a global ‘war on terror’.   
Britain has long been a target of terrorists, extremists and trouble-makers in different 
periods of its history. In particular, the month of July carries extraordinary importance 
because soon after 7/7 came the 21/7 plot. Previously, on 22 July 1946, Irgun terrorists 
blew up the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, killing 91 people and injuring 46 (Hoffman, 
2011, p.261-264). In addition, the Bradford riots occurred on 7 July 2001. The term had 
previously been used to describe the second Sino-Japanese War (1937/1945) - the 
“Incident of July 7” - suggesting that certain events are more newsworthy, significant 
and political than others.  
Long before the 9/11 attacks, on Tuesday 11 September 1973, Chile’s Presidential 
Palace was bombed, resulting in the “suicide of President Salvador Allende and 
ultimately the death or disappearance of over three thousand people” and producing a 
turning point in the Cold War (Gómez-Barris, 2010, p.235; Stern, 2006, p.29). Arguably, 
both names - 9/11 and 7/7 - indicate the power and influence of America and Britain as 
leading nations of the world. These resemblances are unique and display the political 
alliance between these two nations, presenting them as victims and providing them 
with reasons to expand their political leverage.  According to Igor Primoratz (2013), 
9/11 was described as the “Worst case of terrorism ever” whilst 7/7 is described as a 
“worst-case terrorism scenario” (Howie, 2012; Walker, 2011). Describing all terrorism 
as morally wrong, Primoratz also recalled the night of July 27-8, 1943, when the RAF 
operation “Firestorm Raid” on Hamburg killed 40,000 civilians (Primoratz, 2013).  
From a philosophical viewpoint, this shows the difference between an occasion when a 
powerful nation comes under attack, when it is described as the “worst”, and when 
others are attacked, when it is either ignored or presented as self-defence. This raises a 
fundamental question about the value of human life and whether all lives are equal. 
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John McGowan (2012 ) writes: “The standard of progress, of civilization, not only 
justifies violence but offers a metric by which to determine which lives are ‘more 
precious’ than others” (McGowan,  2012, p.53). For argument’s sake, if British foreign 
policy is to be blamed for these attacks, they would surely have happened much earlier 
because the perpetrators of 7/7 were born to parents of Kashmiri origin, a disputed 
territory whose inhabitants have been prevented from exercising their right to self-
determination since 1948.  
Surely, the Kashmir issue has direct links with British foreign policy and politics; hence, 
one may ask why the perpetrators used the Iraq connection rather than Kashmir. And 
what is the manifestation of these two expressions, 9/11 and 7/7? Are they describing 
an unending conflict? After closely reviewing the 7/7 event and its overall effects on 
British society, Steve Hewitt (2008) concludes that,  
 While 7/7 demonstrated the danger of terrorism to the UK, the 
refusal of the government to hold a proper independent inquiry is 
damaging to British counter-terrorism. Successful counter-
terrorism in a democratic society requires trust and confidence in 
the efficacy of security forces because public cooperation is 
essential (Hewitt, 2008, p.106).  
Undoubtedly, on 7 July London witnessed the worst form of “terror” since the IRA 
campaign that had shaken Londoners for years. It will be remembered as one of the 
saddest moments in the history of multicultural Britain and remains a significant event 
because of its timing, global transmission and newsworthiness (Aitchison, 2006; 
Borenstein, 2009). In the BBC Radio 4 documentary “The Summer that Changed 
London” (2010) Mehdi Hasan argued that it “had a much greater impact on 
Muslim/non-Muslim relations in this country than the 11 September attacks in the 
United States”.  
Drawing upon the above narratives of 7/7, a leading debate appears to centre on the 
bombings’ long-term impact on British Muslims, particularly Londoners, who had 
witnessed long terror campaigns by the IRA. Another significant aspect in most writings 
concerns how an incident not only changed the political landscape of Britain’s capital 
but also acts as a reminder that the British government should perhaps revisit its 
foreign policy.  
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Considering major polls conducted by ‘YouGov’ and ‘Gallup Survey’ and newspaper 
articles, Hasan described the impact of 7/7 on British Muslims as causing “‘fear, anxiety 
and bad press” (New Statesman, 9 July 2010). Consequently, it became a watershed 
moment for British Muslims who started to be seen as a potential threat and the enemy 
within. Ever since the events of 7/7, scores of newspaper and journal articles, radio and 
television commentaries, live talk shows and academic literature have discussed the 
reasons for them and the implications for and long-term effects on British society. There 
is an increasing amount of discussion of the media’s role in defining and shaping any 
event. Van Dijk (1988) says that “An event thus analysed is represented as a model in 
episodic memory. Such a model features the dominant actions or events, participants, 
time and location, circumstances, relevant objects, or instruments of action, organised 
in a hierarchical structure” (Van Dijk, 1987b and 1988, p.111).  
Later on, Van Dijk (2006) explains the event using several illustrations such as 9/11, 
which is used as an ‘emotional event’, the term’s constant repetition reminding the 
public of the existence of “Us” (good, innocent) and “Them” (evil, guilt) (Van Dijk, 2006, 
p.370). To him, whether any event is newsworthy depends on the system of news 
values of journalists and their organisations; if the event satisfies the settled criteria, it 
becomes a high-value event (Van Dijk, 1988, p.111). This view is also shared by McNair 
(2006, p. 39-68).  
These authors’ explanations reveal significant aspects of the news process in which 
media report, construct and present certain events as more emotional, significant and 
newsworthy than other events of similar magnitude such as the terrorist attacks. These 
authors’ viewpoint seems to be true particularly when comparing similar terrorist 
attacks in one country with the other. Looking at the media coverage of the Paris 
terrorist attacks on 13 November 2015 and the Beirut terrorist attack on 15 November 
2015, it is evident that Paris received far greater coverage to the extent that mainstream 
Western newspapers published editorials and Facebook offered a France flag profile 
picture but disregarded a Lebanon flag profile picture (see Metro, 15 November 2015).     
Van Dijk (1977) finds a close link between the identification and description of any 
event and believes that the representation of an event also depends on the conventional 
means of language through which we present and view it (Van Dijk, 1977, p.169). Thus, 
the descriptions of the same event, 7/7, in The Daily Telegraph and The Guardian have 
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notable differences from the initial reporting although the presentation style had a few 
similarities. Another important feature that emerged from the reporting is the use of 
different words and phrases and the selection of quotes from similar press briefings and 
speeches of high-ranking politicians, particularly Prime Minister Blair’s statements.   
2.2-A Typical Day and the Press Reporting:  
On that fateful day, 7 July, Londoners were contented as their city had been selected for 
the 2012 summer Olympic Games after overcoming Moscow, New York City, Madrid, 
and Paris, which were also bidding for the same honour. In addition, the UK was hosting 
the G8 summit of the world’s most powerful industrial nations at Gleneagles. At this 
historic moment, the atrocities of 7 July sent shockwaves worldwide, especially since 
Britain appeared to have been stabbed in the back.  Worryingly, the perpetrators were 
not outsiders but British Muslims born and raised in Yorkshire.  
Within seconds, the incident received massive media coverage worldwide, not only on 
TV screens and radio but also in newspapers, websites and blogs, including social 
networking sites and chat forums, facilitated by ordinary people on the spot with 
camera phones and other forms of communication. Both The Guardian and The Daily 
Telegraph reacted promptly by providing minute-by-minute updates to their readers, 
viewers, and listeners on their websites using new media technologies such as video, 
blogs and podcasts. This section provides a description of the way the press headlines 
and leading contents of the instant reports determined the main topic. At the same time, 
it also offers an analysis of fragments of the same news stories to ascertain the ways in 
which the two newspapers reported the incident and portrayed Islam and Muslims.  
It also scrutinises the follow-up commentaries on 8 July in The Guardian and The Daily 
Telegraph, beginning with their front pages. The front page holds a distinctive position 
in a newspaper and is reserved for a lead story (Fowler, 1991, p.71). Front-page 
headlines also have an extraordinary effect in shaping public opinion of the event (Page 
et al., 1987). Ideally, the comparison of front-page headlines and leads should also 
reflect the overall pattern of the story and its importance in the newspaper. 
Furthermore, for a schematic analysis of newspaper text, the headline is one of the 
“most obvious initial categories of news” (Van Dijk, 1983, p.242).      
The Guardian’s front page carried Ian McEwan’s column in G2 that read: “How could we 
have forgotten that this was always going to happen? We have been savagely woken 
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from a pleasant dream”. Underneath the title are three bullet points: “at least 38 dead; 
700 injured; Al-Qaida cell claims responsibility”; meanwhile, the main headline reads 
‘London’s day of terror’ coupled with a picture of a ripped open double-decker bus.  
Overall, the story runs to twenty pages of coverage including the sports page which 
carries a piece headed “Gruesome timing” featuring London’s winning Olympic bid. The 
reporting includes statements, news, comments and photographs of victims on various 
pages and a picture of a blackened body on a stretcher. On page three, The Guardian 
published an iconic photograph of a woman (see Image 4) whose face was covered by a 
white protective mask being helped by an unknown white male; this image latterly 
appeared in all the major British newspapers including on the front page of The Daily 
Telegraph.  
 
Image 4: This iconic image corresponds to media selectivity: “Ideal victims” and 
“Newsworthiness’” (The Daily Telegraph, 8 July 2005, also see Chris Greer, 2007, p.22). 
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This shows how different newspapers with dissimilar editorial policies published the 
same picture and made it into an icon. So, who decides and controls the editor? Is it 
newspapers themselves or external powers? It emerged in most academic studies that 
the man caught up in the Edgware Road blast giving a kind hand to the woman was Paul 
Dadge, who became an iconic figure in the British media (Lerenzo-Dus and Bryan, 2011, 
p. 281). Importantly, the appearance of his iconic picture spontaneously in all 
newspapers including The Daily Telegraph and The Guardian testifies to the notion of 
news values (Fuller, 1996; Bell, 1991; Hartley, 2013).  
Of course there is nothing wrong with the press publishing pictures of injured people. 
However, the point is that the same iconic picture in almost all newspapers’ front and 
inner pages suggests that perhaps the victims were all non-Muslims and white people. 
Certainly, the injured and dead men and women were of various races and religions 
including Muslims. Thus, arguably, this iconic picture sends a powerful emotional 
message to readers of both broadsheets that non-Muslims and whites were the prime 
targets.  Another example of news values appears in both newspapers using similar 
iconic pictures of Paul Dadge and the word “terror” in their main headlines and “Attack 
on London” (The Guardian) and “Terrorism in London” (The Daily Telegraph) in their 
banners, reflecting their attitude towards the issues.  
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Image 5: The Guardian’s front page on 8 July 2005 (Courtesy The Guardian).  
In comparison, The Daily Telegraph’s main headline read: ‘Al-Qa’eda brings terror to the 
heart of London’. It carries an iconic picture of an injured white woman in a protective 
white mask being helped by a white security man or an unknown member of a rescue 
team.  
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Image 6: The Daily Telegraph Front Page on 8 July 2005 (Courtesy The Daily Telegraph). 
Other than this, a notable feature of the reporting became visible in the traditional 
rivalry between these two newspapers. Later on, in one of its leading reports about 7/7 
The Guardian ran a story about The Daily Telegraph, showing how it elevated David 
Cameron in importance in the 7/7 event and, thus, showed less patriotism, as can be 
seen in the headline and clip below: ‘Big news: the Telegraph’s ‘Cameron, PM’ headline 
in perspective: Britain’s biggest-selling broadsheet greeted Conservatives’ return to 
government with a two-inch-high shout of joy. So how far out of the ordinary is that?’ 
In this illustration, The Guardian compared The Daily Telegraph’s front pages on 7/7 and 
other significant occasions. It shows that David Cameron received a two-inch headline 
that was larger than the headline for 7/7 when the whole nation grieved. It further 
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states: “Cameron is bigger than the 7 July 2005 London bombings, back towards the 
beginning of headline inflation at the paper” (The Guardian, 12 May, 2010). Thus, the 
images that The Guardian uses in this article also display the importance of headlines in 
the newspapers (Jackson, 1942, p.75; Casey Ronan, 2014). 
 
Image 7: Source: (The Guardian, 12 May 2010); this image shows the importance of 
main headlines (see Jackson, 1971; Charles, 2009; Hodgson, 2013).  
One key difference in both headlines is in the spellings used for “Al-Qa’eda” and “Al-
Qaida”, a terrorist organisation that was also supposedly behind all major attacks such 
as 9/11 and the Madrid train bombings. There were also differences in key information, 
such as 37 dead vs. 38 dead and 700 vs. 300 injured. It is inevitable that the figures will 
keep changing in these situations but it also shows the newspaper reporters’ 
competence in acquiring up-to-date information.  
 In the Arabic language, as in other languages, words change their meanings according 
to the pronunciation of the same letters. For example, in the two different spellings the 
first suggests “principle” while the second means “foundation”. Hence, one refers to 
“ideology” that indirectly linked Islam with terror. Again, these possible spelling 
65 
 
mistakes suggest that newspapers editors’ ability and knowledge of significant subjects 
can lead to the misrepresentation of Islam and Muslims. In comparison, the word 
“foundation” is less suggestive in the sense that any organisation has a foundation/base 
which might consist of its key aims, monetary policies and so forth. Another important 
feature that emerged from the reporting is the use of different words and phrases and 
the selection of quotes from similar press briefings and speeches of high-ranking 
politicians, particularly Prime Minister Blair’s statements.   
2.3-The Guardian’s Reporting of that Particular Moment on the 7th of July: 
Soon after the terrible explosions on 7 July, The Guardian began to report the incident on 
its website (The Guardian, 2005). The first news item emerged at around 11.03am and 
then continued until 9:54pm bringing minute-by-minute updates to its readers and 
listeners worldwide. During approximately ten hours of news transmission on the event, 
The Guardian focused mainly on eyewitness accounts, emergency team activities, 
casualties, victims, hospitals and ambulance services, and security developments after 
the incident, particularly further threats.  
In other words, it concentrated on aspects of the event such as rage, hope, causation, 
calm and tolerance within the communities and human values in terms of victims 
including the dead and injured and the safety of the members of the rescue teams. This 
particular incident was significant because of its timeline; for example, just the day 
before 7 July, London had won the Olympic bid, and on the day of the event London’s 
anti-terrorist “A Team” was busy at the G-8 summit in Gleneagles in Scotland (The 
Guardian, 7 July, 2005).  At this time of anguish and resentment it is important to note 
that The Guardian not only adopted a healing strategy but also tried to avoid spreading 
any sort of anger or incitement even in the words of sources such as political or ordinary 
people on the ground. For instance, at 4:35 pm it cautioned British Muslims by 
publishing a headline “Muslims urged to stay indoors” (ibid).   
2.4-The Daily Telegraph’s Reporting of that Particular Moment on the 7th July: 
Throughout that particular day, The Daily Telegraph provided minute-by-minute 
coverage (The Daily Telegraph, 2005). In total, it published 38 news clips that covered 
the whole day’s activities and developments from 8:51am to 9:08pm on its website. It is 
feasible to divide the reporting into sets in order to examine the headlines and leaders 
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that form a major category in the summary and help to identify topics (Van Dijk, 
1997).These classifications of news items also enable us to recognise the sources from 
which the newspaper derived its news.  
Normally, newspapers’ reports come from their own reporters but at this particular 
event most reports originated from government officials, politicians, clergymen and 
activists, possibly because the unexpected attack on the heart of London shook the 
government and the entire community including businesses and the public. Given Van 
Dijk’s (1977) assumption, the headlines are not simple sentences but in fact  represent 
information in “fact ordering and sequence ordering”, which means that sentences 
denote facts and therefore a “sequence of  sentences would denote sequence of facts” 
(Van Dijk, 1977, p. 103).  
• ‘Terrorism has hit Europe once again’ at 9:20 am on 07 July 2005 
In this story The Daily Telegraph cited Tony Blair and George Bush, thereby reflecting 
the importance of the alliance in terms of The Daily Telegraph’s own political 
orientation. In the leading paragraph it stated: “Tony Blair condemned the “barbaric 
attacks”… “whatever they [the terrorists] do it is our determination that they will never 
succeed in destroying what we hold dear in this country and other civilised nations in 
the world” (The Daily Telegraph, 7 July 2005). It also cited George W Bush: “The contrast 
could not be clearer about the intentions and hearts of those who care about human 
rights and liberty…The war on terror goes on. I was impressed with the resolve of the 
people here. We will spread the ideology of hope and compassion.” (ibid.)  
At this moment, The Daily Telegraph carefully chose its words and stressed those 
sentences within the broader words of the Prime Minister and other high-ranking 
officials. For example, the term “civilised nation” itself clearly draws a line between “The 
West” (as Civilised) and “The Rest” (as Uncivilised and Barbaric)” (Said, 1997; Hall, 
1987). Notably, the Bush and Blair nexus was a prominent feature in The Daily 
Telegraph reporting in comparison to The Guardian, which avoided this connection. 
• “Blair: ‘they will never succeed’” (12:19pm).  
• “The Prime Minister says it is ‘reasonably clear’ that the explosions were the 
result of terrorism” (12.10pm.) 
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• “Mr. Blair reads a joint statement from G8 leaders saying it was ‘not an attack on 
one nation but on all nations’” (1.07pm). 
• “At Downing Street, Mr Blair promises the ‘most intense police and security 
service action to make sure we bring those responsible to justice’” (5.33pm). 
• “Jack Straw, Foreign Secretary, says attacks bear the hallmarks of al-Qa’eda” 
(7.39pm). 
2.5-The Next Day Reporting of the London Bombings in The Daily Telegraph:  
On its website archives, The Daily Telegraph published 75 news clippings underneath 
News banner, 47 of which were closely linked with the 7/7 event (The Daily Telegraph, 
2005). In other words, in order to obtain the percentage of the news relating to the 7/7 
event, I apply the mathematical equation (75-47=28); 28 were irrelevant and therefore 
(47/75=0.626*100=63%). For the purpose of a thematic analysis of all news clippings 
(headlines and leads), this forms one of the most important categories (Summary) in 
the semantics of Van Dijk’s model, as already demonstrated above in this chapter. The 
key topics reported in The Daily Telegraph on 8th of July 2005 included the following:  
• Prime Minister Tony Blair  (seven headlines with one indirect)  
• Faith Leaders (Pope and Archbishop of Canterbury) 
• Muslim leaders (two indirect references in the headlines)  
• Government Officials (Home Secretary and Lord Mayor of London)    
• Al-Qaeda (three direct references and one indirect reference in headlines) 
• Terror/terrorist/terrorism (3/3/1), all direct mentions.    
• Bombers/Bombing (six altogether in this topic)   
• Security/Law enforcement agencies (no direct reference in headlines) 
• Radical groups   (no direct reference in headlines) 
• Links (Madrid and New York attacks)  
The remaining headlines and leads carry various important topics such as security 
situation, emergency services, hospitals, London Transport, banks, future strategies, the 
level of threat of a similar kind, radical organisations and their networking on British 
soil, possible links to international terrorist organisations and political events; these 
68 
 
constituted the fundamental aspects of the reporting. Most importantly, the solidarity 
and reassurance messages to Britain from its counterparts in Europe were notable 
features of the reporting. In this regard, considerable space was allocated to G8 leaders, 
American and European dignitaries who pledged to fight against terrorism together. 
Almost all material relating to foreign dignitaries, officials and local notables and the 
strength, power and distinguished status of Britain became prominent aspects of the 
reports.  
Distinctively, most main headlines followed sub-headings in The Daily Telegraph, 
especially in the mentions of Blair: “Britain will not be cowed by terrorists, vows Blair; 
Islamist terrorists were blamed for the London blasts by Tony Blair last night. He 
insisted that Britain would not be “cowed” by the worst terrorist atrocities in the 
capital; Blair flies back from a suddenly subdued Gleneagles; G8 not derailed by terror, 
says Blair; and we cannot stop these attacks, says Blair”. Each article carried Blair’s 
intention and promise to bring those responsible to justice and showed how he received 
support from his close ally George W. Bush on the issue that they saw as an attack to 
undermine their commitment to the fight against terror, for which they held al-Qaeda 
responsible. This was perhaps to be expected as, in times of crisis, nations usually look 
to their leaders. Consider a few lines from one of these articles:  
                    Those responsible have no respect for human life. We are united in 
our resolve to confront and defeat this terrorism that is not an 
attack on one nation but on all nations and on civilised people 
everywhere. We will not allow violence to change our society or 
our values.”; Mr Blair promised “the most intense police and 
security service action to make sure that we bring those 
responsible to justice”; and Two days after London bombs killed 
49 and injured 700, Tony Blair has said that “all the surveillance in 
the world” cannot prevent determined terrorists from attacking 
Britain (The Daily Telegraph, 8 July 2005).  
Such an assessment indicates that, despite the government’s pledge to adopt the best 
security measures to avoid further attacks, they were unable to guarantee their ability 
to halt any determined terrorists targeting Britain again. In other words, the terrorism 
threat would remain and public safety would remain the government’s priority. In 
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comparison to The Guardian, these citations indicate that both the government and The 
Daily Telegraph were ignoring the Iraq connection and were perhaps ‘on the same page’. 
Another important feature of The Daily Telegraph’s reporting the next day suggests an 
over-mentioning of al-Qaeda: 
Al-Qa’eda link hides multitude of suspects. Who was responsible? 
Reports that a group linked to al-Qa’eda was claiming 
responsibility for the London bombings tells us very little. There 
are many fundamentalist organisations that fly under Osama bin 
Laden’s flag of convenience and some of them have bases or off-
shoots in London; Al Qa’eda brings terror to the heart of London 
(Front Page Headline on 8 July 2005).  
This article quotes Jack Straw, stating that the explosions “bore all the hallmarks” of al-
Qa’eda. Another article states: Hydra-like terror cells a problem for MI5 war on al-Qa’eda. 
This quote suggests that it is certain that al-Qa’eda was responsible for the 7/7 attacks. 
This terrorist organisation has posed a tough challenge to security agencies because it 
not only has the tendency to further develop but it also operates secretly. The activities 
of such organisations are rather hard to predict, particularly when they function and 
exist in the form of multiple units.    
2.6-The Next Day Reporting of the London Bombings in The Guardian:  
The next day, follow-up coverage in The Guardian determined the social and political 
attitude of the British government, media and the general public to the incident. More 
importantly, it also suggested The Guardian’s own political standpoint on the event; i.e. 
it was the outcome of the government’s foreign policy. For example, it published a news 
clip: “Group linked to al-Qaida cites UK’s Iraq actions” (The Guardian, 8 July 2005). 
Overall, The Guardian published a total of 73 news items together with 69 stories 
related to 7/7 including a double-page spread on pages four and five that could be 
found at its website (The Guardian, 8 July 2005).  
Hence, the total number of stories might be calculated as follows: 69/75=92*100=92%). 
Like The Daily Telegraph, the main themes appearing in the Guardian were terrorism, 
security threat, and the government’s action in dealing with the problem. Alongside 
these broad themes, it also discussed and shaped the debate around a range of topics 
including the following: “From Olympic jubilation to bafflement and horror: First the 
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shock and then a strange, quiet kind of chaos took over London streets”; “Stay off work 
if you can: Met’s plea as tube restoration gets under way”; “Companies shut down early 
as post and deliveries are hit: Banks close and Royal Mail unable to move vans. 
“Tens of thousands of workers were sent home early last night as shops and businesses 
across the capital closed - or failed to open at all - after the terrorist attacks”; 
“Emergency plan and call surge hit phones…”; “As a mark of respect, the shows won’t go 
on: Theatre, pop concerts and Olympic bid celebrations called off, but war anniversary 
events will go ahead”; “Emergency powers help tackle chaos: Ministers take charge of 
response teams”; “Hospitals clear decks for victims: Major incident alert declared”; 
“Blair’s careful plans end in painful dilemma”; and “Met chief tells of readiness for 
attacks ... minutes later, the news broke: London anti-terror is ‘envy of world’”. In all 
these reports the key message is visible in terms of the following main themes and 
topics: backlash, consequences, government failure to detect and stop the attack, and in 
particular its foreign policy.  
The above reporting describes a panic situation in which government agencies; public 
and private organisations were all trying to restore the situation and were determined 
to prevent any further incidents. Normally, in tense situations such as 7/7, the public 
needs support and reassurance that the aftershocks and reactions will not worsen the 
circumstances. Evidently, this is what The Guardian accomplished through its reporting 
that was largely aimed at calming the state of affairs.  
2.7-Conclusion:   
According to the reporting of both broadsheets, The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, 
on the 7/7 event, it emerged that the British way of life and its internal security were 
now at risk. Moreover, the terrorism threat in the form of al-Qaeda would continue to 
exist in the years to come because of the operational nature of this terrorist 
organisation. Nevertheless, both newspapers rarely mentioned the emergence of al-
Qaeda and its leadership connections with some Western governments, particularly the 
United States of America. Probably because of the overplaying of the al-Qaeda 
leadership and the perpetrators’ own religious interpretations and views, the overall 
event became more religious than political in its formulation. In addition, both 
newspapers’ reporting embraced the expression ‘7/7’ which rendered the event 
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significant, emotional and historic. Both broadsheets clearly stated that it was an attack 
on all liberal and democratic societies, not just Britain.  
Overall, the particular moment of 7/7 and the subsequent reactions to and 
interpretations of the London Bombing incident in The Guardian and The Daily 
Telegraph mirror Stanley Cohen’s (1972) concept of “Folk Devils and Moral Panics”, 
which basically argues that certain groups are defined and presented as threats to 
societal norms and interests. The overall reporting illustrations include warnings of 
further attacks and an iconic photo of a masked woman that is perhaps indirectly 
suggestive of a chemical or biological attack. Furthermore, the statements of politicians, 
particularly Blair and Bush, show that this home-grown security threat will be 
prolonged. Evidently, certain topics such as British foreign policy, the Iraq war, 
radicalisation, terrorist networks, al-Qaeda and the security system receive more space 
and attention.  
Moreover, the interpretation of the event in terms of identifying the groups or 
organisations responsible for the attack suggests that The Guardian was more cautious 
about its professional ethics. Considering The Guardian’s reporting, it also appears to 
have used several examples to demonstrate that its competitor The Daily Telegraph was 
less patriotic. In short, the initial reporting shows the distinct policies of the two 
newspapers; for example, The Guardian emphasised the Iraq connection and quoted 
several academics, politicians, activists and peers to validate its point. On the other 
hand, The Daily Telegraph insisted that the incident was a result of religious ideology 
and problems among British Muslims such as extremism and radicalisation. Both 
broadsheets raised questions over the security failure that further added to public fears 
of terrorists.  
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Chapter 3: Literature Review:  
3.1-Introduction:  
Ever since the Satanic Verses (1989) issue, British Muslims in particular have been the 
centre of attention in the British media, possibly because a number of national and 
international cases of terrorism and violence that have occurred in the past two decades 
have involved a few Muslims. At present, most of the literature on the representation of 
Muslims focuses upon a number of themes such as identity, integration, radicalisation, 
extremism, Islamophobia and terrorism. In addition, the existing literature on Muslims 
enquires into the reasons why terrorism is constructed as “Islamic” and whether 
Muslims’ representation in the context of 7/7 is equal to that of Catholics?  
This aim of this chapter is to provide a narrative of established discourses surrounding 
Muslims and the way this thesis has placed itself within these established discourses. 
This chapter reviews earlier and recent studies relating to the representations of Islam 
and Muslims. It also shows the structure of past and recent debates on the topic. It 
incorporates the views of three main thinkers - Edward Said, Stuart Hall and Stanley 
Cohen - whose ideas are appropriate to and essential for an examination of Muslims’ 
representation in the media. Said’s study, Orientalism (1978), mainly focuses on the 
“Orient” as a distant land in the Middle East that is predominantly Muslim. It is evident 
that Said’s work is still relevant to the study of the representation of Muslims in the 
media. In addition, the news discourse is a central element for an understanding of the 
representation of Islam and Muslims.  
One of the essential features of the news discourse is that it discusses the factors that 
lead to the production of racist news. Therefore, this thesis examines the process of 
news production, consumption and dissemination. Lastly, it intends to integrate Cohen’s 
concept of ‘Folk Devils and Moral Panics’ and its relationship with the media 
representations of Muslims, particularly in the wake of 7/7, and also whether the media 
are responsible for stigmatising and stereotyping Muslims.    
Obviously, prejudice against Muslims is a well-established fact but it was not as serious 
as it became in 1996 after the Runnymede Trust report suggested the expression 
‘Islamophobia’ in Britain, which became a widely recognised term. During the 1980s 
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and 1990s, a number of events, some of which were discussed earlier, such as the 
Iranian revolution (1979) and The Gulf War (1991), led to an increase in problematic 
images of Muslims in the media as well as a rise in harassment, verbal abuse and hatred 
of Muslims in some sections of society. This situation raised concerns among a number 
of British Muslim campaigning organisations such as “MuslimWise” and “An-Nisa 
Society” that eventually brought the term ‘Islamophobia’ into the mainstream (see 
Richardson, 2012).  
The following year, Said published his study on the media portrayal of Islam and 
Muslims, which provided a basis for understanding Islam and Muslims’ media 
representation. Forty years ago, the issues were rooted in the cultural clash; now they 
are rooted in radicalisation and terrorism. Moreover, at that time, the conflict did not 
involve a security threat although the divide between the secular West and the Islamic 
world was apparent in various writings. Muslims were far behind in terms of science 
and technology and the essence of democracy but now the world has changed 
considerably.  Since then, a number of important studies have been published including 
those by Baker et al. (2013), Poole and Richardson (2004), and Petley and Richardson 
(2011).  
Indeed, media study is a complex and sometimes sensitive subject of inquiry. Thus, on 
the one hand, in talk about the media in public places, private discussions or even in 
academic debates we often hear such views as ‘The media are biased’, ‘They misinform 
and misguide people’, ‘They fabricate stories’, ‘The media sensationalise issues’, ‘I don’t 
trust the media’, ‘They are a government mouthpiece’, ‘Media are controlled by political 
and business elites’, ‘The media give more time to celebrities’, and ‘Minorities are 
excluded from mainstream media’ (Philo et al., 1982; Rosenblum, 1993; Seymour-Ure, 
1996).  
Conversely, discussions and debates on Muslims generate somewhat similar clichés: 
‘Muslims are violent’, ‘they are backwards’,  ‘they don’t pay tax’, ‘they are not law-
abiding citizens’, ‘they live in ghettos and don’t want to integrate’, ‘they are a migraine’, 
‘they want to bring Sharia to Britain’, and so forth. The following sections discuss and 
debate the topic integrating established theoretical concepts relating to the media and 
representations of Muslims and Islam. 
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 It is also important to note that, within the field of media, from early historians to 
modern-day critics and theorists, media studies remain an important field of inquiry. 
Fred S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm’s Four Theories of the Press 
(1956) offer a critical analysis that informs us of the historic roots and workings of the 
press in different political and social structures such as the following: The authoritarian 
theory; libertarian theory; social responsibility theory; and the Soviet communist theory 
(Siebert et al., 1956, p.1-7).  
Other popular traditions of media representation include the widely documented 
framing theory (Bateson, 1955; Fairhurst and Sarr, 1996; Goffman, 1974) and Edward 
Herman and Noam Chomsky’s Propaganda Model (1988) which discusses the 
systematic bias in the news construction. However, this thesis considers news 
discourse, Orientalism and the concepts of folk devils and moral panics.    
3.2-News Discourse: Discrimination and Racism:  
News media have become a significant component of our daily information diet; for 
example, 24/7 news bulletins, be they early morning breakfast or evening dinner 
‘news’, are a special dish on our information menu. Hence, the role and significance of 
the media in social, cultural, economic and political spheres is unavoidable (Curran, 
2002; Freedman, 2008; Tunstall, 1983). Overall, media studies present a complex 
picture suggesting that the media both inform and misinform the public.  
Wickham Steed (1938) writes that “Newspapers exist to get and give news. How they 
get it. It is an intricate story. What they do with it when they have got it is another story” 
(Steed, 1938, p.23). In an early study Lippmann (1921) argues, “Every newspaper when 
it reaches the reader is the result of a whole series of selections as to what items shall be 
printed… There are no objective standards here. There are conventions” (Lipmann, 
1921, p.328).  
Almost a century later, similar issues lie at the heart of academic debates about the 
media. This does not mean that media have not developed since then; rather, the way in 
which news is produced still follows somewhat similar practices to those highlighted by 
Lippman in the last century. Indeed, the power and influence of news in the age of 
advanced technology is far greater and is capable of promoting peace and harmony and 
informing people; at the same time, it fuels differences and becomes a cause of conflict.  
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Evidence shows that news also contributes to racism, which has long been recognised. A 
number of studies have found that media attitudes to ethnic minorities have reached 
the point of racism (Allen and Seaton, 1999; Entman, 1992; Spencer, 2014). Don Heider 
(2014) raises the point that racism is perhaps felt in the news more because newsrooms 
are less multi-ethnic and are dominated, in his view, by white journalists who talk about 
others.  
This state of affairs makes “News” a complex and multi-layered phenomenon. Almost all 
major media studies agree that “News” is a product of social, political, economic and 
cultural factors. The production of “News” entails institutional polices that also sustain 
political and governmental bodies, pressure groups and other organisational pressures 
and controls. For Montgomery, the “News” means “New information of most recent 
events,” and it “constructs a taken-for-granted world of others, of ‘them’, of people 
whom we do not expect to encounter as part of our daily life, in places where we are 
not. But they are second-order realities,” (Montgomery, 2007, p.4-5).  
He cites Hall (1981, p.234) who argues that “Journalists speak of the news as if events 
select themselves...yet [of] millions of events which occur every day in the world, only a 
tiny proportion ever become visible as ‘potential news stories’: and of this proportion, 
only a small fraction are actually produced as the day’s news in the news media” (cited 
in Montgomery, 2007, p.5). He refers to Galtung and Ruge (1965a and 1965b), who state 
that “negative events tend to unfold more quickly than positive events and that the 
meaning of negative events is more emotionally charged, more clear-cut, less 
ambiguous” (ibid, p.8). Montgomery gives the examples of 9/11, the Iraq War, and other 
related incidents to argue that the news media spent more time on these incidents and 
paid less attention to positive events (ibid, p.8). 
A contrasting study was carried out by Machin and Mayr (2008) to investigate The 
Leicester Mercury, a newspaper which promoted community cohesion in Leicester by 
practising specific polices such as avoiding “sensitive” issues. This study is important 
because it presents a constructive role of The Leicester Mercury in bringing together 
people of different races, faiths and ethnicities. These authors explain that this 
newspaper’s editorial policy of promoting mutual respect and understanding in a multi-
ethnic city might provide a useful example to promote community cohesion in other 
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British towns and cities. This example is significant in the current period because 
studies that accuse the media of fomenting conflict and divide among communities 
outnumber those that find positive elements.  
Drawing on both earlier and recent studies, this thesis acknowledges that the way in 
which the British press represents British Muslims and Islam has become Islamophobic; 
indeed, scholars coined a new term, “Islamophobia”, back in the 1990s (Runnymede 
Trust, 1997) to describe anti-Muslim or anti-Islam hatred. Evidence shows that white 
people are the dominant group within the British media and have more editorial power 
and influence in the process of news production (Ainley, 1998; Cottle, 2000). Although 
Muslims are the second largest group after Christians in Britain, they are still 
underrepresented in the media and, hence, ignorance of Islam continues to be a major 
source of bad press.   
Van Dijk (1993) assumes “racism as a form of dominance” and believes that white 
people are the dominant group in the West, possessing social, economic and political 
power (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 21). He emphasises the “discursive reproduction” of racism 
and the role of text and talk in this process. He argues that “genres” and “communicative 
events”, such as “everyday conversation, institutional dialogues, news reports, 
editorials, advertisements, novels, films, text books, lessons, laws, political 
propaganda…”, all play a vital role in the reproduction of racism (ibid, p. 28).  
Drawing on 65 previous studies, Van Dijk demonstrates that the way the British press 
represents ethnic minorities is mostly negative (ibid., p. 241). On the same subject, 
Machin and Mayr’s study incorporates various research projects such as those by 
Hartman and Husband (1974), Murdock (1984), McLaughlin (1999) and Van Dijk 
(1999) and also finds that ethnic minorities “were mainly represented in association 
with crime, violence, social welfare and problematic immigration” (Machin and Mayr, 
2008, p.91).  
Overall, news remains a focal point of discussion in this thesis because of its eminent 
role in eliminating social problems as well as being a source of social conflicts. Wodak, 
(2011) considers previous studies (Fairclough, 1989; Chilton, 2004; Wodak, 2009) and 
finds that the way in which specific terms and words are used to describe certain sets of 
people, for example ‘asylum seeker’, ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’, shows an interchangeable 
relationship which falls into a single category of “foreign” or “other”; hence, in this way 
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“fear of foreigners is constructed; they are then perceived as dangerous, and are blamed 
for many problems” (Wodak, 2011, p.223).  
Language is a powerful and significant component of the news construction. It produces 
an extraordinary effect on the representation of individuals, groups and communities in 
many ways. It is relevant to include an example of The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph 
coverage of the Madrid bombings which occurred on 11 March 2004 and shocked the 
European continent. The reporting of these bombings demonstrates the way in which 
these broadsheets have reported terrorism. One of the best studies on this topic is that 
by Roberto A. Valdeo’n (2007) who has established a corpus based on 150 articles to 
examine the use of two key phrases, “terrorist” and “separatist”, by investigating the 
Madrid Bombings (3/11) in the American and British media including The Guardian and 
The Daily Telegraph. Valdeo’n’s study specifically focuses on the representation of two 
organisations in Britain and Spain, namely the IRA (Irish Republican Army) and ETA 
(the Basque Militant Group). Valdeo’n finds that when the media follow the government 
version they use terms such as “terrorista” for ETA and “terrorist” for the IRA in Britain 
(Veldeo’n, 2007, 109). Further, Valdeo’n states that both The Guardian and The Daily 
Telegraph use the term “Separatist” but avoid “Terrorist” when describing the Spanish 
militant group ETA (Veldeo’n, 2007, 106-109).  
Although, both organisations were presented as troubled groups related with political 
issues but not directly associated with religion. But in context to Muslim involvement 
the language of the newspaper changes linking Islam instead of the perpetrators to the 
terrorists attacks such as The Guardian headline “The worst Islamist attack in European 
history”(see The Guardian, 31 October 2007). The media and Muslims have become 
interdependent in recent years for many reasons. In fact, the media require “news” and 
‘Muslims’ are its current contributor of news worldwide providing the media with 
excuses and reasons to report their matters. Since 7/7, extremism, violence, terrorism, 
protest, and a number of other issues have enabled the media to establish a continuous 
link between “Muslims” and “Islam” (Kumar, 2013; Kundnani, 2014).  
In fact, the media identify, exaggerate, misinform and then finally transform events and 
issues into a panic-like situation, as Stanley Cohen (1972) observes in his study using 
the example of white English youths, “Mods and Rockers”, during the 1960s. More 
specifically, a recent study by Morey and Yaqin (2011) suggests that overall, “Muslims” 
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are largely seen as “Strangers” in media platforms although there is no full-scale “Anti-
Islamic” agenda (Morey and Yaqin, 2011, p.37). They outline a few illustrations of 
constructiveness in the portrayal of Islam and Muslims in certain documentaries and 
films such as Don’t Panic, I’m Islamic (2005), Battle for Islam (2005), The Muslim 
Reformation (2006) and What Muslims Want (2006); in many other examples, they 
dismiss the ‘claim’ that Muslims may have an utterly negative media representation 
(Morey and Yaqin, 2011, p. 56). In addition, Flood et al., (2012), in contrast to other 
media members, give credit and continue to acknowledge the constructive and sensible 
reportage of the BBC in regard to its coverage of extremism, the war on terror and 
terrorism issues, especially after 7/7 (Flood et al., 2012, p.245). 
3.3-News Production:  Tamasha (Drama).  
Thussu (2007) calls News Tamasha [Urdu/Hindi word meaning Drama] (Thussu, 2007, 
p. 110-161). In the same rich vein, James Carey explains that “[N]ews is not information 
but drama. It does not describe the world but portrays an arena of dramatic forces and 
actions…” (cited in Martin, 2004, p.7). The Oxford English Dictionary describes ‘news’ as 
“informal information not previously known to someone.” The word ‘news’ in fact 
echoes something new and for this reason it not only informs but also transforms 
people’s thinking on certain issues, events and characters.  
 Thussu (2007) considers ‘news’ to be a “commodity” (Thussu, 2007, p.110). Endorsing 
Thussu’s point of view, Hamilton (2004, p.7) also describes ‘news’ as a “commodity” and 
thinks it is not a “mirror image of reality” (Hamilton, 2004, p.21). Perhaps because of its 
increasing use in reference to certain groups, communities, and characters, Thussu 
refers to this practice as a “cultural commodity” and argues for a rethinking of the 
European way of news manufacture (Thussu, 2007, p.110-161). His point is also visible 
in Doppelt’s (1994, p.113) work. Above all, Harold Jackson states that “News is a 
commodity: it is packaged, seasoned, and retailed just as much as baked beans. Some 
like it spicy, some bland, but virtually everyone wants it hot” (Jackson, 1978, p.192). 
According to William Randolph Hearst, “News is what someone wants to stop you 
printing; the rest is ads” (cited in Franklin, 1997, p.47), and for Patterson (1998), “News 
is constructed and framed” (Patterson, 1998, p.17). In addition, Cook (1998) assumes 
that “’news’ is a ‘co-production’ of the media and the government” (Cook, 1998, p.3). 
Besides, Tuchman (1978) writes, “News is a window on the World. Through its frame, 
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Americans learn of themselves and others…” (Tuchman, 1978, p.1) But he also 
acknowledges that “the news frame may be considered as problematic” (Tuchman, 
1978, p.1).  
These authors’ various descriptions of news show that it is not just simple information; 
to some extent, it serves the purpose of a producer. In the media world, events of a 
similar nature occurring in different places attract dissimilar coverage. Susan Moeller 
(2009) examines coverage of four terrorist attacks - Madrid (11 March 2004); Taba (7 
October 2004); London (7 July 2005) and Amman (9 November 2005) - in the British 
and American media including The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph. Moeller aims to 
examine how similar events (terrorism) are characterised as different. Her comparison 
discloses that these attacks, although similar in their nature and in their impact on 
human lives, have received contrasting coverage in the American and the British media. 
She finds that the London attacks have received far more coverage than the Madrid 
bombings. Similarly, the Madrid bombings were reported extensively in comparison to 
those in Amman; in turn, those in Amman received more media attention than those in 
Taba (Eygpt) (Moeller, 2009, p. 121).  
She notes that The Guardian published 79 articles on the Madrid bombings in 
comparison to The Daily Telegraph’s 63 articles on the same subject (Moeller, 2009, p. 
121). Certainly, the attack on mainland Britain received far greater coverage in these 
newspapers (The Guardian 122 articles; The Daily Telegraph 196 articles) (Moeller, 
2009, p. 122). In addition, the same pattern of news coverage became visible in regard 
to the terrorist attacks in Amman (Jordon) and Taba (Egypt) (The Guardian 15 and 9; 
The Daily Telegraph 14 and 6) (Moeller, 2009, p. 122). This illustrates how the media 
make certain news events newsworthy and significant while at the same time playing 
down other events of a similar nature.  
Scholars continue to debate the significance, place and work of news in society and 
therefore see it differently; for instance, Murphy (1978) assumes that “The news is 
created and manufactured, not found” (Murphy, 1978, p.177). In comparison to this 
interpretation, Burden (2008, p.19) sees ‘news’ as the “News of the Screws”; thus, these 
assertions suggest that “news” is a complex and rather multi-layered phenomenon. 
Martin (2004) carried out a survey on ‘Self-censorship’ with journalists and found that 
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five per cent of them admitted that the “News that would hurt the financial interests of a 
news organisation often or sometimes goes unreported” (Martin, 2004, p. 44). 
 Perhaps this is the norm in practice because of the complex nature of “news” 
production that sometimes suggests injustice, particularly when it comes to 
representing certain unprivileged groups in society. Mark D. Alleyne (1997) reviews the 
existence and practices of “justice” within the production of international news, 
particularly in accordance with the UN-agreed “New Economic Order” and “New World 
Information and Communication Order” resolutions in the 1970s, which stressed the 
need for equality and the maintenance of justice in news production. Alleyne traces 
elements of stereotypes of certain people and regions in the “news” production 
(Alleyne, 1997, p.58).   Alleyne’s assumption is mostly true because if the principle of 
equality in “news” production is not practised, the news will be nothing more than 
Thussu’s expression “Tamasha” or “Drama”.  Another reason for the presence of such 
practices in “News” production is pointed out by Martin Mayer (1993): “there are 
incidents and people who become newsworthy, very briefly, because they are 
accidentally within the cone illuminated” (Mayer, 1993, p.68).  
This fact is first recognised in the work of an early media scholar, Walter Lippmann, 
who called it the “searchlight” of “News” (cited in Mayer, 1993, p.68). As a result of this, 
the “news” mostly, if not always, fails to reflect facts; as Weaver (1994) notes, in real life 
people witness and interpret events using their own perceptions and, hence, it is often 
difficult to maintain “objectivity” and “facts” in order. He finds that “often facts are 
unclear or their significance is ambiguous” (Weaver, 1994, p. 82). A brief example of 
what Weaver describes here is the British journalist John Pilger’s documentary “A War 
on Democracy” (2007) in which Pilger showed how different American media 
organisations such as CNN used the same footage of a protest from different angles to 
suggest that pro-Chávez protestors opened fire on the anti-Chávez protestors. Pilger 
concluded that the opposite was true and the media had in fact fabricated the evidence 
to suit their agenda.   
To conclude, the competition between different media organisations in search of 
breaking news has somewhat damaged the essence of news. For instance, the media 
organisations often ask journalists to produce stories within certain timeframes, which 
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badly affects the quality of news (see Davies, 2009). Nick Davies (2011) gave the 
example of the BBC guidelines that on the one hand emphasise objectivity and on other 
hand push journalists to produce stories.  Hence, one may say that, with the rise of 
commercialism in the news production, new has become no less than what Thussu 
described above: “Tamasha”.  
3.4-The Language of News:   
Language is a key tool in news production; for instance, headlines transform the entire 
meaning of news instantly. The use of a few powerful words is enough to display the 
policy and attitude of those involved in the process of news production to certain 
communities and issues. For example, words and phrases such as fraud, 
fundamentalists, terrorist, extremist, and opportunist in fact spell out the whole story.  
Fowler (1991) explains this rhetoric in terms of M.A.K. Halliday’s functional model 
which assumes that ‘language performs functions in a specific practical sense...being 
used distinctively to write headlines’ (Fowler, 1991, p. 69). He states that language has 
three important functions at three levels: ‘for the expression of content’, ‘as 
interpersonal function’ and ‘textual function’, which explains the experience, attitude 
and ability of an individual to generate messages using language skills (Fowler, 1991, 
p.69).  
As an example, Fowler uses the 1986 American bombing of Libya, selecting The 
Guardian headlines published between 14 and 19 April 1986. These include “US 
threaten new attacks against Libya”, “Britons lie low in Beirut as hostages die”, “Hunt on 
for Heathrow terrorist”, “Arab held in bomb hunt”’ and “Heartaches and dangers facing 
the foreigners in Beirut”, and he finds “violent acts which were widely assumed to have 
been undertaken in retaliation against Britain’s part in the bombings” (ibid., p.114).  
In these stories, most of the conversation relates to Muslims and there are fewer 
mentions of the government action. Drawing on eleven major studies on news (such as 
Bell 1991; Fairclough 1995; Ungerer 2000) that examine the construction, role and 
impact of language in the process of news manufacturing, Harrison (2006) assumes that 
all these ingredients are essential to construct, disseminate and consume news; 
therefore, Harrison says that “We all need and rely upon news; we have to invest trust 
in those who tell it to us” (Harrison, 2006, p.2).  
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This positive beginning further strengthens the thought that ‘News’ has an impact on 
our day-to-day lives. Tuchman (1978) sees ‘news’ as knowledge and assumes that ‘news 
reports are the only mass medium shaping an understanding of the everyday 
world...[and] may be of a limited force in swaying public opinions and attitudes” 
(Tuchman, 1978, p.3). Other important studies relating to news construction (including 
Scannell 1991; Cameron 1996; and Scollon 1998) offer mixed opinions of news. Shaw 
argues that “when words are used ‘recklessly’ and ‘uncaringly’ they can easily translate 
into ‘fighting’ or ‘hate’ words, or worse still, ‘words of mass destruction’” (Shaw, 2012, p. 
510).  
Obviously, as a result of such representation in the media, “discursive stereotypes and 
clichés portraying Muslims as ‘inferior’, ‘uncivilised’, ‘violent’, and ‘destructive’ 
constitute ‘fighting’ and ‘hate’” (ibid., p.511). That is why many such as Grabe and Zhou 
(2003) consider Thussu’s assertion to have become meaningful, because the news 
displays little responsibility for the effect on society and rather seems to think it is just a 
drama. Shirazi (2010) suggests that all this is a “politics of Image” that rotates around 
two key themes: “the reality and representation” (Shirazi, 2010, p.1).  
A typical pattern of such ‘Drama” is visible in the following irresponsible ‘news’ stories. 
For example, one of the most popular and frequently appearing topics in the press is 
‘grooming’, which often refers to Muslims alone. Joseph Harker wrote an investigative 
article in The Guardian on 22 July 2012 under the heading, “This is how racism takes 
root: The different ways the media covered two cases of men grooming children for sex 
show how shockingly easy it is to demonise a whole community” (The Guardian, 2012). 
Accordingly it emerged that there are in fact more non-Muslim men than Muslims 
involved in this heinous crime. The Jimmy Savile case shows that the press also covers 
sex crimes committed by other members of society.  
Sections of the British press, particularly The Guardian, published several articles to 
discuss the issue and its relationship with Muslims. In one of its articles, Vikram Dodd 
refers to a study (2011) conducted by the ‘Child Exploitation and Online Protection 
Centre’ that examines “2,379 potential offenders caught grooming girls since 2008. Of 
940 suspects whose race could be identified, 26% were Asian, 38% were white and 
32% were recorded as unknown. Asians are roughly 7% of the population” (The 
Guardian, 14 May 2013). Moreover, Muslim sex offenders such as Rochdale sex gang 
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ringleader Shabir Ahmed are facing deportation and the loss of their citizenship but no 
one has suggested the same punishment for other members of society (see BBC, 16 
February 2016).  
Baker (2010) cites ten leading studies, especially Akbarzadeh and Smith (2005, p.4) and 
McEnery (2005) and Partington (2006), that indicate the presence of anti-Muslim bias 
in the news. Furthermore, Baker’s corpus suggests that British Muslims receive a 
negative media portrayal, with the most common words appearing in the tabloids being 
‘terrorists’, ‘bombers’, ‘killers’, and ‘suicide attackers’ (Baker, 2010, p.13-25). Wodak 
continues by discussing the role of language and its relationship with different 
influential people, such as politicians, editors and others, who use language as a tool to 
safeguard their interests.  
She points out that in the modern age “we no longer communicate only in ‘traditional’ 
written or spoken genres, but also using new ones, such as text messages, email, tweets 
and Facebook posts”, which has turned communication into a globalised act (ibid, 
p.216). McCarthy and Carter (1994) find that language is complex and not 
straightforwardly “transparent and neutral”; rather, it “is a site in which beliefs, values, 
and points of view are produced, encoded, and contested” (McCarthy and Carter, 1994, 
p.155).  
In British society, the north-south divide and the difference between the forms of 
language used in various British newspapers reflect the fact that “cultural values” and 
“ideologies” are explained in the forms of writings, such as in newspaper headlines. To 
illustrate this, these authors refer to three different newspapers: The Guardian (an 
independent liberal paper that is considered “quality press”) versus the Daily Express or 
The Sun or Daily Telegraph; these newspapers have different values, beliefs and of 
course language (ibid, p.156), since they obviously have different readers.  
From this discussion, ‘power’ also emerges as another important aspect of language 
discourse that significantly affects the production of news. Fairclough (1989) offers a 
descriptive account of language and its relationship with authority and power, 
particularly in contemporary Britain. He considers the significant role of language in the 
“production, maintenance, and change of social relations of power” and its contributions 
to the “domination of some people by others” (Fairclough, 1989, p. 1). To validate his 
point, Fairclough argues that language is not only a “primary medium of social control 
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and power” but has also “grown dramatically in terms of the uses it is required to 
serve…” (ibid, p.3). 
This shows that “the ideological nature of language” has made it one of the key “themes 
of modern social science” (ibid). Despite its indisputable importance, Fairclough also 
finds that, in many studies, the notion of “ideology”, which is closely linked to language 
and power, is missing (ibid, p.2). Fairclough assumes that since the “producers exercise 
power over consumers in that they have sole producing rights and can therefore 
determine what is included and excluded and how events are represented…journalists 
work under editorial control” (ibid, p.50). Additionally, Fairclough finds that, “In the 
British media, the balance of sources and perspectives and ideology is overwhelmingly 
in favour of existing power holders…”; for this reason “the media operate as a means for 
the expression and reproduction of the power of the dominant class and bloc” (ibid, 
p.51).  
Earlier, this thesis established that there is a predominant narrative of three capital 
‘M’s’: the Muslims, Media and the Middle East. Certainly, the Middle East has always 
been a focal point of academic and media attention, mainly because of the Western 
powers’ political and economic interests. The political, social and cultural landscape of 
the oil-rich Middle East has been changed enormously in the past few decades. Yet, to an 
extent, its image in the Western media, Hollywood films and literature is still 
stereotypical (see Said, 1997; Shaheen, 2008 and 2015). In a way, this depressing 
reminder prompts us to ask about the reasons behind the stereotypical representations 
of the Middle East and its people and whether they denote a never-ending conflict 
between the West and the Rest (the Middle East). The next section discusses the 
relevance of Edward Said’s (1978) Orientalism study in the contemporary period. 
Notably, it is considered essential for an understanding of Muslims’ representation and 
has been used successfully by many academics since its publication.  
3.5-Terrorism Discourse:  
In the context of the Middle East, terrorism is a reoccurring theme in the media 
reporting probably because of the Israel-Palestine conflict, the Saudi-Yemen clash, the 
crisis in Iraq and Syria and terrorist groups operating in the region, such as the ISIS. 
Besides, the Western powers’ political and economic interests and their direct military 
involvement in the region have led to an increase in the media presence. Given the 
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contemporary political settings in the Middle East it is therefore essential to include the 
existing terrorism discourse and ask some crucial questions: Is terrorism solely a 
Muslim problem? What role do the media play in covering these conflicts and when and 
how did the relatively new phrase “Islamic Terrorism” emerge? Has any other religion 
been portrayed like Islam before?  
(i) Defining and Understanding Terrorism:  
Several notable studies observe that terrorism is a contested concept; hence, a single 
definitive description is virtually impossible to produce (Alali and Byrd, 1957, p.19-101; 
Miller, 1982, p.14; Paletz and Vinson, 1992, p.1-5). Wardlaw notes that there is no single 
agreed definition of terrorism (Wardlaw, 1989, p.3). The complexity of the debate is 
confirmed by Wardlaw’s acknowledgement that all debates on terrorism will come up 
with dissimilar views (Jaehing, 1982, p.106; Schlesinger et al., 1998, p.110).  
Richard W. Schaffert’s (1992) study traces more than a hundred existing descriptions of 
terrorism; however, these have not received an agreed universal recognition (Schaffert, 
1992, p.1). It has long been challenging to define “Terrorism” as Walter Laqueur finds 
that, from 1936 to 1982, 103 definitions of terrorism emerged (cited in Murphy, 1989, 
p.3). Since then it has been explained from Western states’ perspective (FBI, 2014).  
In Britain, the security agency website defines it as “The use or threat of action designed 
to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to 
intimidate the public, or a section of the public; made for the purposes of advancing a 
political, religious, racial or ideological cause; and it involves or causes serious violence 
against a person…” (MI5, 2015) Currently, terrorism is one of the most widely discussed 
and examined topics in academia and the media. Reports on terrorism often suggest 
that it is one of the most serious issues facing Britain.  
John F. Murphy (1989) considers the distinctive nature of the terms “terror” and 
“terrorism” and their use in the media. In more detail, he suggests that the word “terror” 
was first used during the French Revolution while “terrorism” refers to “actions of 
private individuals or groups” and was used in Brussels in 1930 during a conference 
(Murphy, 1989, p.3). These descriptions of terrorism “have been used by politicians as 
labels to pin on their enemies” and for this reason it has lost its meaning(s) (ibid). 
Terrorism appears in a range of violent activities that include state terrorism, religious 
86 
 
terrorism, separatist terrorism, political issues-related terrorism. For instance, suicide 
bombers often target unarmed civilians and, sometimes, military installations.  
In addition, a judge decides on its legal position, saying that “The world community 
should stop using the term ‘terrorism’ entirely” (ibid, p.3). In the same vein, Marc 
Redfield (2009) highlights that the political use of the words “terror” and “terrorism” 
emerged in Europe in the eighteenth century (cited in Redfield, 2009, p.72). Geoffrey 
Nunberg states that both phrases, “terror” and “terrorism”, are “vague and politically 
manipulated” (ibid, p.71). According to Whittaker (2009), the concept of terrorism dates 
back to the 1920s and was known as “The Troubles” (Whittaker, 2009, p.61). The 
majority of terrorism discussions reflect that it is power-driven and serves the interests 
of ruling powerful elites who benefit from it.  
In brief, it is often said that “one nation’s terrorists are another’s freedom fighters”. 
Rudolf Ondrich (2014) writes: “The media portrays terrorism as only being committed 
by enemy groups. Terrorist acts committed by the United States and its allies are not 
considered to be ‘real terrorism’ and claims of terrorist acts are summarily dismissed by 
the media” (Ondrich, 2014, p.1). Arguably, it distracts attention from corruption 
committed by those in power, or terrorist organisations such as warlords’ private 
armies use it as a mechanism to control people. Typically, governments put huge 
budgets aside to provide for their people’s security, create Special Forces to defend them 
against presumed attacks and establish departments to deal with terrorism. All this is 
particularly visible in Britain, where £30 million is spent on counter-terrorism each 
year.  
In the light of the conceptual framework of E. V. Walter (1964), the sociology of 
terrorism is a process that involves “the act or threat of violence, the emotional reaction, 
and the social effects”; he calls this a system of terror where “it is confined to a special 
class or group within a society” (cited in Wilkinson, 1974, p.35). Of course, this is a 
complex and lengthy discussion because, on the one hand, terrorism is perpetrated by 
non-state actors and, on the other hand, it consists of a “system of state terror, colonial 
terror, police terror…special forms of repressive terrorism” (ibid, p.43).  
(ii)-The Big Debate:  “Newness” in Terrorism.  
Although the literature on terrorism shows that it is ancient practice, in the current 
scenario ‘newness’ refers to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Hence, it is presented as a new 
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phenomenon in terms of a superpower coming under attack. Wolfsfeld (2011) believes 
that “’The Age of Terrorism’ began, of course, on September 11, 2001, when Islamic 
terrorists flew two jets into the World Trade Centre in New York” (Wolfsfeld, 2011, 
p.86).  
In addition, Matthew J. Morgan (2004) describes it as “The Origins of the New 
Terrorism” whilst Spencer (2006) believes that “new” terrorists are those who want to 
acquire deadly biological and chemical weapons with which to attack the West and 
America. Europe has experienced a few terrorism incidents such as Madrid (2004), the 
London bombings (2005) and Paris (2015) that involved Muslim perpetrators; this 
makes terrorism new because none of the members of Muslim communities in Europe 
had ever attacked the countries of their birth.   
Obviously, these authors, including Wolfsfeld, are referring to Muslims of Arab origin, 
such as those who carried out the New York bombings. However, from a philosophical 
point of view, if the “newness” is attached to the notion of biological, chemical and 
deadly weapons, then the Americans had used such weapons long ago in Japan; hence, 
does it make sense to say that it started on 6 August 1945?       
Similarly, on 7 July 2010, The Guardian remembers the occasion as follows: “London 
bombings: the day the anti-terrorism rules changed”. Keeping in mind the value of life, 
some fundamental questions arise here: Is terrorism the biggest challenge facing the 
world? Who benefits from terrorism? Why did the rules change on that particular day 
when the world has witnessed worse forms of terrorism long before that day?  
Of course, terrorism is inhuman and condemnable, just like war and the dropping of 
nuclear bombs. But, for a philosophical discussion, it seems that a notable feature in 
current terrorism debates is the notion of “newness” that relates it to Islam, possibly 
because those perpetrators confess in their video messages, be they the 7/7 bombers or 
other al-Qaeda-related individuals, that they are perhaps doing it for Islam.   
The contemporary discourse of terrorism suggests that the “new” wave is a particular 
problem of “Islam”, which is also well-established in many studies (Amanat, 2001, p.23; 
Hill, 2001, p.81; Chaliand and Blin, 2007, p.95). Googling “New Terrorism” produced 
376,000, 000 results (on 21/05/2014), which means that a vast variety of 
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commentaries has arisen from different sources that discuss the concept of “newness” 
within the broader field of terrorism.  
Much of this scholarship explains the attacks on New York and the commencement of an 
era of the “new” conflict, the “War on terror” resulting from it. Afterwards, the Madrid 
and London bombings further strengthened the perspective of “new terrorism”. Several 
studies assume that terrorism has been redefined and reconstructed through the prism 
of the powerful West that frequently links modern terrorism to “Islam” (Silverman, 
2004, p.148; Gabriel, 2006, p.124; Palmer and Palmer, 2004, p.194).   
The “newness” is a wide-ranging phenomenon and offers various perspectives. For 
instance, Mark Juergensmeyer (2003) assumes that the use of the typical notion “in the 
name of God” makes it an “Islamic terrorism” (Juergensmeyer, 2003, p.185). Other 
scholars such as Stern (2003) follow the same argument.  However, Wilkinson (2003) 
understands it as a “weapon” that is used by states, as well as by disfranchised groups 
and individuals, as a political and religious tool (Wilkinson, 2003, p.106-121). Crenshaw 
(2003) assumes that, ever since the Iranian revolution of 1979 and a series of other 
events such as the 1993 bombings of the World Trade Centre, the 1995 Oklahoma City 
bombings, and the attack on American military installations in Saudi Arabia (1995), the 
American administration has felt threatened (Crenshaw, 2003,  p.161).  
Some of these incidents had links with the Middle East, predominantly a Muslim region, 
which may be a reason for the increasing level of discussion of “Islam” in the media and 
public spheres. During this period, terror related to al-Qaeda has damaged the 
reputation of Islam because radicals frequently use their versions of verses of the 
Qur’an. However, the “newness” often brings about the construction of “Islamic 
Terrorism” (Arquilla, et al., 1999, p.39).  
During the mid-1990s the word “Islam” was excessively associated with terror and, 
hence, a new era of terrorism began (Crenshaw, 2003, p.165). Importantly, this thesis 
views the “new era” of terrorism as a shift from fear of a nuclear attack by the Cold War 
enemy, Russia, to a “supposed” nuclear attack from a new enemy, the Muslims. A 
number of defence sources see “newness” in terms of weaponry and a new way of 
targeting the West by radicals such as Al-Qaeda members (National Commission, 2004).  
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On the other hand, several British scholars offer a different analysis of terrorism. For 
example, Paul Rogers believes that the rise of terrorism is perhaps linked with the 
imperial ambitions and global dominance of America that is referred to as “a new 
American century” and that became prominent in the late 1990s in US politics as a 
result of lobbying by powerful interest groups (Rogers, 2008, p.5). After studying the 
post-9/11 situation, Douglas Little (2013) argues that the “Red Threat” seems to have 
been replaced by the “Green Threat” in the West (Little, 2013, p.71). Morgan (2004) 
reviews work by a range of scholars who relate “newness” to nuclear, biological and 
chemical attacks. For Morgan, it is presented as a “third wave of vulnerability” followed 
by a “fourth wave” of terrorism which focuses on “the break-up of empires, de-
colonialization, and anti-Westernism” (sic) (Morgan, 2004, p. 29-30).  
The “newness” could possibly be viewed in either way, i.e., as political or religious 
rivalry. I would argue that, since Muslims are not politically well established, the 
“secular” West has singled out “Islam” as its rival religion mainly because of its growth. 
Currently, data from different sources confirm that more people in Britain are claiming 
not to have any religion (National Statistics, 2013). This idea has some credence, 
especially when one reviews the historical records of empires, particularly the Roman 
Empire. Niall Ferguson (2001) finds the presence of a rivalry between the state and 
religion; for instance, the corruption of the Roman Empire allowed it to view a radical 
form of Christianity as a resilient force (Ferguson, 2001, p.123). Edward Gibbon (2000) 
argues that whenever empires were confronted with religions they branded them as 
“new” political opponents (cited in Ferguson, 2001, p.120-22).  
The emergence of Islamic revival movements in different parts of the Muslim world 
gave birth to the idea of “Islamism” or “Political Islam”. In the West, scholars began to 
describe various movements in Muslim lands aiming to establish society according to 
Islamic teachings.  According to Philippe Miguax (2007), initially the term “Islamism” 
was coined to explain political Islam. It has received more publicity as it is used to 
describe fundamentalism which is an outcome of interpretations of religious ideology 
with its roots in Sharia (Migaux, 2007, p.259). Henceforth, “Islamism” progressively 
appears in the forms of “radical Islamism”, “militant Islamism” and “activist Islamism” 
to describe violence used by radical groups to attain their goal (ibid).  
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Migaux concludes that other similar phrases such as “Islamist terrorism” or “jihadist 
terrorism” also became popular mainly because of the new wave of terrorism that 
began on 9/11 (ibid., p.259). Parallel to “Islamic” radical groups, Christian radicals such 
as The Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda and Christian Anti-Balaka Militia in Rwanda are 
a few examples of the use of sacred religious texts as an excuse for violence by 
misguided individuals. In this regard, in the last few decades the practising of the old 
phenomenon of “Suicide terrorism” has perhaps been triggered by the increasing media 
attention (Géré, 2007, p.363; Pape, 2003, p.345).  
In most of these cases, “terrorism” has overtly referred to “Islamic” acts ever since the 
war against terrorism began on September 11 (Hill, 2001, p.84). More importantly, Hill 
believes that modern “terrorism thrives on myth” (ibid, p.83). Thus Hill, like Pape 
(2003), in fact dismisses the linkage of religion with “terrorism”. However, in contrast to 
these scholars Walter Laqueur (1999) writes that “religion has always been a main 
feature of terrorism; the Sicari, the Assassins, and the Indian secret societies practicing 
thugee were religious sects”, which is the prime reason for the use of words such as 
“zealot”, “assassin” and “thug” (Laqueur, 1999, p. 127). 
Certainly, a tiny minority of those perpetrators misinterpret their religious teachings to 
attain their political goals; in the current scenario a few al-Qaeda and ISIS members 
often claim that they are fulfilling the commandments of their religion. But a vast 
majority of Muslims discredits them and their misunderstanding and misinterpretation 
of religious teachings. However, Laqueur also admits that thirty years ago “global 
terrorism was predominantly secular in inspiration and in orientation, right wing, left 
wing, or nationalist extremist” and that “Islam in modern history has not engaged in 
acts of mass violence on a Hitlerian or the Pol Pot scale” (ibid., p. 128). It is only recently 
that the “popular Western perception equates radical Islam with terrorism” (ibid, p. 
129).  
Several other scholars hold similar thoughts about Western perceptions of Islamic 
terrorism (Dalacoura, 2011, p.33; Martin, 2012, p.162; Heath and Zahedi, ‎2011, p. 104). 
The vast majority of academic studies assume that the notion of “newness” relating to 
“terrorism” is not a simple phenomenon to describe because there are those who 
believe that a new kind of threat ranging from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons 
to modern warfare such as drone attacks is a reality. On the one hand it is aimed at 
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states and people, and on the other it is directed by states against anarchist 
organisations and individuals. Therefore, perpetrators of terrorism hold different sets 
of political and religious motives, goals and affiliations. 
Often, misguided and disfranchised individuals commit criminal acts, such as the 
murder of Lee Rigby, an unarmed British soldier, in 2012 and the Norwegian (2011) 
attacks. In both cases the perpetrators thought they were serving their presumed God. 
To legitimate and validate their barbaric actions they find excuses, be they political or 
religious. Truly, terrorism has become more apparent in scholarly discussions in the 
aftermath of 9/11 and 7/7 (Clark, 2001; Martin et al., 2004). The use of terrorism is 
politically driven when those involved in terrorist activities globally assume that their 
actions are against Western governments because these governments support 
oppressive and brutal regimes in the Middle East.  
Leonard Weinberg (2005) writes that the idea of “new terrorism” in fact suggests the 
attempts by governments to divert people’s attention from basic economic, political and 
social issues, particularly in the West (Weinberg, 2005, p.1). Interestingly, Weinberg 
notes that a single significant event, 9/11, became a source of the use of the phrase 
“new terrorism” and its linkage with “Islam” and “Muslims” (ibid, p.41). Weinberg states 
that the new wave of “terrorism” has “most obviously” been stimulated by religion 
[Islam] and that “Muslims claiming inspiration from Islamic ideas have been responsible 
for much of new terrorism” globally (ibid, p.43). In his recent publication, Weinberg 
(2013) reaffirms his stance on “Islamic Terrorism” exemplified by “the relationship 
between Terrorism and the Arab Spring” (Weinberg, 2013, p.63).  
Recent evidence shows that Weinberg’s illustration is weak because the connection 
between the Arab Spring and terrorism was rooted not in religion but in political goals 
as different Western and regional governments supported their chosen sectarian 
groups to curb unfavoured groups. This whole situation suggested that the Arab Spring 
was perhaps an example of Islamic terrorism. In a series of articles The Guardian’s 
writers such as Seumas Milne disclosed that “American forces bomb one set of rebels 
while backing another in Syria” (see The Guardian, 3 June 2015).  
3.6-Orientalism in the Words of Said:   
Although almost three decades have passed, Said’s Orientalism is still considered a well-
established, widely acknowledged and the most cited text in a sizable number of 
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inquiries into the representation of people in distant lands. Having been translated into 
36 languages across the world, his work stimulates considerable discussions and 
debates and still functions in media and communication studies. 
In 1995, Said included an afterword and in 2003 a preface in the same volume. These 
deal with the criticisms of Orientalism and also provide an explanation of his thoughts 
on the same subject in the wake of 9/11, the War on Terror and the Iraqi invasion. Thus, 
he attempts to make it an up-to-date, valid and relevant guidebook that reveals different 
ways in which the West views, studies and positions people in faraway places, 
particularly in the Middle East, the birthplace of Said before he settled in the United 
States.  
He acknowledges that the terms ‘Orient’ and the ‘West’ are both human inventions to 
describe the “other” and that this description and interpretation of “other” could be 
either positive or negative. In other words, for him, an identification of “Otherness” 
consists of various labels such as “fear, hatred, disgust, resurgent self-pride, and 
arrogance” (Said, 2003, p. xiii). Hence, these attributes not only portray and represent 
sets of people but perhaps also create a distinction between the non-Westerner and the 
“Westerner”; that is to say, “Orientalism” is a way of thinking that is “based upon an 
ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the 
time) ‘the occident’” (ibid., p.2). For him “Orient” and “occident” are “two forms of 
humanity”; one might also say “East” and “West” or “Europe” and “Asia” (ibid, 115).  
Said employs the term “orient” to describe the Middle East because the majority of the 
population is Muslim; hence, the “orient” in his study could be seen as “Muslims” whilst 
the term “Occident” refers to “Westerners”. Another important factor to consider is that 
Said dismisses the perception that the “’Orient’ was essentially an idea, or a creation 
with no corresponding reality” (ibid, p.5). In fact, he believes that “Orientalism” is “a 
Western style for dominating, restricting, and having authority over the orient” (ibid, 
p.3).   
In brief, for Said, “Orient” is connected to Europe as a place where Europeans, in 
particular Britain and France, set up their richest and greatest colonies; it was therefore 
the “source of its civilisations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one of the 
deepest and most recurring images of the other” (ibid., p.3). At present, especially in 
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regard to Muslims, “Orientalism” as Said predicts “is a shift from the British and French 
to American hegemony” (ibid, p.25). More precisely, it is something like “inferiority” 
versus “strength” or “East” versus “West” (ibid, p. 201). Resulting from such a 
description, “the orient that appears in Orientalism, then, is a system of representations 
framed by a whole set of forces that brought the orient into Western learning, Western 
consciousness, and later, Western Empire” (ibid, p. 202). For that reason it is a “product 
of certain political forces and activities” and also “a school of interpretation whose 
material happens to be Orient, its civilisations, peoples, and localities” (ibid, p.203).  
At this point it is essential to review Said’s concept of “Orientalism” once again in order 
to broaden our understanding of current circumstances as well as the recent past events 
and conflicts. Notably, by ‘Orient’ Said doesn’t necessarily mean just ‘Islam’ and  
‘Muslims’; he means that “the Orient” is a “constituted entity, and the notion that there 
are geographical spaces with indigenous, radically ‘different’ inhabitants who can be 
defined on the basis of some religion, culture, or racial essence proper to that 
geographical space”. This is why he now assumes that “Orientalism” has been 
“successfully accommodated to the new imperialism… the continuing imperial design to 
dominate Asia” (ibid, p.322).   
Typical of such a scenario is the sequence of events that have occurred in the recent 
past such as the defeat of the Soviet Union, the West’s non-Muslim and communist 
enemy, in Afghanistan. Since then, different nations have been seen as threats to and 
enemies of the West or perhaps its imperial ambitions. Currently, in the aftermath of 
9/11, the resulting War on Terror, and the 7/7 attack in Britain, Muslims appear as a 
case-study of “modern Orientalism”. Hence, the underlying notion emerging from Said’s 
work is the “otherness” on the basis of “difference” that allows the powerful “West” at 
present to define and identity “others” who are constantly changing. As Said argues, 
“each age and society re-creates its ‘others’” through an “interpretative process which 
involves” and “identifies different ‘others,’ whether they are outsiders and refugees, or 
apostates and infidels” (ibid, p.332).  
Finally, to sum up the idea of “Orientalism” and its relevance to Muslims in the given 
circumstances, a key example is the invasion and destruction of a country in a faraway 
place “in the name of freedom” that is presented by all sorts of “polemicists, politicians, 
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evangelical, and right-wing radio hosts” using the “same unverifiable fictions and vast 
generalisations” to show “America” against “the foreign devil” on the assumption that 
they (Muslims) are “not like us” and don’t appreciate “our values”; hence, they are a 
threat and should change or become like us (ibid, p. xv). This particular event allows 
him to say that the Western “enlightening and civilising [of] ‘Others’ has brought 
nothing but destruction” (ibid, p. xvi).         
Evidence indicates that most of such misleading and inaccurate representations of Islam 
and Muslims in fact come from the media. The best illustration of this can be seen in 
Said’s work (1981), which provides an incredible volume of proof that most media 
citations of Islam are “peculiarly traumatic news” in the present-day West, which tells 
readers, audiences and listeners that Islam is perhaps a “menace to the West” (also cited 
by Majaj, 2000, p.324; Parsons, 1999, p.60). To Said, this happens because different 
modes of communication including television, radio and newspapers follow “certain 
rules and conventions to get things across intelligibly”. Therefore, reality often does not 
fully appear in news; rather, news stories reflect reduced reality (Said, 1981, p.45). 
Hence, the “picture of Islam (and of anything else, for that matter) is likely to be quite 
uniform, in some ways reductive, [sic] and monochromatic” (ibid., p.45).  
3.7-Critique of Orientalism: 
Crockett (2005) writes that the term “Orientalism” is now considered a limited tradition 
in relation to the study of the Orient. Therefore, on the occasion of the 29th 
International Congress of Orientalists in 1973 it was decided that the field of study 
should be regard as Oriental studies or area studies (Crockett, 2005, p.19). Stuart Hall 
argued that “Orientalism” was Foucauldian in inspiration more than in method’ (cited in 
Abu El-Haj, 2013, p.70). Although “Orientalism” deals with people in distant lands, some 
of them such as Muslims are now established communities in Europe (ibid, p. 19).  
Therefore it is more valid now; however, the fundamental question is whether it is 
applicable to British Muslims or perhaps white converts.  
One key objection to the “Orientalism” discourse is that it presents closed narratives of 
the ‘Other’ and, therefore, often offers misleading opinions. In this regard, K. Humayun 
Ansari’s (2013) study begins by asking whether it is time for “Re-thinking Orientalism” 
He states that the British historical imagination of the Muslim world is a blend of hostile, 
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sympathetic, and admiring accounts of Islam and Muslims. He enlists several Orientalist 
scholars such as T.W. Arnold and E.G. Browne, who argue that “European and Muslim 
cultures had interacted in the past in mutually influential and beneficial ways” and 
therefore they offer an idea of global community (Ansari, 2013, p.11). 
 In contrast to this were William Muir and others who undervalued Islam and 
misrepresented Muslims (ibid). However, Ansari also acknowledges Said’s viewpoint 
that “all knowledge is a product of its age” and that his critique helps scholars to 
“become more acutely and self-critically aware of the existence of multiple perspectives 
and the need to consider them in historical analysis” (ibid, p.16-17).  Likewise, Daniel 
Martin Varisco (2007) enlists those intellectuals who see Said as courageous and 
admire his scholarship yet pinpoint faults in his thesis and disagree with him on certain 
issues; these include Aijaz Ahmed and Fred Halliday. In comparison, Martin Kramer and 
a few others call him “a left-wing culprit”, because Said’s work blames the West for the 
problems in the Middle East (Varisco, 2007, p. xiii-xv). Said received hostility from the 
pro-Israeli and right-wing press who branded him a “professor of terror” and criticised 
him for his stance on Palestine and American policies in the Middle East, although they 
did not see him as a secular Westerner (The Guardian, 26 September 2003).  
In his novel, Alam al-din (1882), Ali Basha Mubarak described the Orientalist as an 
“advocate of the East in the West” (cited in Varisco, 2007, p.151). But for many who are 
engaged in modern debates, Mubarak’s work, Alam al-din, is a fiction because 
mythologies, language and characters of the Orient have significantly changed 
(Tegeldin, 2011; Selim, 2004). Despite considerable criticism, “Orientalism” provides a 
foreign perspective of culture and enhances one’s knowledge and ideas of others in 
numerous ways. Varisco states that his main disagreement with Said is that his use of 
“power and ideology” with which the West describes its Orient is actually 
“unidirectional”, which means that it is limited to the Middle East. Varisco provides 
illustrations such as Chinese representation and construction of the ‘Western Other’ 
(ibid, p.152).  
Using several critical narratives, Driss Habti (2010) also denunciates Said for blending 
Michel Foucault’s and Antonio Gramsci’s concepts and illustrates this by citing Dennis 
Porter’s allegation that Said’s “Orientalism” shows “a continuous history of oppressive 
representational practices from the eighteenth century through to the present day” that 
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display a “homogeneity of colonial discourse” (Habti, 2010, p.22-24). Habti also uses an 
example of Occidentalism discourse as a reverse of “Orientalism” that produces a 
stereotypical and dehumanising representation of the West (ibid, p.85).  
However, Occidentalism is a recent field of study through which non-Westerners 
construct Europe (Jouhki, 2006; Venn, 2000). Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit (2005) 
highlight the Occidentalism discourse as the main cause of increasing hostility to and 
hatred of the West in the Middle East and claim that the birth of al-Qaeda and other 
radical organisations is actually a result of this thesis.  
On balance, the Orientalism discourse begins by acknowledging the legacy of Said’s 
theocratic interpretations of the Orient and his representation of the ‘Other’ (Iskander 
and Rustom, 2010; V. Spanos, 2009; Vickery, 2013). In contrast, those who disagree 
with Said on a number of issues, such as his secular thinking and views on humanism, 
include Herron (1996), Courville (2010) and Sardar (1999). 
 Sardar’s (1999) key differences with Said begin with the grievance that his work is built 
upon various disciplinary boundaries such as Islamic studies, linguistics, history and 
philosophy in which Said borrowed from Tibawi, Alatas, Abdel-Malik, Talal Asad, Ramila 
Thapar  and others but did not give credit to any them (Sardar, 1999, p.65). A series of 
objections include the accusation that the achievement of Orientals are ignored by this 
study whilst evidence shows that the two civilisations have a shared essence recorded 
in great books; “Orientalism” still relies heavily on medieval images of Islam and, hence, 
it looks like “discarding old-fashioned clothes in favour of more modern attire” (ibid, 
p.58). Furthermore, Sardar cites a number of scholars who, like him, note that the idea 
of ‘humanism’ is vague because it “offers no alternative to the discourse it critiques”. 
Here, Sardar states that there should be an option other than a “secular humanism and 
its high culture” (ibid, p.73-74).  
Similarly, Said blames religion as the prime cause of conflict and human suffering but at 
the same time ignores the secular ideologies behind Marxism, Stalinism, Maoism, Pol 
Pot nationalism, modernity and other notions that have helped produce violence far 
greater than any religious wars in recent memory (ibid., p.75). In fact, Sardar points out 
that “Humanism came to Europe from Islam in the twelfth century along with the vast 
corpus of Muslim scholarship” that Said refuses to credit (ibid).  
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However, Mathieu Courville (2010) advocates Said’s stance on secularism and dismisses 
his critics such as William D. Hart, Bernard Lewis and Martin Kramer, which shows that 
Said’s authority on “Orientalism” discourse remains resilient. Several other critics such 
as Varisco see “Orientalism” as limited in scope and also “unidirectional”. However, 
despite differences on several issues with Said, Varisco acknowledges that critics want 
to “strengthen” rather than “jettison” Said’s achievements because Said in fact provides 
them with a reason to discuss and debate a strand of scholarship (ibid). In addition, 
Sardar refers to Maryam Jameelah’s work which is based on six main orientalists and 
concludes that “Orientalism is not a dispassionate, objective study of Islam and its 
culture by the erudite faithful in the best tradition of scholarship” (ibid, p.56).  
3.8- Orientalism: Relevance in Contemporary Debates on Islam and Muslims.  
The contemporary debates on Islam and Muslims are largely based on Western models 
of society, culture and citizenry within these broad themes, including way of life, beliefs, 
and science as well as systems of governance, knowledge, thoughts and values. 
Altogether, these notions sketch the chain of debates; for instance, democracy is 
attached to system of governance which gives an edge to the West in many ways over its 
opponent the Orient at this moment of history. Said’s viewpoint that ‘Orientalism is a 
system of thoughts’ is perfectly in tune with the present-day Orientalist perspective that 
employs different phrases to achieve its imperial ambitions in a polite manner. For 
instance, for Zillah Eisenstein, “Terrorism is equated with ‘jihad’ which is equated with 
holy wars and death” (Eisenstein, 2004, p.154).  
This enables America and the West to naturally define ‘jihad’ from their own standpoint 
which incorporates their political mission. Possibly, other countries also interpret their 
position from their own standards. Eisenstein illustrates with reference to the US 
president’s mentioning “of the war as Enduring Freedom and Infinite Justice; the 
antiterrorism bill was renamed the Patriot Bill” (ibid). Said mentions that, “the scope of 
Orientalism exactly matched the scope of empire”. This brings the crisis in history which 
is still on-going. Considering American and Western imperial ambitions, Said’s idea is 
still valid and it helps Orientalists to redefine circumstances that suit their aims. In the 
same vein, the current debate on women and their role in society has been transformed 
according to the wishes of the West at large which uses it as a pretext to demonise Islam 
and at same time establish Western hegemony and legacy.  
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In recent years, the West has covered up its wars using the popular notions of freedom, 
justice and liberation of women. The Western governments’ recent wars and their 
support for dictators and radical groups in some parts of the Muslim world have 
affected their fine tradition of Western democracy. There are many different types of 
democracy and rarely have wars involving Western powers ever been fought for any 
vision of democracy. Consequently, some scholars have begun to raise questions over 
the well-marketed idea that democracy is the essence of Western governance. 
Robertson says, “We should put democratic West in inverted commas” (Robertson, 
2014). Robertson’s ideas have probably always been right. In addition, Eisenstein 
illustrates that the West often misleads individuals about the idea of democracy because 
it “was founded on slavery”, and given the practice of Caribbean slavery including sexual 
slavery, rapes, killings and other forms of dehumanisation that still continue today, the 
“Western Enlightenment theory as democratic” lost its real meanings (ibid, p.74-84). 
However, it is important to note that there is not one single system of democracy but, 
rather, many types that all urge different things. For example, there is the British 
parliamentary democracy, which allows a significant minority to control politics, a 
proportional representation system in the Netherlands, which allows all voters to 
return parties according to the proportion of the vote they receive, or other forms, all of 
which have different strengthens and weaknesses and different structures and 
relationships.   
The Western debate on women in the contemporary period is a fine example of 
redesigning the “Orientalism” discourse to attract public attention to the idea that the 
West is actively liberating Muslim women from oppression and male captivity. At best, 
Eisenstein summarises the debate by saying that the Americans skilfully used the 
feminism theory to “successfully call world attention to the Taliban’s horrific treatment 
of Afghan women”, and for this purpose the discourse on the burqa and women’s rights 
campaigns were sold to the public as if they were aimed at the ‘protection’ of women, 
thus encouraging Western people to sympathise with the women and endorse war (ibid, 
148-152).  
Furthermore, she states that the Quran has women-friendly teachings but unfortunately 
these are ignored at the international level even though half a billion Muslim women in 
the world “re-appropriate the veil for access rather than seclusion; diversify diversity 
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the meaning of dress codes to express their freedom”; now, when things are worsening 
as a result of the invasion, Laura Bush is silent (ibid, 153-167). Evidence shows that 
Laura Bush’s justification of the invasion of Afghanistan by suggesting that it was aimed 
at improving the lives of Afghan women was duplicitous (see The Guardian, 20 
September 2002; The Guardian, 12 February 2004).  A long list of Western scholars who 
criticise Laura Bush for misusing feminist ideas to justify the invasion of Afghanistan 
include Friedman (2005, p.29), Green (2015, p.133), Greenberg (2014) and Sheehi 
(2011).  
The English Orientalists, Stanley Lane-Pool and Evelyn Baring, who took the title of Earl 
of Cromer, wrote extensively on Egyptians without having knowledge of their language; 
Cromer became famous as an authority on Egyptians and said that “Islam keeps women 
subjugated” (cited in Lockman, 2004, p.93-94).  This Orientalist approach shows what 
Eisenstein describes as a “state of mind, a set of privileged cultural values” (ibid, p.74). 
It means that everything that the West does is for ‘good’ and it has a legitimate right to 
intervene; therefore the debate on Drones attacks is wrapped up in humanitarian 
assistance (Benjamin, 2013; Gardner, 2013).   
The next example, from a Time Magazine cover page story, best sums up the 
Orientalist’s mind which for Sabine Schiffer (2010), is an illustration of ‘selectively 
mentioning and omitting, emphasising and de-emphasising facts’, suggesting that the 
framing of Muslim women is used to escalate the war in Afghanistan which is hugely 
opposed by the ordinary European people (Schiffer, 2010, p.2). She argues that these 
frames indicate that, in the Western discourse, “humanitarian intervention in the 
Muslim world” is a legitimate case and that ‘Islam is a threat’ to our freedom (ibid). Abu-
Lughod (2002) states that the war on terror is intended to save Muslim women and, in 
the words of Lockman, it shows the politics of “Orientalism”.  
In comparison to Said’s critics, a large body of texts recognises his concept and admits 
that it is even more applicable in modern times (see Jakimów, 2012; Lennon, 2004; 
Paschyn, 2014). These writings trace the image of Islam that the West purposely 
distorted and altered during different periods of history. This strengthens Said’s point 
of view, although he himself was secular and more of a Westerner. But years ago he 
senses that the “present crisis dramatizes the disparity between texts and reality” (Said, 
1978, p.109). 
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Abu el-Haj finds that Orientalism dates back to ancient Greece and supports Said’s idea 
that the Orient is how Europe imagines the East and reflects the fact that “Europe is 
powerful and articulate; Asia is defeated and distant” (ibid, 63). Similarly, Zachary 
Lockman points out the image of Ottoman Turks, who were “often depicted as cruel, 
violent and fanatical, in ways that drew on long-prevalent caricatures of Islam” 
(Lockman, 2004, 42). Most writings of the past portray Turks as cruel, murderous and 
corrupt and as rapists (see Barbour, 2003; Macfie, 2007; Crinson, 2013). In addition, 
Said exposes the “sources of Orientalism” that Orientalists use to sketch the image of 
‘other’, such as a “Lustful Turk” (ibid). 
For Lockman, the ‘Orient’ is a special field of humanities that refers to the study of 
languages, cultures, histories and religions of a particular ‘Orient’, which emerged as 
“Orientalism”. Lockman finds that Europeans use a French term “the Levant” which 
means “land where the sun rises” and is located predominantly in Muslim Asia; he 
considers that “Islam was central” to this new branch of knowledge (Lockman, 2004, 
p.44). Lockman’s analysis shows that Ottoman Turks (Muslims) and their society was 
presented in Europe as backward while they were seen as “boorish, ignorant, 
dishonourable, immoral, ineffectual, corrupt and irrational”; thus, the original image of 
the Ottoman state “as an efficient, just, virtuous and tolerant meritocracy faded away, to 
be replaced by a depiction of that state as corrupt, oppressive and brutal” (ibid., p. 45-
46).  
This shows that the “Orientalism” discourse is used to reconstruct and reframe others 
using terms and phrases that fulfil the purpose. Decades have passed but the Muslim 
image in the West has changed little; that image is of “Sleazy” men who have desires for 
white girls, whom Jack Straw describes as “easy meat” (2011). Perhaps the fair 
complexion is only known to Europe and in the rest of the world people are ugly and 
non-white. Marilyn Nassr (2008) studies the image of Arabs and Islam in French 
textbooks that consist of tales of the pre-Islamic period such as the Paranoiac origin 
representing Arabs as mythical characters (Nassr, 2008, p. 225). However, she traces a 
positive change among a few young writers who portray Arabs no differently from 
those who hold references to the Middle Ages and colonial periods (ibid, p.230). 
 Nassr points out that Muslim Spain was more prosperous than Europe but Arab 
scientists and writers are rarely mentioned (ibid, p.232). Undeniably, early medieval 
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Muslim scientists laid the foundations of scientific inquiry that opened a pathway for 
Europe’s modern inventions and discoveries (Al-Khalili, 2012; Lyons, 2010; Morgan, 
2008). Conversely, these studies evidently support Said’s claim that “Orientalism” is a 
‘product of circumstances’ that may improve or worsen but will not remain constant 
(Said, 2003, p.2).  
Said’s explanation above makes sense because it is evident that Jews, Christians and 
Muslims have collaborated with each other during certain periods of history in Europe 
to develop trade and  intellectual accomplishment (see Glick, 2005, p.4; Vanoli, 2015, 
p.30). On the other hand, it is also evident that, for whatever reasons, Islamic history 
has been distorted. For example, Norman Daniel (1960) procured historic accounts of 
the distortion of Islamic belief, ideas and history, which starts off with the “formula of 
St. John of Damascus”, i.e. to denounce everything in which a Muslim believes including 
his thoughts about the Christ that are true even according to Christianity (Daniel, 1960, 
p.3). Firstly, in a systematic manner the image of Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) as a 
true messenger of Allah (God) was replaced with a “feudal”, “incompetent” and pre-
Islamic period, Jahiliyah, which was interpreted as the Islamic era (ibid, p.241).  Then, 
“the Scriptural picture of the wild men of the desert, sprung from Ismael, [which] fitted 
neatly into the idea of a civilized Christendom” was spread far and wide (ibid). 
Several Western scholars challenge the closed-mindedness of the Western religious 
elites and disclose malicious attempts to vilify Islam. For example, Robinson (1999) 
examines the historical records and writes that Peter the Venerable, the Abbot of Cluny 
(d.1156), endorsed Latin translations of Quran and other Arabic texts to safeguard the 
Church, and thus, “Mediaeval biographies of Muhammad (P.B.U.H)…depicted him as an 
opportunist, an imposter, a lecher and a warmonger” (Robinson, 1999, p.4).  However, 
for R. W. Southern, it is a matter of ignorance of Islam in the Western world, which has 
failed to understand it, even before the eleventh century. The West “knew nothing of 
Islam as a religion. For them, “Islam was only one of a large number of enemies 
threatening Christendom from every direction” (Southern, 1960, p.14). Another point 
that authorises Orientalism’s relevance to the contemporary period is the fact that after 
11 September both Britain and America have continued their “illegal and unsanctioned 
imperial” ambitions, suggesting that the idea of a “clash of civilizations” is never-ending.  
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Poole’s (2002) study concludes that, although decades have passed, the media’s way of 
representing Muslims is somewhat similar; on the other hand, Muslims have emerged 
as a powerful lobbying group, which is having an overall effect on Muslims’ 
representation (Poole, 2002, p. 253). Later on, she provides another comprehensive text 
on the same subject of the Muslim presence in the media in 2006 and again finds that, 
since 9/11 and 7/7, there has been a climate of ‘fear’, ‘threat’, and ‘misunderstanding’ 
about Islam and Muslims. This is evident in the media reporting which is mostly about 
“terrorism”, “violence”, and the “War on Terror”, indicating that “Muslim Otherness” is 
still well and truly alive (Poole and Richardson, 2006).   
Another significant work on Islam using Said’s concept of “Orientalism” comes from 
Sayyid (2003), who calls “Islamic fundamentalism” a type of “Orientalism” and suggests 
that “representations of the Orient are based on textual exegesis rather than modern 
Oriental realities” and perhaps that is why “the oriental is unchanging, uniform and 
incapable of describing itself” (Sayyid, 2003, p. 31-51). Given the circumstances, he calls 
Muslim representation “Weak Orientalism” (ibid, p.39). Furthermore, he provides an 
example of representations of the “white man” as “European” or “English” and argues 
that, in the same way, the representation of “Muslims” tends to appear in media settings 
such as “Saudi” or any other “horrific” form of representation that is reserved for Islam. 
This takes us back to Said’s view of “Orientalism” as a “product of circumstances”, and in 
present political circumstances the representation of Islam is weak. Sayyid calls it “little 
Islam” (ibid), meaning that it is in a reduced shape in media settings.  
Most importantly, Lockman endorses Said’s idea of “Orientalism” and notes that a 
number of leading scholars reject criticism of Said’s work for several reasons, such as 
“the question of terrorism” which is reserved for Muslims and tagged with Islam 
(Lockman, 2004, p.223). Given the present circumstances and the representation of 
Muslims through the prism of the “War on Terror”, Lockman’s study offers a historical 
discourse of ‘terrorism’ that reflects how, during the colonial period, government 
officials used phrases such as “disturbances”, “riots”, and “troubles” to present 
themselves as peacekeepers or helpers whilst Muslims were the ‘bad guys’ (ibid, p. 228-
229). For Nadia Abu El-Haj, Said’s main concern is the problem of representation and 
the way human beings distinguish between themselves and others (Abu El-Haj, 2013, 
p.58). 
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3.9- The Current State of Affairs: The Re-Emergence of ‘Folk Devils and Moral 
Panics’.  
In the current circumstances, the media portrayals of Islam and the Muslims echo 
Cohen’s concept of ‘Folk Devils and Moral Panics’ (1972), in which he discussed how the 
British media identified and symbolised an existing subculture, ‘the Mods and Rockers’, 
in British society. Cohen’s analysis brings out three key elements of the media reporting 
relating to ‘the Mods and Rockers’: ‘Exaggeration and distortion’, ‘prediction’, and 
‘symbolisation’. 
Cohen finds that the media overstated the situation by offering distorted facts and 
figures, images and sound bites recorded with local people and youths, and used words 
such as ‘warriors’, ‘invade’, ‘young Hooligans’, ‘stabbing’, ‘stoning’, and ‘terror on the 
beaches’. Furthermore, Cohen’s analysis finds that the media reporting predicted the 
reoccurrence of similar events in the future unless the authorities dealt with ‘the Mods 
and Rockers’ severely. Thus, the media also use words such as ‘terror’, ‘invade’, and 
’stabbing’ to link this particular event with unknown  future events. The following 
diagram shows the formulation of Cohen’s concept and the related government 
response.  
 
Diagram 3.1: The Formulation of ‘Folk Devils and Moral Panics’. 
(Source): BBC TWO (see Jeremy Cooper, OU Learning Zone - Moral Panics 3/3, Ecstasy) 
explains Stanley Cohen’s (1972) Model.  
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The above diagram explains Cohen’s concept in the form of a classic formulation of 
moral panic that shows how the media skilfully fabricate certain events and present 
them to the general public in a way that creates panic and increases fear. In the next 
phase, the media publish surveys, opinion polls, and distorted facts and figures relating 
to such an event or problem and then transform them into a campaign involving various 
political and activist groups; consequently, the authorities are pressed into tougher 
action against certain groups of people that they think cause problems for society at 
large.  
In regard to examining the representation of Islam in the media, Cohen’s model seems 
more reliable, valid, and relevant because it doesn’t concede the sole power of the 
media in identifying certain groups of people as threats; rather, the media mobilise 
politicians, pressure groups, the general public and government officials to form a 
concrete and agreed opinion that certain groups of people are sources of moral panic 
and folk devils in society and that we should do something about them.  Welch (2005) 
points out that “Moral panics lead to production of and persecution of folk devils” 
(Welch, 2005, p.120). In the past two decades, ‘The Question of the New Muslim’ has 
received currency as a result of the hostile media coverage of Islam and Muslims. There 
have been several significant studies in the past few years such as those by Alexander et 
al. (2013) and Ameli et al. (2007). 
Several sociologists, criminologists and anthropologists have applied Cohen’s idea to 
examine various case-studies across a wide range of subjects such as the social 
construction of deviance which includes youth subcultures, muggings, school violence, 
single mothers, drugs, crime, pornography, child abuse, welfare issues, refugees, asylum 
seekers, gypsies, and, most relevant to my own study, the wearing of the veil, Sharia law, 
and terrorism. Around twenty major studies employ Cohen’s concept of “Folk Devils and 
Moral Panics” including Acton (1994), Ben-Yehuda (1990), Hayle (2013) and Massey 
and Singh (2012).  
It is worth noting that Cohen’s concept of ‘Folk Devils and Moral Panics’ has been used 
in several leading studies in association with Islam and British Muslims in particular, 
possibly because a series of events since the 1980s in which British Muslims have been 
connected with violence and social disturbances. In 1989, Muslims in the city of 
Bradford in the north of England protested and raised their concerns over Salman 
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Rushdie’s controversial book The Satanic Verses (1988) which sparked anger among 
British Muslims in other cities across the UK. To an extent, the British press coverage of 
these protests displayed elements of what Cohen described as “Folk Devils and Moral 
Panics” (see Morgan and Poynting et al., 2012; Shain, 2011).  
Other scholars such as Massey and Tatla (2012), who studied the media representation 
of British Muslims in the wake of the Bradford riots of 7 July 2011, find that British 
Muslims became the “folk devils” in the press coverage that associated them with 
violence and a threat to society at large. Massey and Tatla reviewed a number of 
scholarly studies (Abbas, 2007; Allen, 2004; Alexander, 2000 and 2004; Amin, 2003; 
Kundnani, 2007) and pointed out that media coverage of the Bradford riots argued that 
the issue was not “Nationality” but in fact “religion”, meaning Islam (Massey and Tatla, 
2012, p. 163). Similarly, Morgan and Poynting argue that the “Muslim ‘other’ has 
become a ‘folk devil’ of our time” (Morgan and Poynting, 2012, p.1). In the same vein, 
Messey (2012) points out that the problematic labels attached to Muslims, such as 
failing to ‘integrate’ and being singled out as ‘criminally blameworthy’, present them as 
‘modern folk devils’ (Messey, 2012, p.1). In brief, the riots of 2001 gave rise to 
Islamophobia and anti-Muslim feelings among society, which fuelled a “fear of Islam” 
(Massey and Tatla, 2012, p. 173). 
Many other scholars, such as Salgado-Pottier (2008), assume that British Muslims are 
‘modern’ “folk devils”. Frost (2007) also finds that Muslims “are ‘folk devils; of the 
twenty-first century” (Frost, 2007, p.570) whereas, for Alexander (2000, p.15), 
“Muslims have then, ironically, become the new ‘black’ with all the associations of 
cultural alienation, deprivation and danger that come with this position” (cited in 
Salgado-Pottier, 2008). In addition, Shooman and Spielhaus (2010) assume that moral 
panic stems from the hostility of a group of people who are presented as a ‘threat’ to 
society and are continuously exaggerated in the media (Shooman and Spielhaus, 2010, 
p.200). Hence, to them “the concept of moral panic describes states of collective 
hysteria” (ibid, p.200).  
Given the British Muslims’ media representations, Shooman and Spielhaus’s argument 
seems valid because in the wake of 9/11 and 7/7 British Muslims were represented as a 
group that has become a threat to British society.  Swedenburg (2010) writes of the “… 
public fears in Britain that Muslims in the country not only possess an alien culture, but 
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also pose a serious security threat… the general public that has been enabled by all the 
successive ‘moral panics’ surrounding Muslims” (Swedenburg, 2010, p.298).    
In her book review of Global Islamophobia: Muslims and Moral Panic in the West, 
Katherine Brown (2014) shows that the contributors to this edited volume find a 
common theme, “Islamophobia”, in connection with the media portrayals of Muslims 
(Brown, 2014, p.866). Brown pointed out that sections of the press reports reflected the 
presence of “Folk Devils” using a portrayal of an allegedly radical hate preacher Abu 
Hamza (ibid, p.865). Brown related her own previous study with this edited volume and 
pointed out that although the media’s scapegoating and stereotypical attitudes have 
badly affected British Muslim communities, they have not been “silent and passive”; 
rather, British Muslims “have protested, sought protective legislation, created their own 
media networks, and demanded participation in political systems” (Brown, 2010; 2014, 
p.866).  
One of the notable features of Cohen’s concept is that he does not simply hold the media 
responsible for being a driving force behind the panic but, rather, sees them as one of 
the driving forces behind the fear and perceived threat of certain groups of people in 
society. Through a narrow lens, it appears that politicians, pressure groups, press and 
the public all play their part collectively in declaring certain groups ‘folk devils’, with 
their actions or perhaps way of life being seen as causing ‘moral panic’ (see Critcher, 
2003). Consider a short paragraph from Said’s work: “The media, the government, the 
geopolitical strategists, and - although they are marginal to the culture at large - the 
academic experts on Islam are all in concert: Islam is a threat to Western civilisation” 
(Said, 1997, p.144).  
Although this research only analyses broadsheets (quality press) to discuss the 
representation of Muslims, it takes into account a few randomly selected front pages 
from tabloids: “Muslims Tell British: Go To Hell!” and “Now Muslims Get Their Own 
Laws in Britain”; front-page incitement (Daily Express, 4 November 2010 and 30 April 
2007); “Muslim-Only Public Loos” (Daily Star, 15 July 2010); “Britain Goes Halal” (Daily 
Mail, 19 September 2010). These randomly selected newspaper front-page images and 
headlines clearly display a uniformity in using the word “Muslims” in its plural form, 
suggesting that the media adopt a collective approach to representing Muslims as 
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problematic “Others” and aliens in the larger society. One could say that many 
newspapers make the same representations for other groups, such as trade unions. 
The previous examples are just a few of the hundreds if not thousands that perhaps 
remind us of Said’s view: “Accuracy was never a virtue of media” (Said, 1997, p.109). In 
short, these descriptions also validate the view of Cohen, who uses white British 
youngsters, the “Mods and Rockers”, as a case-study to show how the British press 
presents and exaggerates issues and sometimes even constructs and produces events 
that become panics. It is evident that the British media often demonise working-class, 
immigrant communities, ‘chavs’ and all those they identify as outsiders. Philo et al. 
(1982) conclude that certain stories do not qualify to appear in headlines simply 
because they do not fit the newspaper’s framework and ideological perspective on 
certain issues (Philo et al., 1982, 134). This may not be an exclusive parade of the 
overall media but it could possibly be applied to large media groups in the Muslim and 
non-Muslim worlds that are owned by wealthy businessman and states in many 
countries.   
 Forty years on, the press is testament to the fact that Cohen’s analysis of the ‘media 
aggregating and misleading published facts’ was correct. Let us consider a case in point. 
The Independent published an investigative report by Robin Stummer on 4 April 2004 
that included an interview with David Cooke, a Brighton-based ‘Mod Ephemera’, who 
said: “There are famous photographs taken in Brighton where the photographer paid 
the lads a few shillings…Quite a few people know that photographs were set up in 
Brighton” (The Independent, 4 April 2004). This sort of distortion in the media reports 
on Mods and Rockers is also traceable in a documentary, ‘In the Living Memory’, 
broadcast on Radio 4 in 2004. On other hand, some scholars may point out that this 
description appears as “self-evident”; however, situations always change.  
3.10-Criticism of ‘Folk Devils and Moral Panics’:  
Despite its relevance, validity and considerable visibility in the field of sociology and 
criminology studies, a growing number of studies also suggest that we rethink the 
concept of ‘folk devils and moral panics’ in present times. Sociologist Salman Sayyid 
stated that it is ‘old-fashioned’ because it was coined to describe the bad behaviour of a 
few young boys (Sayyid, 2013). Sheldon Ungar (2001) also considers that, since the 
concept of ‘folk devils’ is typically identified with the evil doings of an individual or 
108 
 
group of individuals who, according to Cohen’s definition, “encompass not only ‘persons 
or groups of persons’ but also ‘conditions’ and ‘episodes’”, it is therefore irrelevant now 
(Ungar, 2001, p.272).  
Ungar provides the example of ‘elite panic over Swine Flu in USA’, which to him doesn’t 
‘fall under the folk devils rubric’ (Ungar, 2001, p.272); he embraces the changing nature 
of society and hence recommends Beck’s (1992) concept of ‘risk society’, rather than 
‘moral panic’, because he thinks that ‘society anxiety’ has emerged alongside ‘moral 
panics’ as a result of advanced industrialisation and scientific development in the past 
four decades. In the same vein, Angela McRobbie and Sarah L. Thornton object to the 
concepts of “high rate of turnover and the increasing tendency to label all kinds of 
media events as ‘moral panics’”; therefore, the concept needs to be reconsidered in 
terms of its ‘strengths’ and ‘weaknesses’ (McRobbie and Thornton, 1995, p.560).  
McRobbie’s point of view has been widely recognised. She states that “we live in 
postmodern moral panics, when the moral panics can no longer proceed unchallenged 
and cannot therefore be used to justify new measures of social control” (cited in Hunt, 
1997, p.644). Moreover, Hunt extends her point that “folk devils hardly changed from 
Cohen’s original model” ibid. These are significant assumptions because Cohen’s “folk 
devils” were originally neither outsiders in the sense of “foreign” nor racial “others” but 
were in fact representatives of a subculture within a wider Westernised society.  
Another significant point to remember is that Cohen’s idea was founded on labelling 
theory, which mainly deals with youth subcultures. Applying these points in the context 
of Britain, McRobbie’s suggestion is valid; i.e. the “folk devils” phenomenon has hardly 
changed because new “folk devils” have emerged from another subculture, the inner 
cities of the North of England. These are mainly “Asian British-born Muslims” often 
linked with “riots”, “crimes” and, in the aftermath of the 7/7 incident, “radicalisation”, 
“extremism” and “terrorism”; these are far more dangerous crimes than those with 
which previous “folk devils” have been tagged.  
For Rayen Salgado-Pottier (2008), this new development suggests a change in the “folk 
devil” phenomenon from “ethnicity” to present-day “race”, which means that “Muslims” 
come into view as the new “Blacks” (Salgado-Pottier, 2008, p.4; Alexander, 2000, p.15). 
Based on other scholars’ citations, Salgado-Pottier asserts that each generation is 
different from the previous one, thus changing the “youth deviance” from “mods” and 
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“punks” to black youths who posed a threat to the peaceful ‘British way of life’ by 
involving themselves in “mugging” (Salgado-Pottier, 2008, p.3). Now, if we further 
extend this point to the contemporary period and apply it to the same British society, 
“Muslim youths” have now replaced “black”; hence, the panic has also changed from bad 
to worse because of the nature of the threat to British society.  
Tina Patel (2013) states that the new panic, i.e. the “terror panic” heralded by a 
dangerous new “folk devil”, the “Islamic terrorist”, is worse than the previous ones 
(Patel, 2013, p.34). In the same vein, Felix Odartey-Wellington describes the moral 
panic over “Islamic terrorism” as “racial profiling” which emerges from the arrests of 
terror suspects, mainly “Muslims”; he calls this an “operation thread” pushed jointly by 
the media and security agents (Felix Odartey-Wellington, 2009. p.25-28). However, it 
seems unrealistic to consider “Islamic terrorism” a moral panic given the contested and 
controversial nature of the term itself; moreover, the initial description of “folk devils” 
in terms of culture and actions hardly matches up with Muslims. Notably, Cohen does 
not extend his concept to Irish troublemakers, who are often related to present-day 
British-born Muslim radicals.  
One of the criticisms of Cohen’s work, according to J. C. Davis (1986),  is that Cohen’s 
idea is not “about real deviance, or about real activities subsequently classified as 
deviant, but about manufacturing of the chimera of the existence of those activities” 
(cited in Hunt, 1997, p.633). However, in the preface of Cohen’s 1980 edition, Cohen 
himself writes that he is self-conscious about some missing features of his work; indeed, 
Hunt writes that Cohen “is guilty of a certain timelessness, an unveiling of a set of 
consequences insulated from history and politics” (ibid., p.633). 
Further, in Cohen’s third edition (2002) he states that he is ‘reviewing uses and 
criticisms of the concept over the last thirty years’; hence, this edition shows the validity 
and relevance of the concept after viewing the media events that occurred during this 
time period. McRobbie and Thornton suggest that the term has lost its meanings and 
that it is time to revise “the process of constructing a moral panic” because “folk devils 
were less marginalised than they once were [and] they not only find themselves 
vociferously and articulately supported in the same mass media that castigates them, 
but their interests are also defended by their own niche and macro media” (McRobbie 
and Thornton 1995, p.559).  
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In the current circumstances, McRobbie and Thornton’s point seems valid, particularly 
with the increase in terrorists’ usage of online blogs, video messaging and social 
networking sites, not to mention their growing presence in the mainstream media. On 
the other hand, Bill Thompson and Andy Williams (2013) question the concept of moral 
panic, which they consider irrational to the extent that every event is identified as a 
moral panic. Thompson and Williams say that a “large number of panics, descriptive and 
generic, have no justification whatsoever (sic)” (Thompson and Williams, 2013, p.9). 
They conclude that “Mods and Rockers proved that media did not have the effects 
ascribed to it” (Thompson and Williams, 2013, p.242). However, Cohen argues that ‘The 
mass media, in fact, devote a great deal of space to deviance, sensational crimes, 
scandals, bizarre happenings and strange goings on” (Cohen, 1973, p.17). Now, almost 
40 years have passed and even today the front pages of the red-top tabloids endorse 
Cohen’s assumption. In addition, during those years Cohen mentions ‘over-reporting’ 
and ‘misleading headlines’ which are still prevalent in the tabloids and other sections of 
the media (Cohen, 1973, p.32) 
Various case-studies have investigated a wide range of subjects related to the social 
construction of deviance, including youth subcultures, muggings, school violence, single 
mothers, drugs, crime, pornography, child abuse, welfare issues, refugees, asylum 
seekers, gypsies, and, most relevant to my own study, the wearing of the veil, Sharia law 
and terrorism. Some of the significant studies in this long list include those by Ben-
Yehuda (1990) Hayle (2013), Jenkins (1992a, 1998b) and Pearson (1995). Equally, 
there are a number of rival scholarly voices who have contrasting opinions of ‘folk 
devils and moral panics’, such as Garland (2008), Davis (1986) and Springhall (1994). 
In sum, those who criticise Cohen’s concept argue that it is a controversial sociological 
concept that is primarily based on a sensationalist media response to a problem that 
emerged from a youth subculture (see Heir et al., 2011; Hall et al., 1978; Hall, 2012). 
Despite these criticisms, scholars continue to apply Cohen’s ideas to modern-day social 
problems and the way the media act in response to them. Evidently, in regard to Muslim 
issues, media coverage of a number of events suggests that Muslims have now become 
the new folk devils, like Irish Catholics (Greenslade, 2014; Pantazis and Pemberton, 
2009; Nickels et al., 2011). 
3.11-Strengths and Weaknesses of the idea of Folk Devils and Moral Panics:  
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Yvonne Jewkes (2015) argues that the rise of social media has brought huge change to 
the landscape of crime news. Of course, in the most recent terrorist events, especially 
the 7/7 incident, eye witnesses captured the shocking footage on their mobile phone 
cameras. Jewkes also considers these new developments in the field of media and 
extends her study, which is based on the Boston Marathon Bombing of 15 April 2013 
and the murder of a British non-combatant soldier, Lee Rigby, in Woolwich, London 
(2013). She relates these crimes to Cohen’s concept and concludes that, despite some 
“fundamental flaws”, Cohen’s idea is still valid and useful because it reflects “genuine 
public anxieties” (Jewkes, 2015). Kirsten Drotner (1999) suggests that one of the 
drawbacks of Cohen’s concept is that “it is rooted in conflict of interest - at community 
and societal levels - and the presence of power differentials which leave some groups 
vulnerable to such attacks” (Drotner, 1999, p.597). Further, Drotner states that, based 
on the “mods and rockers” case-study, the mass media and the press may build a 
negative image of a certain group, which leads to the stigmatising of a particular 
community or faith group (ibid). 
Another weakness of Cohen’s concept is that it focuses heavily on the press sources in 
the creation of a moral panic, thereby limiting the roles of other factors in the creation 
of the panic and suggesting that the “press itself orchestrates public opinion” (Drotner, 
1999, p.598). One of its strengths may be that growing concerns over one particular 
youth group’s activities, such as British Muslim youths’ radicalisation, will improve the 
“possibility of policy reform in the present time which can properly avert a tragic and 
dangerous future” (see Justen, 2011). 
3.12- Justification of Adapting Cohen’s Concept, ‘Folk Devils and Moral Panics’:  
Since its inception over forty years ago, Cohen’s concept of “folk devils and moral 
panics” has been continually applied to locate its significance and connection with 
several issues classed as “moral panics”, such as drugs, crimes, pornography, child 
abuse, welfare issues, refugees, asylum seekers and gypsies (see Ainley, 2005; Cree, 
Clapton and Smith, 2016; Morgan and Poynting et al., 2013; Pearson, 1983).  Given the 
rapid developments in the media universe as well as in academia, it seems pertinent to 
apply this concept to discern its relevance, in regard to terror events, particularly this 
thesis’s examination of the 7/7 event. At the time of its inception, the concept was 
particularly associated with the press, which was accused of creating moral panics, 
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especially in the case of “mods and rockers”. Although this thesis examines press 
reporting, to capture developments in social and economic fields it asserts that there 
were eye witnesses to the 7/7 incident with mobile phone cameras, whilst social 
networking sites, blogs and other modern forms of communication were peddling 
fictions. Even since this concept was developed, scholars have suggested that the media 
and press power and influence are undoubtedly present, but they alone are not 
sufficient to create moral panics. This is therefore a valid reason to test the original idea 
in the contemporary period in terms of its developments and relevance.  
3.13-Relevance and Usefulness of “Folk Devils and Moral Panics”:   
In the context of the London bombings and the resulting representations of British 
Muslims, the concept of folk devils and moral panics clearly fits the circumstances of the 
aftermath. Of course, despite convincing influence, the media alone seem less capable of 
creating panic. Realistically, this is a significant point that is observable in the 7/7 
reporting because almost every panic begins with situations and events in which the 
media are an agency raising concern. For example, Muslim women’s traditional veil was 
known to British society long before the London bombings but it suddenly became a 
panic because of the 7/7 incident and the reaction to it. This was evident in Jack Straw’s 
column in the Blackburn-based Lancashire Telegraph in the first week of October 2006.  
This column led to a heated debate in Britain that reached the point where The Daily 
Telegraph backed the idea of proposing a ban on it, as in France (At Home in Europe 
Project, 2015; Kabir, 2010, p.148, The Daily Telegraph, 13 and 15 September 2013; 18 
January 2016). The point is that the press played the role of a courier by facilitating and 
allocating a space to a well-known politician who initiated a debate that sparked 
resentment among the wider public. Thus, the process of turning the veil into an 
immense panic itself testifies to the relevance and usefulness of the notion of ‘folk devils 
and moral panics’. However, it is equally evident that in some situations it is the press 
that starts off campaigns leading to panics.  
3.14-‘The West’ and ‘the Rest’: 
Another important discourse relating to ethnic minorities’ representation is Stuart 
Hall’s series of studies (conducted in 1972, 1985, 1989 and 1992). These establish the 
foundation of ethnic minorities’ representation, particularly the thesis “The West and 
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the Rest: Discourse and Power” (1985), which broadens our understanding of the 
concept: “The discourse as a ‘system of representation’ represents the world as divided 
according to a simple dichotomy - the West/the Rest. That is what makes the discourse 
of ‘the West and the Rest’ so destructive… [it] constructs an over-simplified conception 
of ‘difference’” (Hall, 1992, p. 280).  
To Hall (1992, p. 277), “[The West] is actually an idea, a concept” which shows certain 
traits such as ‘modern’, ‘advanced’, and so on. In reality, however, he is not quite so 
convinced by this idea for a number of reasons which he illustrates in his lengthy 
writings. For instance, Hall borrows from the historian John Roberts, saying that 
“Europeans have long been unsure about where Europe ‘ends’ in the East” (ibid., p. 
149). Therefore, Hall suggests that “the West and the Rest became two sides of a single 
coin” (ibid, p278).  
Although still engaging in conflict, somehow on many fronts their mutual cooperation 
has opened up a gateway to human discovery and development in several fields. Hence, 
each needs the other; for instance, the growing Asian economies have opened doors for 
Europeans migrants to the Middle East, China and India. The term ‘the West’ often 
appears in books, newspaper columns, and everyday discussions and debates 
surrounding present-day issues. In many parts of the world, being ‘Western’ means 
being successful, bright and open-minded.  
Thus, the notion of linking ‘modernism’ echoes the words of the historian John Roberts: 
“Europeans have long been unsure about where Europe ‘ends’ in the East” (Roberts, 
1985, p 149). However, in the academic world, this discourse is considered one of 
concrete authority on a scale that is useful for measuring both the image of the ‘others’ 
in the Western mind as well as the West’s relationship with the rest of the world. 
 Stuart Hall’s thesis is applicable to and relevant in the field of cultural studies. In 
particular, in dealing with the problem of the portrayal of Muslims in the British press 
and its effects in Britain and outside the Muslim world, one may assume that this thesis 
will help us to understand the original problem. Hall’s book, West and the Rest: 
Discourse and Power, begins with the assertion that the “ideas of ‘East’ and ‘West’ have 
never been free of myth and fantasy, and even to his day they are not primarily ideas 
about place and geography” (Hall, 1985).  
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Without a doubt, Western advancements in the fields of science, its modern values, and 
its democratic traditions since World Wars I and II have inspired many in the world, 
who have begun to associate it with modernism and accomplishment. Hall suggests that 
‘many societies aspire to become western,’ (Hall, 1985, p.276). Hall states that, “by 
“Western”, we mean the type of society that is developed, industrialised, urbanised, 
capitalist, secular, and modern… such societies arose at a particular historical period - 
roughly, during the sixteenth century after the breakup of feudalism” (ibid, p.277). Hall 
continues by explaining that we [the entire population of the world] have come to a 
point where, regardless of geographical locations or other faiths, people link the above-
mentioned characteristics with ‘the West’, which then suggests that the term ‘the West’ 
is ‘therefore identical to that of the word ‘modern’” (ibid., p.277).  
Hall concludes that “’The West’ is ‘an idea’ and a ‘concept’ that has four major 
components including the characterisation and classification of societies into various 
groups such as ‘Western’ and ‘non-Westerner’ (ibid, p.278).  Next is the ‘image’ or ‘set of 
images’ that explains the idea of the West, for example ‘Western’=urban=developed or 
‘non-Western’=non-industrial=rural=agricultural=underdeveloped” (ibid). 
The third component suggests that “it provides a standard or model of comparison”; 
fourthly, it offers ‘certain criteria of evolution’, for example “the 
West=developed=good=desirable”, that also delivers some “kind of knowledge about 
the subject and a certain attitude” that shows it is an ideology (ibid).  The discussion on 
the ‘West and the Rest’ thesis reaches a point where Hall mentions that “The West and 
the Rest became two sides of a single coin” (ibid). 
Based on his concept, further probing into this subject indicates that his predictions are 
evident in the changing world where ‘the West’ as an idea is weak in many ways. For 
example, on the economic front the West is losing its grip because the world’s four 
leading economies are now America, China, Japan and India. This is reflected in an 
article ‘The risk of a Eurozone break-up,’ published in The Guardian on 2 April 2013. For 
some analysts, it is also losing authority in science, the arts, education and technology 
(see Mahbubani, 2009; Shenkar, 2006).  
With regard to the field of education, Steve Johnson wrote a report called “Investment: 
Asia is ahead in continuing education” published on 18 June, 2012, in The Financial 
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Times. Returning to Hall’s thesis, it is worth considering his view that the weaknesses of 
‘the West’ as a concept might be seen as “unified and homogenous, essentially one place, 
with one view about other cultures and one way of speaking about them”. Of course, this 
is not the case because “The West” has always experienced several internal differences 
among European nations (Hall, 1985, p. 280). Examples supporting Hall’s argument 
include the debates on growing pro-self-rule movements inside Europe, such as 
Scotland and Catalonia, which may give rise to nationalist thoughts within a ‘united 
Europe’; hence, the idea of the West is not perpetual. Perhaps for this very reason Hall 
also considers “The West and the Rest” discourse to be “destructive because it draws 
crude and simplistic distinctions and constructs an over-simplified conception of 
‘difference’” (ibid). 
Roger Scruton (2002) summarises: “The difference between the West and the rest is 
that Western societies are governed by politics; the rest are ruled by power” (Scruton, 
2002, p. 7). Scruton’s inquiry mostly deals with Islam and the war on terror, which to 
him originates from the idea of ‘freedom’ because the Western view of the war on terror 
lies in defending its liberty and freedom. His key theme in this discussion relating to ‘the 
West and the rest’ is religion.   
Scruton argues that, in the West, religion has now been replaced by secular thought 
whilst in the Muslim world religion still holds a key position in social life. He states that 
the Ottomans used the millet system which means ‘nation’, ‘a creed community’ or ‘sect’; 
they “included Christians and Muslims, Jews, Druze and Alawites, the last two groups 
originat[ing] from the different sects of Islam” (ibid, p. 26).  On the contrary, the modern 
Western notion of multiculturalism differs from Scruton’s example of the Ottomans in 
many ways, such as banning minarets and veils and implementing other anti-Muslim 
policies. On the whole, the thesis “The West and the Rest” is a little problematic 
although it is relevant to Muslims and in some cases other ethnic minorities’ 
representation in the media and polity.  
Accordingly, Bonnett (2004) finds that the use of terms such as “the West” and 
“Westerner”, from the early writings of Toynbee (1923) to Said (1978), are perhaps 
uneasy and “a strange and ungainly label” that frequently appear in the daily news 
(Bonnett, 2004, p. 1). He objects to the use of the term “ the West” and thinks that, in the 
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post-9/11 and 7/7 world, the ‘radical Islamists’ and ‘Al-Qa’idah’ use ‘anti-Westernism’ 
as a key excuse for violence against the West.  He calls the rise of anti-West feelings a 
“clash of utopias” and also includes “communist regimes” in Russia and China, which 
also contributed to and promoted anti-Westernism (ibid, p.144).  
This review raises some key issues - for instance whether the clash between ‘the West’ 
(Secular) and ‘the Rest’ (Islam) is based on religion. Arguably, the media’s 
representation of Muslims in the current scenario is largely based on the narrative of 
terrorists and violent extremists but in fact they have distorted and self-constructed the 
image of Islam as the complete opposite of Islamic teachings. Moreover, most Muslim 
countries are of a secular nature, such as Turkey and Syria, whereas Saudi Arabia and 
Iran clearly have political and religious autocracies that use their leverage to mould 
Islamic rulings.  
This is somewhat similar in ‘the West’ which is largely presented as secular whilst 
Christianity is still an official religion, such as in Britain and Orthodox Russia. Even in 
Ireland - a supposedly secular nation - abortion remains illegal for religious reasons 
despite growing pressure to give women control over their own bodies (The Guardian, 
11 February 2016). On other hand, a Muslim country, Bosnia, imposed a ban on the 
wearing of hijabs in court and the Tajikistan government forces thousands of Muslim 
males to shave off their beards (Arab News, 8 February 2016; Al-Jazeera, 21 January 
2016). Essentially, both sides blame religion for their social and cultural problems and 
stress that the clash between ‘the rest’ and the West’ lies in religion, which is arguably a 
fragile description.  
In brief, this chapter identifies a set of questions and themes that it aims to discuss in 
the following theme chapters. The set of questions and themes arising include the 
following: the reasons behind the construction of an “Islamic terrorism”; the 
representation of Muslims as a “threat” to the secular West under the premise of 
Orientalism; and whether the media are the only driving force behind moral panics. It 
has also sought to reveal whether terrorism is religiously driven or is a politically 
motivated idea.  Briefly, in examining the responses of two newspapers, The Guardian 
and The Daily Telegraph, to the events of 7/7, one has to address a number of questions. 
To what extent were these papers reflecting the Orientalism of the past? To what extent 
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were they driving the debate and the moral crisis of the time? To what extent do they 
reflect the different attitudes towards religion and secular matters? 
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Chapter 4: Methodology:  
Given that the representation of British Muslims in sections of the print and broadcast 
media has been a contentious problem for the last few decades, and that the British-
born Muslim suicide bombers’ connection with the 7/7 incident has further worsened 
British Muslims’ media representation, it is essential to trace how this came about. In 
recent years, the 7/7 incident debate has received considerable academic attention 
fuelled mainly by the power of the press in British society. Accordingly, this thesis aims 
to examine British Muslims’ representation in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph 
following the landmark cultural, political and ideological event of the London bombings.  
This thesis seeks to explore the following key research question - in what ways did the 
British press represent British Muslims in the wake of 7/7? To answer this fundamental 
question, I have applied a discourse analysis approach to analyse the representation of 
British Muslims in the wake of the 7/7 incident in two British broadsheets, The 
Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, within a specified period (8 of July 2005 to 7 of July 
2007). Additionally, I intend to discover whether or not British Muslims’ media 
representation became stereotypical, biased, constructive or sympathetic within this 
specified period. 
There are four key components to this chapter. Firstly, it explains the reliability, 
relevance and validity of the method applied to investigate, for instance, the pattern of 
news reporting about British Muslims. Secondly, it describes the data collection 
procedure including a timeframe, selection of articles, and the database search engines 
that were used to collect the data. Thirdly, it seeks to explain the sampling procedure 
and rationale behind the choice of two broadsheet newspapers (The Daily 
Telegraph and The Guardian) and their significance in British society. Fourthly, it 
provides details of a systematic process that included a coding scheme and the 
emergence of three major themes in the data.  
4.1-Applied Method: Reliability, Validity and Relevance. 
Before starting to collect the data, I thoroughly reviewed various research methods and 
their relevance and validity in different academic disciplines. These include quantitative 
(content analysis) and qualitative (discourse analysis) methods. These traditions are 
well-known and widely practised in academia. However, I reviewed these methods 
keeping in view the significance, sensitivity and contemporary developments in the field 
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of media representations of British Muslims. In particular, I focused on well-established 
research techniques that have been applied to study the representation of ethnic 
minorities. Two significant methods that are widely used in the field of social sciences 
are discourse analysis and thematic analysis. (Discourse analysis examines the language 
within a text or speech whereas thematic analysis observes different patterns or themes 
within specified data). These two methods have somewhat similar ways of sorting and 
categorising qualitative data but they do so at different levels (see Parker, 2005).  
(i)-Discourse Analysis:  
Marianne W Jørgensen and Louise J Phillips (2002) view discourse as “a form of social 
action that plays a part in producing the social world - including knowledge, identities 
and social relations - and thereby in maintaining specific social patterns” (Jørgensen 
and Phillips, 2002, p.5). Evidently, from a sociological viewpoint ‘Discourse Analysis’ is a 
broader tent that includes academic, media, corporate, political, race and ethnic 
minority discourses (see Gill, 2008; 2000). Van Dijk finds that, since the 1970s, 
“discourse analysis” has become the explicit method for studying the effect of the media 
because of the “explication of qualitative data” in comparison to content analysis, which 
mainly focuses on quantitative data. It has been used effectively in numerous studies for 
various purposes, including those on racism (Van Dijk, 1993), the representation of 
Muslims (Richardson, 2006) and anti-immigration (Wodak and Reisigl, 1999).  
It examines the way in which language is used within written or oral text such as 
newspaper articles or speeches and lectures and is “beyond the sentence” that is words, 
phrases, grammar, and “meaning (semantics), and the order of words in sentences 
(syntax)” (see Tannen, 2012). More briefly, discourse analysis goes beyond the simple 
examination of text and provides clear and systematic explanations of “structures, 
strategies or processes of text or talk in terms of theoretical notions developed in many 
branches of the field” (see Van Dijk, 1985; 1993). It functions in all types of 
communications and discourses that shape the world. It is a process that examines 
“what and how people communicate” and covers a wide range of diverse topics such as 
health and security. Essentially, discourse analysis reviews various “building-blocks 
inside communication” and understands the way in which each operates (Schneider, 6 
May 2013). A discourse analysis of a particular event may include collecting and 
listening to all speeches or statements related to specific event or topic and then 
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examining the ways in which language reflects “cultural and social contexts” of speeches 
and statements. As such, discourse analysis indicates the intentions and motives behind 
using certain specific phrases and language. An example includes the British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair’s statements and speeches in the wake of the 7/7 event in which he 
constantly used the words “Us” and “Them” and stated his determination to “defeat the 
terrorists” and defend the “British way of life” (see Croft and Moore, 2010; Holland, 
2012; Quist, 2009, p.53).   
Van Dijk (1985) believes that discourse analysis has shown encouraging results in 
interrogating issues such as power and dominance in the media (Van Dijk, 1985, p.280). 
He provides examples of the critical series of “bad news” studies carried out by Glasgow 
University Media Group (1976 and 1993) to trace linguistic differences in the press 
reporting on various issues such as miners’ strikes and the Falklands War (ibid). These 
studies were different from previous traditional media studies that often used content 
analytical approaches to expose biased, stereotypical and racist descriptions in texts, 
graphics and images (ibid). In addition, early media studies mainly focused on 
convenient observations at basic levels of structures that produced biased and binary 
portrayals such as “Us and Them, Ours and Theirs, and “actions and characteristics” in 
representations of communists (ibid). However, despite the considerable use of 
discourse analysis in the field of sociology, this thesis avoids using it mainly because it is 
complex.   
(i-a)-Strengths and Weaknesses of Discourse Analysis:  
Discourse analysis has both difficulties and social relevance, particularly in relation to 
text and language in the media (Dressler, 1981; Howarth, 2000; Fowler, 1991). One 
weakness of discourse analysis is that it cannot be completely legitimate and applicable, 
since it is always changing and conflicting with other discourses; hence, there is no right 
or wrong discourse (see Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002; Parker, 1993; Rodrigo, 2012). 
Van Dijk (1997) calls discourse a type of “action” that is neither restrictive nor 
perpetual but in fact continuously changing. According to Paul Gee (1999), “New 
discourses emerge and old ones die all the time” mainly because people persistently 
create new, modify old and regularly contest discourses (Gee, 1999, p.21). It attaches 
particular importance to language, which has different meanings in different places and 
contexts. Therefore, the use of language varies in different events, places and societies; 
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for example, in Hall’s work (2006), “freedom fighters/terrorists” are two complex 
terminologies that have different meanings for each side. Moreover, discourse analysis 
is too optimistic as some critics say that those who write assume that they can change 
the world.   
Despite all these relevancies, inductive thematic analysis does have some advantage 
over simple content analysis, which simply counts words, phrases and different levels of 
manifestation in the text (Parker, 2005, p.99). Additionally, thematic analysis is more 
observant, fostering the belief that certain words, phrases and themes “really mean the 
same thing in a close enough way for them to be grouped together” (ibid). For this 
particular inquiry into the representation of British Muslims in the British press, I chose 
Braun and Clarke’s thematic analysis method (2006) which helps to identify, examine 
and record patterns in the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.79). In comparison to textual 
analysis, which is also reliable, it is a more convenient approach. However, textual 
analysis tells us how the media use language and specific phrases to influence the 
reader. I am more interested in the way the press represented British Muslims with 
reference to the 7/7 event.  
(ii)- Specified Method: Thematic Analysis:  
Thematic analysis is a comparatively simple and flexible categorising approach for any 
qualitative data analysis. It is a generic technique that allows a researcher to re-
examine, make notes and sort out the data in the form of key concepts or themes. At the 
start, an analyst develops fundamental themes that help to rationalise the data into key 
ideas. In other words, an initial broad reading and rereading of the data enables a 
researcher to observe various patterns and detect developing themes within it (see 
Harvard University Online manual, 2008). For Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke 
(2006), a theme “captures something important about the data in relation to the 
research question and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within 
the data set” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.82).  
Further, these authors define thematic analysis as “identifying, analysing and reporting 
patterns (themes) within data. It minimally organises and describes a data set in (rich) 
detail. However, frequently it goes further than this, and interprets various aspects of 
the research topic” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.79). Thus, thematic analysis is an 
analytical approach through which a researcher can “discover patterns and develop 
122 
 
themes”, and it is therefore applicable to several kinds of qualitative data when one has 
different goals in mind (see Harvard University Online manual, 2008).  
A number of studies find thematic analysis the most suitable tool for qualitative data 
analysis (Boyatzis, 1998; Flick, 2009; Wood et al., 2009). Numerous scholars note that 
thematic analysis is reliable within the broader theoretical framework of discourse 
analysis (see Adeyanju, 2013; Braun and Clarke, 2006; Van Dijk, 1987 and 1988). In 
brief, thematic analysis is an established scholarly tradition which helps to examine the 
hidden meanings in the text. Other leading scholars who have used this method include 
Cottle (2000), Hopkins (2011), Hussain and Bagguley (2012) and Sobolewska and Ali 
(2012), mostly in examining the media representation of ethnic minorities including 
British Muslims in the aftermath of 7/7. The fact that many scholars have used this 
technique shows that it is well-recognised.  
(iii)-Emergence of Themes:  
A notable feature of this study is that it does not begin with a prior notion of themes in 
mind. Instead, it prefers to choose an inductive approach, which is a spontaneous way of 
identifying themes based on constant comparison and careful reading of selected 
articles and reports (see Zhang and Wildemuth, 2005). Therefore, it is essential to have 
knowledge of previous studies (deductive reasoning); it is assumed that an inductive 
approach avoids any personal influence over the selection of themes (Adeyanju, 2013, 
p.31). The procedure involves reviewing the text repetitively and recognising certain 
ideas, themes and categories within the text.    
This thesis will mainly use inductive reasoning as it is assumed that this approach is 
most suitable for answering the research question. An inductive reasoning approach 
enables a researcher to perform a vigilant examination and persistent assessment of the 
data which than automatically produce themes and categories (Zhang and Wildemuth, 
2005, p.2). Moreover, the researcher has no personal influence over or any pre-set 
notions concerning the selection of topics and themes within the data. That is because 
reading and rereading the text within the data naturally produce themes. 
More importantly, this study fully embraces the fact that it genuinely contextualises the 
data and evaluates the judgements of both newspapers about British Muslims and 
Islam. In short, these are the underlying reasons why I chose the thematic analysis 
approach to probe into the representation of Muslims in The Guardian and The Daily 
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Telegraph. However, like other methods, it also has both pros and cons. On the one hand 
it is suitable for large datasets, simple, flexible, and easy to read and decode. On the 
other hand, it is based on the researcher’s own interpretations, which weakens it. 
Additionally it may lack clarity and guidelines, and if it is not applied in accordance with 
the theoretical framework it may have little interpretative power (see Braun and Clarke, 
2006).  
(iv)-Justification of Using Inductive Reasoning:  
Sociologists use three types of reasoning or arguments; these are deductive, inductive 
and conductive reasoning. However, the first two are widely recognised traditions. 
Deductive reasoning is based on a theory and examines it in terms of the evidence that 
supports or opposes that theory. The result may be that the evidence does not support 
the theory. In contrast, in inductive reasoning one gathers the evidence or data together 
and then comes to a conclusion based upon where that evidence points. For historians, 
inductive reasoning is a comparative historical analysis of the evidence which leads one 
to a particular conclusion. Conductive reasoning is grounded on Carl Wellman’s theory 
of “Ethical reasoning” (1971) which is based on “guesswork” that “draws a tentative 
conclusion” that could be modified in the future (Walton, 2006, p. 143).  Conductive 
reasoning is not as common as deductive and inductive reasoning because it is a “case-
based” reasoning which relies on “presumed facts”; hence, there is an uncertainty factor 
involved in it (ibid, 143).       
Of these three types, this thesis chose inductive reasoning on various grounds. A 
significant feature of inductive reasoning or argument is that it simply sees, observes 
and concludes based upon observed patterns. The main reason why this thesis uses 
inductive reasoning is the fact that it also correlates with thematic analysis in which 
initial themes emerge spontaneously as a result of the researcher reading the whole 
text. A significant advantage of inductive reasoning is that a researcher relies 
profoundly on observable patterns which than produce concurrent contents in the data 
set, such as themes. Moreover, inductive reasoning ensures that a researcher has little 
discernible influence over findings generated from the analysis of data, as observable 
patterns automatically produce the subsequent number or theme missing from the 
dataset. 
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In addition, the purpose of selecting inductive reasoning in this thesis is the fact that its 
patterns are also encouraged by the popular Western view of Muslim people as being 
“violent”, “backwards”, and “the enemy within”. Arguably, these patterns also support 
the identification of certain labels attached to Muslims, as explained in the Orientalism 
study. Moreover, in this thesis the core themes emerged directly from the data by 
inductive reasoning and not from existing literature or any theory (see Adeyanju, 2013, 
p.31).  
My own research intends to discover whether or not British Muslims’ representation in 
The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph remained positive, neutral or negative at various 
instances in different types of journalism or whether it changed on the 7/7 
anniversaries. Notably, this thesis analysis is not “theory-driven”. Rather, it has 
gathered its data in the form of published text in two newspapers, The Guardian and The 
Daily Telegraph; therefore, it has used inductive reasoning.    
Inductive reasoning is a procedure in which a researcher observes or recognises sets of 
patterns that demonstrate what has happened or what is possibly going to happen. In 
other words, an inductive argument means to notice a particular pattern and then draw 
a conclusion based upon that pattern (see McCall, 13 May 2013). McCall uses the 
Fibonacci sequence: that is, 1+1=2, 1+2=3, and 2+3=5, hence 3+5=8 (see McCall, 13 May 
2013). Therefore, the missing number is 8, a solution that emerged from the addition of 
each number to the previous number.  A related example of these patterns might be 
observed in the sequence of terrorist attacks on cultural capitals such as 9/11 (New 
York), 3/11 (Madrid), and 7/7 (London).  Noticeably, the method of and reasons behind 
these attacks show a similar set of patterns, such as the perpetrators declaring their 
faith as Muslims; being suicide bombers; and acting in the name of Islam and al-Qaeda 
respectively. Hence, these patterns suggest the possibility of further terrorist attacks 
elsewhere in the name of Islam by perpetrators of any radical organisation, be it al-
Qaeda or a similar radical group. 
In brief, the inductive reasoning model provides the opportunity to identify themes  
from generated data and it is thus a preferred and valid technique in the social sciences. 
Many scholars endorse inductive reasoning mainly because the argument or logic 
derives from the data on a particular event or situation and because it reaches a logical 
conclusion (Babbie, 2013, p.24; Priest, 2010, p.9; Wimmer and Dominick, 2014, p140). 
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However, despite such strengths it also has disadvantages such as the time-consuming 
nature of analysing a large amount of data (Honiden, 2015; Mayfield, 2013; Toplis, 
2010). Nevertheless, this provides an opportunity for an in-depth database study of the 
reactions of two newspapers to the events of 2005. 
4.2-Thematic Coding Scheme:  
Thematic coding is a procedure within qualitative analysis that involves categorising 
and making notes of different pieces of text; these might be passages or paragraphs 
connected by a common theme or idea. It allows the researcher to index the whole text 
into different categories and is hence useful for establishing a “framework of thematic 
ideas about it” (see Gibbs, 2007). I have carried out thematic analysis in accordance 
with the guiding standards set by Braun and Clarke (2006) using full texts of The 
Guardian and The Daily Telegraph reporting of the 7/7 event that brought British 
Muslims to global media attention. In comparison to other studies on thematic analysis, 
these authors offer a systematic framework and rational course of actions to identify, 
interpret and examine themes; this framework is reliable as well as suitable. The 
framework for conducting a thematic analysis consists of six phases (see Braun and 
Clarke, 2006, p.14-23) as follows:  
Phase One: Becoming Familiar with the Data. 
Braun and Clarke recommend that, before engaging in analysis, the researcher must 
have a prior knowledge of the data. Further, they advise the researcher to immerse 
(himself/herself) in the data deeply in order to become familiar with “the depth and 
breadth of the contents” (ibid, p.16). Considering these recommendations, I firstly 
collected and printed out copies of the full texts of each type of journalism in both 
newspapers. I read them repeatedly to familiarise myself with certain phrases, words, 
topics, emergence of debates and discussions in comment and editorial pieces, features 
and news reports. This long process involves personal input as I marked and underlined 
specific phrases, making notes of references, key sources of information, analytical 
concepts, facts and figures, and studies in the articles, and highlighting emerging 
significant themes. Next, I placed all the data in two different log books using Microsoft 
Word documents, calling them The Daily Telegraph and The Guardian in a systematic 
manner. This organised form of data enabled me to trace and verify records of any 
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required type of journalism, article, web-link, word count, author and source of 
information easily and quickly (see Appendix A).    
Phase Two: Generating Initial Codes. 
After the researcher has familiarised him/herself with the nature and type of data and 
set up an initial list of ideas, Braun and Clarke suggest that he/she identify initial 
semantic or latent codes. Semantic means a signifier such as a word, phrase, symbol, 
sign or a list of ideas, whereas latent refers to patterns or assumptions. Essentially, 
coding entails splitting up the key text into small units for the purpose of analysis, 
explaining what each unit in the text is about. It is a process through which certain 
attributes are tagged or assigned to specific units of text, which might be a sentence, a 
phrase or a paragraph (see Bryman, 2006). After familiarising myself with the data, I set 
up a code sheet consisting of a total of 34 key codes with each set carrying further sub-
codes. Such a list of codes is often referred to as ‘code framing’ because one paragraph 
may be tagged with a single code or with multiple codes; for example, I assigned specific 
phrases such as ‘Nigerian Taliban’, ‘Porn-loving Saudi Arabia’ to different paragraphs 
and assigned them to different sub-codes.  
For example, my code sheet C-14 describes ‘Islamophobia in post-7/7 Britain’ with sub-
code (i) fear of Islam. It is important to note that, throughout this process, the codebook 
was regularly refined. This entails rereading the same text to ensure that every single 
code that emerged is recorded correctly. Each type of journalism (news report, 
comment, and feature) was divided into paragraphs and sentences and then assembled 
as a code, keeping in view the context. Notably, “indexing”, “categories”, “codes” and 
“themes” are identical words and phrases that link different portions of the text as 
representative of that text (see Bryman, 2006; 2008). A sample of a coded editorial can 
be viewed in Appendix-B.   
Phase Three:  Searching for Themes.   
The initial “coded and collated” data need to be condensed, i.e. regrouped under 
different codes. This eliminates repetition and binds together similar codes (Bryman, 
2008). Keeping in mind Braun and Clarke’s guideline for this phase, I merged sub-codes 
to form sub-themes, which also help me to condense the data. I made a separate code 
sheet (or thematic map) in which I noted 62 sub-themes and their descriptions. Finally, 
127 
 
the mixing of sub-codes produces sub-themes or ‘provisional themes’ (see Adeyanju, 
2013). These can be viewed in Appendix-C.   
Phase Four: Reviewing Themes.  
According to Braun and Clarke, once initial themes or “candidate themes” have emerged 
they should be refined and compared with the original data to verify that they have 
been backed up. This is done because “Data within themes should cohere together 
meaningfully, while there should be clear and identifiable distinctions between themes” 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.20). In brief, the main purpose of this phase is to ensure that 
each main theme that emerges is consistent and supported by evidence.  
Having reviewed the sub-themes, I merged The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph 
coding sheets into one unit on Microsoft Excel. Next, 62 sub-themes or sub-codes were 
organised and each code frequency was measured carefully using the ‘sort and filter’ 
option. For example, (STC-42; ‘Muslim terrorism/Islamic terrorism’...) appeared 92 
times, which was the highest frequency level. The second most frequent code (STC-10; 
‘Britain foreign policy in Iraq...’) appeared 75 times in total, etc.  
These codes were then remixed according to their resemblances and identical 
contextual meanings. For example, codes 11, 12 and 30, which are about terror 
networks, cells and the radicalisation process, have similarities and were therefore 
merged into one group and assigned a blue colour. The next largest group, marked red, 
carries identical codes relating to Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq and the reasons for 
British Muslims’ alienation. Similarly, the third largest group, marked green, contains 
codes that describe British core values and way of life (see Appendix-D- i & ii).The 
following diagram shows the total share of the three main themes, which are defined 
and named in the following phase five.  
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Diagram: 4.1-Merging identical sub-themes and codes to produce three main themes.  
Phase Five: Defining and Naming Themes.   
For Braun and Clarke, the phase “define and refine” means finding the real meanings of 
themes and what they are about, as well as "determining what aspect of the data each 
theme captures”. Finally, sub-themes in the three main groups were carefully examined 
to facilitate detection of three main themes in the dataset. Each main theme is given a 
specific name; moreover, to substantiate that the sub-themes are interconnected and 
linked, these are divided into three different sets under codes 1, 2 and 3, denoting each 
main theme set.     
Theme 1: Home-grown ‘Islamists terrorism’ Threat 
Theme 2: Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq risks its Internal Security  
Theme 3: British Muslims are Incompatible with the British Way of Life 
Phase Six: Producing a Report. 
 The production of a report indicates and validates the narrative in the dataset. It shows 
that themes are coherent, rational and non-repetitive.   
4.3-Justification of Newspapers’ Selection: 
The purpose of this study is to examine how the broadsheet quality press in Britain 
reported on the Muslim community in Britain and the world in a period of Islamophobia 
during the three years between 2005 and 2007. It is not possible, in a study of this type, 
to do more than examine the way in which two major national newspapers presented 
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the question of Muslims’ representation resulting from the 7/7 event. As a result, this 
research will focus on two main broadsheet newspapers - The Guardian and The Daily 
Telegraph - in order to examine the coverage and approach of the British broadsheet 
press. It is imperative to clarify here that, because of the word limitations of a doctorate 
thesis, I essentially restricted myself to a limited comparison of these broadsheets 
rather than expanding my research by, for instance, including tabloids or more 
mainstream newspapers.  
One justification for this is that these British broadsheets, The Guardian and The Daily 
Telegraph, including their Sunday equivalent editions, are the oldest newspapers in the 
world, originating in 1791 and 1855 respectively, and they hold contrasting political 
views. Evidence shows that these newspapers also have a considerable online 
readership overseas. Several scholars note that The Guardian is a liberal, left-wing paper 
that is often critical of government policies and right-wing parties (see KhosraviNik, 
2009; Mancini and Hallin,). In contrast, The Daily Telegraph holds conservative views 
and mostly supports the Establishment (Goddard et al., 2008). In the light of these 
views, this thesis assumes that it would be worth examining coverage of the 7/7 event 
in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph to determine whether these newspapers 
retained their political and editorial orientations in reporting the 7/7 event. This is 
significant because the 7/7 incident was largely associated with the British 
government’s foreign policy in Iraq.  
Evidently, The Guardian opposed whilst The Daily Telegraph defended the British 
government’s foreign policy relating to the Middle East, particularly on Iraq (see 
Berenger, 2004; Brown, 2006, p.106; Temple, 2008, p.88). To date, this contrast has 
remained a potent element in their editorials as The Guardian assumes that 7/7 was a 
reaction to such policies, whilst The Daily Telegraph denies such connections. Said and 
Poole find that The Guardian’s secular values sometimes contradict Islamic values, for 
example, with regard to women’s veils which it sees as a barrier to women’s liberty. 
However, The Guardian never campaigned to ban the veil, in contrast to The Daily 
Telegraph (18 September 2013). This is because the purpose of The Guardian is not to 
support or reject Islamic views but to reflect upon the status of a situation for its 
readership, which comprises a vast number of secular-minded people along with left-
wing liberals and professional elites of different faiths.  
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Although The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph have different political views, both offer 
a platform for scholars, commentators and politicians of contrasting opinions. For 
example, the left-wing and liberal Guardian and its sister paper The Observer provide a 
space for two Jewish political analysts and columnists, Jonathan Freedland and Nick 
Cohen, who hold different views on British Muslims and are also known for their 
different  progressive and conservative thoughts. Likewise, in its present set-up The 
Daily Telegraph is widely known as a right-wing newspaper but it nevertheless often 
provides space to journalists and authors who do not agree with its stance on different 
issues, such as James Kirkup, who is accused of being a ‘soft’ voice for British Muslims.  
Considering the British press reaction to an opinion on the 7/7 incident, the selection of 
newspapers is based on three principal considerations. First, both publications are 
known for their serious journalism and are referred to as the ‘quality press’ or ‘mid-
market’ newspapers (Brownile, 2013, p.17; Cole and Harcup, 2009, p.31). Further to 
this, both newspapers optimistically proclaim in their editorial polices the significance 
of investigative journalism, which means that their reporting reflects balanced and 
impartial views of issues. Additionally, a range of views free of editorial constraint, such 
as news sources, are printed strictly without interpretation.  
Secondly, these newspapers catch the attention of a considerably well-informed middle 
class, and they present contrasting progressive and conservative views according to the 
needs of their readers. The third key reason for probing the 7/7 reporting in these 
broadsheets is the manifestation of the terrorism discourse, and the extent to which it 
stirs up anti-Muslim bias on the basis of Islamic beliefs. One reason for choosing The 
Guardian is that it has raised its profile as an international newspaper (Conboy and 
Steel, 2015).  
It became the third most-read paper online in March 2014, when its online traffic 
reached 102.3 million monthly. In comparison, The Daily Telegraph (telegraph.co.uk) 
has also adopted a brand new ‘digital strategy’, declaring digital contents to be its 
backbone. It has increased its “monthly browsers nearly 21% to 72.2 million and 
average daily browsers by 12.6% to 3.6 million” (The Guardian, 8 July, 2014). Both 
newspapers are therefore papers which, given their broadsheet and digital presence, 
help to shape the opinion of informed British middle-class readers. Also, to date, no 
other research has been carried out into the broadsheets’ reporting of Islam and British 
Muslims using the 7/7 event as a case-study, apart from Crockett’s (2008) study which 
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examined The Sun and Daily Mirror reporting of 7/7. In addition, a 7/7 victim and 
academic John Tulloch offered a narrative of the event that is more of a personal 
account. Considering this shortage of research, the intention of this thesis is to fill this 
cavernous gap by examining the (elite) press reporting of the 7/7 event, which was a 
big political debate in all forms of the media.  
4.4-Research Timeframe:  
The 7/7 incident opened up a Pandora’s Box of perceived problems relating to British 
Muslims, such as extremism, terrorism, jihad, mosque ideologies, faith schools, veils, 
and human and women’s rights. In these debates the press emerged as a powerful actor 
in shaping public opinion on all these issues. More importantly, this incident became 
one of the most powerful media events of the twenty-first century. The bombings 
received widespread coverage in all forms of the media to an extent that involved 
scholars, policy-makers, politicians, media experts and members of the public. Everyone 
began to express their feelings and the event became a national debate.  
Notably, before this incident, British Muslims had never been involved in such deadly 
acts against innocent and unarmed civilians. To some extent, as a result of the 7/ 7 
incident the loyalty of British Muslims was questioned, as was their place in a 
multicultural Britain. It is significant to examine the press coverage of the 7/7 incident 
to find out how it represented British Muslims during the peak time of resentment 
(7/7) and in normal circumstances when nothing much is happening. Furthermore, the 
press coverage will help determine the attitude of the media as well as that of British 
society towards British Muslims during the first and second anniversaries of the 7/7 
incident, which fall within my research period, and it will tell us whether the press view 
of British Muslims remained the same or improved.  
Hence, one distinctive feature of this research is the timeframe, which is dictated by the 
event itself. The selection of this particular time period allowed me to plot the rise and 
fall in newspapers’ momentum relating to the coverage of 7/7. Notably, within the 
selected time period, two other significant failed terrorist attempts occurred: on 21 July 
2005 there was a failed bombing attempt in London and on 30 June 2007 there was a 
failed attack on Glasgow airport. These two incidents helped me to determine the 
reactions of the two newspapers and establish their approach to the 7/7 event and 
related issues such as extremism and terrorism. Another key development that 
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occurred during this period was the change in the Labour Party leadership which 
passed from Tony Blair to Gordon Brown; this was a significant event that is worth 
examining to determine whether there were any changes in government policies 
relating to terrorism, radicalisation and community cohesion.    
4.5- The Data Collection and Sampling Procedure: Methodological and Theoretical 
Explanations. 
The key aim of a sampling procedure is to effectively organise a large amount of data in 
order to draw a representative sample. The dataset consists of news reports, comments 
and debates, editorials, investigative reports and features relating to the 7/7 event in 
The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph over a period of two years (8 July 2005 to 7 July 
2007). Two separate log books were kept for each newspaper, and carefully placed 
prints of all the stories were kept in chronological order covering the 7/7 incident 
starting on 8 July 2005 and ending on 7 July 2007. 
Notably, scholars, journalists and politicians used various different terms to describe the 
London Bombings such as ‘The 7 July attacks’, ‘July 7’, ‘July Seventh’,  and the ‘7/7’; this 
would produce a varying sample of published articles relating to the 7/7 incident using 
various search engines such as ‘Lexis-Nexis’. Hence, considering such complexities I 
have decided to make use of two terms, ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’, to identify types of 
journalism in the data because the incident itself was referred to both as a terrorism 
event and as an example of home-grown extremists etc.   
First of all, this thesis uses the ‘Lexis-Nexis’ database search engine and applies the 
following phrases and connotations, ‘Islam, Muslims, 7/7, terrorism and extremism and 
jihad’, to collect stories relating to 7/7. I also used other search engines such as 
‘ProQuest’ and ‘microfilm records’ to ensure that every major development in terms of 
coverage of the 7/7 incident was captured in the dataset. For example, the first week of 
July 2005 generated a large number of news reports, opinion pieces, interviews, special 
investigative reports, editorials, columns, comment & debates, and analysis, including 
letters to editors. The key reasons for using the ‘Lexis-Nexis’ search engine are its 
reliability and the fact that it has been successfully tested in several notable studies 
relating to the media portrayal of British Muslims (Allen, 2012; Moore et al., 2008; Poole, 
2011). 
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Moore et al. (2008) describe research terms as ‘news hooks’ in their study; hence, in this 
thesis the following terms or ‘news hooks’ are used as mentioned above: “Islam, 
Muslims, 7/7, terror, terrorism, extremism and jihad”. I employed and named these 
phrases or terms as “news hooks” (see Moore et al., 2008, p.22). These ‘news hooks’ 
helped me to identify the predominant topics and themes within the reporting; they are 
also functional in pinpointing the ways in which these two different newspapers labelled 
the 7/7 incident. It is important to clarify that, by applying different “hooks” or terms 
such as “extremism” and “radicalisation” with connotations such as ‘or’, ‘and’, etc, the 
total number of stories fluctuates. A practical illustration of using these different terms 
and phrases in the ‘Lexis-Nexis’ search engine is evident in the print screenshot:  
 
Print Screenshot 4.1: This show the ‘Lexis-Nexis ‘database search engine used to obtain 
data.  
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Another significant aspect of the data collection procedure is the variation in the total 
number of stories appearing in the search engines using different ‘hooks’, jointly or 
separately. For example, searching for “Islam”, “Muslims”, and “Jihad” revealed 189 
stories in The Daily Telegraph for the year 2005 and 181 stories in the subsequent year 
of 2006. In comparison, ‘Lexis-Nexis’ shows that The Guardian published a total of 257 
stories in 2005 and 221 in 2006 when I used the above terms. In the year 2007, when I 
searched for the terms “Islam, Muslims, extremism or 7/7, and radicalisation” I found 
that The Guardian produced 41 items while The Daily Telegraph published 29 news 
items. 
Since 7/7 occurred after 9/11, it was labelled an act of ‘terrorism’ that paved the way 
for the war on terror. Therefore, I decided to add a different version of “Terror” because 
“Terrorism” and “War on Terror” have been viewed differently in academia. Similarly, 
the use of “war on terror” produced 134 stories in The Daily Telegraph for the year 2005 
and 213 in 2006 compared to 356 stories in 2005 and 371 in 2006 in The Guardian. 
Overall, these different connotations collectively produced a bulky dataset comprising 
different types of journalism items amounting to 1,992 in total; thus, N=1,992, where 
the capital ‘N’ stands for the total number of articles in the aggregate dataset.  
The above illustrations of the data explain the overall data collection procedure. 
However, the data sample collected in this thesis is based on the following phrases or 
hooks as already explained above: “Islam, Muslims, 7/7, terror, terrorism, extremism 
and jihad”. Notably, the data sample for this thesis varied in number because of the use 
of the above-mentioned specific phrases or hooks that were used in search engines to 
collect original data. Overall, news stories related to British Muslims were much higher 
in volume because they included international links, but when the term ‘7/7’ is used as 
a ‘hook’ the search engine limits the volume of articles.  
Indeed, to illustrate the point let us consider two examples of Guardian editorials from 
the dataset that demonstrate that both newspapers published series of articles, 
comments and opinion pieces, editorials, books reviews and interviews discussing 
British Muslims in regard to the 7/7 incident. However, because this thesis has used 
specific ‘hooks’ and phrases to trace the articles related to the 7/7 event only, the 
database search engine did not retrieve those articles. To overcome this problem I 
carefully reviewed the collated articles to ensure that these articles fall into my required 
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category for the 7/7 event reporting based on phrases described above. In some articles 
there was no trace of the phrases that I used to collect data, whilst in a few other articles 
writers refer only briefly to the event, such as “Muslim”, “7/7” (mentioning a film, 
drama, videogame). Examples include The Guardian editorials of 23 August 2005 and 9 
December 2005, which are somewhat relevant to the London bombings but do not 
contain phrases used by this thesis to collect the data.  
Finally, considering the 7/7 event as an outcome of extremism and its association with 
jihadist elements in British society, it was decided to apply phrases and connotations 
such as “Islam, Muslim and jihad” or “7/7 and extremism” which generated 97 stories in 
the Daily Telegraph and 223 stories in The Guardian. Notably, I made use of the options 
“high” and “Duplicate Option-On High Similarity” in the ‘LexisNexis’ search engine, 
which displays duplicate versions, thus helping to minimise the chances of missing any 
additional information or source in a particular story. Moreover, using the “high” and 
“Duplicate Option-On High Similarity” options together may affect the net result; i.e. the 
total number of stories may vary in a selected period.  
This is expected to occur because the ‘Lexis-Nexis’ search engine looked for the required 
words or phrases, in my case “Hooks”, in editorials, letters to editors, columns and 
readers’ comments, and in other places inside the newspapers apart from the main 
stories. To minimise possible confusion, I divided the data on a yearly and monthly 
basis, which allowed me to record either the escalation or decline in my set of 
newspapers in a specified period. This also helped me to determine the relationship 
between the British broadsheets’ press coverage of Islam and Muslims and the 
international political events. 
(i)-Discarded and Duplicate Articles:  
A large number of articles related to Muslim issues such as Shia and Sunni conflicts, 
suicide bombings, ethnic differences and violent clashes in the Middle East and 
elsewhere in Muslim lands outside Britain were discarded because they were not 
directly relevant to the reporting of British opinion about the 2005 bombings. In 
addition, stories containing brief references to Islam and Muslims in Britain that had no 
direct link with the 7/7 event were purposely ignored because they might have 
distracted the focus of attention from the 7/7 event. However, journalistic items such as 
investigative reports carrying information about the 7/7 perpetrators’ visits to religious 
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schools in Pakistan and the Middle East were incorporated. Overall, items such as 
letters to editors and book reviews were discarded along with those articles that carried 
only one or two phrases in a sentence or paragraph or were used as a context to explain 
issues that fall outside the topic of this thesis. The following table shows an illustration 
of a discarded article that falls outside this thesis dataset criterion.   
Newspaper The Guardian 
Type of Press 
Coverage 
News report  
Headline George Galloway has the most amazing ability to see the best in 
everyone - even homicidal dictators like Saddam 
Author 
Description/Affil
iation  
Andrew Anthony 
Type of Source  DISCARDED EXAMPLE  
Date 28 October 2005  
Length   
Link  http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/oct/28/otherpar
ties.georgegalloway 
Table 1.4.1: This table shows an illustration of a discarded article that falls outside this 
thesis dataset criteria.  
Furthermore, careful inspections of the data helped to locate duplicate articles such as 
Jason Burke’s comment piece published in The Guardian on 17 July 2005 entitled: “The 
violence that lies in every ideology: Like most  beliefs, Islam is a religion of peace that 
has to accept that it can also breed terror”. The same article appears again in The 
Guardian on 22 July 2005 under the title: “Ideology’s violent face” (see Appendix-D). In 
addition, reports of other foreign trips by radical and extremist elements within the 
British Muslim community were included because the issue is directly linked with the 
radicalisation of young British Muslims. A small number of articles such as comedy, 
drama and non-serious news clips were also excluded from the sample because these 
were irrelevant to the topic selected.  
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Thus, these practices produce the following overall data sample: The Guardian 187 
articles and The Daily Telegraph 87 articles = 274 
Here, I assign a capital ‘N’ to denote the total number of types of journalism or articles; 
hence N=274. Essentially, it is significant to understand and draw distinctions between 
these categories. For instance, a news report displays basic facts and information on a 
particular event but a feature story carries analysis and direct quotes from officials and 
dignitaries and investigates the matter thoroughly. The following tables show the yearly 
summary of types of journalism items in The Guardian:  
4.5.1- Types of Press Coverage in The Guardian/Observer:  
 
Types of Press Coverage  Year 2005  Year 2006 Year 2007 
Comments/Debates/Features 32 30 8 
Main Stories/news reports/news 
clips/features/focus/investigative 
reports/ 
29 43 17 
Editorials  4 6 3 
Editorial Press Review  1 - - 
Interviews  1 1 3 
Personal views - 1 - 
Special reports G2 - 2 - 
Focus  - 3 - 
Feature/G2 - 1 - 
Special reports  - 2 - 
Total 67 89 31 
Table 2.4.2: Total Number of Types of Journalism in The Guardian/The Observer 
Total Number of News Items: N= 187 
4.5.2-Types of Press Coverage in The Daily Telegraph/Sunday Telegraph:  
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The Daily Telegraph/The Sunday Telegraph:  
Types of Press Coverage  Year 
2005  
Year 
2006 
Year 
2007 
Comments  - 10 6 
News reports/news clips/investigative news reports/ 13 23 19 
Editorials  3 5 - 
Personal views  1 3 1 
Interviews  - 1 2 
Total  17 42 28 
Table 3.4.3: Total Number of Types of Journalism in The Daily Telegraph/The Sunday 
Telegraph 
Total Number of News Items: N = 87 
4.5.3-Item Analysed:  
Total types of journalism in both newspapers amount to 187+87 = 274.  
4.5.4-Items Collected in the original dataset but discarded as irrelevant:  
The Daily Telegraph (Types of Journalism)  2005 2006 2007s  
Reviews: Books/Films/Personal/Interviews  1 2 - 
Letters to Editors/Feedback/email replies 3 3 1 
Total 4 5 1 
Table: 4.4.4: This table shows the total number of types of journalism collected but 
discarded as irrelevant in The Daily Telegraph.  
The Guardian (Types of Journalism) 
 
2005 2006 2007 
Reviews: Books/Films/Personal/Interviews  3 8 4 
Letters to Editors/Feedback/email replies 4 3 1 
Total 7 11 5 
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Table: 5.4.5.: This table shows the total number of types of journalism collected but 
discarded as irrelevant in The Guardian.  
Total items discarded in both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph= 33 
4.5.5-Defining Key Types of Journalism:  
(i)-Editorials:  
The editorial is the most important section of any newspaper as it reflects the views of 
the newspaper or its ownership on a particular political or non-political issue. It is 
mostly written in concise form by the editor and sets out organisational policies on 
current issues. Large newspapers often have editorial boards that decide the 
significance and relevance of a particular issue. In brief, the editorial mirrors the 
newspaper’s political orientation, preferences and understanding of national and 
international subject matters.   
(ii)-Comments:  
The “comment” section contains debates and analysis often written by scholars, 
professional columnists, commentators, politicians and representatives of various 
religious and non-religious groups, activists, campaigners, and government and public 
officials.  
The layout, structure and criteria of the comment section vary across newspapers. In 
The Guardian, “Comment is free” is reserved for comment and debate. The word “free” 
signifies the values and traditions for which The Guardian is best known. It originated in 
a famous speech by The Guardian’s first editor, Charles Prestwich Scott, in which he 
said: “Comment is free, but facts are sacred... The voice of opponents no less than that of 
friends has a right to be heard”.  The Guardian website states: “We publish a plurality of 
voices, but our centre of gravity as a progressive, liberal, left-leaning newspaper is 
clear”.  
Meanwhile, the comment section of The Daily Telegraph is very different to The 
Guardian. It is known as ‘Personal View’ and it includes commentary on British politics, 
political leaders’ conduct, and Britain’s relations with the rest of the world. It is often 
written by its team of writers. It also appears in the form of feature analysis by its 
opinion writers, commentators, and political and non-political figures. In comparison, 
The Guardian comment section reflects upon debates and discussions of international 
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and national politics and religion and also includes a comment cartoon that sums up the 
matter in caricature format.  
(iii)-News Reports:  
George Snell states: “reporting is a commodity but journalism is not” (The Guardian, 10 
December 2009). In simplistic terms, Roy Greenslade asserts that journalism is 
investigative, in-depth analysis and thoughtful explanation of events, which is more 
than simple news. Furthermore, reporting has now become a “commodity by the web” 
because people obtain their news free online whilst journalism is practised by 
professional journalists based in newspapers.   
Recent developments on the Internet have given rise to a new phenomenon, “citizen 
journalists”, which means that ordinary people present on the spot with their cameras, 
mobile phones and laptops create their own news. Alan Rusbridger “sees our journalists 
and readers as equal partners” (The Guardian, 27 July 2009). In other words, the 
traditional model of journalism is no longer in control of news delivery (ibid). In brief, a 
news report tells the reader about the five w’s (who, where, what, when and why) and 
how an event occurs.  
(iv)-Features:  
A feature is slightly different from a news story, which carries facts and figures and 
presents a comprehensive account of an event. A feature includes sound bites from 
various sources, analysis, interviews, opinion polls, background information, predicted 
developments, and relevant studies. In other words, it is a follow-up of any event which 
focuses on human interests and also carries opinions.   
(v)- Investigative Reports:  
Newspaper staff members comprising teams of journalists or foreign-based 
correspondents furnish these reports which include follow-ups with insightful details of 
events. In other words, they are more than just basic facts and they may take months to 
be completed. They include historical contexts of an issue or event (such as the 7/7 
incident), views and opinions of politicians, public, private and government officials, 
database document records, surveys, studies, experts’ interviews, anniversaries  and 
personal research.  
4.6-Editorial Policies of The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph:   
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British journalism is legally bound by ethics and guidelines initially set by the PCC 
(Press Complaints Commission) and later IPSO (The Independent Press Organisation) in 
the wake of the Leveson Inquiry in 2012 which resulted in the closure of the PCC. 
Following the telephone hacking scandal, the Leveson Inquiry was set up to investigate 
the cultural practices and ethics of the British press to determine its role in the scandal 
(see Appendix for details). Thus, reporters and journalists are officially required to 
work under defined parameters by their own organisations as well as regulatory bodies. 
However, quality and freedom of expression are two of the most valued aspects of 
powerful, centuries-old British journalism.  
For instance, The Guardian added a new feature “anonymous contribution” to its 
professional practice in 2011. Similarly, The Daily Telegraph’s editorial policy 
incorporated twenty-five changes during the period January 1991-February 2015. For 
example, since the Leveson Inquiry (2012) it has reduced the number of editors on the 
Code Committee. In particular, after the change in The Daily Telegraph’s ownership in 
2004, its new owner Sir David Barclay said that in future it may no longer be the “house 
newspaper “of the Conservatives. A brief description of editorial polices is essential here 
because these are closely linked with the key findings and argument developed in the 
theme sections. 
(i)-The Guardian’s Editorial Policy:  
At the heart of The Guardian’s editorial policy is a reference to its famous editor: “Our 
most important currency is trust. This is as true today as when CP Scott marked the 
centenary of the founding of the Guardian with his famous essay on journalism in 1921”. 
It is important to note that The Guardian has not signed up to the new regularity body 
IPOS because it thinks it is “just not independent enough” (see The Guardian, 4 
September 2014). It continues to view the PCC (Press Complaints Commission) code of 
practice as valid even though the Commission has closed down, and it sticks with its 
own ‘Professional practice’ and ‘Personal behaviour and conflicts of interest’ codes, 
which have twenty-eight clauses (see Appendix-E). There is particular emphasis on 
accuracy, fairness and freedom of expression: “The voice of opponents no less than of 
friends has a right to be heard . . . It is well to be frank; it is even better to be fair” (CP 
Scott, 1921). 
(ii)-The Daily Telegraph’s Editorial Policy:  
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For a long time, The Daily Telegraph has proudly presented its values and has been 
trusted for its news accuracy. Following the Leveson Inquiry, IPSO (The Independent 
Press Standards Organisation) was set up as a regulatory body for the United Kingdom 
press. On 8 September 2014, it offered a new Editors’ Codebook (2014) with which the 
members of the press including The Daily Telegraph agreed to comply. Every journalist 
of the members’ organisation is bound to follow the reviewed Editors’ Code of practice 
at all times. It includes 16 clauses relating to different disciplines of journalistic 
activities such as “accuracy, privacy, the protection of children and vulnerable groups, 
the need to avoid harassment, limitations on the use of subterfuge and clandestine 
devices - but also the Preamble and the Public Interest exceptions” (The Editors’ 
Codebook, 2014). The most significant aspect is “the ‘spirit of the Code’ - that should 
balance freedom of the individual and freedom of expression, and should be interpreted 
not just to the letter but also in the spirit” (for details, see Appendix- F) - The Daily 
Telegraph, IPSO).   
(iii)-Differences between the Editorial Polices and Guidelines of The Guardian and The 
Daily Telegraph:  
There are a few key differences between the guidelines of the two broadsheets. Firstly, 
The Guardian guidelines (2011) still equate to the PCC standards. More importantly, its 
guidelines include separate sections on professional practices, personal behaviour and 
conflict of interests; for example, The Guardian has a permanent staff member for 
corrections whilst The Daily Telegraph does not offer this service and it is not part of its 
editorial guidelines. Furthermore, there are several sub-clauses in The Guardian 
guidelines that are not part of The Daily Telegraph guidelines; for example, The Guardian 
states that “Direct quotations should not be changed to alter their context or meaning” 
(see Appendix (G) for more details). 
4.7-Ethical Considerations and Research Challenges:  
The data collection procedure involves a few complexities such as verification of 
headlines and sub-headlines, accuracy of articles’ structure, and repetitiveness. After 
the final dataset had been collected using three search engines - Lexis-Nexis, ProQuest 
and micro-films records - each newspaper article was then tested for its accuracy, 
layout and structure to ensure that it fitted the required parameters of my dataset. For 
this purpose, I visited both newspapers’ websites and online archives over a period of 
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four months because of the restrictions on accessing and downloading all the articles 
online. The following are a few examples of differences in the headlines within the 
‘Lexis-Nexis’ search engine and original published newspaper articles. In The Guardian 
comment section, Tania Branigan wrote an article on 4 October 2006 entitled “Johnson 
makes gaffes on all fronts”, but the ‘Lexis-Nexis’ headline read: “Bad day for shadow 
minister: Johnson makes gaffes on all fronts”.  
Similarly, Jason Burke’s article published on 24 December 2006 as “Channel tunnel is 
terror target” appeared in the ‘Lexis-Nexis’ headline as: “Al-Qaeda targets Channel 
tunnel for holiday carnage”. Such differences were also noticed in The Daily Telegraph 
headlines, which were different from the Lexis-Nexis headlines. The original headline on 
The Daily Telegraph mobile website appeared on January 17 2007 as “Fireman 
'confronted bomber on Tube’ but the ‘Lexis-Nexis’ headline says: “Fireman 'confronted 
bomber on Tube’ as passengers fled. Muslim tried to offer an excuse after attack on 
crowded train failed, court told”.   
4.8-Data Analysis:  
Data analysis has already been explained. For each piece of data in the shape of 
editorials, news reports, comments, features and personal views, I have extracted the 
main theme/themes from that piece of data. The following screenshot of the themes’ 
extraction shows the process. 
Theme Codes/Themes Extracted 
 
Print Screenshot 4.2: This screenshot shows the process of themes extraction. 
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On the basis of those themes, I have analysed the whole dataset. Below is a sample 
analysis of The Daily Telegraph sub-theme (STC-10).  
Theme Code STC-10 
Theme Britain’s foreign policy in the Middle East, Iraq and Afghanistan 
radicalised London bombers and created a feeling of anger among 
the younger generation of British Muslims 
Table 6.4.6: This table shows a sample of analysis of The Telegraph sub-theme (STC-
10). 
The above sub-theme was mentioned 14 times in The Guardian over a two-year period, 
once in an editorial, nine times in news reports, twice in personal views, once in a 
comment and once in an interview. The following screenshot shows the above analysed 
data.  
 
Print Screenshot 4.3: Stage 1. In the screenshot above, TOP (D) shows type of press; 
headline; author; code and theme.  
In the next step, all the data were inserted into the Microsoft Excel program, which 
offers a ‘sort and filter’ option. This feature is useful for analysing any piece of data as 
required. This filter helps to locate aggregate data related to a single code, and it enables 
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me to select and analyse any code to show the data related to that single code or set of 
codes.  
 
Print Screenshot 4.4: Stage two. (The red arrow guides towards one specific code 
recurrence in the whole dataset).  
Further, through this filter, it is easy to select and analyse any type of story and retrieve 
the data on a particular story exclusively.  
 
Print Screenshot 4.5: Stage three. (Here the arrow shows a specific item of journalism, 
such as an editorial, which can be traced in one specific theme in either of the 
broadsheets).  
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Furthermore, it shows that the whole dataset is verifiable and authentic, and it can be 
analysed in graphs and tables. In order to provide a snapshot of the step-by-step 
process that involves collecting, organising and familiarising myself with various 
concepts, phrases and themes within the data and coding, I have used an appendix 
section. The decision to use an appendix space is intended to give the reader the best 
perspective on the thematic coding scheme and overall data analysis.  
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Chapter 5 (Theme 1):  Home-Grown Islamist Terrorism Threat   
5.1-Introduction:  
This chapter provides both a narrative and an analysis of the emergence of the home-
grown Islamist terrorism threat posed by a few British-born Muslims who were 
allegedly radicalised by al-Qaeda as presented by two leading British newspapers. The 
reporting of the London bombings in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph 
acknowledges terrorism as a sensitive and complicated phenomenon that has been 
reconstructed and redefined as “political terrorism” and “religious terrorism”. The 
political uses of terrorism tie in with the perpetrators’ political ideology that has its 
roots in Wahhabism. To this day, there is still no single widely agreed definition of 
terrorism, and neither The Guardian nor The Daily Telegraph offers their own specific, 
concrete description of terrorism. This reflects the subtlety of the terrorism discourse, 
yet both broadsheets use the phrase “Islamic terrorism” in their editorials which reflect 
their political orientations and stances on different issues, including terrorism.  
Arguably, by linking Islam with terrorism, i.e. “Islamic terrorism”, both broadsheets 
would appear to agree that the act of terrorism (7/7) was in fact Islamic. But it was 
surely perpetrated by a few British Muslims rather than being an ‘Islamic’ act, since 
these broadsheets were aware that there are and have been other terrorists from 
different religions and with different causes. However, these newspapers may have had 
their own justifications, presumably because the perpetrators of 7/7 and the following 
failed terror plot of 21/7 happened to be followers of the Islamic faith who used their 
own interpretations of sacred texts to validate their brutal actions.  I would suggest that 
the use of an exclusive expression “Islamic terrorism” limits the debate on terrorism, 
which makes it problematic and divisive. In this way terrorism has been reconstructed 
and redefined as a “religious terrorism”. Of course, there is an apparent difference 
between ‘Islamic’ and ‘Islamist’ because the former is an adjective pertaining to the 
religion of Islam while the latter is a follower of a self-designed ideology of radicalism 
and extremism.   
However, there is no denying the existence of contrasting views in the media and polity. 
Certainly, these newspapers are not alone in reconstructing the terrorism debate from a 
new perspective, but this reconstruction has in fact been conducted by a nexus of 
politicians, pressure groups, police and press, as would be the case in most countries. 
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Furthermore, to an extent, both broadsheets overstated the home-grown terrorism 
threat even though it comes from different sources of information. A considerable 
portion of the aggregate reporting on 7/7 arguably misinforms and scares ordinary 
people into believing that British radical Muslims aim to take over Britain and Europe 
and set up Sharia Law, which is “Barbaric”, “Mediaeval” and anti-Western, which is far 
from the case for the vast majority of Muslims in Britain. 
Current debates on terrorism include the role of the media, particularly in the West, 
where a section of the media has supported government vows to combat terrorism. For 
example, sections of the British press and polity often use the word “barbaric” to 
narrate attacks on the West but avoid using the same word to describe their military 
campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. This has raised concerns among scholars and critics, 
who think that the media have in some ways favoured the elite’s viewpoint, thus 
compromising their neutral position (see Bilandzic, 2013; Drakos and Gofas, 2006; 
Martin 2012). This is a central point in the terrorism debate, with suggestions that the 
media are power-driven and usually accommodate the state’s viewpoint; hence, they 
are likely to be biased. This chapter presents and discusses the terrorism theme that 
emerges from the dataset from both press reporting and academic perspectives. 
Section I: Original Data and Findings Emerging from The Guardian and 
The Daily Telegraph Reporting of, Response to and Presentation of the 
7/7 Event:  
 
5.2-The Dataset: Explanation of “Home-grown Islamist Terrorism Threat” Theme. 
The dataset on The Daily Telegraph and The Guardian reflects their attitude to the home-
grown Islamist terrorist threat. The evidence is divided into twenty sub-themes as 
shown in the following diagram which provides details of these along with their 
percentage shares, roles and influence in the formulation of the main theme of the 
‘home-grown Islamist terrorism threat’. The colour scheme in the diagram assigns a 
different colour to each sub-theme and demonstrates its share in the formulation of the 
main ‘home-grown Islamist terrorism threat’ theme.  
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Diagram 5.1 Formulation of the theme “Home-grown Islamists Terrorism threat”.  
The dataset is organised, consulted and applied in the following discussions based on 
these sub-themes. The percentages reflect a share of each sub-theme in the making of a 
main theme, the “Home-grown Islamist terrorism threat”. For example sub-theme/code 
12 (“UK-based sleeper cells/networks have links to al-Qaeda and religious schools in 
Pakistan that espouse fundamentalism ‘Home-grown terrorism’) is represented in a 
burgundy colour, accounting for an area of 15 per cent of the above figure. This sub-
theme denotes home-grown radicals who have developed links with foreign-based 
extremists and radicals such as al-Qaeda. Similarly, the sub-theme/code 42 (“Muslim 
terrorism/Islamic terrorism/Islamist terrorism threat continues to next generation in 
the form of nuclear, biological attacks etc”) represented in sky-blue covers an area of 
around 22 per cent. Furthermore, sub-theme/code 2 (“Terrorists’ ideology e.g. 
‘Wahhabism’ etc. is to destroy and replace Western democratic values with their 
interpretations of ‘Islamic law’”) represented in blue occupies a 13% area or share in 
the main theme, which is “Home-grown Islamist terrorism threat”.  The following table 
explains the structure of a main theme in more detail, including the colour scheme and 
percentage share of each sub-theme/code.    
Table 5.1: The Construction of a Main Theme: “Home-grown Islamist Terrorism 
threat.  
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No.  Colour 
Scheme 
Percentage 
Share  
Sub-Theme/Code  
1 Sky-blue 22% STC 42, “Muslim/Islamic/Islamist terrorism threat 
continues to next generation in the form of nuclear, 
biological attacks etc” 
2 Maroon 
carnelian 
colour 
15% STC 12, “UK-based sleeper cells/networks have 
links to al-Qaeda and religious schools in Pakistan 
that espouse fundamentalism” (Home-grown 
terrorism) 
3 Blue colour  13% STC 2, “Terrorists’ ideology e.g. ‘Wahhabism’ etc. is 
to destroy and replace Western democratic values 
with their interpretations of ‘Islamic law’” 
4 Purple Iris 9% (STC 30, “Radical Islamist individuals, groups and 
organisations (such as al-Qaeda; Hizub-ut-Tahrir, al-
Muhajurin etc.) anti-West activities inside Britain 
and abroad” 
5 Orange 
tangerine  
7% STC 43, “Terrorists are common enemy for British 
Muslims and non-Muslims, so community bonding 
could defeat terrorism” 
6  Pink Parfait  5% STC 7, “Islamists’ real intention is to expand 
caliphate founded on Sharia Law; ayatollahs and 
imams” 
7 Green Pear 4% STC 27, “Islam link with terrorism, extremism, 
radicalisation, women’s issues, etc. (Closed-minded 
views)” 
8 Maroon 
lava 
4% STC 26, “Islam preaches peace and harmony and has 
no link with terrorism etc. (Open-minded view)” 
9 Light pink 3% STC 48, “Court Trials of Suspects and Alleged 
Terrorists reflect home-grown radicals’ 
involvement in attacking their country of birth”   
10 Very light 
blue  
3% STC 16, “The Terrorism Bill’s proposal to increase 
suspects’ detention period for up to 90 days will 
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weaken Britain’s commitment to Human Rights 
Convention”   
11 Blue Arctic 2% STC 45, “British politicians and law lords divided 
over ‘glorification of terrorism’ legislation” 
12 Blue 
Sapphire 
2% STC 1, “London bombings provide British 
Government with a reason to revisit the terrorism 
legislation” 
13 Light green  2% STC 13, “Political process is the best strategy to 
counter terrorism in Iraq and beyond” 
14 Purple 
violet 
2% STC 14, “Britain needs tough laws to deal with 
modern Islamists’ terrorism threat that is global” 
15 Ginger  2% STC 19, “Blair and his Government officials blame 
British Muslims and their leaders for not doing 
enough to combat terrorism and suggest that it is 
Muslims’ problem” 
16 Apricot 
orange  
2% STC 5,“Islam and terrorism cannot be separated” 
18 Blue indigo 1% STC 55, “Beeston/Leeds area’s media portrayal and 
linking to troubles, bad labels” 
19 (Thin-line) 
in Green 
Seaweed 
0.05% STC 51, “Blair government has shown double 
standards in tackling terrorism i.e. ‘Islamic 
militancy’ vs. IRA” 
20 Blue 
cerulean 
1% STC 57, “Blair government strict measures relating 
to anti-terror laws, banning extremist websites, 
pressing opposing voices is unwise and 
undemocratic”. 
21 Thin-line in 
next to blue 
1% STC 53, “History shows that every country, region 
and era has its own terrorists and extremist groups 
who used their religious ideologies to create 
mayhem”  
The following sub-section provides a detailed account of the data that emerged from the 
reporting, interpretation and attitudes of both broadsheets to the 7/7 event. It 
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encompasses the emergence of key phrases to denote terrorism, the development of the 
home-grown Islamist terrorism threat, religious ideology discourse, radicalisation in 
Britain, and debates and discussions on the ways to combat terrorism. In addition, it 
occasionally presents original findings and references from both broadsheets to 
describe the above-mentioned concepts and debates.   
5.3:  The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph Categorisation of Terrorism:  
This section shows the emergence of terrorism terms and phrases that these 
broadsheets applied to describe the 7/7 incident. Initially, however, the two 
newspapers held different views on the organisation responsible for the attacks, i.e. al-
Qaeda, as has already been described in the context chapter. Later, on 10 July 2005, The 
Guardian explained four key theories to describe the perpetrators: “The home-grown 
bombers”, “The foreign professionals”, “Iraqi bleedback” and “Forget the categories”; 
these were based on assumptions relating to each theory. According to the dataset, both 
broadsheets used three main phrases in connection with the London bombings, as 
follows:  
(i)- “Islamic Terrorism”:  
The database shows that both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph used the term 
‘Islamic terrorism’ in their editorials, thereby reflecting their view of the terrorism 
issue. Out of 13 editorials in total, The Guardian used the term ‘Islamic terrorism’ twice 
(2/13*100 = 15.38%). Similarly, The Daily Telegraph used the term ‘Islamic terrorism’ 
twice in eight editorials (2/8*100 = 25%). The Daily Telegraph also used terms such as 
‘Muslim extremism’ and ‘Islamic extremists’ fifteen times in headlines and the leads of 
87 articles, amounting to 15/87*100 = 17.24 per cent of its total articles, whilst The 
Guardian also used terms such as ‘Muslim terrorism’ (4/187*100 = 2.1 per cent), 
‘Islamic extremism’, ‘Islamic militants’, ‘Islamic theology’, ‘Islamic extremists’ and 
‘Islamic radicalism’ (21/187*100 = 11.2 per cent) in its articles’ headlines and leads.  
Within the database, in a total of 21 editorials overall, both The Guardian and The Daily 
Telegraph refer to 7/7 as “Islamic terrorism” (4/21*100=19.04%) in comparison to 
“Islamist terrorism” (1/21*100=4.76 or approximately 5%). Apart from the editorials, a 
few writers in these newspapers also used the term “Islamic terrorism” to denote 7/7, 
twice in The Daily Telegraph news reports and once in its comment piece. In the 
database, about nine per cent of the reporting (24/274*100 = 8.75% or approximately 
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9%) linked Islam with terrorism, thus presenting a closed view of Islam, compared to 
around six per cent of reporting (16/274*100 = 5.83%, that is nearly 6%) that had an 
open view of Islam. More specifically, both newspapers used “Islamic terrorism” twice 
each in comparison to “Islamist terrorism” which was cited in The Guardian editorials 
just once and did not appear at all in The Daily Telegraph editorials within the database.  
According to The Daily Telegraph report published on 11 December 2006, “The Foreign 
Office has advised Government ministers, ambassadors and officials to avoid the phrase 
‘war on terror', and similar belligerent terms, as they risk angering British Muslims and 
generating tensions in the wider Islamic world”. Later on, David Cameron experienced 
this personally when he spent some time with a British Muslim family in Birmingham to 
learn how British Muslims view post 7/7 British society. Among many things, Cameron 
learned that many Muslims were “deeply offended by the use of the word ‘Islamic’ or 
‘Islamist’ to describe the terrorist threat we face today” (The Guardian, 13 May 2007).  
On the day after the 9/11 anniversary on 10 September 2006, Muhammad Abdul Bari 
pointed out to David Harrison of The Daily Telegraph that, “When the IRA was blowing 
people up, the entire Catholic population of Britain was not demonised, so why is it 
happening to the Muslim community?” The point here is surely that the IRA campaign 
and, indeed, the Protestant bombings and killings were seen as a problem based on the 
issue of the future of Northern Ireland and not on religious communities. Drawing on 
Britain’s experience of IRA bombings, Karen Armstrong, in her comment piece entitled 
“The Label of Catholic terror was never used about IRA”, stated that politicians and the 
media should avoid using “Muslim terrorism” and “Islamic terrorism” because the 7/7 
bombers had “violate[d] essential Islamic principles” (The Guardian, 11 July  2005).  
Armstrong made three significant points. First, the Qur’an and Bible both insist on 
forgiveness, love and peace, and, like many Muslims, Jews and Christians have also 
failed to live up to these standards. Second, “We rarely, if ever, called the IRA bombings 
‘Catholic’ terrorism because we knew enough to realise that this was not essentially a 
religious campaign…This is obviously the case with Zionist fundamentalism in Israel 
and the fervently patriotic Christian right in the US” (ibid.). Third, it is imperative that 
Western governments also avoid using the words ‘Islamic terrorism’ to describe the 
threat of radicalisation in Europe because it may increase the risk of radicalisation and 
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limit efforts to reach out to the Muslim population (also see The Daily Telegraph, 12 
April 2006).  
(ii)- “Islamist terrorism”:   
In the days following the 7/7 attacks both broadsheets also applied the term “Islamist 
terrorism” to describe the attacks. This thesis traced the presence of the term ‘Islamist’ 
in several different ways including “Islamist terrorism”, “Islamist terrorist”, “Islamist 
ideology”, “Islamist preachers”, “Islamist extremist” and “Islamist flag”. Overall, the 
phrase “Islamist” appears 80 times (80/274*100=29.19%) in both The Guardian and 
The Daily Telegraph in all their types of journalism including comments, features, 
editorials and special investigative news reports. Here it is important to note that the 
expression “Islamist” mostly appears in connection with radical individuals, groups and 
organisations, and is used to describe affiliates of various international radical and 
extremist organisations such al-Qaeda.  
Notably, both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph used the term “Islamist terrorism” 
only nine times in their all types of journalism (9/274*100=3.28% approximately). The 
editorial citation of “Islamist Terrorism” appears as follows: The Guardian share 
comprises (1/13*100=7.69 or 8% approximately) in comparison to The Daily Telegraph, 
which did not cite the term “Islamist terrorism” in its editorials. Overall, The Daily 
Telegraph reporting used the expression only twice, in a news report and in a comment. 
In contrast, The Guardian used the term “Islamist terrorism” eight times in its other 
types of journalism, including news reports and comments.   
The word “Islamist” appears as a synonym for ‘violent ideology’ ranging from the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Qaeda and Hizbut-Tahrir to Al-Muhajiroun in Britain. Notably, 
the word “Islamist” also denotes hate preachers, radical and extremists such as Abu-
Hamza al-Masri, and Omar Bakri Muhammad who have been accused of making hate 
speeches. In The Daily Telegraph report of 7 July 2007, the British writer Charles Moore 
branded Baroness Sayeeda Warsi an “Islamist” because she supports terrorism in 
Kashmir. In other words, the description “Islamist” suggests that individuals and groups 
who seek to achieve political goals by using or endorsing violent means are “Islamists”.  
(iii)- “Home-grown Terrorism”:  
 ‘Home-grown terrorism’ is a relatively new term used to describe young European-
born Muslims who take up a violent ideology to attack their country of birth. Despite the 
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growing use of the term ‘home-grown’ in various disciplines, the database shows that 
The Guardian uses the term ‘home-grown’ fifteen times in its dataset (15/187*100 = 
8.02%) compared to The Telegraph which uses it on only four occasions in its comments 
(4/87*100 = 4.59% or nearly 5%). I note that in the database The Guardian opinion 
writers Madeleine Bunting and David Clark used this phrase on 16 and 25 August 2006. 
The Guardian also discussed a theory of ‘The home-grown bombers’ to describe the 
London bombings on 10 July 2005.  
5.4-Islamists’ Terrorism Threat May Continue to the Next Generations:  
Given the three phrases applied to describe terrorism, both The Guardian and The Daily 
Telegraph showed concerns in their features, news reports, editorials and interviews 
that the “Islamist terrorism threat” may continue for generations. Overall, thirty-four 
per cent (92/274*100 =34%) of reports published between 8 July 2005 and 7 July 2007 
in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph raised concerns about the terrorism threat. It 
is significant to note that this single highest reoccurring sub-theme within the dataset 
evaluated that the terror threat posed to Britain is not short-term but will in fact last 
until the next generations. Relating to home-grown radicalisation, which emerges in the 
dataset, I merged two sub-themes (63+39 = 102/274*100 = 37.22%) formed from 
reports raising concerns over the threat of home-grown radicals, i.e. networks and cells 
linked to al-Qaeda and other international terrorist organisations.  
From the dataset, one of these two sub-themes reflects young British-born Muslims who 
have turned to radicalisation whilst visiting the countries of their parents. Notably, the 
terrorism threat also includes the wide-ranging assumption that radicals intend to take 
over Britain and replace its secular system with Sharia law. Another aspect of the 
terrorism threat referred to the “Islamic” caliphate that British radicals intend to 
establish. Several articles appeared in both broadsheets, asserting radical Islamists’ 
mission to establish a caliphate in the UK. Overall, the dataset shows that the threat to 
establish a caliphate appeared in around eight per cent of reports, editorials and 
features (21/274*100 = 7.66%). 
Threats continued to build up as, from time to time, politicians, police and security 
officers, press and representatives of public organisations raised concerns that Britain 
is likely to come under terrorist attack at any moment. On 24 August 2006, The Daily 
Telegraph quoted Phil Woolas, the minister for community cohesion, who stated that 
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“the war against Islamic terrorism was likely to last a generation”. Similarly, Home 
Secretary John Reid warned that the danger of a terrorist attack is “very high indeed” 
and that “the struggle against Muslim terrorism will last at least 30 years” (The Daily 
Telegraph, 11 December 2006). Reid equated “Muslim terrorism” with IRA terrorism, 
which also lasted 30 years (ibid).  
Several other contributors occasionally cited politicians, government security and 
police officers and members of public organisations that provided different figures on 
radicals and extremists inside Britain. Commenting on the intensity of the threat, 
Patience Wheatcroft warned that “There are an estimated 1,500 plotters now at work 
attempting to wreak havoc in Britain” and that “Those would-be jihadists who want to 
see Britain quaking under Sharia law will surely think again when they realise the scale 
of the fight-back now underway” (The Daily Telegraph, 22 October 2006).  
From the beginning to end, the terrorism threat was associated with the religious 
ideology that the British authorities and radicals frequently propagated in their 
speeches and video messages. According to The Daily Telegraph editorial, “The Islamist 
rationale lies in medieval theology…It has grown with every clash involving Islamist 
militancy since - in Sudan and Somalia, Pakistan and the Philippines, and countless 
countries and regions in between (The Daily Telegraph, 20 July 2005). In several articles 
and reports The Daily Telegraph carried the same argument, albeit by different 
commentators, that the British “Islamists” intended to replace secular values with 
Sharia law, which would happen under a caliphate. The core message was that “Western 
values” and “way of life” are under threat and that they [Muslims] want to take revenge; 
“That is what we are up against” (The Daily Telegraph, 27 November 2006).  
The caliphate threat continued to appear in The Daily Telegraph reporting in 
subsequent years. It cited and referred to former members of radical groups such as 
Hizbut-Tahrir to strengthen its argument that the caliphate threat was genuine. Ed 
Husain disclosed that during his time at college and university he learned, whilst a 
member of Hizbut-Tahrir, that the purpose of caliphate is to remove “all Arab 
governments that were not sufficiently ‘Islamic' and were liable to removal; entire 
populations would submit to the army of the caliph, or face extinction” (The Daily 
Telegraph, 2 May 2007). Ed Husain said that the caliph will be based in the Middle East, 
from where he will instruct and use British Muslims against Britain (ibid).  
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The fear of a caliphate was a prominent feature of both broadsheets’ reporting. It is 
evident that most Muslim countries’ regimes even today are secular in their beliefs, be it 
Syria, Turkey, Egypt or Jordan. Different sources mentioned the caliphate threat. For 
example, on 6 May 2007, The Guardian investigative report disclosed that “Al-
Muhajiroun, an obscure Islamist organisation, has booked the London Arena in 
Docklands for a conference dedicated to ‘the struggle for Khilafah’, the creation of an 
Islamic state”.  
In the past, several Western countries including Britain and America have successfully 
used the fear tactic to control or to divert public attention from their controversial wars. 
Among other commentators, Karen Armstrong highlighted this point: “Extremists and 
unscrupulous politicians have purloined the word for their own purposes, but the real 
meaning of jihad is not ‘holy war’ but ‘struggle’ or ‘effort’” that bound Muslims “to make 
a massive attempt on all fronts - social, economic, intellectual, ethical and spiritual - to 
put the will of God into practice” (The Guardian, 11 July 2005).    
This is a well-established thesis that has been promoted in the media, films, arts, books, 
dramas and theatre. Jonathan Freedland provided an example of a TV thriller in which 
the hero Jack Bauer has only 24 hours to “prevent terrorists detonating a nuclear bomb 
over Los Angeles” (The Guardian, 24 August 2005). Freedland further stated that, like 
this fiction, in real life people are ready to sacrifice their liberties in order to be safe and 
secure. He illustrates an ICM poll conducted by The Guardian: “Having seen the all-too-
real threat of the July bombings, 73% are ready to pay the price, ready to let our 
protectors do whatever has to be done” (ibid).  
In particular, The Daily Telegraph published surveys using sensitive headlines such as, 
“Poll reveals 40pc of Muslims want sharia law in UK” (The Daily Telegraph, 19 February 
2006). However, it did not explain the structure of the survey and how this 40% figure 
emerged in its follow-up. In addition, Con Coughlin reminded readers that “Islamist” 
radical groups such as Iranian-backed Shia militias and Hizbollah wished for a caliphate 
that would be a threat to Britain from Southern Iraq to Lebanon (The Daily Telegraph, 3 
August 2006). The caliphate threat was presented more or less like the “weapons of 
mass destruction” threat from a constructed enemy in a distant land, the Middle East, 
which equates to Said’s Orientalism concept. In brief, both newspapers raised their own 
concerns alongside the politicians, police and public and private organisations’ 
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representatives who constantly reminded us that the terrorism threat will continue in 
the years to come.  
                 5.5-The ‘Religious Ideology’ Discourse: “Islamist” Ideology. 
Both broadsheets in all forms of journalism more or less identified “Islamist” ideology 
as the root cause of terrorism problems, although they were writing in the context of 
7/7 as opposed to episodes in the past. To an extent, both newspapers’ editorials also 
reflected this view as opposed to the various other contributions. According to the 
dataset, ‘ideology’ refers to the “Islamist” and “radical” interpretation of religion and to 
their mission, which is to establish a caliphate under Sharia law. This sets the scene for 
discussions on British Muslims, Islam as a religion and its link with terrorism in the 
form of an ‘ideology’ that is often misinterpreted by Islamist terrorists and radicals. The 
code/sub-theme for ideology appears 55 times in both broadsheets (55/274*100 = 
20.7% or nearly 21%).  Hence, on the whole, around 21 per cent of the total coverage in 
various types of journalism across both broadsheets talks about ideology.  
Overall, the sub-theme ‘ideology’ ranked fourth after Islamists’ terrorism threat, 
Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq, and “Britishness”. Both broadsheets mainly focused on 
three different types of ideologies that were presented as root causes of the terrorism 
threat. These ideologies were different branches of the same tree but were placed in 
three separate boxes including Wahabbi, al-Qaeda and Muslim Brotherhood ideologies. 
Notably, a total of 46/274*100=16.78 or nearly 17% of reporting in all types of 
journalism, including editorials of both broadsheets, set out the opinions of a few British 
radicals and hate-mongers such as Abu-Hamza, Anjem Choudary, Omar Bakri 
Muhammad and Abu Qatada. Immediately after the bombings, Prime Minister Blair used 
the term “Evil ideology” to describe the 7/7 bombers. On this argument, The Daily 
Telegraph agreed with Blair and wrote in its editorial that the 7/ 7 bombers acted “in 
the name of a perverted conception of Islam… the name of an ideology whose adherents 
hate Western democracy and liberalism” and “They wish to replace it with a theocracy, 
governed by religious leaders who interpret Islamic law in medieval fashion (The Daily 
Telegraph, 10 July 2005).  
(i)-Wahhabi Ideology:  
Within the dataset the sub-theme “Terrorists; ideology e.g. ‘Wahhabism’ etc. is to destroy 
and replace Western democratic values with their interpretations of ‘Islamic law’” 
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appears 55 times in both broadsheets’ various types of journalism, including their 
editorials (55/274*100=20.07%). It is thus the third highest reoccurring sub-theme 
within the construction of a main theme “Home-grown Islamist Terrorism Threat”.  
Notably, a larger portion of 20.07% citation of ‘Wahhabism’ appears in comment pieces, 
news reports and interviews, indicating that the terminology was used by various 
commentators and writers in both broadsheets. It is important to note that The Guardian 
(46/187*100=25%) was more concerned about ‘Wahhabism’ in comparison to The Daily 
Telegraph (9/87*100=10.34%) in terms of overall reporting. However, it is noted that 
The Guardian mentions ‘Wahhabism’ three times in its editorials while The Daily 
Telegraph talked about it only twice.  
‘Wahhabism’ was mostly linked with al-Qaeda and its associates and Saudi Arabia. The 
‘ideology’ debate showed that most writers and commentators in both broadsheets 
regularly presented controversial figures, especially former radicals, as their main 
sources of citation and expert opinion. Thus, controversial and self-styled scholars 
shaped ideology discussions such as the former member of Hizbut-Tahrir, Ed Husain, 
who appeared in The Daily Telegraph as an expert on Islam. Ed Husain blamed Saudi 
Arabia for backing ‘Wahhabism’, which he considered the “root cause of the theology of 
terror, we will not be able to defeat it” (The Daily Telegraph, 2 May 2007). In comparison,  
The Guardian also presented an ex-member of a radical group Al-Muhajiroun, Hassan 
Butt, as an expert in radical ideology who argued that “the real engine of our violence” 
lies in ‘Islamic theology’ that is centuries old and it needs to change (The Guardian, 1 July 
2007).  
These two authors advocated the adoption of a new version of ‘modern Islam’ that is 
compatible with the West. Hassan pointed out that Muslims cannot ignore the fact that 
there are passages in the Qur’an that demand the killing of unbelievers. Upon this, 
neither newspaper expanded the debate and incorporated Islamic scholars’ opinions on 
the historic context of those verses of the Quran nearly fourteen centuries ago. But, The 
Guardian columnist Seumas Milne raised these issues in the comment section: 
Rarely a TV debate goes by without Ed Husain, one-time 
member of Hizbut-Tahrir and now a British neocon pinup 
boy, or Hassan Butt, formerly of the banned al-Muhajiroun 
group, insisting that this is all about people with identity 
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crises who are “hell-bent on destroying the west”, 
denouncing Ken Livingstone for engaging in dialogue with 
Islamists... (The Guardian, 5 July 2007). 
Milne further notes that, like Ed Husain and Hassan Butt, there are neocon politicians 
such as the Tory Michael Gove and New Labour’s Denis MacShane who often loudly 
proclaim that all “Islamists”, from the liberal-minded Muslim scholar Tariq Ramadan to 
al-Qaeda terrorists, should not be engaged with (The Guardian, 5 July 2007). This 
argument is valid in the sense that, on the one hand, selected members of radical 
organisations are presented as moderate and reformist whilst, on the other hand, 
genuine scholars such as Tariq Ramadan have been demonised.   
Evidence emerged in The Observer’s letters-to-the-editor page on 20 May 2007, when 
Taji Musfata, a media representative of Hizbut-Tahrir, rejected Ed Husain’s claim to 
have been a Hizbut-Tahrir member. Ed Husain has received considerable coverage as an 
expert and learned scholar on Islam in both broadsheets. Most of the articles in these 
broadsheets on terrorism and the ideology discussion involved the selective use of 
sources such as controversial hate preachers, ex-Muslims and ex-members of banned or 
working radical groups and organisations such as Hizbut-Tahrir etc.   
The Saudi factor was a prominent feature in the “Islamic” caliphate discourse. 
Furthermore, these newspapers’ writers pointed out that British mosques are being 
funded by Saudi money. In other words Saudi Arabia is backing and promoting the idea 
of Wahhabism in Britain. Evidently, despite the view that the London bombers were 
unconnected with mosques, some of The Daily Telegraph writers constantly labelled 
British mosques as places that inculcate extremism and Wahhabism ideology in young 
British Muslims who are radicalised in the mosques.  
Two commentators in The Daily Telegraph, Mark Steyn and Denis MacShane, pointed to 
Saudi funding of British mosques. On 12 July 2005, Steyn wrote that Britain should even 
force its allies to cut off ties with Saudi Arabia “like General Musharraf shutting down 
his section of the Saudi-Pakistani-LondonistanWahhabist pipeline”. The anti-Saudi 
campaign through the prism of Wahhabi ideology continued in The Daily Telegraph 
comment pieces, features and editorials. MacShane wrote that “The struggle is not 
between religion and secularism, nor between the West and Islam…Bush-Blair and the 
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Taliban or Iraqi insurgents. It is the ideologisation…of religion that needs confronting” 
(The Daily Telegraph, 17 July 2006).  
The anti-Saudi feeling was a predominant feature in The Guardian reporting, and a few 
of its contributors even used phrases such as “Wahabbi terror”, “Sunni Terror” and 
“Porn-loving Saudi Arabia” which suggested that the ideology is a product of the Saudi 
Arabian-backed Wahabbism idea (The Guardian, 10 July 2005). On the other hand, The 
Guardian and The Daily Telegraph did not mention Shia ideology, which can be seen at 
work in Syria, Yemen and the Gulf states where Iran and Saudi Arabia are locked in a 
struggle for regional hegemony.  
(ii)-Muslim Brotherhood Ideology:  
According to The Daily Telegraph writers and commentators, the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
ideology (Sunni Islamism) was responsible for the act of terrorism in Britain. These 
writers pointed out that those members of various home-grown radical groups, such as 
Hizbut-Tahrir and Al-Muhajirouin, who intend to bring Sharia law to Britain, are in fact 
inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood ideology that has also set out to bring back the 
caliphate. Most writers and commentators of The Daily Telegraph present this popular 
view that the Muslim Brotherhood ideology (radical Islamism) is a driving force behind 
British Islamists. 
One of its contributors, Patrick Bishop, wrote that although the London bombers were 
modern in their appearance, they were in reality inspired by the ideology of al-Qaeda 
which is “nearly 14 centuries old”, and “the nature of the violence suggests that they 
were driven by the ideology that propels Islamic terrorism from Leeds to Lahore” (The 
Daily Telegraph, 14 July 2005). The notion that the Muslim Brotherhood ideology had 
inspired the London bombers was constantly raised in all forms of journalistic pieces by 
various writers. For example, Dudley Edwards associated all the troubles and issues in 
Britain, from the Salman Rushdie Affair to the Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) cartoon 
controversy protest and Muslim women’s veil, with the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology 
(The Daily Telegraph, 3 February 2007).  
In contrast, The Guardian emphasised that Britain should engage in a dialogue with the 
Muslim Brotherhood. It provided a platform for Muslim Brotherhood members during 
their election campaign in Egypt and, until recently, in its editorials it condemned 
Morsi’s sentence. Further, it considered that a Muslim Brotherhood government would 
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have been better than one led by military dictators (see The Guardian, 23 November 
2005; 12 July 2006 and 22 April 2015). Madeleine Bunting wrote that the Muslim 
Brotherhood is a global entity that has different roles in different places and countries. 
For example, in Egypt it has won fair and independent elections (The Guardian, 16 
August 2006). Like a few other liberal-minded commentators of The Guardian, Bunting 
also suggested in her four comment pieces that the British government should make 
contact with all strands of Muslims including the Muslim Brotherhood (ibid).  
Another Guardian writer, Jonathan Freedland, also endorsed a dialogue (The Guardian, 3 
August 2005). In contrast, Michael Gove, often described as a strong critic of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, clarified in his article of 23 August 2006 in The Guardian that, although 
Bunting calls his book “Paranoid”, he supports a “more robust relationship with Islam”, 
by which he means “moderates” in these organisations. Although The Guardian 
recognised that ideology played a significant role in the radicalisation of young British 
Muslims, it assumed that cutting off contact with those misguided individuals would be 
even more disastrous (see The Guardian, 16 July 2005). Given Britain’s past experience 
of IRA terrorism, The Guardian’s suggestion in the above illustrations makes perfect 
sense since peace talks with the IRA were ultimately successful.  
In comparison, The Daily Telegraph comment pieces and editorials indicated a rather 
tough approach towards the Muslim Brotherhood but it did recognise that Qutb was 
radicalised in prison where he was brutally tortured and beaten (see The Daily 
Telegraph, 14 July 2005). Patrick Bishop wrote that Qutb’s work was aimed at 
undemocratic Arab regimes that were oppressing Muslims, which is why his work was 
banned in all Arab countries because it didn’t serve the interests of political elites (ibid).  
Bishop further notes that those inspired by Qutb’s work, like many “Islamic terrorists”, 
believe that “democracy and human rights raised a barrier between man and God... This 
belief that all truth is contained in the Koran means that the terrorists have no political 
agenda with which the West can engage”; therefore, for many “young men from Britain 
to Bahrain, it is a vision that outshines anything the modern world can offer” (The Daily 
Telegraph, 14 July 2005). 
The above narrative in The Daily Telegraph reflects the view that secularism clashes 
with Islamic teachings. In other words Islam is “outdated” and it restrains its [radical] 
163 
 
followers from engaging with the modern world. The message is that authorities must 
not engage with the British “Islamists”. However, evidence shows that the modern 
world’s interventions and attempts to force others to buy into its modernity contradict 
the very notions of modern Western values.    
5.6-Al-Qaeda: Home-grown “Cells” and “Networks”.  
A sub-theme, the UK-based sleeper cells/networks linked to al-Qaeda and religious 
schools in Pakistan that espouse fundamentalism, occurs 63 times in the database 
(63/274*100 = 22.99% which is nearly 23%) of the total reporting relating to home-
grown threats in the form of sleeper cells and networks. The aggregate reporting in 
both broadsheets helps to identify a sub-theme reflecting UK-based “sleeper cells” and 
“networks” that have connections with al-Qaeda and other radical groups, including a 
few religious schools in Pakistan  that espouse radicalism.  
Immediately after the London bombings, The Daily Telegraph rushed to hold al-Qaeda 
responsible for these attacks, arguing that it had sympathisers inside Britain. In 
contrast, The Guardian offered a measured response and avoided fabricating such 
connections. According to The Daily Telegraph report on 7 July 2005, al-Qaeda was 
behind the attacks, but the next day, 8 July  2005, it  published another report, “Al-
Qa’eda link hides multitude of suspects”, in which it questioned reports suggesting that 
al-Qaeda was behind the London bombings. It wrote: “Who was responsible? There are 
many fundamentalist organisations that fly under Osama bin Laden's flag of 
convenience and some of them have bases or off-shoots in London...” (The Daily 
Telegraph, 8 July 2005). 
In contrast, The Guardian published a lengthy investigative piece referring to a number 
of sources and claims that the irrational fear of al-Qaeda had been over-reported. It also 
stated in the same article: “Leak reveals official story of London bombings: Al-Qaeda not 
linked, says government: Gang used internet to plan 7/7 attack” (The Observer, 9 April 
2006). Later on, based on an unpublished ISC report, The Guardian disclosed that “The 
police have not uncovered any evidence of direct links to al-Qaeda or a fifth man” but 
the report acknowledged that “they were inspired by Osama bin Laden’s ideology” (The 
Guardian, 11 May 2006).  
However, it was evident in a few news reports that writers in these two broadsheets 
held similar views on home-grown radicals; i.e. they are al-Qaeda sympathisers and are 
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ready to kill their fellow citizens (The Observer, 30 July 2006; The Daily Telegraph, 2 May 
2007). Both newspapers raised similar concerns about how educated, middle-class, 
relatively Westernised young men had been trapped in al-Qaeda’s philosophy.  
The term “cells” refers to a small number of individuals who may have been inspired by 
al-Qaeda ideology using the Internet. British intelligence sources described them as a 
“very small number of inner-core al-Qaeda people” with 30 or so members in Britain 
(The Guardian, 11 July 2005). However, it appeared that “Al-Qaeda is not an 
organisation with a central authority, in the way that the IRA was. The small groups of 
fanatics who decide to plant bombs…No central command structure has to approve an 
operation. In the case of 7/7, it seems likely that Khan, the ringleader, acted without 
explicit approval from anyone” (The Sunday Telegraph, 14 May 2006).  
5.7- The Terrorism Debate within The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph: 
Interpretations and Responses.  
In the aftermath of 7/7, both broadsheets discussed and debated the terrorism problem 
from different perspectives and included diverse views and arguments within their 
comments and debates sections, news, investigative reports, features and personal 
views columns. The following four sub-themes are combined to initiate a broader 
debate on the aftermath of terrorism: the necessity of introducing tough laws; 
introduction of a ‘glorification of terrorism’ Act; a terrorism Bill that provides the police 
with extra powers to hold terror suspects for 90 days without trial; and, considering the 
British history of terrorism, the need to draft new laws and adopt measures to combat 
the threat.  
As mentioned above, these sub-themes account for a total share of 25.18 per cent of 
aggregate reporting. The significant point here is that, of these sub-themes, the most 
recurring sub-theme was: “Terrorists are the common enemy for British Muslims and 
non-Muslims, so community bonding could defeat terrorism”; this appeared 29 times 
(29/274*100 = 10.58 - approximately 11% of the news). This shows that those 
powerful elites (press, politicians, police, peers and public bodies) play important roles 
in the process of news manufacturing and drafting policies, considered British Muslims 
as allies in dealing with the terrorism problem.  
Moreover, both broadsheets suggested that moderate Muslims should come forward 
and play their part to tackle terrorism (The Daily Telegraph, 20 July 2006). A press 
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review of The Guardian explains the idea in a headline:  “It is a battle for the heart of 
Islam”: “Moderate Muslims are urged to tackle proponents of extremism” (The 
Guardian, 18 July 2005). It also cited its sister-paper The Observer’s editorial of 17 July 
2005 that stated: “Most Muslims are stunned that a deluded minority of its youth has 
been so corrupted by extremists that they are ready to die for an essentially fascistic 
cause. [But] real and lasting solutions have to come from Muslim communities” (ibid).  
In contrast, a contributor to The Daily Telegraph, Niall Ferguson, wrote that the British 
government considered 7/7 an act by a “criminal minority” and, therefore, neither Islam 
nor the wider Muslim community should be blamed for it. However, he continues: 
“Quite so. The trouble is that this criminal minority considers that it is acting on the 
basis of Islam.  And it seems to be hatching its schemes right under the noses of the 
wider Muslim community” (cited in The Guardian, 18 July 2005). 
Examining the causes of terrorism, The Guardian stated in an editorial that the Muslim 
community is deprived and underdeveloped and that, “While the response to Islamism 
must cover many different bases, one essential part of the strategy must be recognising 
this connection, and then addressing the pressing problems of poverty that blight so 
many Muslim lives” (The Guardian, 27 June 2006). In contrast, The Daily Telegraph 
disagreed with this notion that poverty is one of the root causes of terrorism in Britain. 
Rather, in its editorial “Attack is the best defence against terror” (The Daily Telegraph, 
10 July 2005), it  pointed out that poverty has no link with terrorism. It further wrote: 
“The reality is that we cannot address the “causes” of terrorism…The only defence we 
have is to penetrate and destroy the terrorist organisations themselves: to identify, 
arrest and imprison the terrorists and their leaders” (ibid.). However, David Davis 
proposed that, to eliminate terrorism, one might simply say: “…I respect your religion, 
you respect mine, and we all respect our laws. That means that we respect the 
universality of our laws, with no special treatment for any one group” (The Daily 
Telegraph, 15 Oct 2006).  
Both broadsheets discussed various options for countering terrorism. For example, The 
Observer editorial of 17 July 2005 asked the following questions: “Should imams be 
registered with the Home Office, perhaps? Should the state fund an Islamic college to 
provide a new generation of British imams? Similarly, David Davis posed a few 
questions in The Daily Telegraph: “Are we going to find the compromises to preserve the 
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freedoms, the tolerance…[of a] vital and creative society in history? Or are we going to 
allow the splintering of loyalties, the division of communities that will corrode the 
foundations of that society?” (The Daily Telegraph, 15 October 2006). Furthermore, both 
broadsheets discussed and debated anti-terror laws and policies, terrorist suspect 
trials, deportation, and options for banning radical groups in Britain. At this point, the 
two newspapers were evidently at odds with each other on different ways to combat 
terrorism.   
(i)- The Guardian Perspective on Counter-Terrorism:  
Soon after the 7/7 bombings, Tony Blair pledged that the “rules of the game have 
changed”. This phrase became a warning symbol of the British government reaction to 
7/7 and also demonstrated its strategy for dealing with terrorism. Subsequently, Blair 
introduced a ’12-point plan’ leading to new legislative measures to combat terrorism. At 
this point, community bonding and engagement with British Muslims emerged as a 
central focus of The Guardian reporting. Hence, it initiated a debate around these two 
themes and published a series of articles suggesting that British Muslims’ confidence 
and cooperation would be a winning tool to combat terrorism. The Guardian raised 
Muslim concerns, grievances and their motivation to engage within wider society to 
fight terrorism. The net percentage of stories in the above table demonstrates that The 
Guardian attached significant importance to Muslim issues. Notably, these figures do not 
include editorials that show The Guardian’s firm position on the anti-terror Bill, 
particularly its provisions such as ‘glorification’ of terrorism, ‘detentions’, and ‘stop and 
search’ practices. 
Generally, the human factor emerged as a prominent feature in The Guardian reporting, 
showing concern over British government proposals for tougher anti-terror laws. Here, 
it challenged the government and insisted that its new legislative measures were 
counter-productive, arguing that fundamental human rights must be considered a 
priority. In its series of editorials such as “Worse than disease” (6 August 2005); “Use 
existing laws” (9 August 2005); “Liberty is our defence” (23 August 2005); “Three 
months is too long” (13 October 2005); “No torture please we’re British” (9 December 
2005); and “Stop and rethink” (28 May 2007), The Guardian showed both its opposition 
to and disappointment with the government’s attitude and policies in battling terrorism.  
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In much of its content, including investigative and general news reports, The Guardian 
continued to criticise the government’s terrorism legislation. In a number of articles and 
news reports, it discussed the delicate nature of terrorism, particularly the notion of 
British core values, government institutional responses, and hasty policies to tackle 
terrorism, resulting in the notorious killing of Jean Charles de Menezes and the Forest 
Gate shooting in 2005 and 2006 respectively. Furthermore, The Guardian urged Gordon 
Brown to reject Blair’s strict policies and harsh tactics, which it viewed as ‘draconian’ 
and inappropriate for dealing with terrorism.     
In series of comment pieces The Guardian commentators Karen Armstrong, Martin 
Kettle, Madeleine Bunting, Oliver McTernan, Geoffrey Wheatcroft and few others offered 
several useful suggestions for combating terrorism such as promoting the role of 
mosques in eliminating radicalisation, appointing English-speaking imams in British 
mosques and acknowledging the need to address British Muslims’ grievances (The 
Guardian, 19 July 2005; 16 February 2006; 9 July 2007). Several other commentators 
criticised government plans to introduce tough anti-terror laws and the detention of 
suspects without trial, and they stressed that the government should learn from the 
past experience of dealing with IRA terrorism. They also noted that extremists, traitors 
and fundamentalists in Europe such as Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, who had 
killed thousands of Muslims, were also the “enemy within” (see The Guardian, 11 July 
2005; 30 July 2005; 31 July 2005).  
The ways of combating the terrorism threat formed an extensive debate in The Guardian 
that required plenty of space to include and comment upon every single article and 
news item. Essentially, The Guardian’s reporting suggested that not all radicals and 
extremists were born with such philosophies but had in fact become radicals due to ill-
treatment. Two of its commentators, Armstrong and Kettle, argued that violence can be 
beaten, not by practising tough laws but through wisdom and patience (see The 
Guardian, 10 July 2005; 19 July 2005).  Notably, Armstrong assumes that “militant 
religiosity is often the product of social, economic and political factors” and reminded us 
of the story of Sayyid Qutb who suffered brutal treatment in prison at the hands of 
Gamal Abdel Nasser’s government (ibid).  
In the same vein, another scholar, Soumaya Ghannoushi, also assumed that Bush and 
Blair had adopted the wrong approach to dealing with Islam which in turn made 
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matters worse. Ghannoushi wrote that “London and Washington must decide which 
Islam they want: a peaceful, democratic Islam, crucial to any pursuit of global stability, 
or the anarchical and destructive Islam of al-Qaida and its ilk” (The Guardian, 5 October 
2005). Ghannoushi stressed that the Western leaders should learn lessons of history: 
“After all, it was Europe's colonialist adventures that drove the esoteric spiritualist 
Mahdis of Sudan, Sanussis of Libya and Qadiris of Algeria out of seclusion and on to the 
road of militancy and jihadism.” (ibid)  
To balance the debate on combating terrorism, The Guardian also included some 
commentators and historians from the right whose views do not accord with its 
editorial policies. For example, Max Hastings, a right-wing historian, noted that there 
had been “acute tensions” between Islam and the West that were “founded upon Arab 
envy and frustration, [and] even if the state of Israel did not exist” there would have 
been a clash (The Guardian, 3 September 2005). Hastings noted that it was the British 
army action in Derry that provided the Irish militants with a cause with which to recruit 
youngsters for years to come (ibid). Based on Liddell’s published diary facts, Hastings 
mentioned Kim Philby and Anthony Blunt, who double-crossed their British officers and 
leaked the country’s secret information to the Soviets; thus, “If one wishes to fear an 
enemy within, the treachery of Philby, Blunt and their friends seems to be a more 
alarming example than that of Khan…and other British Muslims… communist agents, 
those pillars of London social life.” (ibid) These series of illustrations within The 
Guardian comment section shaped the debate in a way that suggested that British 
Muslims must not be singled out as lesser citizens; in fact they must be listened to and 
engaged with to win the battle against terrorism. In brief, The Guardian reminded those 
in power, through its editorials such as “Terror vote: Muslim reaction: ‘The Laws will 
increase tensions” (16 February 2006), that it is a joint effort and not a ‘Muslim 
problem’ alone. 
(ii)-The Daily Telegraph Perspective on Counter-Terrorism: 
 The Daily Telegraph reporting mainly reflected official descriptions of terrorism using 
selected sources. But it also included contrasting opinions and the views of those 
challenging the government position on anti-terror laws and policies for tackling the 
terrorism problem. Notably, on similar subjects and occasions The Daily Telegraph 
headlines appeared to contrast sharply with those of The Guardian, suggesting that it 
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backed Blair’s policies. For example: “Blair calls on Muslims to root out extremists” (The 
Daily Telegraph, 5 July 2006) vs. “Blair says Muslim leaders must do more” (The 
Guardian, 5 July 2006). In these headlines, the words “Muslims” and “Muslim leaders” 
show the sense of responsibility that varies within the Muslim community at different 
levels. A year later, The Daily Telegraph’s editorial headline stated: ‘Muslims have to join 
this battle’; hence, it continued to emphasise ‘Muslims’, like Blair’s approach. Again, its 
headlines such as “7/7 staged by the State, say quarter of Muslims” (5 June 2007) and 
“Muslims must do their duty and fight terrorist barbarians” (4 July 2007) showed that it 
placed more responsibility on Muslims rather than using words that supported joint 
efforts at combating terrorism.  
On the first anniversary of 7/7, in its editorial (7/7/2006) The Daily Telegraph was 
reluctant to draw a distinction between the 7/7 murderers and their religion; thus, it 
described the incident as an ‘Islamic terrorist assault’ but also recognised the security 
flaws and the government’s refusal to held a public inquiry, which raised further 
questions. Consider The Daily Telegraph’s view (editorial) on the second anniversary (8 
July 2007) which included Gordon Brown and Admiral Sir Alan West’s suggestion to 
avoid using the terms “Islamic terrorists” and “Muslim terrorism”. They suggested 
describing terrorists as “criminals” instead of ‘identifying them with their religious 
affiliations’. The above illustrations evidently show that The Daily Telegraph’s 
perceptions of the 7/7 event did not change throughout the entire period (8 July 2005 - 
7 July 2007).  
From day one The Daily Telegraph insisted that the bombers were inspired by a 
religious ideology, and therefore the 7/7 act of terrorism was in fact “Islamic terrorism” 
in its view. But the bombers’ video messages made it clear that they were complaining 
about the Iraq war and Muslims’ suffering because of the war, which seems to be more 
of a political issue. As mentioned earlier at the beginning of this chapter, The Daily 
Telegraph continued to use the term “Islamic terrorism” in its editorials, thus reflecting 
its own attitude to and understanding of the terrorism issue. Upon this, The Daily 
Telegraph wrote in its editorial that it disagreed with those in power, saying that they 
should not be ‘fooled by the change in language’ and arguing that “the reality is that the 
threat comes from a perverted version of Islam. It is not Hindus or Buddhists or Polish 
immigrants to Britain who are trying to plant bombs here: it is men who claim to be 
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Muslims” (The Daily Telegraph, 8 July 2007). It also insisted that the Muslim Council of 
Britain “combat the anti-Western, anti-secular ideology peddled by the fanatics.” (ibid)  
On Muslims’ sentiments, The Daily Telegraph allowed the expression of Muslim views, 
albeit within a narrow margin. For example, Ali Miraj’s analysis, “Muslim anger must be 
recognized” offered reasons for Muslims’ discontent in post-7/7 Britain. He cited a 
series of incidents such as the Forest Gate raid fuelled by suspicion, fearful and 
exaggerated surveys, false perceptions of Muslims ‘killing Kafirs and Jews’, a bad press 
and even government duplicity in its approach to Muslim issues, all of which indicated 
that a ‘hearts and minds’ thesis is more of a political narrative  than a practical 
manuscript. As a Muslim himself, Miraj admitted that Muslims and their self-proclaimed 
leaders ‘must do more to combat intolerance in their midst’. However, “That task is 
made more difficult when, despite all the mass protests against the war in Iraq, the 
Government is seen not to have listened” (The Daily Telegraph, 13 August 2006).  
On the anniversary of 7/7, terror trials and even on 9/11 anniversaries, The Daily 
Telegraph published a series of news reports, comments and opinions, and review 
strategies and policies to combat terrorism. In its editorial “Attack is the best defence 
against terror”, The Daily Telegraph supported Blair’s proposal for anti-terror 
legislation. It also discredited the Law Lords’ decision to reject, on human rights 
grounds, Blair’s anti-terror laws and detentions without charge (The Daily Telegraph, 10 
July 2005). 
On the causes of terrorism, most of its reporting sanctioned the government point of 
view rather than British Muslims’ standpoint. The support for anti-terror laws was itself 
a denial of secular British values that The Daily Telegraph cherished in its pages. It 
continued to support Blair’s policies for combating terrorism in its editorials whilst 
occasionally providing space to alternative voices that opposed the government anti-
terror laws. 
On the whole, The Daily Telegraph, unlike The Guardian, was less supportive of the idea 
that the government should engage with the British Muslim community as part of 
combating the threat of terrorism. Moreover, The Daily Telegraph suggested that the 
7/7 bombers’ grievances were wrong, and in order to stop future terrorist threats it 
was best to disregard the bombers’ political complaints; rather, Britain should be 
adopting strict measures. This included introducing new terrorism laws and making 
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strict interpretations of old laws. It criticised the British government in its editorial of 3 
September 2006, “Five years on, this war must intensify”, for being soft on the use of the 
Terrorism Act 2006 and its provisions such as the outlawing of ‘glorification’ and the 
prosecution of hate preachers who want to kill non-Muslims. Within its features (13 
August 2006 and 17 October 2006) The Daily Telegraph pushed the government to be 
tougher and show no mercy to hate preachers and radicals.  
Throughout, The Daily Telegraph continued to state that British radicals’ grievances 
against the West are wrong. In its editorial The Daily Telegraph wrote, “One side points 
to the disarmament of Libya and the democratisation of Lebanon and Afghanistan; the 
other to the increase in Islamic terrorism. But if fish do indeed need water, the answer is 
to drain it – in other words, to bring down the dictatorships across the Muslim world 
that export the terrorists” (The Daily Telegraph, 11 September 2006). Similarly, in the 
context of the 7/7 bombings The Daily Telegraph disagreed with the government idea of 
avoiding the use of terms such as “Islamic terrorists” and “Muslim terrorism” in order to 
combat terrorism because this may alienate the British Muslim community. Rather, it 
wrote that “The reality is that the threat comes from a perverted version of Islam. It is 
not Hindus or Buddhists or Polish immigrants to Britain who are trying to plant bombs 
here: it is men who claim to be Muslims” (The Daily Telegraph, 8 July 2007).  
In summary, both broadsheets raised genuine concerns over the terrorism threat to 
Britain resulting from growing radicalisation that is allegedly rooted in the self-
interpreted ideology of radicals. However the two broadsheets’ reporting reflected 
different approaches to dealing with these threats. For example, The Guardian believed 
that British Muslims should be taken on board as a wider community and not just 
fractions of selected Muslims to deal with these threats. Moreover, it advocated a softer 
method of treating suspects and, if necessary, the option of dialogue would be most 
suitable. In comparison The Daily Telegraph adopted a conservative approach in which 
it supported the government’s tough laws to tackle radicals and the terrorism threat 
and also believed that “Sufi Islam” should be taken on board.  
Section II: Narrative of Contextual Debates, Critical Analysis and 
Commentary on Islamist Terrorism Threat:  
This section explains the emergence and development of terrorism threat in both 
newspapers reflecting upon the reporting of the 7/7 event. Also, it provides details of 
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the growing phenomena of radicalisation and religious ideology. Arguably, 
reconstructions of terrorism as “Islamic” suggest that the terrorism is exclusively a 
Muslims problem and that state is a victim and is defending itself.   
5.8-The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph Attitude and Approach to the 
Terrorism Threat: Radicalisation and the Religious Ideology.  
(i) Categorisation of Terrorism in the Context of 7/7:  Contextual Explanation of “Islamic”, 
“Islamist” and “Home-grown”.   
Evidently, there is no single agreed definition and explanation of terrorism. This makes 
it a complex and complicated phenomenon and a contested and problematic term. 
Different scholars, media experts and government officials hold different views on 
terrorism even though those targeting innocent civilians around the world have their 
own explanations of terrorism. Karen Armstrong wrote: “Rhetoric is a powerful weapon 
in any conflict” (The Guardian, 11 July 2005). Such complexity was also evident in both 
broadsheets’ reporting that offered a reasonable discussion inviting various scholars, 
journalists, politicians, government and public bodies’ representatives to find a more 
acceptable form of terrorism expression to denote the London bombings. This took 
place in the comments, features, interviews, personal views and debates sections of 
these broadsheets. Notably, all contributors to these discussions, including a few British 
Muslim organisations such as the Muslim Council of Britain, agreed that the London 
bombings were acts of terrorism.  
In recent years, the term ‘Islamic terrorism’ has been used excessively to describe acts 
of terrorism. In the context of the 7/7 event both newspapers described it as an act of 
“Islamic terrorism” mainly because those perpetrators were Muslims inspired by al-
Qaeda ideology. It is imperative that the use of the word ‘Islamic’ in association with 
society, politics, economics, science, culture, arts and business, for example “Islamic 
society” and “Islamic banking”, should indicate that these fields are abiding by ‘Islamic’ 
principles, ideologies and values. In other words, the word ‘Islamic’ in conjunction with 
all aspects of life is a mandate for that particular concept and tangible or intangible 
commodity, be it society, education or economics, to be considered under ‘Islamic’ 
jurisdiction (see Göle, 2000; Halstead, 2004; Kahf, 2003).  
The 7/7 bombers were largely characterised as “Islamic” and “Islamist” terrorists rather 
than simple fanatics, angry disintegrated individuals, or mentally disturbed young men, 
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as was the case with non-Muslim extremists and terrorists. The aggregate reporting 
evidenced that the discourse on “Islamic terrorism” largely omitted mainstream 
scholars, particularly Muslim opinions. Here, one might note that Islam as a religion is 
centuries old; hence, what have the 21st century press and polity now found to link all 
terrorism to “Islam”? Moreover, for argument’s sake, if terrorism is purely an “Islamic” 
problem, why are the terrorist activities of members of other religions not reported as 
“Judaist terrorism”, “Christian terrorism”, “Hindu terrorism”, or “Buddhist terrorism”.  
Although The Guardian writers debated the legal position of citing “Islamic terrorism”,, 
none of The Daily Telegraph writers or editorials offered a discussion on the expression 
“Islamic terrorism” and whether or not it is a valid or problematic concept. Several 
Western scholars such as Shmuel Bar (2004) raise questions about linking the word 
‘Islamic’ with terrorism. He has written that “to treat Islamic terrorism as the 
consequence of political and socioeconomic factors alone would not do justice to the 
significance of the religious culture in which this phenomenon is rooted and nurtured” 
(Bar, 2004, p.28).  
Notably, both broadsheets used the expression “Islamic terrorism” in their editorials to 
describe the 7/7 event and the bombers. Here, it should be noted that an editorial of a 
newspaper in fact reflects that newspaper’s policy and stance on any particular issue. 
Therefore, one might say that both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph viewed 7/7 as 
an act of “Islamic terrorism” rather “Islamist Terrorism”.  I would argue that the 
conjunction of the word ‘Islamic’ with terrorism, indicating a religious phenomenon, 
limits its meaning; more importantly, it damages all those efforts to engage with British 
Muslims, who think they have been seen as “disloyal” and the “enemy within” because of 
this term. Later on, the document “Prevent Strategy” (2011) published by the Home 
Office disclosed that the government had advised its officials to avoid linking ‘Islam’ 
with terrorism. The purpose was to engage with British Muslims, assuring them that not 
all Muslims are considered a threat or bad.  
Given that the terrorism threat is an on-going phenomenon which may well continue to 
the next generations, presenting it as solely “Islamic” limits the discourse to Islam. 
Furthermore, the expression suggests that the followers of the religion of Islam are 
potential terrorists because it is their religion that endorses terrorism. Jackson notes 
that “Political and academic discourses of ‘Islamic terrorism’ are unhelpful, not least 
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because they are highly politicized, intellectually contestable, damaging to community 
relations and practically counter-productive in the struggle to control subaltern 
violence in the long run” (Jackson, 2007, p.395). 
The second term is “Islamist terrorism”, which is often used to describe the terror 
activities of radical organisations or groups such as al-Qaeda and al-Muhajirun. Both 
broadsheets also used the term “Islamist” terrorism to denote the London bombings. In 
fact, it helps to make a distinction between ordinary British Muslims and the 7/7 
bombers. In this sense, in comparison to “Islamic terrorism” the expression “Islamist 
terrorism” is a little safer but at the same it is also problematic, since the word 
“Islamist” suggests the political thoughts and philosophy of any radical Muslim whilst 
the expression “Islamic” indicates a form of Islam. Moreover, both broadsheets’ writers 
and commentators used the expression “Islamist” to describe radicals and hate-
mongers such as Abu-Hamza al-Masri, a former imam of Finsbury mosque, who 
preached violence and hatred of non-Muslims and Muslims who hold opposing views to 
his radical ideology.  
The use of the word “Islamist” gives the impression that scholars who have opposing 
views are radical Islamists, even if they are reformists. For example, during the colonial 
era, several reform movements began in Egypt, Arabia, Afghanistan and the Indian 
subcontinent with the main aim of gaining freedom from British rule. The leaders of 
these movements included Sheikh Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi, and 
Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, whose teachings are often misinterpreted and 
presented as pathways to violent actions by the modern “Islamists”. In turn, such 
misinterpretation of the mainstream Islamic scholars and reformists by a few Muslim 
radicals suggests that perhaps it is Islamic teachings that sanction violence and hatred 
of non-Muslims (see Zainal Abidin, 2012, p.65-66; Daniel, 1960, 2009).  
Similar to The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, in most writings the phrase “Islamist” 
refers to Muslim extremists and radicals who are often inspired by the ideology of 
terrorist organisations, such as the 7/7 bombers who were allegedly al-Qaeda affiliates. 
Moreover, government documents such as the “Intelligence and Security Committee 
Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005” (2006, p.8) also use the term 
“Islamist terrorism” to describe the terrorism threat facing Britain. Notably, the word 
“Islamist” denotes a few Muslim radicals and extremists in Britain such as the 7/7 
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bombers but not ordinary Muslims. Both broadsheets used the adjective “Islamist” in 
different types of journalism to make a distinction between ordinary Muslims and those 
who are violent. Andrew Sullivan sums it up as follows: “The distinction 
between Christian and Christianist echoes the distinction we make 
between Muslim and Islamist. Muslims are those who follow Islam. Islamists are those 
who want to wield Islam as a political force and conflate state and mosque” (Time, 7 
May 2006; also cited in Martin and Bazegar, 2010, p.171).  
Subsequently, prior to the London bombings the term “home-grown terrorism” was 
used to describe the terrorism threat posed by European radical and extremist 
organisations including the IRA and ETA. However, both The Guardian and The Daily 
Telegraph also occasionally used the term “home-grown terrorism” to illustrate the 7/7 
bombings in all forms of journalism including editorials. In contrast to the “Islamic” and 
“Islamist” terrorism, it is arguably a soft expression because it does not accuse any form 
of religion, be it Christianity or Islam. 
Given Britain’s past experience of the IRA and other extremist groups, the phenomenon 
of ‘home-grown’ is better understood. But to many scholars it is also problematic for 
various reasons. For example, Chris Rumford (2013) states that, because the London 
bombers were “highly and globally networked”, the use of the term ‘home-grown’ 
prevents us from seeing this important link (Rumford, 2013, p.98). It is important to 
understand the distinction between these phrases. One may be mindful of the fact that 
“Islamic” is an adjective that describes things that have direct connections with Islam 
(religion) such as laws, teachings and values. In contrast, the word “Islamist” designates 
“a particular political style and worldview, one that is authoritarian and moralizing. 
Some Islamists are not violent; others are very much so” (Cook, The National Interest, 10 
December 2015).  
Cook further writes: “To term something “radical Islamic violence” condemns a religion 
and leaves one with the erroneous impression that the competing modern 
interpretations of Islam that specifically refute violent Islamism’s worldview do not 
exist.” (Ibid) In the case of the 7/7 bombings both newspapers refer to 7/7 as “Islamist 
terrorism”, meaning an act committed by radicals and extremists who have their own 
interpretations and explanations of the crime they have committed. But “Islamic 
terrorism” is directed more at a religion than at those perpetrators who were not 
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committed Muslims because, by doing so, they have already violated the teachings of 
Islam. In sum, the usage of “Islamist” and “Islamic” makes the discourse on terrorism 
problematic and limits it to Islam whilst at the same time a number of other terrorist 
groups and organisations are operating globally. These overstated expressions also 
imply that perhaps the threat comes solely from the followers of Islam and will continue 
to do so.   
(ii)- Will the “Islamist Terrorism Threat” Continue in the Next Decades?  
On 6 July 2005, the day before the catastrophic London bombings, the British 
intelligence agencies told politicians that there is “no imminent threat” and therefore 
Britain lowered its threat level. The next day, the tragic incident shook the whole world 
because of Britain’s leading role in the G8 Gleneagles summit (July 6-8) in Scotland. 
Jason Burke wrote in The Guardian that, from the 7/7 incident to the present day in the 
form of Isis, the terrorism threat is on-going (The Guardian, 6 July 2015).  
                     Following the 7/7 incident and the 21/7 failed bombing attempts, the home-grown 
radicalism threat has re-emerged in the form of a few jihadists who are willing to go 
abroad to join radical groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS, which is seeking to establish its 
own version of ‘Islamic law’. A notable feature of the threat of an Islamic caliphate is 
that the press have constantly published images of perpetrators carrying signs of the 
caliphate such as Kalima (Shahada, declaring a faith in the oneness of Allah SWT) and 
black flags etc.  
                     In this way, the threat continues to develop and take on different shapes, be they 
British radicals and extremists or foreign-based radical groups who are trying to 
engage with young British Muslims to fulfil their pernicious aims. Both broadsheets’ 
reporting suggests predictions that the purpose of British and European radicals is to 
expand the Sharia Law which, in the newspapers’ opinion is a “barbaric” and “seventh-
century” phenomenon that is a threat to the modern British way of life. It is evident 
that a considerable amount of reporting focused upon the radical organisations, their 
members’ speeches, video messages and activities which in turn developed a scenario 
that radical Islamists are on their way to capture the British capital and declare a 
caliphate.  
                  Both newspapers cited British radical organisations and their leaders, particularly 
Hizbut-Tahrir leader Anjem Choudary, who publically expressed his views on 
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establishing a caliphate. The discourse of the caliphate received more attraction in both 
broadsheets during the cartoon controversy protest in the first week of February 2006. 
These trends are also visible in some books such as ML Stewart’s The United Kingdom 
of Islam (2012) in which he predicts that London will come under Sharia law. Take, for 
instance, this extract from the opening of the book: 
                   Declaration by the Radical Islamic Party… London and its 
surrounds are now officially under Islamic Sharia law. If you and 
your family wish to remain within these zones, you are at liberty 
to do so, but strict compliance to ... Any person witnessed 
committing acts of resistance, theft or religiously motivated 
crimes will face death (Stewart, 2012).  
                  Stewart further suggests that by the year 2039 London will have a Muslim governor 
called “Mohammad Kazik” who will be known as the “Holy Governor of the Islamic 
State of England” and that the “The flag of Islam will fly over Downing Street, and Queen 
Elizabeth will wear the burqa. Abu Waleed, Radical Preacher, London 2008…” (Stewart, 
2012) In a similar manner, Ed Husain, a former member of Hizbut-Tahrir, wrote that 
the organisation promoted the notion in universities that “British Muslims were a 
community whose allegiance lay not with Queen and country, but to a coming caliph in 
the Middle East. This caliph would instruct us to act as agents of the caliphate in 
Britain…” (The Daily Telegraph, 2 May 2007) Further, he believed that Hizbut-Tahrir 
wanted to “open a ‘home front' by assisting the expansionist state.” (ibid)  
                     In contrast, although The Guardian continued to raised concerns over the terrorism 
threat, in dealing with this threat it showed a softer approach that was based on 
individual liberty and freedom. Perhaps because of its liberal approach, in a series of 
comment pieces, articles and editorials The Guardian disagreed with the government’s 
ban on Hizbut-Tahrir. In its editorial The Guardian wrote that banning Hizbut-Tahrir 
would be “an unwise step. Hizb ut-Tahrir has some deeply objectionable views, not 
least on Palestine and Israel. Yet it appears committed to non-violence in the UK and 
seems far more interested in politics than direct action.” (The Guardian, 6 August 2005)  
Notably, it has continued to advocate that Hizbut-Tahrir should not be banned (see The 
Guardian, 4 February 2015; 13 February 2015).    
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                    To a great extent, both newspapers misunderstood the concept of Sharia Law which 
was simply presented as a concept that endorses the cutting-off of hands for stealing 
and severe punishments for adultery. Of course, these sorts of punishments are 
applicable only when the governing and administering system is designed according to 
the Islamic constitution, which is the Qur’an and Sunnah. Most importantly, the Islamic 
government is responsible for the basic needs of individuals and it cannot simply 
punish individuals for stealing if it is unable to provide them with sustenance. It is also 
fair to note that The Guardian attempted to explain the concept of a caliphate from an 
Islamic perspective even though it holds a contrasting view of caliphates.  
 In an opinion piece “Bringing back the caliphate”, it allowed the Muslim Council of 
Britain’s Inayat Bunglawala to explain the concept in the words of el-Affendi: “This 
entails a concept of an international order based more on coexisting communities than 
on territorially-based mutually-exclusive nation-states. The European Community and 
the United States of America reflect some of the characteristics of the model we have in 
mind.” (The Guardian, 16 July 2007) In contrast, none of The Daily Telegraph articles 
explains the concept of caliphate in detail. Moreover, The Guardian at one stage 
opposed government plans to ban the radical organisation Hizbut-Tahrir whose 
members talk of the caliphate in public. Evidently, it is fair to say that the ‘Islamist 
terrorism threat’ may remain for a long time but perhaps in other forms and not in the 
shape of al-Qaeda or ISIS.  
              These examples recall several films that were aimed at preparing people for a nuclear 
strike by exaggerating the threat. In 1983, during the cold war period, the BBC film 
Threads portrayed a fantasy in which Sheffield came under nuclear attack. Today, the 
threat has become more serious as The Daily Telegraph cited UN head of ‘International 
Atomic Energy Agency’, Yukiya Amano, who warns of the possibility of “Nuclear 
Terrorism” (see The Daily Telegraph, 25 March 2016). Occasionally, both newspapers 
cited surveys and studies and included opinions and statements of various terrorism 
experts, government officials and their own columnists and writers to point out that 
the terrorism threat is on-going. The period examined by this thesis is confined to 8 
July 2005- 7 July 2007. However, to explain the previous point it includes a recent 
example from “PEW Research” on global threats published on 14 July 2015, in which 
66% of British people now see ISIS as a new threat compared to 68% of Americans and 
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77.5% of Spanish people; this puts ISIS ahead of any other issues, including global 
warming (PEW, 2015). 
                     George Bush and Tony Blair repeatedly assured us that their war on terror was not 
against Islam but against ‘Islamism’, which is the political face of ‘Radical Islam’. Today, 
however, Blair warns that this threat not only exists but also continues to challenge the 
West in different forms (see The Guardian reports on 23 April 2014 and 15 January 
2015). In the opinion of the scholar Shmuel Bar (2004), “Western leaders such as 
George W Bush and Tony Blair have reiterated time and again that the war against 
terrorism has nothing to do with Islam. It is a war against evil” (Bar, 2004, p.27). 
In one news report on 11 December 2006, The Daily Telegraph used the loaded phrase 
‘Muslim terrorism’ to raise further concerns, particularly when it was uttered by the 
Home Secretary, who was suggesting that the terrorism threat may well continue for 
the next 30 to 50 years. Using the example of Ireland, John Reid strengthened his 
argument by suggesting that the timeline of the terror threat stretches over 30 years, 
which is slightly more than a generation. Such assumptions by British politicians raise a 
point about the accuracy and length of the terror threat timeline. How can security 
officials, policy-makers and politicians be so sure that the terrorism threat emanating 
from Muslims will be on-going? Perhaps one of the reasons for assuming that this threat 
will continue for generations is the growth of radical and terrorist groups from al-Qaeda 
to Al-Shabab, Boko Haram and ISIS.  
Several articles appeared in both broadsheets in which government officials and 
politicians repeatedly proclaim that the war against terrorism will continue for 
generations. In other words, the government officials seem to be suggesting that efforts 
to stop this conflict, such as by entering into a dialogue with terrorists or considering 
their grievances, are out of the question. More worryingly, the terrorists have shown no 
sign of halting their activities. 
This is why, on various occasions, the fear of terrorist attack, be it presumed or real, 
became visible in reports mainly based on official security warnings. The consideration 
of public safety and government security measures seems a fair justification of this. 
Obviously this view was developed in both broadsheets based on the opinions of 
security officials and terrorism experts who calculated the threat level and duration 
considering various factors such as radical networks, cells, and home-grown radical 
groups and organisations. 
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                     Previously, the press showed a similar approach that is also reflected in the 7/7 
reporting that Islamist radicals intend to acquire deadly weapons to attack Britain and 
other European capitals. From time to time, both broadsheets published surveys 
conducted by various research organisations commissioned by public, private or 
government bodies; these surveys suggested that British Muslims desire Sharia Law. 
Such reporting misrepresents British Muslims; hence, the press does not construct and 
spread such thoughts independently but in fact channels the opinions of powerful 
elites (a nexus of press, politicians, police and public bodies etc). Furthermore, this 
reminds us of Cohen’s theory of ‘Folk Devils and Moral Panic’, which is discussed 
elsewhere in this thesis. 
(iii)- Radicalisation and Religious Ideology:  
In the light of original evidence that emerged in the shape of data, it appeared that both 
The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph showed serious concern over the growing 
radicalisation in Britain. In a number of articles, editorials, comments and special 
investigative news reports, both newspapers discussed and debated the government’s 
course of action to curb radicalisation. In this regard, both quoted government officials, 
police and politicians who frequently warned the public of the presence of these home-
grown “cells” and “networks”, providing government and policy-making institutions 
with a clear challenge to deal with the terrorism threat. Here, the term “networks” 
indicates organisations and individuals closely affiliated to al-Qaeda or their allies, such 
as the banned group al-Muhjrin in Britain.  
With reference to the New York and Madrid attacks, both broadsheets pointed out that 
al-Qaeda is a common enemy of the ruling elites as well as ordinary people on both 
sides of the Atlantic. In doing so, these broadsheets suggested that Britain should find 
allies to deal with home-grown radicals and extremists, which might eliminate the 
threat. In the light of The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph reporting within a certain 
period in the wake of the 7/7 incident, it is hard to capture a definitive and collective 
view of these newspapers because the debate mostly takes place in comments and 
reporting but rarely in editorials. The point is that these broadsheets have allowed a 
range of opinions within their different types of journalism, and the views of those 
writers, experts and commentators do not necessarily accord with those of The 
Guardian and The Daily Telegraph. As already indicated, both newspapers allocated a 
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reasonable amount of space for the reporting of radical organisations by their 
correspondents in Pakistan and Afghanistan. These newspapers published several news 
reports, features, opinion columns, investigative reports and editorials with a range of 
different opinions.  
At one stage the government was intending to ban local groups of sympathisers’ such as 
Hizbut-Tahrir and Al-Muhajirouin; this proposal was supported by The Daily Telegraph 
but as the data indicate, The Guardian opposed it, suggesting that it was against the 
British values of freedom and liberty, particularly when Hizbut-Tahrir had condemned 
the attacks. Beyond the database of this thesis, much has been written on al-Qaeda in 
the last ten years. Almost all inquiries relating to al-Qaeda seemingly agree on two 
points. First, it remains a threat but certainly not as big a threat as Western 
governments often proclaim. Secondly, it is possible that it will eventually disappear 
because of its involvement in Muslim countries where it is failing to achieve support.  
Alongside the radicalisation debate, both broadsheets discussed religious ideology and 
provided a platform for different writers, journalists, politicians, and religious and 
community leaders to express their views in comment pieces, personal  views and 
interviews, as a ‘free press’ often does. These discussions and debates associated 
ideology with Islam and in turn established a link between terrorism and Islam. In the 
dataset of this thesis, an open view of Islam appeared in The Guardian and The Daily 
Telegraph as follows: like Christianity and Judaism, the fundamental teachings of Islam 
endorse peace and humanity and reject violence, killing or the harming of innocent 
people of any faith. Some critics also point out that the religious teaching of Christianity 
did not stop major life-threatening conflict between Catholics and Protestants. This may 
also be true of the conflict between Shia and Sunni Muslims for centuries. The key 
reason for these clashes and conflicts is the race for hegemony among these groups that 
seek to achieve their political goals using religion as a pretext.  
Both newspapers suggested that the London bombing was seen as an attack committed 
“in the name of Islam” (see The Guardian, 8 July 2005). It is worth noting that both these 
newspapers were citing government officials, politicians, public figures and their own 
writers who took a similar view that the bombers had reacted in the name of Islam 
although there were political ambitions behind their attack.  Thus began a religious 
ideology debate that became a focal point in both broadsheets mainly because of a 
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growing perception that the bombers had reacted ‘in the name of Islam’, a view that 
associated them with al-Qaeda. Initially, The Guardian avoided linking al-Qaeda with 
7/7. While The Daily Telegraph rushed to assert that al-Qaeda was behind the 7/7 
bombing.   
Most of the reporting on terrorism identified religious ideology as the root cause of 
terrorism because both 9/11 and 7/7 were linked to the al-Qaeda network which 
brought forward the concept of religious ideology. A particular reason for this 
perception is the explicit use of the notion “in the name of God” in the texts, news 
reports, academic books, public and private discussions and the words of terrorists who 
use it to justify their inhuman acts. At first, Tony Blair denounced the 7/7 bombings 
thus by referring to an “Evil Ideology” (Deller, 2013, p.119; Boynton, 2011, p.189). The 
impression of ‘evil ideology’ became a tag in every reference to radicals and terrorists, 
including the failed plotters of 21/7.  
As the debate expanded, The Guardian offered several articles on al-Qaeda and its 
ideology by its writer Jason Burke who is an expert on al-Qaeda. It also gave space to 
former members of Hizbut-Tahrir and al-Muhajirun who expressed their views on 
radical organisations and their ideology. Hence, Ed Husain and Hassan Butt were 
frequently referred to in radicalisation and religious ideology discussions. However, The 
Guardian had a different perspective, as Ed Husain wanted the government to ban the 
organisation of which he was once a member but The Guardian opposed this idea. It is 
essential to acknowledge that these two self-proclaimed scholars failed to present the 
contexts of those verses in the Qur’an relating to the killing of non-believers, which is 
their own interpretation. Moreover, Ed Husain failed to present a balanced view 
because he failed to mention ‘Shia ideology’ such as that espoused by Hezbollah, which 
is backed by Iran. In this way, a close view of Islam linked in the form of ‘Wahhabi 
ideology’ appeared in the reporting of both newspapers. This occurred because both 
broadsheets disregarded the well-established and known Islamic scholars’ 
commentaries on this subject. 
Thus, the selection of the commentators Ed Husain and Hassan Butt as scholars of Islam 
is significant if we are to understand the debates that cause confusion about Islam 
among readers and audiences. I would argue that, by presenting ex-members of radical 
organisations as Islamic scholars, both The Guardian and The Telegraph in fact created 
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doubts in the minds of their educated and comparatively better informed readerships. 
Many British Muslims, readers of these newspapers, do not consider Husain and Butt as 
scholars or experts on Islam but, rather, as infamous ex-radicals who are self-styled 
scholars. Thus, both broadsheets contributed to building a rather pessimistic image of 
Islam. One might say at this point that the inclusion of these ex-members of radical 
organisations also demonstrates the broadsheets’ rivalry.  Here, The Guardian writer 
Milne’s viewpoint is considerable and valid because these two individuals are not 
considered experts on a sensitive subject (religious ideology) that has emerged as a 
serious and significant topic of debate. Of course, this does not mean that the views of 
Husain and Butt should not have appeared in the press but they should not have been 
identified as experts as this damages the essence of a fair debate.  
These individuals’ inflammatory speeches, personal opinions and inaccurate 
commentaries formulated the key argument that Islam is inherently violent and 
endorses jihad against non-believers. Occasionally, these arguments were wrapped up 
in ideologies of resistance movement leaders, and finally everything was associated 
with the Qur’an to attest that all forms of terrorism are perpetrated because of an 
ideology that has religious roots. Already-cited examples include: “There shall be no 
compulsion in religion” and “Slay the unbeliever…wherever you find him” (The 
Guardian, 22 July 2005). Similarly, The Daily Telegraph editorial, which carried a 
selected verse from the Qur’an, displayed a lack of investigation and out-of-context 
reporting, “The murders of July 7 2005... (“capture them and besiege them and prepare 
for an ambush from every angle”)...” (The Daily Telegraph, 3 September 2006). 
Undeniably, those suicide bombers misinterpreted it but The Daily Telegraph’s 
reference was also invalid and out of context.  
Most of the discussions and debate on ideology in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph 
reflect a limited view and understanding of it. Notably, it is presented as a religious 
phenomenon that gives terrorists an opportunity to interpret sacred text (Quran) based 
on the ideologies of reformists who were not Imams, jurists or religious scholars, such 
as Qutb, but resistance movement leaders. In this way, ideology is attached to religious 
teachings and, like terrorists, most sections of the press also misinterpret the idea and 
instead relate them to political problems in the contemporary period when it became an 
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issue of Islam. Problems may well arise because some political groupings invoke their 
own interpretation of religious values.  
Overall, the terrorism narrative suggests that it is a product of religious ideology that 
has its roots in Islamic theology. This provides an engine for young British-born 
Muslims who become radicalised and appear ready to kill their fellow countrymen. In 
short, both broadsheets pointed out in their different types of journalism that ideology 
has three major types, al-Qaeda, Wahabbi and Muslim Brotherhood ideology, which 
allegedly promote violence. Other commentators such as Kenan Malik agree with Ed 
Husain that the 7/7 bombers were inspired by the Wahabbi ideology. However, some 
commentators and scholars have provided evidence that the London bombers were 
more secular and had been banned from their local mosques (see Egerton, 2011; 
Fulcher and Scott, 2011).    
                     Notably, the vast majority of British Muslims also believe that those perpetrating acts 
of terrorism, such as the 7/7 bombers, often misrepresent Islamic views by their 
actions. Immediately after the bombings The Daily Telegraph contributor Anthony King 
commented on British Muslims’ attitude to terrorism using a YouGov survey and wrote 
that “88 per cent of British Muslims clearly have no intention of trying to justify the bus 
and Tube murders” (The Daily Telegraph, 23 July 2005). In Britain, the expression 
“Islamist ideology” is widely used in context to describe various radical and extremist 
individuals, groups and organisations that propagate anti-Western feelings and incite 
hatred of non-Muslims.  
In a sense both broadsheets have clearly drawn a distinction between ordinary law-
abiding British Muslims and a tiny fraction of radicals who pose a threat to Britain’s 
security and promote hatred and intolerance. But then, such hate-mongers and 
controversial figures such as Anjem Choudary and Abu-Hamza were routinely 
presented as ‘Islamic scholars” and experts as though they represent all British 
Muslims. Besides, right-wing and controversial figures such as Ed Husain, as explained 
earlier, also appeared frequently in discussions on radicalisation and ‘Islamist 
terrorism’ as experts and authorities. Thus, the ordinary reader receives a pessimistic 
image of Islam arguably because of a few controversial figures who are not considered 
authorities on Islam.  
This is how British Muslims and Islam came to appear in discussions on various 
platforms including the media, mainly because of the established perception that 
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religious ideology motivates people to embrace violent means. Immediately after the 
7/7 attack, Meghnad Desai (2007) closely reviewed it in August 2005: “It is not Islam as 
a religion or even the life style or culture of Muslims in Britain but an ideology, Global 
Islamism, whose nature has to be grasped if we were to fight terrorism…an anti-
Western agenda”, which was a common strategy for dealing with communist Russia 
(Desai, 2007, p. vii). The ideology that is now being constantly linked with Islam is 
actually “the political use of religion which is labelled as Islamism.” (ibid) Reflecting 
upon these newspapers’ reporting of 7/7, it is evident that much of the debate focused 
on the Islamist interpretation of religion (ideology) that associates British-born radicals 
with foreign-based radical organisations including the Muslim Brotherhood and al-
Qaeda. In other words, they are associated with the ideologies of these organisations 
that are mainly based on Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Sayyid Qutab’s writings 
and philosophies. 
5.9- The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph Views on Tackling Terrorism:   
This section provides details on how the two broadsheets discussed and debated 
counter-terrorism. They took a keen interest in government re-designed policies and 
legislation to combat terrorism in Britain in the wake of 7/7. Both discussed the reasons 
behind the tragic terror act, including alienation and poverty within the Muslim 
community, growing radicalisation and extremism among young British Muslims, 
British government involvement in foreign countries, particularly Iraq, Afghanistan and 
the Middle East, and the Israel/Palestine issue; clearly, the arrival of terrorism in Britain 
was rooted in religious ideology. Further to this, they discussed whether the 7/7 event 
was a politically motivated act that may have had its roots in revenge against Britain 
because of her invasions of Muslim lands and support for Israel or whether it was 
“Islamic”.  
This debate took place within editorials and comment pieces in which both newspapers 
included terrorism experts’ opinions, including British university academics; they also 
allowed some Muslim voices although renowned Muslim academic Tariq Ramadan 
received an ‘extremist’ tag. In a series of editorials The Guardian explicitly disagreed 
with the government on several aspects of terrorism such as laws to detain and deport 
suspects. The leading concerns raised by The Guardian were in defence of public liberty 
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and human rights in the battle against radicals and extremists to curb the terrorism 
threat.  
The key theme in The Guardian editorials in the context of combating terrorism was the 
“human factor” that it had vocally supported and advocated. It was at this moment that 
British Muslims experienced considerable sympathy and support from The Guardian.  
Another notable feature of the debate on tackling terrorism that was evident in The 
Guardian reporting was its distinction between faith and its followers, such as Islam and 
Muslims. Maintaining its secular position, it had many issues with Islamic teachings 
including the veil but it also believed that it should be up to those women to decide 
whether they want to retain the veil. Another key point of The Guardian reporting was 
its view that the government should engage with the British Muslim community to 
defeat terrorism and that community bonding is the way forward in tackling the 
terrorism threat.    
The Guardian also offered a mixture of opinions in comment pieces and analysis 
sections in which writers and commentators of various backgrounds focused on 
terrorism and the way Britain should respond to it. With reference to the killing of Jean 
Charles de Menezes and the Forest Gate shooting incidents, a few writers showed 
concerns over the role of the police. Many of the debates on terrorism carried criticisms 
by The Guardian contributors who thought that Prime Minister Blair had himself 
dishonoured the democratic rights of a free country and international laws by forcibly 
overthrowing Saddam Hussein; hence glorifying terrorism was an indication of the 
government’s own view and was contested (The Guardian, 13 April 2006; 15 February 
2006).   
In contrast, The Daily Telegraph editorials indicated that it backed the British 
government policies to modify terrorism legislation and take up strict measures such as 
the ‘glorification of terrorism’ Bill and the introduction of new suspect detention 
periods of up to 90 days without charge. It also supported the official line that the Iraq 
war had not radicalised young British-born Muslim Bombers and that there was no 
connection between the Iraq war and radicalisation in Britain. Two of The Daily 
Telegraph editorials are significant for gauging its attitude to the terrorism threat: 
‘Islam Vs. Islam’ (11 September 2006) and ‘Muslims have to join this battle’ (8 July 
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2007). The timings of these editorials are significant; one was on the anniversary of 
9/11 whilst the other was published on the 7/7 anniversary.  
In these editorials The Daily Telegraph dismissed the argument of those who claim that 
the Twin Towers and the London bombings occurred because of the invasions of Iraq 
and Afghanistan and that West should not interfere in Muslim countries. It constantly 
maintained that the post-7/7 terrorism threat in Britain is a Muslim problem because 
other communities are not planting bombs but the London bombers had Muslim 
backgrounds.  
On the whole, both broadsheets have attempted to answer the following questions: Did 
7/7 occur because of the poverty and sense of alienation among young British Muslims? 
Is there something in Islam (ideology) that has inspired them to kill their fellow beings 
including Muslims? Can community bonding and an improved sense of belonging be a 
solution to eliminate future terrorist threats? Can a better policing and security system 
help save Britain from such threats? Or might English-speaking imams in British 
mosques help young British Muslims to stay away from radicals and their damaging 
interpretation of Islam?  
These are debates that must have been discussed among Muslims. Long before 7/7, The 
Guardian published editorials, Towards a British Islam (1 April 2004) and Nationalising 
Islam (10 December 2004), in which it suggested that Britain must have English-
speaking imams in the mosques because this would help engage the young British-born 
Muslims. Both broadsheets remained convinced that community bonding is a solution 
to combat terrorism but they also assumed commonly that it is a Muslim problem and 
that they have to tackle it. Furthermore, both broadsheets suggested that moderate 
Muslims should come forward and play their part in tackling terrorism. However, at this 
point both broadsheets appeared to become slightly hostile to Islam as they insisted on 
using the controversial term “moderate”; this was these newspapers’ interpretation but 
in reality there is no such thing as “moderate Islam”. Islamic teachings are for all times 
and not just for one particular group, nation, region or specific period. Moreover, the 
Islamic concepts of Ijema and Ijtehad explain Islam’s capacity to absorb modern changes 
in  society; hence, in this sense it is already a modern religion. In terrorism debates the 
principal discussions take place from a Western viewpoint that endorses Edward Said’s 
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concept of Orientalism which suggests that the powerful West views and represents 
others from its own perspective.  
In the terrorism debate, both broadsheets’ overall reporting clearly indicates that these 
newspapers and most of their contributors, including the reporters, have little 
knowledge of Islam. Although both, particularly The Guardian, attempted to offer a few 
Western scholars who are considered experts on Islam, it is noticeable that these 
broadsheets used out-of-context verses from the Qur’an in their editorials and general 
reporting. Arguably, there is nothing in “Islam” that preaches violence or killings, and 
the Quran is very clear on this subject (for example, Al-Quran, 5:32). The Quran also 
says that “...take not life, which God has made sacred, except by way of justice and law: 
thus does He command you, that you may learn wisdom” (Al-Quran, 6:151). In addition, 
a number of Hadiths also stress the sanctity of human life; for example, Prophet 
Muhammad said, “Do not kill any old person, any child or any women”, when explaining 
the ethics of war (see Bukhari, Volume 004, Book 052, Hadith Numbers 257 and 258).  
But one might also consider that during different periods of history various scholars 
continued to interpret religious texts in the cases of Christianity, Judaism and Islam 
which led to different views. This is because both the Bible and the Qur’an are open to 
different interpretations. In fact, there is not one agreed, pure and perfect meaning of 
scholarly interpretations and narrations. Rohan Gunaratna (2002) offers a specific 
example of an out-of-context exercise mostly found in the media and polity: “Let there 
be no compulsion [or coercion] in the religion [Islam]. The right direction is distinctly 
clear from the error” (Gunaratna, 2002, p.85). There is a growing body of scholarly text 
on this verse and the nature of its revelation as well as its misinterpretation; for 
example, Assad (1980, p.256-257) and Haleem (1999, p.69) explain the context of this 
verse in great detail.  
Both newspapers may have their own valid reasons to interpret and present the 7/7 
incident in a way they considered accurate and convincing. However, from the overall 
coverage of the London bombings it is evident that the press is able not only to simply 
report an event but also to shape people’s opinions and perceptions of an event, as has 
already been discussed in the literature review chapter. Most academic studies believe 
that the media are a part of a larger power structure, often misrepresenting events and 
twisting facts, thus demonstrating that they sometimes ‘cover up’ events (Rampton and 
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Stauber, 2003, p.9; Montgomery, 2005, p.239; Jenson, 2005, p.122). In the context of 
terrorism reporting, however, for Dennett (2004) the misreporting of Muslims is done 
through ‘economic motivation’, and in this way people in power use the present 
confrontation between Islam and the West as an excuse to pursue their political 
agendas, such as the “Oil” resources of the Middle East (Dennett, 2004, p.61-79).  
As the debate on counter-terrorism developed, The Guardian’s writers emphasised 
three points: First, Britain should learn from its past experience and adopt restrained 
counter-terrorism options that accord with its British values. Secondly, it should not 
repeat past mistakes such as establishing links with radicals; in other words, Britain 
should avoid duplicity. Thirdly, Britain should engage with British Muslims, particularly 
moderates, and their society must not be divided. Several writers and commentators of 
The Guardian have raised concerns over the British government’s different 
relationships with radicals and terrorist groups. 
The Guardian continues to discuss and debate a range of possible options for countering 
the terrorism threat in the wake of the 7/7 incident. In its editorials, comment pieces 
and articles, Britain’s past experience of dealing with the IRA as well as home-grown 
terrorists has been discussed. The commentators and writers also talk about current 
challenges and ways to tackle the new terrorism threat of British-born Muslims.  
Geoffrey Wheatcroft talked about two radicals, Gerry Adams and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 
to prove the West’s duplicity or, in the words of George Orwell, its “double speak”. 
Wheatcroft questions the different treatment of two radicals of different faiths with 
similar objectives, i.e. to drive British troops out of their territories, namely Ulster and 
Iraq. 
At this point, one might ask whether terrorism has any religion. Since none of the 
world’s religions endorse terrorism, to label it Islamic, Christian, Buddhist, Jewish or 
secularist would be unfair. Equally, the response to terrorism in most states is not 
necessarily very different, be they Christian, Jewish, Buddhist or Islamic states. In fact it 
is a mindset that is based on social, cultural, political and economic factors. Arguably, 
terrorism is a political commodity that is designed to achieve political objectives, not 
religious ones. The act of the London bombings has political origins attached to Britain’s 
invasion of Iraq and not to any hostile policy such as banning Islam in Britain. However, 
several scholars also believe that quite a lot of terrorism is designed to establish 
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religious precedence (see Sharma, 2002, p.170; Reich, 1990, p.190; Perlmutter, 2004, 
p.70).  
Evidently, there are complaints of dual standards on both sides. For example, Bush 
called Iran and Iraq the “Axis of Evil” and accused them of promoting state terrorism, 
whilst the Iranian leader the Ayatollah used a derogatory term to describe America as 
the “Great Satan”, meaning “Evil”. Coincidently, both used “in the name of God” to justify 
their brutal actions that killed innocent people on both sides of the Atlantic. But the 
press portrayed the London bombings as an act of “Islamic terrorism” linking it with 
Islam. In contrast, the actions of Bush and Blair, despite massive opposition from the 
public, were presented as “self defense” and “right to restore democracy”. Bush said that 
“God told him to launch the Iraq campaign” while Tony Blair “is reconciled to the 
prospect that God and history will eventually judge his decision to go to war with Iraq” 
(The Guardian, 2006). Hence, were they both doing service to God’s creation? Did God 
really ask them to inflict brutality on innocent people? If so, why were they not 
concerned about other people’s God, who may have asked them to do the same? 
Of course, terrorism is inhuman and condemnable but, for a philosophical discussion, it 
seems that a notable feature in current terrorism debates is the notion of “newness” 
that relates it to Islam. The contemporary discourse of terrorism suggests that the 
“new” wave is a particular problem of “Islam”, which is also well-established in many 
studies (Amanat, 2001, p.23; Hill, 2001, p.81; Chaliand and Blin, 2007, p.95). Much of 
this scholarship explains the attacks on New York and the commencement of an era of 
the “new” conflict, with the “War on terror” resulting from it. Afterwards, the Madrid 
and London bombings further strengthened the perspective of “new terrorism”. Several 
studies assume that terrorism has been redefined and reconstructed through the prism 
of the powerful West that frequently links modern terrorism to “Islam” (Silverman, 
2004, p.148; Gabriel, 2006, p.124; Palmer and Palmer, 2004, p.194).   
5.10-Differences and Similarities in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph 
Reporting on the “Islamist Terrorism Threat”: 
At the beginning of all the major debates on terrorism, Tony Blair and government 
officials, including security and police officers, appear to have been the main sources of 
information. However, Blair became the focal point of reference in comment pieces, 
features, editorials and news reports. In contrast to The Daily Telegraph reporting, 
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which was mainly supportive of Blair’s counter-terrorism policies and his views on the 
problem of terrorism, the writers and commentators of The Guardian criticised Blair’s 
policies in Iraq, which radicalised young British Muslims, in their seven comment and 
debate pieces. However, in its editorials The Guardian continued to use the term 
“Islamic terrorism”; it thus resembled The Daily Telegraph, which also used this term in 
its editorials, which are indicative of a newspaper’s political stance and attitudes. The 
writers of these opinion pieces argued that the 7/7 incident occurred because of his 
policies in Iraq and the Middle East and his unconditional support for America in its war 
on terror.  
In contrast, The Daily Telegraph continued to refer to the American way of handing 
terror suspects and dealing with the threat of terrorism. It also published editorials and 
comment pieces suggesting that the government should be tough on terror suspects. 
Furthermore, The Daily Telegraph supported the debate on new terrorism legislation in 
the House of Commons and the House of Lords, including detention without charge for 
up to 90 days. At this point, the traditional rivalry between these two broadsheets 
reached its peak. On the one hand, The Guardian praised the Law Lords for rejecting 
government plans to introduce new measures such as the ‘glorification’ of terrorism. On 
the other side, The Daily Telegraph wrote that peers may regret their decision to reject 
terrorism legislation on the grounds that it is a violation of human rights. 
A narrative of the 7/7 terrorist attack published in both The Guardian and The Daily 
Telegraph also reflects the difference in the representation of the bombers in 
comparison to IRA terrorists, particularly in The Daily Telegraph.  However, evidence 
shows that the Irish troublemakers were not attacked on grounds of religion or for 
being Catholic or Protestant. In fact, it is important to note that more people were 
murdered by Protestant paramilitaries in Northern Ireland than by Catholic ‘terrorists’ 
(see Ciment, 2015; Martin, 2011, 2012; Wilkinson, 2015). 
In many ways the response to the 7/7 bombings carried out by al-Qaeda-inspired 
British Muslims compared to IRA bombings was clearly different. The first and foremost 
difference in the media representation of ideology is that 7/7 was linked to Islam 
(religion) whilst the IRA’s campaign was presented as a land dispute, the Ireland 
Question, and was therefore considered political. Equally, both the IRA and the London 
7/7 bombers had a common goal of removing British troops from their lands, as the al-
192 
 
Qaeda-inspired London bombers repeatedly complained about Britain’s military actions 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
It is also important to acknowledge that, since the start of the terrorism debate at 
different stages between 8 July 2005 and 7 July 2007, such as the failed 21/7 attack and 
the unsuccessful Glasgow airport terminal bomb plot, British Muslims have in some 
ways been directly involved in these incidents, which perhaps gives The Guardian and 
The Daily Telegraph the opportunity to view their religion as part of the problem. 
However, it is also important to note  that the 7/7 bombers resembled past traitors and 
‘enemy within’ factions in their actions and lifestyles which were more of a secular 
nature, although they were still heavily associated with ‘ideologies’ of Islamic theology.  
However, The Guardian allows alternative opinions in its comments section, including 
those of David Cameron who wrote that his interaction with British Muslims reveals 
that “Islamic terrorism” is an emotive phrase. The overall discussion in The Guardian 
suggested that a well-integrated society that guarantees equally opportunities to all its 
members might bind them together. This sort of society eliminates alienation and 
provides a shield against the threat of terrorism. On the one hand, The Guardian 
advocated human rights and assurance of British values during the terror trials and 
plots. However, it failed to disassociate the word “Islamic” from troublemakers, i.e. 
terrorists and extremists; secondly, it believed that mosques have played a crucial role 
in the radicalisation of young British Muslims. At this point its stance resembled the 
conservative approach promoted in The Daily Telegraph; for instance, it ran a ‘Muslim 
extremism’ banner from 17-23 September 2005 and published four articles including 
“British imams to tackle radicals in mosques” on 23 September 2005.  
On the whole, The Guardian maintained a balanced approach to the Muslim debate. 
Several commentators in The Guardian, including in its editorials, continued to object to 
new government legislation on terrorism on the grounds that it harms young British 
Muslims and the community as whole. Throughout 2006, The Daily Telegraph articles, 
such as those of 5 and 16 February 2006, suggested that outlawing the “glorification” of 
terrorism would weaken the government’s efforts to fight terrorism. In these articles it 
included a range of opposition voices from political parties; however, within the debate 
Muslim voices were provided with a very limited space in which to present their 
viewpoint. Most of the Daily Telegraph’s writers and commentators continued to 
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endorse Blair’s policies. In the anti-terrorism debate throughout 2007, Ed Husain was 
presented as an expert on the terrorism discourse, for example, in his articles published 
on 7 July 2007 and 2 May 2007.   
The key differences in the reporting of the two broadsheets appeared on two main 
occasions: first, when the British government decided to introduce new laws to deal 
with the threat of terrorism, and, secondly, when the government resolved to strip 
foreign dual nationals of their British citizenship and hand them over to other countries 
to stand trial on terrorism charges. On this matter, The Guardian raised the point that 
Britain should consider the human rights records of those countries before deporting 
alleged terrorists and hate-mongers to these less democratic states in the Middle East. It 
wrote editorials such as ‘No torture, please, we’re British’ (9 December 2005) and 
argued that foreign suspects held without charge should not be deported to places 
where they may be tortured. 
In summary, The Guardian offered  several comment and opinion pieces in which its 
writers discussed Britain’s past experience of dealing with home-grown or ‘enemy 
within’ factions who fell into the hands of Britain’s enemies abroad, such as the 7/7 
bombers. Despite its moderately sympathetic and balanced reporting of British 
Muslims, it viewed their religion as the main cause of the terrorism problem probably 
because The Guardian proclaims itself as the custodian of secular values. It also used the 
term “Islamic terrorism” in its editorials, again revealing its view of the 7/7 incident, 
although it openly denounced the government’s claim that the 7/7 incident had no links 
with Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq.  
5.11-Conclusion:  
The narrative of the 7/7 reporting during a two-year period (8 July 2005 - 7 July 2007) 
in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph reflects a shared view that the London 
bombings were an act of terrorism. Notably, both broadsheets allowed alternative 
opinions and varied voices in all their types of journalism. However the descriptions of 
terrorism based upon the editorials of these broadsheets suggest that it was an “Islamic 
terrorism” that has roots in a religious ideology which endorses violence and hatred. 
More specifically, both newspapers used the term “Islamic terrorism” in their editorials 
more than “Islamist” and “home-grown” terrorism, which further strengthened the 
hypothesis that Islam was directly associated with the 7/7 bombings. Although both 
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broadsheets were reporting on hate-preachers and a few radical Muslims’ activities in a 
few mosques, their overstating of a few extremist views helped to develop a narrative 
that Islam as a religion is perhaps problematic rather than expressing their views on 
same-sex marriages, women’s liberty and other Western norms, which in turn builds up 
an image of Islam as a religion that is negative and hostile to the present-day West.  
Both broadsheets set aside considerable space for discussions and debates on the ways 
to combat the terrorism threat, which they believe will continue in the coming decades. 
Although a considerable portion of reporting in all types of journalism acknowledged 
that the terrorism threat might be defeated through community bonding, it also held the 
wider British Muslim community responsible for the 7/7 bombings, presumably 
because the London bombings, the failed 21/7 attack, and the failed Glasgow bombing 
were committed by a few British Muslims. Both newspapers consulted representatives 
of British Muslims, such as the MCB, but there was still a slight sense of ignorance of a 
few verses of the Quran which were cited without considering their historical context. 
On tackling the terrorism threat, the two newspapers adopted different stances. For 
example, The Guardian challenged government policies such as the arrests and 
deportations of suspects, while The Daily Telegraph proposed the adoption of tougher 
legislation including deportation and other harsh ways of dealing with suspected 
terrorists and radicals. Although the two newspapers agreed that community bonding is 
a solution to combat future terrorist threats, they placed responsibility solely on the 
wider Muslim community, which developed an impression that terrorism is perhaps to 
be considered solely a Muslim problem.  
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Chapter 6 (Theme 2): Britain’s Foreign Policy in Iraq Risks its Internal Security.  
6.1-Introduction:  
The narrative of the security theme has two central components. The first relates to the 
government law enforcement organisations such as the police and secret agencies (MI5 
and MI6) working together or in separate units to tackle the terrorism threat. This set-
up equates to Michel Foucault’s notion of “Panopticism”, built upon Jeremy Bentham’s 
idea of the “Panopticon”, an observational post or watchtower in the centre of a building 
(prison) to enhance security through surveillance. Foucault states that it is in this mode 
that governments watch ordinary people secretly. In the present circumstances, 
governments monitor ordinary people’s emails, text messages, tweets and even their 
movements using various apps and other sophisticated technologies such as the 
‘Dishfire’ program (The Guardian, 22 January 2014). 
The second aspect of the security theme suggests that Muslims have securitised 
themselves mainly because of the terrain of unknown fears that include the following: 
being misjudged; being excessively watched and in some cases misinterpreted and ill-
reported; being detained without charge; and being stopped and searched on suspicion. 
Illustrations of these scenarios include numerous cases of identity checks that ended up 
in police shootings, leaving Muslims even more suspected, terrorised and securitised. 
Examples include the police shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes on 22 July 2005 and 
the Forest Gate Shooting on 2 June 2006, which appears to have been a serious error. 
This situation has probably allowed British Muslims to build a fence around themselves 
and assume that they have perhaps been persecuted.  
This situation echoes George Orwell’s idea (in his novel 1984) of a “Big Brother Society” 
in which powerful elites use different methods of control by employing various tactics 
such as physical restrictions, surveillance, propaganda, and the degradation of language. 
In this way, ruling elites generate fear of the unknown to control people’s thinking and 
limit their ability to question issues that matter to society and individuals. This chapter 
will discuss government and public models of security based on The Guardian and The 
Daily Telegraph reporting, as well as sub-themes under the broader tenet of security. 
The government model is designed to protect public life, possessions and the 
infrastructure of the country against public disorder and the bombing of innocent 
members of the public. 
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It consists of anti-terror laws, networks of agencies, policing and the surveillance 
system. In contrast, the public model is rather self-conscious, suggesting that perhaps 
the government is spying on members of the public by using laws and security settings 
to watch, manipulate and interfere in their privacy. This raises concerns because people 
think that their privacy and civil liberties are under attack. The two models run parallel 
to each other. On the one hand the government adopts measures and laws aiming to 
securitise people. On the other hand it engages in activities that weaken its counter-
terrorism ambitions, such as surveillance, spying and private space-monitoring.   
The immediate reaction to an interpretation of the London bombings in The Guardian 
and The Daily Telegraph reflect two key points. First, these were acts of “Islamic 
terrorism” rooted in “Islamic ideology” that posed a new internal security challenge to 
Britain since the IRA troubles. Second, the 7/7 bombings showed the negligence and 
failure of the British security institutions and indicated that there were gaps in their 
operational system that that needed to be reviewed. Both broadsheets stated that 
security institutions’ fundamental task is to safeguard the general public against any 
possible threat. Furthermore, these institutions are meant to stop terrorist acts given 
that they have already been warned and, hence, the bombings reflect their “scandalous 
error”.  
Both broadsheets openly condemned the anti-Muslim backlash resulting from 7/7 but 
also increasingly presented the British Muslims as a suspect community and a new 
security challenge, mainly because the bombers were part of them. Hence, because of 
this problematic representation of British Muslims, a narrative gradually developed that 
supported the view that British Muslims are a security risk. Arguably, it became evident 
that even a liberal press in Britain has, to some extent, a noticeably systemic bias 
against Islam. Perhaps such prejudice arises from “Islamist” radicals’ misinterpretations 
of Islam. It was further argued that the West is not only a victim and is on the receiving 
end of the current wave of radicalisation but is also a contributor to radicalisation. The 
purpose of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the coverage of the 7/7 bombings in 
both broadsheets in the context of Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq and the increasing 
internal security challenge.  
Section I: The Explanations of the Dataset and Original Findings:  
6.2-The Dataset:  
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The following figure shows the formulation of a main theme that emerges through the 
combining of similar codes and sub-themes. Three sub-themes are major contributors 
to the main theme, STC-10, which deals with Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq, and STC 38 
and STC 47, which deal with the backlash against British Muslims resulting from the 7/7 
incident and their grievances. Here, the abbreviation ‘STC’ refers to sub-theme code, 
which is also explained earlier in the methods chapter and can be seen in the figure 
below. These are followed by two sub-theme codes that described how the London 
bombers were radicalised during their visits to Pakistan, and how Islamist grievances 
against the West are irrational and wrong, which is mainly the government and The 
Daily Telegraph understanding of the 7/7 event.  Moreover, the security failure and 
public inquiry demands were the central focus of The Daily Telegraph, while The 
Guardian mainly highlights foreign policy in Iraq and its adverse effects on British 
society. The following figure explains the formulation of the main theme which 
comprises twenty-three sub-theme codes in different colours and their respective 
shares in the main theme.    
 
 
Figure 6.1: The above figure explains the narrative of Britain’s foreign policy in the two 
broadsheets. As explained earlier, ‘STC’ refers to the sub-theme codes that can be seen 
in this figure.  
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Table 6.1: The Construction of a Main Theme: “Britain’s Foreign Policy in Iraq”.  
No Colour 
Scheme  
Percentage 
share  
STC/ Sub-theme Code 
1 Blue Azure 22% STC 10, “Britain’s foreign policy in the Middle East, 
Iraq and Afghanistan radicalised the London 
bombers and created a feeling of anger among the 
younger generation of British Muslims” 
2 Purple 
amethyst  
14% STC 38, “British Muslims have set of grievances and 
resentment e.g. Government’s double standards over  
faith schools and labelling them as “enemy within’, 
disloyal’, ‘anti-Semitic’, etc.” 
3 Green 
shamrock 
10% STC 28, “British Muslims’ anger and resentment is a 
result of Western hypocritical and hostile policies in 
the Middle East and elsewhere in Islamic world”   
4 Light blue 9% STC 47, “Backlash of 7/7: Muslims’ feeling of being 
persecuted, stop and search, suspect arrest, families 
of 7/7 bombers harassment, veil attacks, derogatory 
links e.g. Beeston, etc.”    
5 Red cherry   8% STC 11, “Many young British-born Muslims became 
radicalised during their visits to Pakistan, a country 
of their parents that exports terrorism”   
6 Purple 
heather  
5% STC 8, “Islamist grievances against the West are 
irrational and wrong” 
7 Red ruby 5% STC 23, “The 7/7 event reflects security agencies’ 
failure” 
8 Blue lapis 4% STC 35, “Critics says that Britain should not 
participate in American-led “pre-emptive wars” and 
distance itself from “war on terror” 
9 Blue 
Cerulean 
4% STC 22, “7/7 bombers were known to MI5” 
10 Blue 
sapphire 
3% STC 31, “Britain foreign office had accommodated 
and sponsored radicals and their organisations such 
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as Muslim Brotherhood” 
11 Orange 
carrot 
3% STC 21, “Non-Muslims including politicians, 7/7 
victims demand for a public inquiry into the 7/7 
event” 
12 Purple 
violet 
3% STC 3, “Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq cannot be 
blamed for the London Bombings” 
13 Green pear 2% STC 15, “British Muslim organisations view Tony 
Blair’s anti-terrorism laws as undemocratic and 
unjust that aim to demonise the whole Muslim 
community” 
14 Blue arctic  2% STC 18, “British Muslims demand for a public 
inquiry into the 7/7 event” 
15 Purple 
Orchid  
1% STC 56, “British security institutions’ inhuman 
treatment and torture of suspects, deportations, 
refusal of asylum, trials in other countries etc. raise 
concerns over human rights issues”    
16 Orange 
apricot 
1% STC 50, “Mistaken Identity issue in the post-7/7 
Britain such as the non-Muslim arrests, shootings 
etc.’” 
17 Purple 
lavender  
1% STC 60, “Event like Burning Quran, and 
disrespecting Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) raises 
Islamophobia and hatred of Muslims and Islam that 
increase resentment among British Muslims” 
18 Light sky 
blue 
1% STC 9, “Britain had provided financial assistance to 
radicals and Islamists and had developed 
relationships with their organisations”   
19 Green olive 1% STC 37, “Many young British Muslim students 
turned to radicalisation at the universities that are 
centres of “Islamist extremism”; “Islamic 
McCarthyism” and “fertile recruiting grounds” of 
extremists” 
20 Orange yam  1% STC 36, “Most Islamist terrorists were well-
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educated, social, integrated, football lovers who 
belong to wealthy families”   
21 Thin-line 
mauve 
purple  
0.001% STC 17, “MI5/Police operations to prevent Islamist 
terrorism threat at home and abroad, i.e. suspect 
arrests, investigations, bravery etc,”   
22 Thin-line 
green fern 
0.001% STC 61, “Public (7/7 victims) complaints about the 
compensation process” 
23 Thin-line 
light orange 
0.001% STC 34, “Britain’s military campaigns in Afghanistan 
and Iraq were based on construction and peace-
keeping mission that aimed to destroy al-Qaeda and 
radical Islam”   
 
6.3-Britain’s Foreign Policy: Iraq War, Radicalisation and Internal Security.  
Following the 7/7 bombings Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq became one of the key 
debates within The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph editorials, comment pieces, and 
investigative and special news reports. The dataset shows that the sub-theme code “STC 
10, “Britain’s foreign policy in the Middle East, Iraq and Afghanistan radicalised London 
bombers and created a feeling of anger among the younger generation of British 
Muslims” appeared to be the key point of discussion in both broadsheets; it accounts for 
a share of 22% in the formulation of the second main theme. In contrast, sub-theme 
code STC 3, “Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq cannot be blamed for the London Bombings” 
contributes around a 3% share in the formulation of the second main theme, “security”.  
In more detail, around 75/274*100=27.37% of the reporting in the database debated 
whether foreign policy in Iraq had radicalised the London bombers while only 
3/274*100=1.09% of the reporting denied the link between the Iraq War and the 
London bombings. Importantly, the foreign policy debate in The Guardian and The Daily 
Telegraph reporting clearly showed their differing views on this subject. Here it is 
equally important to note that, out of 75 stories that carry sub-theme code 10 as 
mentioned above, The Guardian alone published 61 stories in all its forms of journalism 
including editorials, which suggests that it had given much more importance to foreign 
policy discourse in its reporting. In comparison, The Daily Telegraph published 14 
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articles with nine news reports and only two comment pieces, suggesting that it had 
overlooked Britain’s foreign policy as a topic of debate.   
Immediately after the attacks, The Guardian pointed out that Britain’s intervention in 
Iraq and the Middle East had radicalised the London bombers. This pattern of dissimilar 
political orientation remains a distinctive feature of the 7/7 reporting in these 
broadsheets. In other words, Britain’s foreign policy initiated a rivalry between The 
Guardian and The Daily Telegraph that continued throughout the following years (2005-
2007) covered in the dataset. The following table provides details of the reporting on 
Britain’s foreign policy in these broadsheets:           
      Table 6.2:  The Guardian’s discussion of Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq 
The Guardian (Types of Journalism)  8 July 2005-7 July 2007 
Editorials  5 
Comments & debate  33 
Investigative news reports 1 
Focus: Investigate reports 1 
News reports 18 
Interviews  1 
Special reports  1 
G2 Special report  1 
Total  61 
 
   Table 6.3:  The Daily Telegraph’s discussion of Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq 
The Daily Telegraph (Types of Journalism)  8 July 2005-7 July 2007 
News reports  9 
Comments  2 
Interviews  1 
Personal Views  1 
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Editorials  1 
Total  14 
Overall, more than a quarter of the discourse, i.e. 27.37 per cent of the total reporting 
space in the dataset discussed the role of Britain’s foreign policy in the growing 
radicalisation and disaffection among young British Muslims. Moreover, The Guardian’s 
contribution to this debate is 22.26% in comparison to The Daily Telegraph’s share of 
5.1%, which means that The Guardian has placed more importance on foreign policy 
debate. The thread of The Guardian’s reporting suggests that Britain’s foreign policy is a 
prime source of “alienation” and “radicalisation” among British Muslims. In his pre-
recorded video message that was made public after the 7/7 attack, British-born Sidique 
Khan blames Britain’s foreign policy as follows: 
                   Your democratically elected governments continuously 
perpetuate atrocities against my people and your support of them 
makes you directly responsible…Until we feel security, you will be 
our target. Until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and 
torture of my people, we will not stop this fight (The Guardian, 2 
September 2005). 
Foreign policy was a key sub-theme code within the recurring theme of internal 
security. Britain’s foreign policy appeared to be a big debate in The Guardian and The 
Daily Telegraph within all forms of journalism. Notably, it made up a quarter of the 
overall reporting in the main theme “Britain’s Foreign Policy in Iraq Risks its Internal 
Security”.  Moreover, this single most important code, “Britain’s foreign policy”, 
indicated the political orientations and policies of these broadsheets that became a 
prominent feature in their reporting. In its editorial The Guardian argued that growing 
radicalisation is happening “in some parts of British Islam, partly because of the British 
government's support for the Iraq war” and that “The evidence of such radicalisation 
was so obvious by 2005 that it is hard not to conclude that the security failure was both 
negligent and inexcusable (The Guardian, 12 May 2006). In another editorial The 
Guardian wrote that “Anger about the Iraq war is doubtless relevant, as, in a smaller 
way, are recent events at Forest Gate” (The Guardian, 27 June 2006).  
One of The Guardian writers, historian Brian Brivati, posed a question: “Would 7/7 have 
happened, and would it have been more or less deadly, if we had not liberated 
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Afghanistan and Iraq?” (The Guardian, 12 July 2005). Brivati wrote that “The invasion 
of Iraq acted as a deterrent to states that were nurturing a new generation of loosely 
affiliated ‘network terrorists’” (ibid). David Clark referred to a Guardian/ICM poll that 
suggested that “72% of the British people agree that our foreign policy has made us less 
secure, while only 1% accept the government’s assurance that it has made us safer” 
(The Guardian, 25 August 2006). Further, Clark argued that Britain’s erroneous policy in 
Iraq had helped to “create an enormous terrorist threat that didn’t previously exist” 
(ibid). Another writer in The Guardian, Alexander Chancellor, argued that Britain is 
under American influence which is why it went to war and the “government’s 
unquestioning support of the United States in all its foreign adventures” has “upset 
British Muslims”  (The Guardian, 2 September 2006).  
In contrast, The Daily Telegraph discussed two contrasting popular views on Iraq in its 
editorial: first, that “The attack on the Twin Towers predated the invasions of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and that Osama bin Laden was complaining about the garrisoning of Saudi 
Arabia, not about US support for Israel”; and, second, that “The invasion of Iraq has 
radicalised Muslims around the world and created a link between Iraq and al-Qa'eda 
where none existed before” (The Daily Telegraph, 11 September 2006). In an editorial 
The Daily Telegraph wrote: “This fight is not principally about Israel: it is an internal 
dispute within the Islamic world, which will continue to spill over until the region 
discovers liberal democracy. Five years on, we are no nearer to that goal” (The Daily 
Telegraph, 11 September 2006).  For example, on 17 June 2007 it published a lengthy 
article under the headline, “No compromise with those creating terrorism”, 
incorporating several columnists and studies that basically attack Islam. Notably, in a 
series of articles published after the 7/7 incident, The Guardian reiterated its stance on 
Britain’s foreign policy, which it saw as dangerous and responsible for the rise in 
Muslim extremism. Furthermore, in most articles it embraced the idea that Britain is 
perhaps paying the price for the American adventures mainly in Muslim lands in the 
wake of 9/11. It continued to stress that Britain foreign policy does not match its image 
and values in the world.  
Overall, both newspapers published reports accounting for 12.043 per cent of the total 
reporting, of which The Guardian’s share was 10.21% in discussing and debating 
Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq and its connection with the 7/7 event. Notably, The 
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Guardian supported the view that British Muslims’ anger and resentment is a result of 
Western hypocritical and hostile policies in the Middle East and elsewhere in the 
Islamic world. Seumas Milne pointed out that “it is an insult to the dead to mislead 
people about the crucial factors fuelling this deadly rage in Muslim communities across 
the world” (The Guardian, 13 July 2005). Milne insisted that the invasions of Iraq and 
Afghanistan proceeded on the basis of false arguments that al-Qaeda and its supporters 
simply hate Western freedoms and the Western way of life and that their “Islamist 
ideology” aims to conquer the whole world; he pointed out that those arguments were 
fabricated to justify the Iraq war. (ibid)  
The key point in The Guardian reporting suggests that Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq has 
put British people’s safety at risk at home and abroad. Given Britain’s political and 
economic interests and its role in the Middle East, most of The Guardian’s 
commentators, like Milne, rejected Blair’s argument that attacks on the West such as 
9/11 predated the Iraq war and therefore cannot be linked with problems in Britain. 
Milne wrote that, prior to 7/7, Muslims’ anger had been directed against America 
because of its anti-Muslim policies in the Middle East but Britain only became a target of 
Muslim radicals after “Blair backed Bush’s war on terror. Afghanistan made a terror 
attack on Britain a likelihood; Iraq made it a certainty” (The Guardian, 13 July 2005).  
On the other hand, like the British government The Daily Telegraph also rejected the 
arguments that Britain’s Iraq policy was damaging. Within the dataset, around 5.83 per 
cent of the reporting, mainly referring to Blair and other official sources, reflects the 
same view that Islamist grievances against the West are irrational and wrong. It also 
dismissed Islamist grievances, saying that their actual mission is to spread their 
ideology throughout the world and that even if the West resolves their complaints they 
will not halt their operations: “...The real project is the extension of the Islamic territory 
across the globe, and the establishment of a worldwide “caliphate” founded on Sharia 
(The Daily Telegraph, 20 July 2005).  
According to The Daily Telegraph Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq cannot be blamed for 
the London Bombings, which appeared as a sub-theme with 3.28 per cent of the 
reporting, mainly in The Daily Telegraph. Furthermore, The Daily Telegraph distanced 
itself from the belief that Britain should not participate in American-led “pre-emptive 
wars” and should distance itself from the “war on terror”, which appeared in The 
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Guardian with 8.21 per cent of the reporting. Under the broader theme of security, both 
newspapers discussed and debated British foreign policy and the Iraq War and their 
interconnectivity. Obviously, each newspaper took a clear position on these critically 
important issues which showed their political orientation.  
Despite all this, The Daily Telegraph continued to support Blair’s stance and published 
articles presuming that British Muslim grievances were wrong and unacceptable and 
that Iraq was a major threat to British security regardless. It defended its stance, 
asserting that British foreign policy in Iraq and its interfering role in Muslim countries 
in particular are intended to establish good and diminish evil, a popular American 
political line. One of The Daily Telegraph commentators Alasdair Palmer wrote a lengthy 
article under the headline, “No compromise with those creating terrorism”, 
incorporating several columnists and studies that essentially attack Islam (The Daily 
Telegraph, 17 June 2007). Palmer wrote that “British foreign policy, which has been 
blamed for the creation of home-grown Islamic terrorists, has had very little to do with 
it” and “...a conflict within the culture of an immigrant group can lead to the 
radicalisation of the next generation.” (ibid) Foreign policy appears as a key component 
within the recurring theme of security. For many critics it remains a main cause of 
extremism and terrorism aimed at the British government.  
Notably, in its post-7/7 reporting The Guardian reiterated its stance on Britain’s foreign 
policy in Iraq. Its series of articles asserted that Britain’s Iraq policy was responsible for 
increasing radicalisation and extremism among young British Muslims. Furthermore, 
The Guardian stated that Britain is perhaps paying the price for American adventures 
mainly in the Muslim lands in the wake of 9/11. Throughout The Guardian’s reporting, 
including comment and opinion pieces, investigative stories, debates, and front-page 
coverage, particularly on the 7/7 anniversaries, the terrorism that occurred on the two 
Thursdays (7/7 and the 21/7 failed attempt) was seen as a reaction to Britain’s role in 
the controversial Iraq War. Milne found that most sections of the British press and 
politicians had united to dismiss the argument that the Iraq War had radicalised the 7/7 
bombers. He wrote: “The pro-war Times and Telegraph have led the field, with 
neoconservative commentators and politicians hammering home the Blair-Bush 
message that terror is simply the product of an evil ideology” (The Guardian, 5 July 
2007). The article further disclosed the government’s propaganda tactics of labelling 
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scholars and journalists who oppose “Britain’s violent role in the Muslim world” as 
somehow soft on terrorism (ibid).  
6.4-The London Bombings: Anti-Muslim Backlash and Britain’s Internal Security. 
Both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph carefully recorded the anti-Muslim backlash 
in Britain and across the globe following the London bombings. Within the dataset a 
sub-theme code STC 47, “Backlash of the 7/7: Muslims feeling of being persecuting, stop 
and search, suspect arrest, families of 7/7 bombers harassment, veil attacks, derogatory 
links e.g. Beeston, etc” appeared 32 times meaning that 32/274*100=11.67 or nearly 
12% of the reporting consisted of the warning and condemnation of the backlash in any 
form on British Muslims. But, at the same time, the views of the contributors of these 
newspapers along with government officials and newspaper editorials clearly suggest 
that it is primarily British Muslims’ responsibility to put their house in order (The 
Guardian, 18 July 2005).  
Both newspapers in all forms of journalism considered that British Muslims have a set 
of grievances including resentment over the government’s double standards on Islamic 
faith schools and that a large part of the British press report them as “bad guys”, “enemy 
within”, “disloyal’, and “anti-Semitic”. Here, once again, The Guardian considered the 
British Muslims to be the victims of unfair treatment by the British media and 
government, which demonised them in the wake of 7/7. The sub-theme code in both 
broadsheets that talks about British Muslims’ set of grievances while discussing internal 
security and the terrorism threat facing Britain accounts for 14% of the reporting (14%-
2.5%=11.75%); hence The Guardian devoted more space to the Muslims’ grievances. 
Overall, it is evident that, within this main theme, the two newspapers talk of British 
Muslims’ grievances in 34 % of their reporting.  
Immediately after the London bombings a series of violent incidents occurred 
throughout England, particularly in Leeds and London. Freedland notes a visible rise in 
anti-Muslim attacks as “Police recorded 300 hate crime incidents in less than a week, 
including the killing of a man in Nottingham after anti-Muslim abuse...by August the 
feared backlash had receded” (The Guardian, 7 July 2006). The dataset shows that The 
Guardian alone contributed an 84.37 per cent share of the total reporting on the 
backlash. Of this 84.37 per cent., 56.25 per cent appeared in the form of journalism, i.e. 
investigative work describing the difficulties faced by the bombers’ family members and 
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the residents of the Beeston area of Leeds and Dewsbury where the bombers lived, and 
British Muslims’ overall experience in the wake of the bombings, such as stop and 
search and the bad press. The remaining 28.12 per cent of The Guardian’s coverage of 
the backlash consisted of news reporting. The following tables show the differences in 
the reporting by The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph. It is also important to note that 
most of these comment pieces and reports have more than one theme, which suggests a 
broader view of topics in the discussion. 
           Table 6.4- The Guardian (7/7 Backlash) 
Types of Journalism (The Guardian) Sub-theme: 47 
Editorials 2 
Comment Pieces 10 
News reports  9 
Personal Views  1 
Features  1 
Investigative reports  3 
Total  27 
        
        Table 6.5: The Daily Telegraph (7/7 Backlash) 
Types of Journalism (The Daily Telegraph) Sub-theme: 47 
News reports  4 
Interview 1 
Total  5 
Moreover, the backlash that took place in public differed from that which occurred 
within the government, which reviewed its anti-terrorism policy and introduced new 
laws to combat the terrorism threat. However, The Guardian criticised the government’s 
legislative framework that aimed to enhance counter-terrorism, particularly legislation 
prohibiting the “glorification of terrorism”. In its editorial of 27 May 2007, The Guardian 
equates Blair’s argument for increasing police powers with American Vice President 
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Dick Cheney’s infamous One Per cent Doctrine; i.e. “if there’s even a 1% probability of 
the unimaginable coming to pass, act as if it is a certainty”. 
Thus, by combining three sub-theme-codes within the main security theme (STC, 28, 38 
and 47) relating to the anti-British Muslim backlash, grievances and resentment at the 
British government policies, The Guardian initiated an important debate. Evidently, in 
its 45 comments and debate pieces The Guardian highlighted the problems of British 
Muslims and challenges in the wake of 7/7. In an editorial, The Guardian argued that, 
“On existing evidence, therefore, stop and search not only fails to achieve its objective in 
battling terrorism; it is counterproductive, driving a wedge between the forces of law 
and order and a community they need to keep tabs on (The Guardian, 28 May 2007).   
Within these comments it provided space to the bombers’ family members to express 
their feelings and explain what went wrong with their cousins and brothers who had 
been living normal lives like ordinary British Muslims. Furthermore, what has pushed 
those young British Muslims to become suicide bombers and how have their actions 
affected the lives of their loved ones? (See The Guardian, 19 May 2007) Here The 
Guardian considered and presented the views of the 7/7 bombers’ family members to 
display three important features of British Muslims’ lives after the incident: Shock, 
grievance, and resentment. All three elements became prominent features of The 
Guardian discussion of the backlash and the after-effects of the horrific events.  
In one of The Guardian editorials, it wrote: “The picture painted by official statistics is 
damning. Muslims live in more crowded housing than people of any other faith. They 
are more likely to lack qualifications, and, at any given age, they report more health 
problems…”  (The Guardian, 27 June 2006; see also 14 October 2006).  
In contrast, The Daily Telegraph published only three comment pieces in which 
commentators voiced their opinion on British Muslims’ feelings, resentment, fears and 
possible measures to overcome troubles related to the 7/7 bombing. In his personal 
view, “Muslim anger must be recognized” Ali Miraj, a Conservative Party member 
expressed the situation of ordinary British Muslims as “… Muslims across the world as a 
consequence of the foreign policies of the West (principally the US) is palpable”. There 
is no doubt that all British Muslims… must do more to combat intolerance in their midst 
(The Daily Telegraph, 13 August, 2006). In its personal views and interviews sections, 
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The Daily Telegraph also included the views of high-profile Muslims such as Prince 
Hassan of Jordan and Britain’s Muslim celebrity Yousaf Islam (formerly Cat Stevens) to 
explain how 7/7 has changed the perception of Muslim communities across the world. 
Importantly, The Guardian’s coverage of this matter echoed two points: the structure 
and the presentation of the debate that reflected its campaigning stance over British 
Muslims’ problems, albeit from liberal-minded commentators. Consider, for example, a 
few headlines that concentrated on the healing process and making matters better: “The 
heavy mob will get us nowhere: Muslim communities must be treated as allies, not 
enemies” (The Guardian,  14 July 2005); “Throwing mud at Muslims: branding 
moderates as extremists will have disastrous consequences” (The Guardian, 22 July 
2005); and “How not to have a debate: Ministers need to listen more to Muslims and 
avoid grandstanding to the scared majority” ( The Guardian, 9 October 2006). The 
sequence of comment pieces shaped the debate in an ascending order of topics, i.e. 
problem, reaction and solution.  
The dataset shows that The Guardian raised concerns over human rights issues such as 
deportations, refusal to grant asylum, and trials of suspects in other countries that are 
undemocratic. In an editorial The Guardian wrote: “Giving police arbitrary powers to 
stop whoever they want, without even the fig leaf of “reasonable suspicion” they 
currently require, could poison community relations and so choke off crucial sources of 
intelligence” (The Guardian, 27 May 2007). In the same editorial The Guardian suggests 
that, under section 44 of the ‘Terrorism Act 2000’, police already hold stop-and-search 
powers.  
In comparison, The Daily Telegraph showed little interest in criticising the government 
over its tough-laws policy following the 7/7 incident; in fact, it pushed the government 
to follow the American and French models to deport terror suspects and endorse their 
trials in any other country. Evidently, The Guardian adopted an opposing view on 
human rights and government legislative measures in response to the bombings.  On the 
occasion of the first anniversary of 7/7, The Guardian sent its reporter to the Beeston 
area of Leeds, which had been described in The Daily Telegraph as a “hotbed of Islamic 
extremism”. Roger Ratcliffe found that the international media and British security 
agencies had invaded the Beeston area in the wake of the 7/7 incident, and that it had 
subsequently been associated with all sorts of troubles (The Guardian, 3 July 2006). 
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Obviously the reason for their interest was to provide coverage of the 7/7 event, 
produce follow-up reports and, for the security personnel, to investigate and perhaps 
prevent further attacks.  
In turn, the whole Beeston community has received bigoted labels. One of The Daily 
Telegraph writers even accused the ‘Hamara Centre’ of preaching extremism (see The 
Daily Telegraph, 15 July 2005). According to The Guardian press review of 18 July 2005, 
Niall Ferguson’s article published in The Sunday Telegraph on 17 July 2005 revealed 
that the government-funded ‘Hamara Access Point’ was preaching extremism in the 
name of Islam even though the British government said that 7/7 was the work of a 
“criminal minority” that “should not be blamed on Islam or the wider Muslim 
community”. Ferguson wrote: “A campaign has for some time been under way to 
convert young European Muslims ... Whatever their stated purpose, such centres are 
evidently being used as jihadist recruiting stations ...” (The Guardian, 18 July 2005). 
Ratcliffe provided the example of BBC reporter Emily Buchanan’s experience in Beeston 
six months after the 7/7 incident where she talked to young British Muslims (The 
Guardian, 3 July 2006).  Buchanan witnessed terrible changes in the same area that had 
been “a peaceful, isolated community, proud of its low crime rate” until the incident 
brought it into the international media limelight (ibid). Things became worse when the 
“media cavalry” designated Dewsbury, Beeston and Leeds as terrorist-harbouring 
places.  
Evidence shows that people in these areas and British Muslims in particular began to be 
seen as the “enemy within”, “suspect” and “disloyal” to the extent that the families of the 
London bombers were raided even while they were grieving. Even some well-
established professionals who happen to be white Muslims encountered such 
depressing experiences. A British music star, the Muslim convert Yusuf Islam, formerly 
Cat Stevens, had some bad experiences; in particular, he was misreported in the press 
and refused entry into America (The Daily Telegraph, 29 April 2007). After the 7/7 
incident The Daily Telegraph asked him about his experience: “Does he feel he has been 
a victim of Islamophobia?” “Yes, exactly. What happened on the plane; Islamophobia 
affects me directly because Islam is my name, Yusuf Islam”.  
The backlash against British Muslims continued to appear in different forms in the 
press. At worst, the government initially planned to close down mosques that spread 
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extremism. Although hate preachers such as the controversial self-proclaimed scholar 
Abu-Hamza had continued to present a self-interpreted distorted image of Islam to 
Westerners for several years at Finsbury Park mosque in London, there was little 
evidence of government intervention. Soon after the bombings, the mosques, rather 
than the hate preachers, came under scrutiny.  
While The Guardian discussed the scale of the backlash, one of its commentators, 
Seumas Milne, argued that Blair’s policies were wrong and had put the British public at 
risk, resulting in 7/7 and a hatred of British Muslims as its side effect; Milne wrote, 
“What they did was not “home grown”, but driven by a worldwide anger at US-led 
domination and occupation of Muslim countries (The Guardian, 13 July 2005). In the 
opposing camp Martin Kettle dismissed the claim that the whole Muslim community 
was demonised after the 7/7 bombings (The Guardian, 7 July 2007). The notable aspect 
of the 7/7 backlash is that it was predominantly different from the backlash to the New 
York and Madrid bombings in the sense that Londoners showed strength and unity and 
did not allow the incident to stay with them as a bad memory, preferring to move on.  
6.5-British Security Institutions and Islamist Radical Organisation Connections:   
Both broadsheets raised this point, as 9/274*100=3.28% of their reportage on the 
reaction to the bombings dealt with how the British Foreign Office had accommodated 
and sponsored radicals and their organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Furthermore, in a few reports (around 1.09 per cent) it also appeared that Britain had 
provided financial assistance to radicals and Islamists and had developed relationships 
with their organisations to achieve political ambitions. Furthermore, both broadsheets 
also pointed out in their investigative reporting that the 7/7 bombers were already 
known to MI5, a strand that accounts for 14/274*100=5.10% of the reporting. It is 
evident that both broadsheets discussed and debated the role and responsibility of 
security institutions in assessing and dealing with the internal security threat in three 
sub-theme codes: STC 22, “7/7 bombers were known to MI5”; STC 23, “The 7/7 event 
reflects security agencies failure”; and STC 31, “Britain’s foreign office had 
accommodated and sponsored radicals and their organisations such as Muslim 
Brotherhood”. In other words, both broadsheets allocated a considerable section of the 
reporting to debate security institutions’ policies, strategies and achievements.  
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The debate on radicalisation mainly focused on religion as the prime reason behind the 
growing radicalisation in British society. Both broadsheets in editorials and other forms 
of journalism largely agreed on this perception that the London bombers and many 
other young British Muslims were radicalised during their visits to Pakistan. However, 
there was no concrete evidence on this matter to indicate that the bombers were 
actually radicalised there.   
Further, a large part of reporting, which is sub-theme code STC 11, “Many young British-
born Muslims became radicalised during their visits to Pakistan a country of their 
parents that exports terrorism”, suggests that religious schools in Pakistan brainwashed 
these British youngsters like the London bombers.  In its editorial The Guardian wrote: 
“It is also essential to underline that even where communities are alienated … the 
overwhelming majority - in Britain and across Europe - are opposed to Islamist violence 
in all circumstances” (The Guardian, 27 June 2006). For Karen Armstrong, “The chief 
problem for most Muslims is not "the west" per se, but the suffering of Muslims in 
Guantánamo, Abu Ghraib, Iraq and Palestine…” (The Guardian, 8 July 2006).  
Another point discussed in The Guardian was the inhuman treatment of those suspected 
radicals under sub-theme code STC 56, “British security institutions’ inhuman 
treatment and torture of suspects, deportations, refusal of asylum, trials in other 
countries etc. raises concern over human rights issues”. This shows that The Guardian 
reinforced its stance on human rights and criticised the British government over its 
laws and policies that contradict Western values. It also believed that this was a cause of 
growing radicalisation. 
In the wake of 7/7, both broadsheets discussed and debated the roots of radicalisation 
in Britain. The contacts between Britain’s security agencies and radicals go back to 1990 
during which time radicals from around the world visited London without encountering 
many security hurdles. Mark Steyn (12 July 2005), Alasdair Palmer (14 May 2006) and 
Con Coughlin (12 May 2006) raised the “Londonistan” issue that linked London with 
“Islamic” radicals’ notorious activities, accusing the British institutions of being soft on 
“Islamic extremists” to the extent that the security agencies stopped using the word 
‘terrorists’ to describe them. Further, these Daily Telegraph writers suggested that 
“Islamic extremists” had used London as a base for their activities to attack the Paris 
Metro (1995) and the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001.  
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According to The Daily Telegraph report, “Why France lived in fear of ‘Londonistan’”, 
published on 13 October 2001, the “French counter-terrorism experts refer to the 
capital as ‘Londonistan’ because of the number of wanted extremists who have sought 
and found safe haven there”. It continued to connect Finsbury Park Mosque with 
radicals and “Londonistan” in its reports; perhaps mostly using controversial sources 
such as Ed Husain (see The Daily Telegraph, 2 May 2007).  
Conspicuously, a Hizbut-Tahrir spokesman rejected Ed Husain’s claims that he was a 
member of the organisation. In contrast, in one of its investigative reports, 
“‘Londonistan’ no longer rings true: Once Britain used to be a safe haven for Islamic 
radicals, but all that changed with the emergence of the al-Qaeda threat”, published on 
17 July 2005, The Observer discredits American and French secret agencies’ allegations 
and insists that they exaggerated and mistranslated British traditional tolerance and 
gave it the wrong angle, portraying London as “Beirut-on-Thames” or “Londonistan”, “a 
safe haven for dissident Islamic groups of varying degrees of extremism from across the 
Muslim world”.  
In the same report, The Observer learned that both France and America had suggested 
that Britain should be hard on Muslims, stating that “This bombing should mark the end 
of the open borders notion. Britain should adopt the French model of assimilation, 
where you hammer away at everyone until they think they are French.” (ibid) In an 
article mentioned above, The Daily Telegraph writes: “It was here that the Paris Metro 
bombings in 1995 were masterminded, and most of the key figures responsible for 
planning the 9/11 attacks had strong ties with the British capital” (The Daily Telegraph 
12 May 2006). 
Consider The Guardian report, “Newspapers warn of threat to America from 
‘Londonistan’”, published on 12 July 2005, in which it explained how the mainstream 
American media established links between terrorist plots and London and claimed that 
terrorist activities around the world have close ties with London-based radicals. In 
other words, the British government appears to be softer on Muslim radicals who have 
threatened Europe and America. Furthermore, it provided references to various leading 
American newspapers that used phrases such as “feeding ground for hate”, “crossroads 
for would-be terrorists” and “openly preach jihad” to describe the UK as a hotbed of 
Islamic fundamentalism that threatens global security. In the same article the newspaper 
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quoted Peter Bergen, a fellow of The New America Foundation, who said that British 
Muslims pose “one of the greatest terrorist threats to the United States.” (ibid) 
Furthermore, most sections of the American media criticised the British government for 
being too lenient with Muslims while George Bush used the bomb attacks on London as 
renewed justification for the war on terror (The Guardian, 12 July 2005). In keeping 
with its own right-wing ideology, The Daily Telegraph on 7 July quoted the likeminded 
Professor Anthony Glees who estimated that there are “…up to 200,000 potential 
martyrs, at universities at home and abroad, who are susceptible to recruitment”. 
“There are huge reservoirs to draw on,” he warns, “a potentially terrifying fact that the 
police and intelligence agencies must now ponder” (The Daily Telegraph, 2007).  
 In the wake of the 7/7 incident, London Mayor Livingstone stated: “We let Islamic 
terrorists raise funds in the UK, and fund their terrorism abroad from the UK. We let 
them broadcast their terrorism-inciting poison from the UK”. Indeed, the evidence 
shows that Livingstone’s argument is correct and this duplicity of the British 
government has led to British Muslim youth radicalisation.  
This has to be seen as “part of the background which led to 7/7” (The Sunday Telegraph, 
14 May, 2006). Martin Bright and Jonathan Freedland criticised the British 
government’s relationships with Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who in their opinion 
“blesses suicide bombings against Israeli civilians, denounces homosexuality, and 
defends the physical disciplining of women by their husbands” (see The Guardian, 12 
July 2006; 30 July 2006).  
In view of the fact that the security organisations knew of al-Qaeda’s presence inside 
Britain, this failure raised concerns and generated criticism. More importantly, it gave 
an indication of whether al-Qaeda radicals and law enforcement organisations have had 
a working relationship. In the context of security arrangements and the role of law 
enforcement agencies, both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph published a series of 
articles discussing the relationship between radical organisations and individuals in law 
enforcement departments.  
In The Daily Telegraph editorial, it quoted MI5 head, Eliza Manningham Buller, who 
warned that “There were at least 30 plots involving more than 100 dedicated 
terrorists… most of the active terrorists are foreign, rather than home-grown…they are 
bigoted, racist and utterly ruthless in their dedication to commit mass murder “in the 
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name of God” (The Daily Telegraph, 8 July 2007). Perhaps it is this notion “in the name of 
God” that has became a reason for the formulation and increasing use of the term 
“Islamic terrorism”. Furthermore, the description of the London bombers as “Islamist” 
radicals signified Islam as a problematic religion even though radicals have clearly 
violated its principal teachings.  
Polly Toynbee also wrote in The Guardian that the London bombers reacted “in the 
name of God” and were ready to kill innocent people (The Guardian, 22 July 2005). 
Toynbee also mentioned all other major religions and the way a tiny fraction of 
extremists within Christianity, Judaism, Sikhism and Buddhism all killed innocent 
people “in the name of God” (The Guardian, 22 July 2005). Another important point here 
is that Bush and Blair also used “in the name of God” logic to invade Iraq (The Guardian, 
7 October 2005). Other writers in The Guardian also discussed the problem of 
radicalisation in connection with all major religions, not just Islam, such as George 
Monbiot who wrote: “We also know that few religious governments have committed 
atrocities on the scale of Hitler’s, Mao's or Stalin’'s” (The Guardian, 11 October 2005). 
The point is that on one hand the secular West viewed and linked the London bombings 
to Islam. But, on the other hand, it ignored the political elites who also used religion to 
justify their invasion of Iraq. Hence, what is the difference between Bush and Blair and 
those 7/7 perpetrators who also used their version of religion to kill innocent people?  
According to The Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) report 
published in The Observer on 7 May 2006 under the headline “7/7 ringleader ‘had direct 
link with terror cell’”, the perpetrators “carried out a cheap and simple plot to bomb 
London using techniques they had found on the internet” and their “ringleader” Sidique 
Khan and the “Terrorist cell had been under surveillance by the security services”. 
Meanwhile, The Observer wrote: “The ISC has found there was a direct link between the 
bombers’ ringleader Sidique Khan… tube train at Edgware Road, and a terrorist cell that 
had been under surveillance by the security services” (ibid).  
On this matter, The Observer has shown serious concerns; the newspaper consulted 
several leading academics in the field of terrorism and security and suggested that those 
security organisations should take responsibility for the incident. Like The Guardian’s 
approach, The Daily Telegraph adopts a somewhat similar attitude that is visible in 
several articles. For example, on 12 May 2006 it wrote: “MI5 knew the identities of two 
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of the London bombers a full two years before they launched their suicide attacks on the 
capital’s transport system last July, killing 52 innocent people” (The Daily Telegraph, 12 
May 2006). 
In fact both newspapers were concerned about the performance of MI5 given that it is a 
mainstream institution responsible for safeguarding Britain’s interests at home and 
abroad. Thus, any sort of failure in MI5’s operating system sends an encouraging 
message to Britain’s opponents. However, the discussion on the security agencies’ 
operating systems in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph reflected a division among 
their writers and columnists as well as other sources of references such as the 
academics and media experts who talked about security institutions’ role and their 
responsibilities in tackling terrorism.    
According to global media reports, several countries including Saudi Arabia warned 
Britain well in advance of the attack, as noted in The Daily Telegraph report published 
on 21 June 2006. The Malaysia Sun wrote: “US warned UK over London bombers”; Gulf 
News said: “Britain knew about July 7 bombers”; The Australian said: “London bomber 
banned from US”. In the same vein, The Daily Telegraph printed an article under the 
headline “The Times, MI5 and a case of mistaken identity: American book claiming that 
the security services could have prevented London Bombings is called into question”. It 
goes on to describe the issue in the light of Ron Suskind’s study, which is seen as 
controversial in Britain. The study claims that the British secret agencies had contacts 
with Islamic radicals. Consider a short passage from The Daily Telegraph: “This 
‘revelation’ had serious implications…security service had failed properly to keep tabs 
on a man who went on to perpetrate Britain’s worst terrorist atrocity; it also meant they 
had been lying about what they knew” (The Daily Telegraph, 21 June 2006).  
6.6-Descriptions of British Radicals (7/7 and 21/7 Bombers):  
The portrayals of the 7/7 terrorists and the failed 21/7 bomb plotters in The Guardian 
and The Daily Telegraph are largely based on descriptions supplied by their family 
members, neighbours, work colleagues and close friends. These newspapers discuss the 
bombers’ mindsets, beliefs, family backgrounds, religious affiliations, childhoods and 
way of life. Most importantly, The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph narratives of the 
bombers reflect an attempt to find answers to the following questions: what motivated 
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the bombers to attack their own country of birth; how had they become radicalised; 
what was the role of their religious beliefs; were they brainwashed?  
Another leading reference that was associated with the bombers’ portrayals was the 
idea that they “hated the British way of life”. These two notions of “ideology” and “the 
British way of life” were the main tags applied to the bombers’ and radicals’ profiles in 
both newspapers. Therefore, a notion prevails in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph 
reporting that they did not cherish liberal values and wanted to promote a medieval 
way of life. At this point, these two sub-themes show that 20.07% of the total reporting 
posits religious “ideology” as a prime cause of radicalisation.  
The significant component of the coverage exhibits the process through which bombers 
became radicalised. One hypothesis is that most of the young British-born Muslims 
become radicalised in Pakistan. This appears 29 times in the dataset, making this sub-
theme “Many young British-born Muslims became radicalised during their visits to 
Pakistan, a country of their parents that exports terrorism” (29/274*100 = 10.58%). 
Still, it is a popular tradition in some British-Pakistani families to visit their parent 
country occasionally. Overall, 27.37% of the reporting in both newspapers, mainly in 
The Guardian, states that the London bombers became radicalised because of the Iraq 
War which was part of Britain’s foreign policy.  
Also, a very small number of stories relate to young British Muslims being radicalised in 
British universities. A sub-theme-code (STC 37) describes the issue as, “Many young 
British Muslim students turned to radicalisation at the universities that are centres of 
“Islamist extremism”; “Islamic McCarthyism” and “fertile recruiting grounds” of 
extremists”. It appears in both broadsheets reporting as follows: (5/274*100=1.82% or 
nearly 2%). More specifically, the two newspapers’ shares are The Guardian 
(2/187*100=1.06)’ and The Daily Telegraph (3/87*100=3.44%).  
One view was that radicalisation derives from a cultural background and those British-
born perpetrators hated Western values and instead glorified their extreme ideologies. 
Audrey Gillan reviewed the causes of radicalisation among young British Muslims and 
found that both Hasib Hussian, who became a suicide bomber, and his victim Shahara 
Islam were second-generation Asian Muslims living in close-knit and well-connected 
families (The Guardian, 14 July 2005). Moreover, Gillan found that religion had little 
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influence on radicalised youngsters who were more inclined to a secular way of life. 
(ibid)    
6.7- The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph Attitude and Approach to Britain’s 
Security Operating System: A Way Forward.  
Soon after the 7/7 bombings, both broadsheets focused their attention on possible ways 
of preventing any further attacks. These broadsheets suggested that the main challenge 
was now to find a way forward to deal with the serious problem of internal security. 
According to these newspapers reporting, the 7/7 experience indicated that the British 
security services had misunderstood the terrorist risk. The Guardian and The Daily 
Telegraph took on this new challenge from different perspectives and both discussed 
and debated the nature and causes of the security challenge in their all forms of 
journalism. The dataset shows that a sub-theme code STC 35, “Critics says that Britain 
should not participate in American-led “pre-emptive wars” and distance itself from the 
‘war on terror’”, accounted for 13/274*100=4.74 or nearly 5% of reporting, 
demonstrating one of the causes of the 7/7 attacks. For these broadsheets, another 
reason for the attack was sub-theme Code 31, “Britain’s foreign office had 
accommodated and sponsored radicals and their organisations such as Muslim 
Brotherhood”, which made up 3.28% of the overall reporting on security.  
Further to this, both newspapers also examined possible measures to eliminate the 
challenge of radicalisation among young British Muslims and improving security 
conditions inside Britain. On this matter, some of the contributors in The Guardian 
argued that public privacy and liberty should not be compromised. In contrast, a few of 
The Daily Telegraph writers pointed out that Britain had to sacrifice some of its liberty 
to improve security. On 5 July 2006, The Daily Telegraph quoted Blair who emphasised 
the need for British Muslims “to root out extremists”. The opening passage explained: 
“Moderate Muslims should do more to challenge extremists within their communities 
and tell those with ‘grievances’ against the West that they are wrong…”.  
In the same article The Daily Telegraph also provided a space to the spokesman of the 
Muslim Council of Britain, Inayat Bunglawala, who recognised that Muslims have an 
essential duty to join the government’s battle against extremist ideas. But he also 
pointed out that “Many Muslims across the UK believe that the UK’s participation in the 
wars against Afghanistan and Iraq and the resulting carnage have been a key 
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contributory factor in the radicalisation of some young Muslims”. Although the paper 
allocated little space to consider the point of view of Muslims on the first anniversary of 
the 7/7 attack, it continued to argue that the Muslims’ grievance about Britain’s foreign 
policy in Iraq and the Middle East is wrong.  
Notably, The Daily Telegraph also believed that the terms “Islamic terrorists” and 
“Muslim Terrorism” were legitimate and that the government should not be swayed by 
Muslim reaction. Consider its article, “Muslims have to join this battle” published on 8 
July 2007 on the occasion of the second anniversary of 7/7, in which it stated: “Admiral 
Sir Alan West … to oversee security in Britain has made a comprehensive assessment of 
terrorist threats currently facing us…” In the next paragraph it wrote: “It is important, 
however, for no one in authority to be fooled by the change in language: the reality is 
that the threat comes from a perceived version of Islam. It is not Hindus or Buddhists or 
Polish immigrants to Britain who are trying to plant bombs here; it is men who claim to 
be Muslims”; therefore, it believed that it is Muslims’ responsibility to work alongside 
the security agencies to combat extremism. 
Considerable discussion has been devoted to the government security apparatus and its 
future strategies for combating any possible risk of further attacks. In addition, a large 
part of the debate calls on Muslims to accept responsibility for the perpetrators and to 
securitise inner communities where potential extremists are hiding. A long paragraph in 
a The Guardian article entitled ‘Face up to failures’ published on 12 May 2006 
summarised all this nicely: “How should a strong open society respond to these 
failures?...The obvious way of conducting such a review is to strengthen the role of 
parliament …That would not solve all the problems, but it would be a good start”. 
Meanwhile, for The Daily Telegraph a way forward to avoid further incidents was to 
renew the intelligence system, which needs to be under the control of a public 
representative body, meaning politicians (see The Daily Telegraph, 12 May 2006). Both 
newspapers reporting reflected a patriotic and serious attitude and approach to dealing 
with the internal security problem.  
6.8-Government Security Model: Public Concerns and Possible Measures.  
Evidence shows that the government model of securitising the public has a number of 
serious issues including lack of collaboration between security agencies, methods of 
arresting suspects, and government claims that its security failure occurred because of a 
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lack of funding and staffing. According to The Sunday Telegraph news report, “The 
security service has 1,000 fewer officers countering terror plots than there are 
bureaucrats implementing Gordon Brown’s tax credit system. Are we really taking the 
threat seriously?” (The Sunday Telegraph 14 May 2006)   
Furthermore, it questioned the security system, stating that “MI5’s failure to recognise 
the threat posed by Islamic terrorism at the end of the 1990s is the best explanation of 
its inability to prevent the bombings on July 7, 2005” (ibid).  Essentially, in this article 
The Daily Telegraph, although a supporter of the government’s Iraq policy, criticised its 
security systems. In the same vein, The Guardian also questioned the government model 
of securitising the public. On 8 July 2005 The Guardian stated that “Hundreds of 
suspects, many of them young Muslim men, have been arrested and the police claim to 
have broken up several terrorist cells and networks. The government has invested 
millions in extra security officers and intelligence systems”. The next, long paragraph 
deserves to be quoted here for two reasons: on the one hand it recognises the 
government’s efforts to tackle extremism and terrorism but on the other it sticks to its 
belief that it is “Islamic terrorism”. It stated: “After the 2001 attacks on America, a wide-
ranging review of how Islamist terrorism is tackled in the UK was 
undertaken…institutions and legislative changes were made; MI5 has already begun a 
recruitment campaign to increase its size by 50% to 3,000 staff by 2008” (The Guardian, 
8 July 2005).  
Both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph published a number of articles and 
comment pieces in which these newspapers discussed the operating systems of security 
institutions, their budgeting and their professional standards, and they accused them of 
working with some radical organisations. In short, both newspapers not only 
questioned the British security system but also highlighted flaws in its operating 
mechanism. Now let us take two reports of The Daily Telegraph, “MI5 must pay for a 
scandalous error” published on 12 May 2006 and “The Times, MI5 and a case of 
mistaken identity: American book claiming that the security service could have 
prevented London bombings is called into question”, which appeared on 21 June 2006 
criticising the government.  
According to The Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) report 
published in The Observer on 7 May 2006 under the headline “7/7 ringleader ‘had direct 
221 
 
link with terror cell’”, the perpetrators “carried out a cheap and simple plot to bomb 
London using techniques they had found on the internet” and their “ringleader” Sidique 
Khan and the “Terrorist cell had been under surveillance by the security services”. 
Meanwhile, The Observer wrote: “The ISC has found there was a direct link between the 
bombers’ ringleader” Sidique Khan… tube train at Edgware Road, and a terrorist cell 
that had been under surveillance by the security services.” (ibid) To sum up, The Daily 
Telegraph articles disclosed that MI5 and Special Branch were watching the suspects 
and it was already known that the attack might occur at any moment. On 8 July 2005, it 
noted: “Only a few weeks ago, the state of terrorist alert was lowered from ‘severe 
general’, the second highest, to ‘substantial’, which means the threat remained but it 
was not known where it was coming from or against whom it was targeted”.  
6.9-Demands for a Public Inquiry into the London Bombings:  
After the London bombings, some politicians, sections of the press, public bodies, 
pressure groups, victims and the relatives of the 7/7 victims, including those of the four 
suicide bombers, raised concerns over official accounts of the bombings. The demands 
by both Muslims and non-Muslims of diverse professional and political backgrounds for 
an independent inquiry were evident in both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph 
comment pieces, interviews, investigative reports and editorials, particularly on the 
occasions of the 7/7 anniversaries. The dataset reveals that 2.1% of the reporting shows 
British Muslims’ representatives demanding an independent inquiry. In comparison, 
3.28% of the reporting in the dataset discloses that non-Muslims in Britain, including 
politicians, commentators, campaigners and public organisations’ heads, asked the 
British government to hold an independent public inquiry into the incident. Notably, the 
calls from non-Muslims for a 7/7 inquiry outnumbered those of British Muslims. 
Evidently, the overall reporting shows a public consensus on the unanswered questions 
relating to the 7/7 incident. One of the key points raised was that the bombers were 
known to the security agencies prior to the incident. On 30 April 2007, The Daily 
Telegraph also reported in its news section that “Conservatives and Liberal Democrats 
demanded a full inquiry into why the security agencies failed to use this knowledge to 
prevent the 7/7 attacks” (The Daily Telegraph, 30 April 2007).   
Despite a warning of an al-Qaeda attack from the Saudi secret agency, the British 
security institutions did not adopt precautionary measures and even lowered the 
222 
 
terrorism threat before the attacks. In their editorials, The Guardian and The Daily 
Telegraph pointed out discrepancies in the official account of the London bombings and 
suggested that those responsible for the security failure must resign and that there is no 
excuse for failure. Both newspapers questioned the official accounts of the London 
bombings in their editorials and other forms of journalism including opinions, 
comments and investigative reports. The Guardian editorial offered an analysis of Home 
Office and Commons Intelligence and Security Committee reports on the 7/7 incident. It 
considered both reports conscientious and significant and accepted that they tried to 
find answers to “how and why” (The Guardian, 12 May 2006). It concluded that “Each 
report leaves important questions hanging in the air. Each report tells a story of serious 
official failure.” (ibid)  
In the same vein, The Daily Telegraph also continued to question the government 
narrative of the 7/7 incident and supported the idea of a full public inquiry. In an 
editorial The Daily Telegraph criticised the Government for its refusal to “order a public 
inquiry into the deadliest attack on the capital since the Second World War” (The Daily 
Telegraph, 7 July 2006).  It is important to note that, prior to the 7/7 attacks, The Daily 
Telegraph supported the same government on the Iraq war that was based on 
assumptions of the existence of “weapons of mass destruction” that turned out to be 
false. Both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph criticised Blair’s instant refusal to 
conduct an independent public inquiry on the grounds that it would undermine security 
institutions and his defence of the British security institutions.  
The Guardian also proposed that the public’s representative, parliament, should have 
more powers to scrutinise the intelligence agencies. Overall reporting on calls for a 
public inquiry unveils a few important facts; for example, Muslims are more inclined to 
believe in conspiracy theories in comparison to their non-Muslim fellow British citizens. 
In one of its reports The Daily Telegraph wrote: “A quarter of Britain’s two million 
Muslims believe Government agents staged the July 7 suicide bombings” (The Daily 
Telegraph, 5 June 2007).  
On the other hand, Honingsbaum’s article provided details of those non-Muslims who 
were fascinated by conspiracy theories (The Guardian, 27 June 2006). Further, 
Honingsbaum included the views of bloggers, campaigners, and some of the prominent 
victims such as Rachel North who were distrustful of official reports and raised their 
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concerns over distorted facts that did not match the ground realities; hence, they all 
supported the idea of an independent inquiry. (ibid) Honingsbaum found that, “Ever 
since the Kennedy assassination, people’s faith in the official narratives surrounding 
seismic political events has been steadily eroding”. In addition, he unveiled some claims 
of 9/11 conspiracy theorists who think that “7/7, like the attacks on the World Trade 
Centre and the Pentagon, were all part of a cunning scheme to further the pro-Iraq war 
agenda of the Bush/Blair governments and the ‘New World Order’”. Moreover, The 
Guardian quoted Nick Clegg, the Liberal Democrat home affairs spokesman, who said: 
“There can be no excuse for any lack of communication between the bodies responsible 
for public safety… question marks persist about the events leading up to the July 7 
attacks, the case for a full public inquiry will remain strong” (The Guardian, 13 May 
2006).  
 In a report, Martin Bright quoted Mark Oaten, who insisted that the government should 
clearly explain the link between extremism among British Muslims and anger about Iraq 
and that for “the government to deny a link between the war in Iraq and dismay among 
the Muslim community is ridiculous. But to try to cover it up, when senior civil servants 
have recognised the seriousness of the resentment is even worse’ (sic) (The Observer, 28 
August 2005).  
In the next paragraphs of the same editorial, the writer then rejected claims that 
avoiding interfering in the Muslim lands would make the state of affairs any better. 
Further, The Daily Telegraph suggested that the West should bring down the 
dictatorships across the Muslim world that exports terrorists. “This has not yet been 
tried” (The Daily Telegraph, 11 September 2006). Interestingly, both newspapers had 
similar stances on the need to conduct an independent public inquiry despite the fact 
that The Daily Telegraph was evidently pro-government on its Iraq War policy.  
Section II: Narrative of Contextual Debates, Critical Analysis and 
Commentary on Britain’s Foreign Policy in Iraq that Risks its Internal 
Security.  
This section offers detailed discussions of the security topic including the concerns 
raised and discussed, the alternative evidence presented and the way both newspapers 
reflected upon the event. Given the current state of our knowledge it also describes the 
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narrative of what they reflected upon and what they missed out in their discussions and 
debates on security. In addition, this section examines our understanding of the debates 
on this topic. Arguably, the British government established connections with the 
“Islamist” radicals and its refusal to hold an independent inquiry of the 7/7 has 
weakened its position on public safety and its resolve to fight terrorism.  
6.10-British Foreign Policy Debate: Narrative of The Guardian and The Daily 
Telegraph Views on Iraq War and Britain’s Foreign Policy.  
This part provides a detailed narrative of the contextual debate on “Britain’s foreign 
policy” and the way both broadsheets interpret and present it. This debate takes place 
in all forms of journalism in both broadsheets, which offered different perspectives on 
this issue. Obviously The Guardian in its all forms of journalism refused to believe the 
government line of argument that its foreign policy in the Middle East, particularly the 
Iraq War, had any connection with the 7/7 incident and the problem of growing 
radicalisation among young British Muslims. Its series of articles asserted that Britain’s 
Iraq policy was responsible for increasing radicalisation and extremism among young 
British Muslims. Under the broader theme of security, both newspapers discussed and 
debated British foreign policy and the Iraq War and their interconnectivity. Obviously, 
both newspapers took a clear position on these critically important issues. For example, 
The Guardian strongly opposed the Iraq War and Britain’s alliance with America in its 
war on terror. It reminded the nation that the London bombings had a connection with 
British foreign policy and that ordinary British people’s lives were in danger because of 
the Blair government’s unwise foreign policies.  
In contrast, The Daily Telegraph supported the British government stance on “weapons 
of mass destruction”, which later turned out to be misleading and a key factor in the rise 
of radicalisation in Britain. Despite all this, The Daily Telegraph continued to support 
Blair’s stance and published articles presuming that British Muslim grievances are 
wrong and unacceptable and that Iraq was a major threat to British security regardless. 
Hence, it defended its stance and wrote that British foreign policy in Iraq and its 
interfering role in Muslim countries in particular were intended to establish good and 
diminish evil, a popular American political line. Evidently, The Daily Telegraph clearly 
supported and endorsed the government’s view on its Middle East policy including the 
British government stance on the Iraq War. Even before the 7/7 attacks The Guardian 
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had opposed the British government’s decision to go to war with Saddam Hussein on 
the assumption that he possessed “weapons of mass destruction” (see Fahmy and Kim, 
2008; Kumar, 2006).  
In contrast, The Daily Telegraph had supported the British government intervention in 
Iraq on the basis that Saddam Hussein’s “weapons of mass destruction” posed a threat 
to Britain’s security (see Goddart et al., 2008; Kaufmann, 2004). One of the key points of 
“Britain’s foreign policy” debate is that both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph 
retained their prior positions on this issue that they had taken long before the 7/7 
incident. Throughout, The Guardian continued the same line of argument in its editorials 
while most of its contributors and writers pointed out that the Iraq War had indubitable 
connections with radicalisation in Britain. Evidently, one might say that The Guardian 
argument seems to be valid and sound particularly because Britain had never 
experienced any forms of terror threats from British Muslims before it invaded Iraq. 
Even though Britain had left the Kashmir issue unresolved, British-born Muslims of 
Kashmiri origin had apparently never blamed Britain nor attacked it for that 
unreasonable decision.  
In contrast, The Daily Telegraph editorial dismissed the notion that the 7/7 event was a 
reaction to Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq and the Middle East, as the attacks on New 
York occurred before America and Britain invaded Iraq. This is an incomplete narrative 
of Britain’s foreign policy in the Middle East, because evidence shows that the American 
and Western governments have long been offering unconditional support to Israel, 
which has been a cause of growing resentment among some Muslims. Long lists of 
scholarly studies have raised this point that Israeli actions in Gaza are fuelling 
radicalisation among Muslim youth in particular (see Hafez, 2013, p.96; Jangharia, 2010, 
p.283). Of course there is also increasing resentment among Muslims about the West’s 
support for Muslim dictators and Kings in the Middle East (The Guardian, 31 August 
2014).  
Here The Daily Telegraph support for the government line of argument that the London 
bombings had nothing to do with its policy in the Middle East was weak in comparison 
to The Guardian’s point of view and evidence, although in Britain another cause of 
radicalisation among Muslim youth is alienation (The Guardian, 19 September 2014). 
However, it is fair to say that The Daily Telegraph proposal for Western governments to 
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stop supporting Muslim dictators seems an ideal, especially considering the West’s 
model of democracy but it misses two significant points. First, evidently it is a well-
documented fact that the West hsd been a long-standing ally of several dictatorships 
and monarchies that it has planted and supported over the last few decades in the 
Middle East region and other parts of the Muslim world (see Blum, 2000 and 2014).  
For example, prior to the Iraq War Saddam Hussein had been a close ally of the West 
and was also was a recipient of the West’s smart weaponry. As The Guardian wrote in its 
investigative report, “A chemical plant which the US says is a key component in Iraq’s 
chemical warfare arsenal was secretly built by Britain in 1985 behind the backs of the 
Americans, the Guardian can disclose” (The Guardian, 6 March 2003). Moreover, several 
critics point out that, even before the invasion of Iraq, the same Saddam Hussein was 
supported and given weapons by the same people in the West (Howe, 2011; Phythian, 
1996; Smith, 2013).  
Further, it is also evident now that The Daily Telegraph argument was weak particularly 
in the present situation in Syria and Libya where the same Western-sponsored dictators 
had ruined the lives of ordinary people. According to The Daily Telegraph editorial, the 
West has been helping Muslim countries to achieve democracy and America and its 
allies in Afghanistan have helped remove the Taliban regime. But again, one might ask 
who created and supported the Taliban in the first place? To validate the point it is 
important to include an investigative report published long before 7/7 in which Jason 
Burke wrote: “Mujahideen trained and funded by the US are among its deadliest foes” 
(The Guardian published 17 January 1999).  For many critics, 7/7 remains the major 
cause of extremism and terrorism aimed at the British government. As The Observer 
wrote on 28 August 2005: “Leak shows Blair told of Iraq war terror link: Top official 
warned in 2004 of British Muslim anger. Secret document said UK seen as ‘crusader 
state’”.  
Several academics, politicians and activists have also criticised British foreign policy, 
albeit in a peaceful way.  Relevantly, looking at the present situation and also 
considering the future of the Middle East, Clark’s prediction seems genuinely true when 
he assessed the effects of Britain foreign policy: “We ended up backing the Shia brand of 
Islamic fundamentalism against its Sunni equivalent” (The Guardian, 25 August 2006). 
In a more conciliatory tone Clarke suggests that “There is now a strong public appetite 
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for a change of foreign-policy direction, and Labour will need to tap into that if it is to 
recover the authority to govern.” (ibid) 
Several scholarly studies noted that young British Muslims were unhappy with Britain’s 
role in Muslim lands, particularly Afghanistan and Iraq (see Kundnani, 2015; 
McConnachie and Tudge, 2013; Thomas, 2012). Burke wrote a chapter called Iraq and 
London on the London bombings, in which he discusses the context, causes and security 
failings of the 7/7 incident. He suggests that the British public was misinformed on the 
Iraq issue and that both governments have consistently used the “new international 
bogeyman of bin Laden to mask responsibility of their own policies in fermenting unrest 
and eventually violence. The British government, whose foreign policy was deeply 
controversial, was at pains to deny any link between the bombing and the war in Iraq 
despite the conviction of their own secret services” (ibid, p.271-291).  
In brief, the debate on Britain’s foreign policy also showed that ordinary white British 
people were more concerned about Britain’s policy in Iraq and Middle East, as is evident 
in the number of protest marches across European capitals including a historic ‘million 
march’ in London. Those protestors did not accept the official line that Britain’s foreign 
policy in Iraq and Middle East was planned to protect them. Later on, when the 7/7 
incident was presented as an outcome of “Islamic ideology” in sections of the press 
including The Daily Telegraph, the public at large rejected the idea that the 
government’s foreign policy was not linked to the event. Even prior to the London 
bombings, around 30 million people had gathered to take part in anti-war protests in 
600 cities across Europe and Asia, including a historic gathering of 750,000 people in 
London (BBC, 16 February 2003). 
Logically, Amitav Acharya (2004) offers some statistical findings: “Anti-war rallies have 
marked cities around the world: 30,000 people protested in Washington DC on January 
18; at least 750,000 people in London on February 15; one million in Rome; 660,000 in 
Madrid; 500,000 in Berlin; 100,000 in Paris…” (Acharya, 2004, p.96) Evidently, the large 
number of non-Muslims participating in these rallies across Europe reflects the anti-
government sentiments in Europe where people believe that their countries’ foreign 
policies are designed to endorse war and achieve political goals.  
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These protests constitute evidence that Western democratic values reflect elements of 
duplicity in practice and often favour people in power who share Western political 
agendas. Ideally, the foreign policy of any nation should put the human factor first 
before any political and economic interests, but it often works in reverse. Most nations’ 
foreign policies are more reflective of their political objectives than their moral 
obligations. Several critics also view Britain’s foreign policy as damaging and 
contradictory to its democratic values (see Ralph, 2014; Ahmed and Sonn, 2010). 
Notably, Blair and other high-ranking government officials dismissed the argument that 
the Iraq war radicalised the London bombers. Against the government’s denial of Iraq 
connections, a long list of scholars have offered critiques of Britain’s foreign policy 
including Dardis (2006, p.416), Goddard, Robinson and Parry (2008, p.22), and Keegan 
(2004). John Pilger (2003), one of the mainstream critics of British foreign policy, thinks 
that it is contradictory to British values and “unsafe” and “immoral” for the world. For 
example, Pilger says:  
 Its illegal wars; its support for war ‘against terrorism’ that is 
acting as pretext for a new phrase of global intervention and the 
American imperial power; its support for repressive elites and 
state terrorism; its arms exports that help sustain repressive 
governments…the state propaganda - mislabelled ‘spin’ (Pilger, 
2003, p.1).  
It is noted that The Daily Telegraph continues to associate Islam and a few young British 
Muslim radicals of a South Asian background with the security problem in all its types of 
journalism. However, several critics and scholars do not agree with its approach. For 
example, Laqueur (1999) finds that, in the beginning, “Kashmiri Muslims were rather 
secular in outlook”, which is perhaps why “Gandhi once called Kashmir an island of 
secularism on the Indian subcontinent” (Laqueur, 1999, p. 151).  
Looking at the involvement of British Muslims in violent and appalling acts such as the 
London bombings, it is surprising that most people link them with Iraq and the fact that 
they were angry at Muslim suffering; meanwhile, Kashmir has experienced oppression 
and atrocities for more than half a century, the root causes of which are linked to the 
British Raj. The debate on foreign policy particularly in The Daily Telegraph reflects the 
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viewpoint of the government that rejects “Islamist” grievances against the West. 
Further, its editorials are evidence that it largely supported the government view that 
Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq had no connection with the London bombings and that 
the driving forces behind 7/7 remain “Islamic ideology”.  
In contrast, The Guardian stressed that Britain’s democratic values are the “best defence 
against terrorism” and maintained its stance that foreign policy had radicalised the 
London bombers. Commentators and writers on both newspapers acknowledged the 
fact that Britain’s foreign policy has elements of what George Orwell called ‘Double 
Speak’. Some might say that duplicity is hardly unusual, common in all countries, and 
often reflective of different shades of opinion. In pluralistic contemporary societies, as 
in other societies, there are many different shades of opinions, including in Muslim 
societies. People in all societies hold different opinions; therefore, saying one thing and 
doing another is quite common. Sometimes, it simply means “I changed my mind” and is 
often not seen as bad practice. However, this type of hypocrisy can only really exist in a 
society where one view prevails.   
The Guardian also strongly opposed the Iraq War and Britain’s alliance with America in 
its war on terror. It reminded the nation that the London bombings had a connection 
with British foreign policy and that ordinary British people’s lives were in danger 
because of the Blair government’s unwise foreign policies. In contrast, The Daily 
Telegraph supported the British government stance on weapons of mass destruction, 
which later turned out to be misleading and a key factor in the rise of radicalisation in 
Britain. In the context of this debate, it is important to include The Guardian writer 
Milne’s strong viewpoint based on evidence that shows that Britain had supplied 
weapons and diplomatic support to Saddam Hussein against the Kurds and to al-Qaeda 
and the Taliban in Libya and Afghanistan (see Hipler, 2016; Kelly, 2013).  Moreover, 
Milne’s argument is strengthened by the fact that the Iraq war was launched on the 
basis of an incorrect assumption that Iraq had biological and chemical weapons that it 
intended to use against the West.  
Both newspapers quoted and presented politicians, government officials, religious 
leaders and other dignitaries who either criticised or defended the government stance 
on Iraq and its view that the 7/7 bombings had nothing to do with it. Further 
radicalisation has roots in perpetrated ideology which Blair called “Evil Ideology”. Now, 
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the post-Iraq War situation affirms two fundamental setbacks: the economic instability 
across the Middle East region and the spread of terrorism all over the Middle East as 
well as in France and other European countries. There is no doubt that The Guardian’s 
warnings on the long-term consequences of Britain’s damaging foreign policy in the 
Middle East were accurate predictions. Of course, no one can deny that when Bush and 
Blair invaded Iraq on the false assumption of “weapons of mass destruction”, the 
present-day militant groups such as al-Shabaab and Isis had not been born, and Libya, 
Syria, Turkey and Pakistan were not prime targets of terrorism.  
It is noted that The Guardian built upon its argument in a series of articles in by British 
and American experts, scholars, politicians, scientists, diplomats and journalists who 
were all closely involved with the Middle East. This list includes Scott Ritter, Rowan 
Williams, Noam Chomsky, Ron Paul and Tony Benn (see The Guardian, 31 October 2004; 
22 June 2005).  On might say that when sections of the press and a handful of top 
politicians were selling their false notions of a chemical and biological weaponry threat 
to Britain and the West, their arch enemies the Russians and the Notrh Koreans already 
possessed all those deadly weapons that have the potential to cause severe damage in 
Europe and beyond. Indeed, the economic losses and, in particular, the human suffering 
of those who became permanently disabled and homeless, are other disastrous effects 
of the Blair government’s policy that was criticised by its Labour MPs such as Robin 
Cook and David Kidney (The Guardian, 17 March 2003; 18 April 2005).  
A notable feature of The Guardian is its a firm stance on Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq 
and the middle East. This did not change with the passage of time but in fact 
strengthened as different events unfolded such as 7/7 and the present Syrian crisis. Of 
course, it allowed alternative opinions such as those of Douglas Murray, David 
Aaronovitch, Michael Ignatieff and several other politicians, writers and scholars (See 
The Guardian, 31 October 2006 and 27 January 2007).  Throughout this research, The 
Guardian’s key concern was “humanity”, and its concern and criticism turned out to be 
accurate because the new Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn admitted that “He will 
apologise for ‘deception’ in run-up to 2003 invasion and to Iraqi people for suffering” 
(The Guardian, 21 August 2015). Before and after the Iraq War The Guardian continued 
to present evidence and remind its readers that their leader had misused their votes 
and that the war was not about a threat but about political and economic hegemony 
(The Guardian, 20 March 2014; 16 June 2014; 21 August 2015).  
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Mainly, the two newspapers asked whether Britain’s government foreign policy in Iraq 
was responsible for the rise in radicalisation among young British-born Muslims or was 
it an al-Qaeda ideology. This point remained the central focus of both newspapers’ 
reporting on 7/7 throughout the period of study (8 July 2005-7 July 2007). These 
newspapers have not changed their contrasting stances on British foreign policy in Iraq 
and the Middle East. Long before the London bombings and the Iraq War, the British 
people, the government and the media were divided over whether Britain should take 
part in the Iraq War, which was fought on the false assumption that Iraq had “weapons 
of mass destruction” and that these weapons were dangerous and a threat to the West.   
Foreign policy was a key point in both newspapers reporting of 7/7 and it had engaged 
them in a big debate even before 7/7 when they had adopted utterly different positions: 
for and against participating un the Iraq War.  The overall descriptive reporting of 
terrorists and radicals included the views of different writers, commentators, editors, 
journalists and other contributors to The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph. Initial 
reporting suggested that the bombers ‘hated the British way of life’ because of their 
anti-Western ideology which led them to attack their country of birth. The notion of 
ideology dominated the descriptive coverage of the bombers in both newspapers. It 
suggested that the bombers believed that they had to kill non-Muslims (Kafirs) and 
Muslims who disagreed with their version of Islam. On the other hand, both newspapers 
reported that the terrorists had also denounced the fine values of their religion and 
were even involved in the killing of their fellow Muslims. Bearing in mind Islamic 
teachings, this is true and a fair comment. The notion of religious “ideology” was the 
main tag attached to the bombers’ portrayals in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph 
reporting.  
6.11-Radicalisation: A Challenge that Risks Britain’s Internal Security.  
The debate on radicalisation mainly focused up religion as a prime cause of the growing 
radicalisation in British society. Of course, these newspapers also covered several other 
causes of radicalisation, such as the British government’s contacts with radical groups 
and its support of a few radical organisations in the past. These newspapers also 
discussed how London was a “safe haven” for the radicals during Afghanistan’s war with 
Russia. Apart from these causes of radicalisation, both newspapers also pointed out the 
possible measures to overcome this problem. The debate took place from different 
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political positions and arguments. For example, Melanie Phillips believed that after the 
Rushdie affair “Islam in Britain” manifestly became violent (The Guardian, 28 May 
2006). In contrast, Karen Armstrong dismissed the notion that religion is a driving force 
behind radicalisation (see The Guardian, 8 July 2006 and 18 September, 2006). Other 
writers who also dismissed the concept that religion produces radicalisation include 
Giles Fraser and Ann Aly (The Guardian, 14 January 2015 and 27 June 2015).     
(i)-The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph Narratives of “Londonistan”: 
The term “Londonistan” refers to networks of “Islamist” radicals in London that 
developed during the Cold War period in the 1980s. It was first coined by the French 
Intelligence Agencies, which allegedly labelled London a hub of terrorist activities 
(Foley, 2013, p.287; Phillips, 2006, p.19). During the 1980s the Cold War against 
Communist Russia reached its peak when Taliban fighters received massive financial 
support and weaponry from America, Britain and Saudi Arabia.  
Meanwhile, the nexus of secret agencies and radical Muslim leaders was successful in 
recruiting illiterate, naive, angry individuals mainly from Pakistan and other Muslim 
countries including wealthy Arabia, where the war was sold as a “holy” cause; hence, an 
army of young people arrived in Afghanistan and Pakistan to take part in the so-called 
“jihad”. At that time, Britain and the rest of Europe tolerated these radicals, such as 
asylum seekers, in their various guises, and wounded Afghan mujhadeens became 
frequent visitors to European capitals, including London, for medical treatment and 
fund-raising missions. Arguably, in the word “Londonistan” the connotation “istan” 
reflects Pakistan and Afghanistan connections who, according to The Daily Telegraph 
articles, were exporters of radicalisation and terrorism to Britain. Unlike The Guardian it 
did not publish editorials, comment pieces and investigative reports to find out how 
London had become “Londonistan” in an advanced country whose security system is 
one of the best in the world. Surely, the authorities knew that radical factions visited 
London because at that time, as discussed earlier, the Afghan Taliban was fighting the 
West’s war with Russia.  
The Guardian continued to disclose American ambitions of getting Britain to be tougher 
on its Muslim population: “Elements of the American media were quick to point the 
finger at Britain’s long-standing ‘compact’ with Islamic radicals. The New York Times 
suggested that Britain was paying the price for our ultra-liberal stance on political 
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refugees from the Islamic world”. In contrast to The Guardian, The Daily Telegraph 
appeared rather reluctant to reject the American and French allegations and their use of 
the term “Londonistan”. It published several articles on this issue. For example, Philip 
Johnston wrote in The Daily Telegraph that, “For many years before September 11, 
2001, Britain’s capital was known derisively throughout the world as 
Londonistan…extremist groups that had set down roots, publishing tracts and 
newsletters and providing financial and propaganda support to overseas activists such 
as Hamas” (see The Daily Telegraph, 13 October 2001; 17 January 2012).  
Basically, The Daily Telegraph established London’s links with all major terrorist events 
while academic studies and The Guardian’s reporting highlighted that some of these 
claims were fictitious. Notably, The Guardian’s reporting takes a different perspective 
which is largely neutral and investigative. It raises important points such as the 
Americans’ use of the notion of “Londonistan” to further tighten their border controls 
and crack down on British Muslims’ easy entry into America. In The Guardian’s opinion 
this sort of coverage suggested that America was making a case for applying sanctions 
on British citizens travelling to America, as noted above. It writes: “…the reality that 
Islamic militant groups in Britain ... represent a growing threat to the United States that 
will continue…British capital as an outpost of the Muslim diaspora, that London is now 
commonly referred to as “Londonistan””. 
In reality, none of the 9/11 perpetrators had had proven links with London and no 
British Muslims were found guilty of attacks in France but newspapers establish such 
links to spread fear of Islam and Muslims. In particular, The Daily Telegraph published 
some controversial studies and surveys that suggested that a large population of British 
Muslims want Sharia and that they are sympathetic to the 7/7 bombers  (see The Daily 
Telegraph, 23 July 2005; 19 February 2006; 5 June 2007). Such reporting linking a 
majority of the British Muslims with radicalisation and Sharia extremism in turn 
developed a view that Britain is a soft haven for radicals. At that point the authorities 
started spying on Muslim students across British universities. The Daily Telegraph was 
of course reflecting upon an event and the people responsible for it but the question 
remained: Why did British security institutions tolerate and allow hate preachers and 
radicals to poison young British Muslims’ minds?  
234 
 
This attitude has remained a prominent feature of The Daily Telegraph’s reporting since 
then. For example, it published a story, “University campuses are ‘hotbeds of Islamic 
extremism’: Islamic fundamentalism is being allowed to flourish at universities, 
endangering national security, MPs and peers say” (The Daily Telegraph, 27 April 2011). 
Again, The Daily Telegraph’s references above contain serious errors and lack validity. 
The figures presented in the Glees study attracted a storm of criticism in British 
academia. For example, the vice chancellor of Essex University, Alasdair Smith, called it 
a “Ragbag” on January 26 2006, while the Institute of Race Relations published a report 
headed “Document on student extremism seriously flawed” (10 April 2008), 
discrediting the information. Other scholars who criticised the Glees report include 
Major and Moran (2009).  The figures were mentioned in Glees’ report “When Students 
Turn to Terror: Terrorist and Extremist Activity on British Campuses” which he wrote 
with his student Chris Pope in 2005.  
In the words of Hewitt, “The 1990s and even earlier were significant for another reason: 
the evolution of London and the UK into a fabled safe haven for international terrorism” 
(Hewitt, 2008, p.62). Hewitt notes that French Intelligence described this influx of 
troublesome people as “Londonistan” (ibid). In this regard, Hewitt explicitly links this 
infiltration with the British government’s “irresponsible policy” of allowing so-called 
“Islamic” extremist “networks to flourish in Britain”; more precisely, he describes it as 
“payback time” for ill-planning (ibid, p.63). Notably, during the same period radicals 
such as Abu-Hamza, Abu-Qatada Muhammad al-Massari and Omar Bakri Muhammad 
entered Britain and radical organisations such as al-Muhajiroun were founded (ibid,  
p.62). It seems that the term “Londonistan” was used to suggest that Britain is falling 
into the hands of Islamist radicals and that the government should review its policy on 
British radicals.    
(ii)-Britain’s Security Institutions and Islamist Radical Organisation Connections: Reasons and 
Measures to overcome Radicalisation.  
Both broadsheets published several stories that mentioned that the British foreign 
office had accommodated and sponsored radicals and their organisations such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Many scholars and journalists argued that Britain’s security 
organisations could have prevented the London bombings. In view of the fact that the 
security organisations knew of al-Qaeda’s presence inside Britain, the failure raises 
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concerns and generates criticism. More importantly it gives an indication of whether al-
Qaeda radicals and law enforcement organisations have a working relationship. In the 
context of security arrangements and the role of law enforcement agencies, both The 
Guardian and The Daily Telegraph published a series of articles that discussed the 
relationship between radical organisations and individuals in law enforcement 
departments. On this matter, both newspapers had serious concerns; they consulted 
several leading academics in the field of terrorism and security and suggested that those 
security organisations should take responsibility for the incident. Like The Guardian’s 
approach, The Daily Telegraph adopted a somewhat similar attitude that is visible in 
several articles (see The Daily Telegraph, 12 May 2006). 
Arguably, one of the causes of growing radicalisation in Europe is the fact that, on the 
one hand, the West is facing and fighting the dilemma of radicalisation. On the other 
hand, it is also manifest that the West has created and supported radical factions within 
the Muslim world mainly to attain its political goals and safeguard its economic 
interests. Take, for example, the Taliban, which fought the West’s war on communism: 
soon after the war had finished they became opponents. Both newspapers, particularly 
The Guardian’s writers and contributors, discussed the controversial role of the West 
which to them is a significant reason for increasing radicalisation. A noted feature of the 
debate in these broadsheets on the growing radicalisation was the double standards of 
government authorities and the press itself to an extent in presenting radicals and 
extremists with Muslim backgrounds and those who were of other religious groups. 
Here, it seems relevant to point out that, as with many other radical groups and 
organisations, the over-citing of al-Qaeda suggests that it is a scapegoat that is more of a 
fantasy than a reality.  
For time to time, this rhetoric is used as a fear-mongering machine to obtain political 
control. However, to an extent both broadsheets also highlighted British government 
relationships with radical groups within Muslim countries, such as the Taliban. On the 
one hand, it had created and supported the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and its Foreign Office 
had close ties with radicals. It also wages war on both the Taliban and al-Qaeda groups. 
It should be acknowledged that both parties pursued their own interests and supported 
each other; for example, the Taliban had received British and US military and financial 
support to fight the common enemy of Britain and America, communist Russia. This is 
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still the case today as friends have become rivals in the changing global political, 
economic and social landscape in which various countries have restructured their 
foreign policies. After years of conflict, the Taliban and America are now engaging in 
dialogue in Qatar, while Iran has reviewed its foreign policy and is reopening the British 
embassy in Tehran after nearly twenty years (see The Guardian, 20 August 2015).  
In the long battle against terrorism, the treatment of terrorists of different and the same 
religions is a recurring theme that shows, on the one hand, the government’s apparent 
willingness to talk with terrorists to enhance peace and public safety. On the other hand, 
the same governments intervene and support terrorists to gain their political and 
economic objectives. In recent times, Libya, Iraq and Syria are the best examples of 
double standards of Western and Middle East Muslim governments that support 
terrorist organisations (see Mahan and Griest, 2013; L. Nacos, 2015).  Evidently, the 
British government is also providing financial and military aid to radical groups that it 
thinks might safeguard its political and economic interests in the Middle East (see 
Curtis, 2010; 2012; Pilger, 2003; 2016).  
This casts doubt on the British government’s resolve to counter terrorism both at home 
and abroad. In The Guardian opinion piece, Nick Cohen presented evidence of high-
ranking British government officials’ contacts with radicals in Egypt and their 
willingness and determination to push the government to engage with “The radical 
Islamists in the Muslim Brotherhood. Its motto is: ‘Allah is our objective. The Prophet is 
our leader. The Koran is our constitution. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is 
our highest hope’”. (The Guardian, 24 June 2007) Nevertheless, a growing body of 
scholarship is challenging this delicate notion that most terrorist, violent and 
criminally-minded individuals establish links with their religions to justify their actions 
(Buzan 2006; Esposito, 2007; Pratt, 2010). Those who challenge this disproportionate 
attitude strongly oppose ‘Terrorist” conduct by all means but at the same time point out 
that reserving one specific word for one religion does not help.   
In the wake of 9/11 and 7/7 some scholars pointed out that radicalisation in its present 
form is increasingly presented as a religious factor. It is this link that brings Islam into 
the spotlight even though its radical views and actions contradict its beliefs. Mark 
Juergensmeyer (2003) assumes that the use of the typical notion “in the name of God” 
makes it an “Islamic terrorism” (Juergensmeyer, 2003, p.185). But then, one might also 
237 
 
say that one God is the same in all major religions including Judaism and Christianity. 
The question that arises here is why “Islamic terrorism” is exclusively used to describe 
the acts of that tiny fraction of Muslim terrorists while there are followers of other 
faiths who are also involved in terrorism. Parallel to “Islamic” radical groups, Christian 
radicals such as The Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda and Christian Anti-Balaka Militia 
in Rwanda are also a few examples of the use of sacred religious texts as an excuse for 
violence by misguided individuals. In this regard, in the last few decades the practising 
of the old phenomenon of “Suicide terrorism” has been triggered possibly because of 
increasing media attention (Géré, 2007, p.363; Pape, 2003, p.345). 
It is relevant to point out that, as with many other radical groups and organisations, the 
over-citing of al-Qaeda suggests that it is a scapegoat that is more of a fantasy than a 
reality. For time to time, this rhetoric is used as a fear-mongering machine to obtain 
political control. One of The Guardian foreign correspondents Jason Burke, who is an 
expert on Al-Qaeda and has contributed a series of analysis articles on al-Qaeda and 
radicalisation, has noted that, in the beginning, bin Laden was not hostile to America, 
nor was he anti-Western. In fact, his mission was to topple “corrupt and hypocritical 
regimes in the Muslim world. All around him the volunteers…saw their primary 
objective as…struggle against their own governments” (Buke, 2007, pp.75-85).  
Several other critics and scholars embrace a similar logic to that of Burke, believing that 
although al-Qaeda remains a threat to Europe, it has diverse mindsets, policies and 
priorities. Notably, these are two different phenomena, particularly in the context of 
contemporary Britain. Kundnani (2015) notes that the term “radicalisation” became 
popular in the post-9/11 period while “extremists” often refers to those who disagree 
with political ideas; for instance  extremism in the British context means “opposition 
to British values” (Kundnani, 2015, p.28). One of the reasons for the increasing 
radicalisation is the fact that many Muslims are unhappy with the interference by 
Western governments in their political issues and the waging of wars on Muslim 
countries and unconditional support of Israel.  
The interference in Muslim lands is seen as part of the political process that is often 
presented in the Western press as the West’s aim to restore or bring democracy. 
However, the other side of the picture shows that it is the West that overthrew 
democratically elected governments in many Muslim countries such as Iran, Lebanon 
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and Egypt (The Guardian, 19 August 2013).  Brian Brivati also thinks that “The 
operation of often western-backed elites has turned many in the Islamic world towards 
forms of fundamentalism, and a hard core towards theocratic fascism. Democratising 
those states must form an essential part of the left-of-centre political project for the 
region” (The Guardian, 12 July 2005).  
The debate on radicalisation within both broadsheets evidently reflected their own 
political orientations, which are secular beliefs. Perhaps because of this belief, these 
newspapers had failed to disconnect religion from radicalisation which in its present 
form is presented as “Islamic”. To be fair, The Guardian contributors also discussed and 
debated radicalisation within other religions but again it appears to think that 
secularism is better and that radicalisation is a religious problem. Furthermore, The 
Guardian also thinks that secularism is a solution to radicalisation and extremism in 
Europe although its liberal writers such as Karen Armstrong often argued that religious 
extremism and radicalisation is a myth (The Guardian, 25 September 2014; 16 June 
2015; 29 June 2015).  
Similarly, The Daily Telegraph also largely failed to recognise within all its forms of 
journalism that many American school shooters and several other extremists and killers 
in Europe are evidently secular in their beliefs whilst many were also religious-minded 
individuals. On other hand, obviously, The Daily Telegraph’s reaction to the security 
institutions’ failure over the 7/7 bombing was exaggerated and also reflective of double 
standards because it did not criticise the same institutions with the same passion when 
British secret agencies put forward a case for the Iraq War on incorrect assumptions of 
“weapons of mass destruction”.   
6.12- The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph Views on an Effective Security 
Operating System: A Way Forward.  
Both newspapers have offered, as we have seen, several articles in which these 
broadsheets and their commentators, writers and government and public figures 
describe the possible ways of making the security system more effective, as follows:  
(i) Better Policing and Intelligence Sharing:  
In the wake of the 7/7 and 21/7 incidents, the security forces have detected more terror 
plots which have increased the radicalisation and terrorism threat. This in turn allows 
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security institutions, particularly police forces, to escalate their operations beyond the 
normal situation with the aim of securing public safety. Whilst operating in tense 
situations, the police have made a few disastrous mistakes, such as the shooting of an 
innocent Brazilian (22 July 2005) and the Forest Gate raid (2 June 2006) in which police 
ended up shooting the wrong Muslim suspect. These incidents raise further questions 
about the operations of British security institutions, which were already facing criticism 
for their failure to prevent the 7/7 bombings.  
In the wake of 7/7 both broadsheets were very vocal in their criticism of the security 
institutions, which they viewed as a failure. Both pointed out that British foreign office 
contact with some radical organisations is an ill-advised practice that may make things 
worse. On this matter, evidently, The Guardian went a bit further to disclose double 
standards in government policy to deal with radicalisation because it mentioned that, 
on the one hand, Britain was giving aid to radicals to gain its political objectives whilst 
at the same time it declared radical groups as its enemy. Later, it became apparent in 
Paris and in other attacks that it was right to raise concerns over the government 
contacts with hardliners in Iraq since they have now turned against the West.     
(ii) Community Bonding. 
Soon after the London bombings The Guardian took the initiative to encourage the 
building of contacts with the British Muslim community. It published a series of 
comment and debate pieces that provided a space to various commentators and writers 
highlighting the need to make contact with British Muslims. According to The Guardian, 
a Foreign Office document “Building Bridges” reveals that the government does not see 
the Muslim community as a threat (see The Guardian, 28 August 2005). The Foreign 
Office document “Building Bridges with Mainstream Islam” (2003) begins with the lines: 
“We do not see the Muslim community as a threat. Muslims have always made, and 
continue to make, a valuable contribution to society”. In contrast, a Home Office 
document ‘Young Muslims and Extremism’ (2004) reveals the British government’s 
intention to promote a working relationship with the British Muslim community. John 
Gieve ties up the draft of this document on 6 April 2004 that discloses the British 
government’s aim to build an alliance with Moderate Muslims to tackle domestic 
extremism. It also recognises that “a sense of isolation and disaffection within parts of 
the Muslim community is leading to acts of terrorism” (Home Office, 2004). The draft 
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document acknowledges the contributions of British Muslims to British society and also 
considers them an ally and not a threat.   
In its editorial in the wake of the De Menezes killing at the hands of British police, The 
Guardian described this event as not “fatal” but said that this killing of an innocent man 
had increased the risks of damaging community confidence. It wrote:“The danger is that 
the Muslim community, still reeling from Iraq, could be further alienated if tactics 
deployed are felt to be arbitrary or disproportionate. This would pose security risks: 
intelligence must come from within that community… to build networks of contacts” 
(The Guardian, 6 July 2006). Further, The Guardian endorsed David Omand’s proposal 
that security institutions should take more staff from ethnic minorities and stressed 
that “Direct contact with minority communities is needed.” (ibid) Overall, The Guardian 
columnists and commentators were more inclined to support the idea of stronger 
community bonding to combat radicalisation.  
(iii)- Backlash: Muslim Sentiment.  
The narrative of the ‘British Muslims’ cause’ was the significant feature of The Guardian 
reporting on the security theme. The reporting occurred in all forms of journalism that 
discussed and debated the reaction to the London bombings and its impact on British 
Muslims. The key difference between The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph reporting 
on the anti-Muslim backlash appeared in their attitude and response to government 
proposals for new anti-terror laws and human rights issues, resulting in the police 
receiving more powers for stop and search and holding suspects without trial. On this 
topic The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph published five reports that reflect the 
viewpoint of British Muslim organisations, which see Blair’s anti-terrorism laws as 
undemocratic and unjust. The main reason is that Blair’s proposal to extend police 
powers to hold a suspect for 90 days without charge appeared unjust, particularly when 
in the past Britain had perpetrated a miscarriage of justice when it imprisoned some 
Irishmen in the Birmingham pub bombings case.  
For these reasons some British Muslim organisations raised their concerns and fears 
that the new laws may demonise the whole Muslim community because many terror 
suspects may eventually be found not guilty. However, it is fair to say that the cases of 
miscarriages of justice are not unique to Britain but in fact occur in other Muslim and 
non-Muslim countries such as India and Iran where ethnic minorities such as Christians 
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and Muslims have been victims of the justice system. Similarly, The Guardian focused on 
government plans to modify its terrorism policy, in contrast to The Daily Telegraph, 
which supported the government view. Similarly, The Guardian’s reporting, including its 
editorials, showed concern over the British security institutions’ complicity in inhuman 
treatment and torture of suspects. Sadly, torture practices are fairly common in almost 
all countries, albeit to varying degrees.   
In five editorials The Guardian reminded the government that although the British 
nation had a collective demand to combat terrorism, we must not lose our values, which 
are human rights, liberty and equality. In fact, it raised concerns of a possible backlash 
resulting from the 7/7 atrocities. It continued to remind people in power that fighting 
terrorism must not single out the British Muslim community; instead, they should be 
contacted, listened to and trusted. An interesting point raised in the debate on British 
Muslims’ feelings was the fact that The Guardian sent its investigative reporter, a 
Muslim woman, to the Beeston area of Leeds where the bombers came from to find out 
how and why young Muslims feel alienated and angry, what can be done to bring back 
these youngsters into mainstream social life and, most importantly, how the media has 
played its part in reporting Beeston (see The Guardian, 24 July 2005; 18 June 2006).  
This sort of coverage resembles campaigning journalism, which is what a quality press 
is supposed to do. Here, The Guardian writer raised a key issue of hostile and negative 
media and the way they has damaged the Beeston community. In these comments and 
editorials on this particular issue of “Muslim feelings”, The Guardian affirmed that it 
practises and considers its core values of humanism and liberty as vital important. 
Although it has clashed several times with some of the views of British Muslims, such as 
on the veil, because of its secular nature, it has maintained its position that wearing the 
veil is basically a woman’s choice and not an enforced action. Here it also drew a line 
between radicals and ordinary Muslims and their faith. On Friday, a special day for 
Muslims, The Guardian (1 November 2006) published two episodes of a lengthy feature 
that explained the life of a British Muslim: “Criticised for their beliefs, clothing and 
attitudes; accused of not being British enough; reviled as the enemy within - not a day 
passes without Muslims being attacked in the media. So how does it feel to be Muslim in 
Britain today?” (The Guardian, 1 November 2006). Thus, at the same time within its 
comment pieces, The Guardian continued to inform the public on what Islam is about 
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and how the media have caused panic about Islam and demonised its followers, British 
Muslims, in the wake of 7/7 (see The Guardian, 10 June 2007). In brief, to be fair, The 
Guardian’s attitude to British Muslims was visibly sympathetic and it has maintained 
that they are victims of the actions of a few “lone-wolf terrorists” which every society 
experiences in some ways.  
Interestingly, the key theme that ran in an editorial and six news reports on the 
backlash in The Daily Telegraph showed the presence of two core arguments: 7/7 is a 
“Muslim problem” and “Muslims should do more”. In other words, British Muslims must 
accept that those bombers were from their community and it is their responsibility to 
resolve this problem, which also reflects the wider government stance. Reversing this 
argument, one might ask all Christians to accept responsibility for the actions of Blair 
and Bush which have ruined an entire nation. Thus, contemplating the terrible actions 
of Hitler, Stalin and Pol Pot, should we blame their faith and community groups?  
In other words, The Daily Telegraph suggested that British Muslims should spy on their 
fellow Muslims, as the paper concluded: “We agree with Sir Alan: we must all be 
snitches now” (The Daily Telegraph, 8 July 2007). Here “We” is emphasised to include 
The Daily Telegraph and all those who have the same ideology and approach to this 
issue. The question here is whether it is worth encouraging everyone to spy on their 
fellow citizens. And if it is, what will be the consequences? Eventually, it may damage 
the process of integration and in turn promote an individual-based society with no 
sense of community. This point is made not to discredit government efforts to tackle the 
terrorism threat and protect the general public, including ordinary Muslims, but to 
object to the way in which this threat is being handled; for instance, the government’s 
Prevent and Contest strategies for counter-terrorism have raised concerns in terms of 
partiality.  
Government officials and politicians repeatedly emphasised that it is the responsibility 
of British Muslims to crack down on extremism. For example, Madeleine Bunting, 
writing in The Guardian on 10 October 2005, quotes Paul Goggins, the then minister for 
Faith and Community Cohesion, stating: “It is Muslims’ responsibility to deal with 
extremism. The government will help, but basically it’s down to Muslims to sort 
themselves out. One can hear the faux-innocent pleading of ‘It’s nothing to do with us, 
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guv’”. However, Bunting  wrote: “If that wasn’t a tall enough order in a country whose 
foreign policy incenses the Muslim community, Goggins says he’d like Muslims to speak 
with a more ‘united voice’: the internecine factionalism of minority community politics 
is confusing. The irony of course is that when Muslims do speak with one voice - on 
British foreign policy - Goggins and his government colleagues refuse to listen.” (ibid)  
Evidently, following the 7/7 attacks British Muslims as well as those resembling 
Muslims experienced some forms of racism that made their lives unpleasant at that 
particular time. Racial attacks on some bearded Sikhs and the shooting of a Brazilian 
electrician on suspicion of being a Muslim suicide bomber reflect the confusion and 
fears among the British public and law enforcement agencies just as much as the killing 
and bombing of innocent people in London. Although the response of Londoners to 
terrorism was visibly different from those of New Yorkers and Madrilenians, spying on 
Muslim students in the universities, stop and search, and a bad press are noticeable 
illustrations of the security forces’ response.  
On the whole, the impact of the 7/7 incident resulted in a rise in racial tensions, 
especially in inner-city communities in Leeds, Dewsbury and Bradford. The anger was 
unleashed on British Muslims because they had become a reason to limit public 
freedoms and increase stop-and-search procedures at airports and other public places. 
Had there been another bombing, greater emphasis would surely have been placed on 
violence to prevent another and to reassure the public. Prior to the London bombings, 
these practices were unpopular but the 7/7 incident indicated a risk to national 
security.   
There was some reporting of hate crimes and anti-social behaviour at local levels in the 
national press, including The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph. These incidents were 
also monitored and recorded at local and national levels by different institutions and 
organisations including leading British universities. Given the current state of our 
knowledge and unfolding of several political events it is evident that part of the 
reporting was a factual analysis; i.e. a well-knitted community could help defuse 
radicalisation and improve security conditions in the wake of the 7/7 bombings. More 
than a decade has passed since these newspapers suggested that the idea of community 
bonding could unite Britain, and we have seen the proof of it in the recent European 
referendum that has divided Britain. Reflecting upon the reasons for and further 
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consequences of radicalisation in the future, The Guardian’s argument to appoint 
English-speaking imams in British mosques was surely an intelligent piece of advice 
that has proved in later years that these British-born imams can help boost contacts 
with young British Muslims. Moreover, these newspapers’ reflection on British Muslims’ 
community problems such as the non-existence of a widely recognised leadership that 
can represent and negotiate on behalf of British Muslims was a mirror of a just 
complaint. 
At the time of fury, The Guardian avoided sensitive and damaging headlines and focused 
upon genuine problems of the British Muslim community such as a bad press and 
concern over growing disrespect for the Muslim faith for which it criticised its 
competitor newspapers including The Daily Telegraph. This was campaigning 
journalism aimed at a healing process in the wake of the bombings that detached 
Muslims from mainstream Britain to a great extent. In contrast, The Daily Telegraph did 
not reflect upon British Muslims’ problem so much but presented a closed view of 
Muslim sentiments.  
What The Daily Telegraph missed was the fact that Britain has to pay the price for 
joining America in its war on terror in the years to come. We see now that the war on 
terror thesis has critically failed and that the economic and political losses are far more 
then what Britain might have gained from her unconditional support for the Americans. 
Now, The Guardian’s analysis of the American policies and, in particular, its war on 
terror has become a true reflection of the reality that the war on terror has failed to 
address the causes and done more harm than any benefits it might have accrued. 
Among the long list of scholars who have studied the phenomena of the war on terror 
and radicalisation,(Abrahams (2006), Ayoob (2013), Daalder (2016) and Reese and 
Lewis (2009) affirm the view of The Guardian that the American policies have made our 
world more insecure. 
On the whole, The Guardian was evidently right to argue that the 7/7 event was mainly 
a reaction to British foreign policy in Iraq and the Middle East in many ways, such as the 
bombers’ conviction in their video messages that they were unhappy over the sufferings 
of Iraq at the hands of a democratically elected British government. Although The 
Guardian did not reject the notion of “Islamist” radicalisation in Britain, it argued that it 
is linked with the terrain of events in the Middle East where the British government is 
interfering to secure its political and economic interests, which was a fair reflection of 
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the event. Moreover, radicalisation did not develop overnight; British Muslims’ bad 
experiences such as poverty, inequality in jobs and alienation were also important 
factors.  
The Daily Telegraph did provide a factual narrative of events but overall its argument 
that radicalisation is purely a religious phenomenon in the aftermath of 7/7 was 
inaccurate and showed its conservative approach. Hence, this demonstrates that The 
Daily Telegraph is unbalanced and biased; it may be right from its own point of view but 
it ignored other factors in the discussions on security.  In sum, within all these debates 
and discussions on Britain’s foreign policy and internal security, a hypothesis developed 
that supports Stuart Hall’s “West and the Rest” discourse which has already been 
discussed earlier in this thesis. The powerful and technologically advanced West is less 
concerned about its Muslim population but is more worried about their faith (Islam) 
which it sees as a challenge and a driving force behind radicalisation which has posed a 
security challenge.  
6.13-Conclusion:  
The overall response to the 7/7 incident in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph 
reflects a range of mixed feelings, particularly on Britain’s foreign policy in the Middle 
East. In relation to security, there are two opposing views on Britain’s foreign policy. 
They are that the British government’s point of view is that the Iraq War had nothing to 
do with the 7/7 event, while academic figures on the left argue that the British 
government has risked public safety by intervening in the Middle East. The use of the 
term “Londonistan” in the context of security has further strengthened the perception 
that Muslims are a potential security threat that will endure for generations. In addition, 
the press reporting and mentioning of national and international extremist 
organisations such as al-Qaeda cells, al-Muhajirin, Hizbut-Tahrir, al-Shabaab and ISIS 
suggests that the threat is moving around and is long-lasting. In turn, the net coverage 
raises concerns about Muslims’ loyalty and urges the government to take necessary 
actions to ensure public safety.  
Equally, both broadsheets raised concerns about new terror laws, surveillance, 
detentions without charge, increasing use of stop and search and mishandling of 
suspects. In particular, The Guardian was prominent in pointing out that such cases of 
mishandling could damage Britain’s human rights commitments. It is evident that the 
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securitising of Britain may also affect its liberal democratic values. However, it is 
understood that the threat of bombing necessitates the diminution of some civil rights 
in the name of security.  That is because in the age of information both sides have equal 
excess to technical tools such as contact modes, emails and messages. Therefore 
security institutions may have to access information channels through radical websites 
and mobiles or scan emails.  
In brief, reflecting upon the comments of the two newspapers that explained their 
perspective on the 7/7 event, it is apparent that these newspapers showed a reasonably 
good understanding of the security situation and offered some worthwhile ideas such as 
“community bonding”; on the whole, however, these newspapers’ reporting also 
reflected elements of exaggeration and distortion of the facts and narratives on security. 
This shows that the press does not produce and transform events alone; in fact, to an 
extent, it facilitates the particular idea of an event or story. Thus it works with other key 
players such as politicians, police, public and private bodies, thus indicating the 
presence of Stanley Cohen’s idea of “folk devils and moral panics”. Finally, even though 
both newspapers showed quite similar attitudes to improving the internal security 
situation, they differed hugely in their opinions on the cost of securitising the public, 
which is individual liberty.  
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Chapter 7 (Theme 3):  British Muslims are Incompatible with British Way of Life: 
7.1-Introduction:  
The portrayal of the present Orient that emerged in post-7/7 reporting shows a shift in 
representation with terms such as “radical”, “suicide bomber”, “disloyal”, and “enemy 
within” at home in comparison with the previous Orient in faraway places in Asia, which 
was characterised as “backward”, “illiterate”, “old-fashioned” and “other” but not as 
“dangerous” and “radical other” like the present one. Unsurprisingly, the reaction to an 
interpretation of the London Bombings in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph reflect 
a new “Other” that is comparatively more challenging as this Orient is the radical and 
extremist “Insider” who has been born and raised in the West and is evidently more 
adapted to the Western way of life.  
Within a few hours of the London Bombings, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
declared that “We shall prevail”, sending a strong message to those British suicide 
bombers and their associates. Further, Blair stated: “Today’s bombings will not weaken 
in any way our resolve to uphold the most deeply-held principles of our society and to 
defeat those who would impose their fanaticism and extremism on all of us” (The 
Guardian, 7 July 2005). At that sad moment, the G8 leaders also joined Blair to show 
their solidarity and their resolution that terrorism would be defeated.  
President George W. Bush also said: “It’s a war on terror for us all…we will not yield to 
these people. We will find them, we will bring them to justice...we will spread an 
ideology of hope and compassion that will overwhelm their ideology of hate” (The 
Guardian, 7 July 2005). Initially, Blair recognised the distinction between suicide 
bombers and British Muslims as two separate elements of the same Muslim community. 
Hence, the obvious division was between “Us” (the British public including British 
Muslims) and “Them” (terrorists/Islamists). Gradually, the narrative was built up in 
both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, suggesting a serious challenge ahead to 
defend the “British way of life” endangered by four British-born Muslim suicide 
bombers. 
Gradually, the familiar rhetoric of “Our society” and “Our values” appeared in these 
newspapers, further deepening the division between “Us” (non-Muslims, whites, 
secularists and Europeans) and “Them” (Muslims/British-born Asians/Arabs/non-
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secular and non-Europeans). This binary division demonstrates that Edward Said’s 
seminal work Orientalism (1978) is still valid and applicable. Said’s work deals with the 
representation of people (Orients) and societies in faraway places in the East, mainly the 
Middle East which is already explained in the literature review.   
One might say that the Western elites, including the press itself and politicians in 
particular, are wilfully ignorant of Islam, although the evidence suggests that this 
operates both ways as it is also true of some Islamic countries in their dealings with the 
Christian religion. Consequently, the whole debate on British Muslims and their ability 
to integrate into a secular British society is presented from the British perspective. A 
key reason for this is the fact that self-styled scholars, controversial figures and hate 
preachers receive more attention and space in debates focusing on British Muslims.  
As a result, most discussions in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph on modernity 
reflect a very limited understanding of the cultural and religious tradition of Muslims. At 
the same time, it is fair to say that some sections of the press in Muslim countries are 
just as lacking in their understanding of the Christian and Western values of societies to 
which some Muslims have moved. This chapter argues that the press redefined and 
reconstructed the “British way of life” narrative, which was presented as though it were 
under serious risk because of the actions of four British-born bombers. It further argues 
that the notion of the “British way of life’ was reframed to cover up the failure of the 
government’s foreign policy in Iraq and to regain public support that it had largely lost 
because of its foreign policy.  
The 7/7 incident also provided a reason for policy-makers, press and politicians to ask 
British Muslims to be more adaptive of secular values given that the bombers had failed 
to demonstrate the essence of their religious and cultural norms. Nevertheless, the 
alarm communicated by the press in reaction to the bombings, which were likely to 
increase the social divide, was legitimate and accurate. The following sections of this 
chapter provide details of the discussions and debates presented in The Guardian and 
The Daily Telegraph on British Muslims’ ability to integrate and their compatibility with 
the British way of life.  
Section I: The Original Dataset and Findings:  
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This section is designed to provide details of the database that emerged in The Guardian 
and The Daily Telegraph reporting of the 7/7 bombings. It comprises the response to, 
interpretation and representation of the event in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph 
reporting in the context of the British way of life.  
7.2-The Dataset:  
 
Figure 7.1: The above figure shows 19 sub-themes and their share in the making of a 
main theme “British Muslims are Incompatible with the British Way of Life”. 
 
No.  Colour Percentage 
share 
Sub-Theme-Code   
1 Sky-blue  15% STC 46, “Britishness is our culture; our British values 
must be adopted” 
2 Blue 
Lapis  
11% STC 39, “British Muslims have created social ghettos 
and live parallel lives rooted in their cultural and 
religious beliefs/ideologies such as separate schools, 
veils; this leads to radicalisation”   
250 
 
3 Blue 
sapphire  
9% STC 32, “British Government promotes the idea of 
British Islam/Modern Islam/moderates (Sufi Islam, 
Council of Imams etc) to counter Islamic radicalism”   
4 Orange 
carrot 
9% STC 49, “Engaging with Muslims includes government 
initiatives such as road shows, reaching out in the 
community, combating Islamophobia, listening to 
Muslims’ leadership etc.” 
5 Orange 
apricot 
7% STC 41, “Hate preachers, Abu Hamza, Finsbury Mosque 
promote anti-Western feelings and radicalisation” 
6 Purple  7% STC 44, “British Muslims do not endorse ‘Freedom of 
Speech’ and criticism of their religion, for example 
Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) cartoons”   
7 Green  7% STC 52, “British Muslims are victims, for example bad 
press etc.” (Sympathetic view) 
8 Purple 
Orchid 
6% STC 24, “British mosques’ link with 7/7 bombers, 
meeting points, promoting extremism and 
radicalisation, problematic labels, non-English speaking 
Imams, etc. (closed views) 
9 Red  6% STC 6, “British Islamists, Sheikh Omar Bakri and his 
associates like al-Qaradawi, Abu Izzadeen, are anti-
Western hate preachers who must be denounced and 
banned” 
10 Light 
sky-blue 
4% STC 29, “Hate preacher Anjem Chaudhary’s statements 
etc” 
11 Blue 
Cerulean  
4% STC 54, “Problems within the Muslim community, for 
instance widely acknowledged leadership, Imams and 
mosques, sectarian divide etc.” 
12 Purple 
violet  
4% STC 62, “Jack Straw veil controversy fuels Islamophobia 
in British society” 
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13 Blue 
azure 
3% STC 20, “Londoners showed strength after bombings”       
14 Blue 
arctic 
2% STC 4, “Islamist extremists and white imperialist racists 
are two identical troublemakers”   
15 Orange 
yam 
1% STC, 25, “Mosques are promoting community cohesion 
etc. (Open-minded Views)” 
16 Green 
pear  
1% STC 33, “Radical Islam and Militant Muslims are also a 
challenge to Muslim regimes; therefore the West must 
make an alliance with modern Muslims” 
17 Green 
lime  
1% STC 40, “Representing Livingstone as hate preacher 
Qaradawi’s friend who hates gays, Jews, etc. closed 
views, anti-Semitic” 
18 Pink  1% STC 58, “Government select, promote and engage with 
like-minded British Muslims” 
19 Red 
cherry 
1% STC 59, “Freedom-of-speech boundaries should be 
drawn in order to avoid confusion and conflict between 
Muslims and non-Muslims” 
 
The dataset reveals that the debate finally reached a point where both newspapers 
began to write about “modern Islam” and “moderate Muslims”, suggesting that ordinary 
Muslims are incompatible with the British way of life. Overstating the notion of “modern 
Islam” indicates that the secular West sees traditional Islam as a threat and therefore 
desires to alter it to make it fit into the contemporary Western lifestyle. In some ways, 
the West imposes its secular values on Muslims living in Europe, including Britain. Of 
course, the reverse is true when Europeans move to some Muslim countries such as the 
Gulf States or Iran, where some Western cultural norms conflict with Islamic traditions; 
for example, Public Displays of Affection are restricted.  
Both The Guardian’s and The Daily Telegraph’s coverage of the main event of 7/7 and the 
following events such as 21/7, the veil debate and the cartoon controversies were 
interpreted and presented as a problematic outcome of religion. In this sense, despite 
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wide-ranging opinions and arguments expressed in all forms of reporting, including 
comments, features, news reports and editorials, the central theme remains the same: it 
is the religion (Islam) that restricts integration in a secular society? Reflecting upon 
these two newspapers’ views, it emerged that their explanation of “modernity” suggests 
that British Muslims must adopt certain aspects of modern Western society, which is 
secular. To them this is modern thinking, for British Muslims should approve the 
modernisation of mosques where Imams must speak English, women must be allowed 
to pray in the mosques, and faith schools must introduce courses that include secular 
education.  
7.3- Are British Muslims failing Modernity?  
The narratives of The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, which are largely based on the 
views of these newspapers’ contributors, writers and editors, suggest that the British 
government should work together with “Moderate Muslims” to counter terrorism, 
radicalisation and extremism. In all the different types of journalism, 46 carry the two 
sub-theme codes along these lines: (STC 32, “British Government promotes the idea of 
British Islam/Modern Islam/moderates (Sufi Islam, Council of Imams etc) to counter 
Islamic radicalism”) and (STC 49, “Engaging with Muslims includes government 
initiatives such as road shows, reaching out in the community, combating Islamophobia, 
listening to Muslims’ leadership etc.”). These account for a total share of 
46/274*100=16.78 (or nearly 17%) while The Guardian’s contribution to the discussion 
on encouraging the British government to engage with moderate Muslims accounts for 
12.40%.  
Further, these newspapers’ descriptions of “moderate Muslims” suggest Muslims who 
do not disapprove of secular traditions and values such as same-sex marriages, dress 
codes, and ways of life. The best illustrations of moderate and conservative Muslims to 
have emerged from the dataset are the portrayals by al-Qaradawi, Ramadan, Ed Husain 
and Ayaan Hirsi Ali. For example, al-Qaradawi is extremist, fanatical and fundamentalist 
because he opposes same-sex marriage and supports the Palestinians (see The Daily 
Telegraph, 19 July and 20 July 2005).  
Nearly three months after the London bombings a Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten 
published distasteful caricatures of Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) on 30 September 
2005. The incident left British Muslims deeply upset and caused anger among Muslims 
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worldwide, eventually resulting in violent protests and riots. The situation was taken 
seriously by Muslim countries, which activated their diplomatic missions to resolve the 
issue. The coverage of the incident in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph opened a 
debate on modernity and freedom of speech and the extent to which British Muslims 
are compatible with these ideas.  
(i) Freedom of Speech: 
Following the 7/7 incident, several newspapers around the world, especially in Europe, 
reprinted the cartoons to show solidarity with the Danish newspaper and to defend 
‘freedom of speech’ and the values of ‘press freedom’.  Notably, the British press and 
broadcast media declined to reprint the Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) 
satirical caricature as part of a solidarity campaign with their European counterparts 
who had offended Islam and Muslims. One exception was the Cardiff University student 
newspaper, which published the cartoons, although its 10,000 copies were soon 
withdrawn (The Daily Telegraph, 8 February 2006). This incident indicates that Britain’s 
response to the distasteful cartoons was considerate in comparison to its European 
neighbours. 
On 3 February 2006, the British foreign secretary Jack Straw praised the British media 
for being considerate and responsible in a sensitive situation. Straw said, “There is 
freedom of speech, we all respect that, but there is not any obligation to insult or to be 
gratuitously inflammatory... republication of these cartoons has been unnecessary, it 
has been insensitive,...disrespectful” (The Guardian, 3 February 2006). Despite the 
British media and government’s solidarity with British Muslims in condemnation of the 
cartoon, a handful of members of the radical organisation Hizbut-Tahrir and the banned 
group Al-Ghurabaa organised a protest with placards declaring “Behead the one who 
insults the prophet” and “free speech go to hell”. This demonstration, which constituted 
threatening behaviour, unsurprisingly initiated a debate on freedom of expression in 
both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph.  
Thus The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph writers and commentators questioned 
British Muslims’ place and role in mainstream society, which holds secular values 
including individual liberty and freedoms. To an extent, these newspapers also reflected 
on the statements of British Muslim leaders who challenge the nature of these values 
such as freedom of expression; this is a natural defensive reaction. The following table 
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shows the total number of articles published in The Daily Telegraph based on two sub-
themes, “moderate Muslims” and “freedom of expression”, in Britain (8 July 2005-7 July 
2007).  
        Table: 7.1: Data on the cartoon controversy in The Daily Telegraph.  
Types of journalism (The Daily Telegraph) Codes: 32/44 
Editorials 2 
Comments  5 
News reports 10 
Interviews 1 
Total  18 
The above figures from the dataset show that The Daily Telegraph provided around 
nearly 21% (18/87*100 = 20.68) of its total reporting  space to debate the needs of 
“Modern Islam”, “Moderate Muslims” and “freedom of expression” based on the cartoon 
controversy. Notably, these articles are also referred to elsewhere in this thesis because 
each has more than one sub-theme. These indicate The Daily Telegraph’s belief that, in 
view of the cartoon protests and the rise of radical groups, the British government 
should redesign its previous policy of talking to radical organisations and groups such 
as the Muslim Brotherhood. It criticises the Foreign Office for its long-standing contacts 
with radical groups and suggests that radical groups be replaced by moderate Muslims 
such as the newly-launched Sufi Muslim Council (SMC).  
Further, it argued that Britain should be tough on hate preachers and those 
organisations that promote radicalisation, including the Muslim Brotherhood and its 
associate organisation the Muslim Council of Britain, some of whose members adhere to 
Muslim Brotherhood ideology. Notably, this theme remained constant in The Daily 
Telegraph comment section and news reporting of British government rethinks and 
policy overhauls in favour of moderate Muslims. Similarly, on ‘freedom of expression’ 
The Daily Telegraph’s key argument in its editorial was that ‘freedoms’ of all sorts are 
foundation stones of British democracy that had been won in lengthy struggles and 
must be protected. At this point the reporting shows a divide between Muslims and 
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non-Muslims, with the assumption that British Muslims do not endorse freedom of 
expression; hence, an “Us and Them” narrative emerged.  
In two of its news reports based on the views of Prof. Frank Stewart and Matthias 
Küntzel, The Daily Telegraph criticised the BBC and the University of Leeds for failing to 
robustly defend the value of freedom of speech. Most of these items indicate that British 
Muslims are too sensitive and less open to freedom of speech, and they must 
acknowledge that this is an essential norm of modern British society in which they have 
chosen to live. Overall, the reporting in all items reflects that The Daily Telegraph was 
critical of radical Muslim groups and hate preachers. However, with reference to the 
cartoon controversy protest it speculates that British Muslims do not cherish the value 
of freedom of expression; this indicates a biased view linking the entire British Muslim 
community to one incident in which a couple of hundred protestors belonging to a 
banned group participated.  
However, the paper also provided space to Ali Miraj (Board Member of the Conservative 
Party Policy), whose views to some extent echo those of British Muslims who have some 
genuine grievances and feel disappointed by the coverage of these issues. In sum, The 
Daily Telegraph’s coverage includes the views of the Conservative party here and 
elsewhere in the data. In its editorial on 5 February 2006, The Daily Telegraph argued 
that the protestors against the cartoon controversy had devalued the notion of 
‘freedom’, which is a ‘hard-won liberty’ and central to British democracy. The Daily 
Telegraph also reminded its readers that it had not published the cartoons and 
considered those caricatures as “vulgar and fatuously insulting” (The Daily Telegraph, 5 
February 2006).  
In the same editorial, The Daily Telegraph also criticised Jack Straw and the Labour 
government for showing a soft response to the protestors and inadequately defending 
‘press freedom’ (The Daily Telegraph, 5 February 2006). It wrote: “The Government’s 
response is especially feeble when compared to Margaret Thatcher’s behaviour during 
the Rushdie Affair” (The Daily Telegraph, 5 February 2006). It is also important to 
mention here that The Daily Telegraph used derogatory language in comparison to The 
Guardian to describe Muslim scholars such as al-Qaradawi; it believes that he is against 
same-sex marriages and that some of his views are anti-feminist, which conflicts with 
the Western point of view. However, one might also point out that some of the recent 
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comments of Donald Trump indicate that some Western males are just as likely to be 
anti-feminist as anyone else. Surely, it is a given that all societies will, in some respects, 
be divided on such issues, the Christian religion having long been divided on both 
issues. In addition, The Daily Telegraph portrays Oxford Muslim Professor Tariq 
Ramadan as “an extremist”, “bad” and “dangerous”, in line with the right-wing press 
(see The Daily Telegraph 14 July 2005: The Sun 9 July 2005). This may be due to The 
Daily Telegraph’s disapproval of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded in 1928 
by Ramadan’s grandfather Hassan al-Banna.  
In the debates relating to Islam and British Muslims, The Daily Telegraph’s and The 
Guardian’s reporting differs in the treatment of politicians, writers, religious leaders and 
writers based on their faith and ethnicity. An example of such treatment within the 
dataset is the writing of Jonathan Freedland, who calls Israeli actions in Gaza “morally 
indefensible” in his article “we need to engage with all strands of Muslims”, published 
on 12 July 2006 in The Guardian. However, when the Muslim politician Sayeeda Warsi 
quit the Tory-led coalition government over her stance on the Israeli attack on Gaza, 
which she too called “morally indefensible”, she was immediately subjected to media 
criticism, with The Daily Telegraph writers branding her an “extremist” and “Islamist” 
because she condemned the Indian army atrocities in the disputed territory of Kashmir 
(see The Daily Telegraph, 22 February 2015). Thus, one might say that this distinguishes 
The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph in their treatment of this issue because 
Freedland, ironically, is Jewish.  
In short, with regard to the cartoon controversy The Daily Telegraph’s reporting 
suggests an important point; i.e. the British government stance on freedom of 
expression is less defensive in comparison to its European neighbours. Hence, the 
British government showed that it was afraid of British Muslims’ anger, and its priority 
therefore was not to protect freedom of expression. Perhaps playing down the 
possibility of racial conflict will endanger these freedoms. However, the bad behaviour 
of a few members of an extremist sect, Al-Ghurabaa, shows that British Muslims are at a 
disadvantage because they are unfamiliar with the notions of freedom and liberty. Yet 
they live in a society which has certain concepts of freedom and liberty which they have 
to live by. Surely, they are very aware of the different views of the society in which they 
came to live.  
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The cartoon controversy debate takes a different shape in The Guardian’s comments, 
news reports, special reports and editorials because it also allowed a few Muslim 
writers to express their views on freedom of expression. On the positive side, the 
cartoon controversy promoted community bonding because mainstream Muslim 
communities reject violence as a means of protest. The Guardian reporters disclosed on 
11 February 2006 that the demonstration was organised “by an Islamist sect whose 
supporters have repeatedly been linked to violence and terrorism. Al-Ghurabaa, the 
organisation which takes credit for the protest, is essentially the same organisation as 
al-Muhajiroun” (The Guardian, 11 February 2006). The following table shows the 
overall types of reporting published in The Guardian that discussed the cartoon 
controversy, which in turn opened up debates on freedom of speech, modern Islam and 
moderate Muslims.   
       Table: 7.2: Data on the cartoon controversy in The Guardian. 
  Types of Reporting (The Guardian) Codes: 32/44 
Editorials 3 
Comments  6 
Interviews 2 
News Reports 6 
Special Reports 1 
Total 18 
  
On the cartoon controversy, The Guardian editorial expressed its “displeasure” and 
“condemnation” of the attitude of those few fanatical protestors, particularly one 
dressed like a “bomber” and an “al-Qaeda lover”. It says that the “British tolerant way of 
life” should be defended even if white fascists have to be confronted. The Guardian also 
advised security agencies such as the police to ensure that an “exaggerated sense of 
victimhood” among Muslims after 7/7 does not gain strength in response to these 
fanatics. Notably, The Guardian also defended freedom of expression and included views 
such as “redefining its boundaries”, which appeared in The Daily Telegraph as well. The 
cartoon protests added further weight to The Guardian’s view that moderate Muslims 
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should take the lead; this is particularly prominent in its editorial and comment section 
in which it argues that the battle against extremism cannot be won without moderate 
Muslims.  
The ‘moderate Muslims’ and ‘freedom of speech’ debates in The Guardian include a 
mixture of views but fail to identify the criteria for defining a moderate Muslim. Thus, 
the impression developed that British Muslims have to distance themselves from 
traditional Islam, which provides a justification for extremist views that lead to 
terrorism. Overall, its news reports were different from its comment section because 
the news reports were mostly based on official views while the comment section debate 
on ‘freedom’ and ‘moderate Muslims’ was more balanced, even though it failed to define 
the latter. Furthermore, The Guardian used its editorial position to record its concerns 
over the British government’s laidback attitude on the day of the protest, which 
threatened public order because one of the protestors was dressed like a suicide 
bomber. Its editorial stated that those protestors who had threatened the public with 
their outrageous behaviour must not be spared and should be brought to justice. Here, 
The Guardian editorial demonstrates a sense of justice, “…Ours is a tolerant way of life; 
we must be robust in defending it against its enemies (The Guardian, 6 February 2006).   
Another important point was raised by The Guardian: “There must be no witch-hunt to 
feed further the ugly and exaggerated sense of victimhood surging through the 
otherwise legitimate protest against the cartoons' gratuitous insult” (The Guardian, 6 
February 2006).  But it emerged two days later that Omar Khayam, who had threatened 
public order by dressing in a suicide bombers jacket, was on parole after serving part of 
his sentence for drugs offences (see The Guardian, 8 February 2006). The key point here 
is that, following the actions of a few individuals, both The Guardian and The Daily 
Telegraph started debates on multiculturalism, integration and on British Muslims and 
their ability to live by Western values in a secular society. A considerable portion of the 
debate on freedom of expression, in fact, presented British Muslims through the lens of 
those protestors who were less inclined to cherish Western values. On this debate, the 
dataset shows that the two broadsheets reserved 7.29% of their reporting space to 
highlight British Muslims’ inability to accept criticism of their religion.  
In contrast, only 1.09% of the reporting space was given to the point of view that 
freedom of expression by all means is an exquisite value but it should have limits to 
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avoid causing offence to people of all faiths and disciplines. This ratio is reflective of 
these newspapers’ news production mechanism in which British Muslims have little say 
in matters related to them, although The Guardian did ask some British Muslims for 
their opinions. However, one should also consider that it is the production team and the 
owners who dictate policy in response to their perceived audience.  
Here, the contemporary West contrasts with Islam because Islam strictly forbids the 
caricaturing of messengers and prophets of God, including Prophet Jesus, whilst this is 
not the case in secular Western societies. On the cartoon controversy The Guardian 
published a series of news reports, comment pieces and an editorial in February 2006 
to offer alternative views on freedom of expression. On 12 February 2006, one of The 
Guardian commentators Fareena Alam pointed out contradictions in the use of the 
notion of freedom of speech because the same newspaper had “rejected cartoons 
lampooning Jesus” in deference to its readers’ sentiments. She argued: “Freedom of 
speech is not absolute. It has to be in service of something, like peace or social justice. 
How have these cartoons, and the hypocritical defence of them, served these ideals?” 
(The Guardian, 12 February 2006). In addition, Karen Armstrong wrote that freedom of 
expression was long practised in the Muslim world before it was won as a “liberty” in 
the West. She gives the example of the seventeenth-century Muslim Iranian philosopher 
Mulla Sadra who resisted the Iranian mullahs’ campaigns to limit “freedom of 
expression” (The Guardian, 21 July 2007).  
(ii) Modernity: “Modern Islam”, “Moderate Muslims” and “British Islam”.  
The following table shows the composition of the modernity debate in The Guardian and 
The Daily Telegraph during the period July 2005-July 2007.  
  Table 7.3:  The Guardian, July 2005-July 2007 Modernity Debate. 
Types of journalism (Moderate Muslims/Modern Islam) July 2005- 2007 
Comments & debate  6 
News reports 4 
Editorials 2 
Total  12 
  
260 
 
  Table 7.4: The Daily Telegraph, July 2005-July 2007 Modernity Debate. 
Types of journalism (Moderate Muslims/Modern Islam) July 2005-2007 
Comment & personal views  5 
News reports  1 
Interviews  4 
Editorials  1 
Total 10 
    
In the views of The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, the idea of modernity means that 
members of different communities, particularly British Muslims, have to incorporate 
British values. Notably, within the dataset the notion of modernity with regard to 
British Muslims is mostly concerned with their supposed disadvantages or 
shortcomings in integrating into modern British society. On 18 July 2005, after the 
London bombings, The Guardian offered editorial press reviews of the mainstream 
British press entitled: ‘It is a battle for the heart of Islam’: Moderate Muslims were 
urged to tackle proponents of extremism, suggesting that something in Islam drove the 
London bombers and needed to be changed. It referred to the Scotsman’s editorial of 16 
July 2005: “Moderate Muslims are at long last beginning to recoil at the jihadist reign of 
terror ... The only way to isolate [such] extremism definitively is for moderate Islam to 
go on the offensive” (The Guardian, 18 July 2005).  
Furthermore, on 17 July 2005 The Observer offered a few suggestions in its editorial. For 
example, British Muslims must denounce the Imams trained in Saudi Arabia and 
Pakistan who cannot speak English and establish links with British-born Muslims (The 
Observer, 17 July 2005). It suggested that British Muslims must inform the authorities of 
any issues such as hatred and bigotry expressed by such preachers (ibid). More 
importantly, it wrote: “Should imams be registered with the Home Office, perhaps? 
Should the state fund an Islamic college to provide a new generation of British imams? 
These are debates that must be had among Muslims” (The Observer, 17 July 2005). 
On the occasion of the second anniversary of the 7/7 incident, The Daily Telegraph 
editorial suggested that it is significant to endorse the idea that, “whether new arrivals 
261 
 
or settled citizens, residents in Britain have a duty to accept the values of tolerance, 
individual liberty and the separation of religion from politics that define our society” 
(The Daily Telegraph, 8 July 2007). Here, the underlying message is that the best 
possible way to become part of mainstream society is to adopt the modern values of a 
secular society. Although much of the talk of modernity in both newspapers emphasised 
secular values, a number of articles by politicians and commentators also acknowledged 
fundamental values of other cultures and faith communities.  
David Cameron spent two days with a British Muslim family in Birmingham in May 
2007 in order to enhance his understanding of the lifestyle of British Muslims. 
Cameron’s host family had three children, who were enrolled with Jewish and Christian 
children in a neighbouring Jewish faith school (The Guardian, 13 May 2007). Cameron 
recognised that the idea of modernity is mainly presented from Britain’s point of view, 
which mainly focuses on its achievements; for example, he learnt that modern Britain 
faces several problems such as “family breakdown, drugs, crime and incivility” that are 
seen as normal experience. (ibid)  
According to The Guardian, Cameron discovered that “Many British Asians see a society 
that hardly inspires them to integrate. Indeed, they see aspects of modern Britain which 
are a threat to the values they hold dear - values which we should all hold dear” (ibid). 
However, this is hardly surprising in a Western secular society much as the reverse 
situation operates in other societies including Muslim and non-Muslim. Cameron 
concluded that integration is a two-way street: “If we want to remind ourselves of 
British values - hospitality, tolerance and generosity to name just three - there are 
plenty of British Muslims ready to show us what those things really mean” (The 
Guardian, 13 May 2007).  
Similarly, in an interview with The Daily Telegraph, the Chairman of the Muslim Council 
of Britain Abdul Bari suggested that there is a positive side of “arranged marriages and 
espousing”, which endorse strong family values (The Daily Telegraph, 2006), although 
arranged marriages challenge the British value of individual choice. In an editorial, The 
Daily Telegraph endorsed the launch of a new organisation, the Sufi Muslim Council 
(SMC), which it regarded as the “voice of a moderate Islam” and a representative body 
of the “silent majority of Muslims”. On the one hand, it criticised the Muslim Council of 
Britain for being both conservative and radical (The Daily Telegraph, 20 July 2006). On 
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the other hand, it approved of a new think-tank that it assumed will represent the 
“silent majority” of Muslims and provide “solutions to problems faced by the Muslim 
community” (ibid).  
Naima Bouteldia pointed out that the British media portrayal of the Muslim scholars 
Ramadan and al-Qaradawi as “extremists” was unreasonable and contradicted freedom 
of thought (The Guardian, 21 July 2005). For some, this surely reflects freedom of 
thought even though it may be wrong. Bouteldia wrote that although al-Qaradawi 
condemned the London bombings, sections of the British media urged the government 
to ban him from entering Britain (ibid.) Bouteldia disclosed that the British media have 
a similar attitude to Ramadan; he denounced the London bombers as “criminals” and 
rejected their justifications for the bombings, be they ideological or political, but he was 
still presented as an “extremist Islamic scholar” (Ibid). Bouteldia found that Ramadan is 
not alone in his support for the Palestinians, as there are millions of non-Muslims across 
Europe who also support their cause; Ramadan has “never supported suicide bombings. 
He has no links with any terrorist group and is not banned by France” (ibid).  
Another key point in the debate on modernity was raised by one of The Guardian’s 
commentators. Faisal Bodi disclosed that a report of an American think tank “the RAND 
Corporation” compiled by Cheryl Benard revealed that the United Nations’ “interests lay 
in making a long-term alliance with secularists and modernists. Such a policy would 
encourage an Islamic reformation of the sort that transformed Christianity and ushered 
in Europe’s Enlightenment” (The Guardian, 18 July 2006).This policy-oriented document 
indicates that the Western world’s view of Islam is based on its political objectives or 
the political objectives of some Muslim groups.  
7.4- Barriers to Integration and Cohesion in British Society:  
Drawing on the dataset, this section presents the discussions and debates that took 
place in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph considering the post-7/7 challenge of 
building a cohesive society. Both newspapers discussed and debated problems and 
issues that are considered the main barriers to integration and cohesion. These 
newspapers provided a mixed narrative of problems, opportunities and possibilities in 
the making of a cohesive society from the British government’s and British Muslims’ 
perspectives. A list of barriers to the process of integration that contradict the notion of 
a secular society includes hate preachers, the role and place of mosques, veils, social 
263 
 
ghettos and problems with the British Muslim community such as the absence of a 
widely-recognised Muslim leadership.  
The dataset shows that both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph reporting 
designated five radical hate preachers who are “Islamists” and anti-Western: Abu-
Hamza al-Masri, Sheikh Omar Bakri Muhammad, Anjem Choudhary, a reverted Muslim 
Abu Izzadeen, and the Middle East-based Islamic scholar Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi. 
Overall, within the dataset the two newspapers’ aggregate reporting on these “hate 
preachers” has a 17% share in the formulation of the third main theme. According to 
these figures, 20% of The Daily Telegraph’s reporting space was devoted to hate 
preachers and controversial figures who have no support in the wider British Muslim 
community. In comparison, The Guardian provided 4% less reporting space to hate 
preachers and controversial figures. 
Another important debate taking place in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph 
suggested that British Muslims are less integrated into mainstream society. Overall, 
11% of the aggregate reporting in this theme indicated that British Muslims are living 
parallel lives. The segregation of Muslims has roots in their cultural traditions and 
religious beliefs. This resulted in social ghettos which led to disaffection and alienation 
of young British Muslims. Some commentators and journalists in these newspapers also 
pointed out that the second generation of British Muslims is less integrated. A number 
of labels were attached to British Muslims such as “disloyal”, “enemy within”, 
“backward”, “uneducated”, and “anti-Semitic”.   
In the main, these negative connotations in the representation of British Muslims were 
either directly or indirectly related to the 7/7 bombings. This trend in reporting 
continued until the end of the research period covered by this thesis. Based on the 
Channel 4 survey of 500 Muslims, The Daily Telegraph published a report on 5 June 
2007 entitled: “7/7 bombs staged, say one in four Muslims”. It wrote: “A quarter of 
Britain’s two million Muslims believe Government agents staged the July 7 suicide 
bombings, a new survey has found” (The Daily Telegraph, 5 June 2007). Although the 
newspaper did not disclose details of this survey’s demographic selection process, it 
claimed that Muslims are habitually disloyal and live in denial (ibid.) It stated: “A poll 
for The Daily Telegraph shortly after the 9/11 attacks found a large proportion of 
Muslims that refused to accept they were carried out by members of their faith.” (Ibid) 
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Thus, based upon the opinions of 500 Muslims surveyed by Channel 4, The Daily 
Telegraph calculated a ratio and then related it to the entire British Muslim population, 
claiming that more one in four did not believe that 7/7 was carried out by British 
Muslims. Jonathan Freedland provided several illustrations to explain that British 
Muslims are tagged with negative connotations, often resulting from irresponsible 
reporting. Freedland wrote: 
The Times splashed on “Suspect in terror hunt used veil to 
evade arrest”…Daily Express: “Veil should be banned say 
98%”. Nearly all those who rang the Express agreed that “a 
restriction would help to safeguard racial harmony and 
improve communication”…the Sunday Telegraph led on 
“Tories accuse Muslims of ‘creating apartheid by shutting 
themselves off” (The Guardian, 18 October 2006).  
On the positive side, six out of ten comment pieces published in The Guardian discussing 
this sub-theme presented British Muslims as victims and favoured their perspective on 
several issues such as their under-representation in the police. The Guardian’s 
commentators also questioned negative media assumptions that British Muslims are 
anti-Semitic and anti-Western. In other forms of journalism, including news reports, 
interviews, personal views, editorials and special G2 reports on this sub-theme, The 
Guardian presented Muslims’ viewpoint as positive. Relating to the social ghettos sub-
theme, The Daily Telegraph published six comment pieces that all linked British Muslims 
with issues such as Sharia law, veils, honour killings, extremism, terrorism, radicalism, 
integration and cohesion etc. The most important barriers mentioned in both 
newspapers appeared to be Muslim women’s veils and British mosques.  
(i) The Politics of the Veil:   
Muslim women’s veils are one of most significant topics discussed in the dataset of this 
time period (8 July 2005 to 7 July 2007). It is important to note that the veil is still a 
recurring theme in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph and is frequently linked to 
modernity, liberty, women’s oppression and social cohesion, and to terrorism in its 
worst form.  After the 7/7 event, which changed the political and social landscape of 
Britain, the role of mosques, hate preachers, young British Muslims lured into 
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radicalisation and extremism, and the future of the multicultural society dominated 
discussions in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph.  
At the time of the London bombings, Muslim women’s veils were not an issue in secular 
British society. At that time, no one considered the veil an object of women’s 
oppression. However, in the first week of October 2006, the Labour Minister Jack Straw 
wrote an article entitled ‘I felt uneasy talking to someone I couldn’t see’ in his local 
newspaper The Lancashire Telegraph, which prompted a heated debate on Muslim 
women’s veils. At the time, Straw was referring to women’s face veil, also known as 
“Niqab”, which he saw as having “implications of separateness”. 
Straw’s comments may well have been taken out of context, as several writers and 
politicians point out in discussions, but the seriousness of the debate reached a climax 
after Trevor Phillips, the Chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality, warned that 
the veil would be the cause of riots (see The Guardian, 23 October 2006). In its editorial 
The Guardian wrote: “Jack Straw’s comments on the wearing of the niqab appeared to 
unveil characteristics of British society that might be better kept under wraps” (The 
Guardian, 14 October 2006).  
Just three weeks after the start of the veil debate, on 1 November 2006, The Guardian 
published a two-part investigative G2 report that brought together diverse voices of 
British Muslims from a variety of backgrounds, from a gay rights campaigner to a niqab-
wearing teacher, who were asked “So how does it feel to be Muslim in Britain today?” on 
one particular Friday. The results appeared in The Guardian’s bold headline as follows: 
“Criticised for their beliefs, clothing and attitudes; accused of not being British enough; 
reviled as the enemy within - not a day passes without Muslims being attacked in the 
media” (The Guardian, 1 November 2006).   
Notably, until this point there was a sense of confusion about the veil among members 
of British society including some journalists of the mainstream press. On 24 November 
2005, The Guardian published a “Clarification: Imperial College London has asked us to 
point out that its dress code extends only to a ban on veils, hooded tops and other 
garments that obscure the wearer’s face”. This clarification appeared because The 
Guardian reporter had misunderstood the veil concept which, according to the college 
authorities, was as follows: “Employees and students should refrain from wearing 
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clothing which obscures the face, such as a full or half veil, or hooded tops or scarves 
worn across the face” (The Guardian, 24 November 2005).   
The dataset shows that The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph associated the veil issue 
with integration, multiculturalism and moderate Muslims; more pessimistically, it was 
related to separate faith schools, social ghettos, radicalisation and terrorism. The 
combination of these topics reflects two sub-themes (62 and 39) within the dataset that 
combine to produce fifteen per cent of the coverage. The following table shows The 
Guardian’s reporting on the veil in various types of journalism.  
         Table 7.5: The Guardian’s reporting on the veil.  
The Guardian (Types of Journalism) Oct 2006- July 2007 
Editorials  3 
Comment & debate  11 
New reports  2 
Special reports  1 
Investigative reports (Focus) 4 
Features  1 
Personal Views  1 
Interviews 1 
Total  24 
 
         Table 7.6: The Daily Telegraph’s reporting on the veil. 
The Daily Telegraph (Types of Journalism) Oct 2006-July 2007 
Personal views  6 
News reports  5 
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Investigative report  1 
Total 12 
 
On 6 October 2006, The Daily Telegraph began the debate with a question: “//Your 
view: An obstacle to integration?”, suggesting the importance of the debate. It inspired 
Muslim and non-Muslim voices, from imams and bishops, politicians and working-class 
professionals to law experts and ordinary citizens, to debate the veil. In two consecutive 
personal views published on 15 and 17 October 2006, The Daily Telegraph gave a 
platform to two of Britain’s leading politicians, Denis MacShane (Labour MP for 
Rotherham) and David Davis (Shadow Home Secretary).  
MacShane saw the veil debate through the political spectrum of “Islamism” but not 
Islam as a religion and he therefore concluded that it is the ideology of radicals that 
Britain needs to confront (The Daily Telegraph, 17 October 2006). However, Davis 
suggests that “the actual question of the small minority of Muslim women who wear the 
niqab is not really the issue at all. It is both unimportant and intrinsically personal, not a 
matter for the state” (The Daily Telegraph, 15 October 2006).  
Almost all the writers and commentators of The Daily Telegraph suggested that the main 
barrier to British Muslims’ integration lay in their acceptance of core British values. To 
this end, The Guardian also emphasised in its editorial that “Muslims too have a part to 
play in improving integration” (The Guardian, 14 October 2006). Up to July 2007, The 
Daily Telegraph debate on the veil suggested that it leads to separation and violence in 
society and that British Muslims are less adoptive of the core British values. David 
Harrison wrote a lengthy article, in which he referred to Patrick Sookhdeo, who 
suggests that Britain should also ban Muslim women’s veil (The Daily Telegraph, 8 
October 2006). Earlier, on 6 October 2006, The Daily Telegraph published an article 
entitled: “what the Koran says about the veil”, quoting a verse from the Quran: “O 
Prophet, tell your wives and daughters and the believing women to draw their outer 
garments around them when they go out or are among men”. However, several scholars 
also include the next line of this verse which is; “That is better, in order that they may be 
understood to be Muslims and not annoyed” (Quran, 33:59) (see Kheirabadi, 2004, p.77; 
Morgan, 2010, p.196).  
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A Daily Telegraph campaign that falls outside the thesis timeframe but produces a better 
understanding of the issue has a number of headlines: “French burka ban descends into 
farce” (The Daily Telegraph, 17 June, 2011); “Italy drafts law to ban burka…An Italian 
parliamentary commission has approved a draft law banning women from wearing veils 
that cover their faces in public” (The Daily Telegraph, 3 August, 2011); “Netherlands to 
ban the burka…Holland is to become the latest European country to ban the burka, 
despite the fact that fewer than 100 Dutch women are thought to wear the face-covering 
Islamic dress” (The Daily Telegraph, 15 September, 2011]; “France’s burka ban is a 
victory for tolerance: Britain’s politicians take fright at the idea - but Sarkozy’s brave 
step is both popular and right, says William Langley” (The Daily Telegraph, 11 April, 
2011);  “We’re not far off a British burqa ban”(The Daily Telegraph, 11 April, 2011].  
However, the two key questions that arose from the veil debate were its timing and its 
association with the 7/7 event although, as Alam argues, none of the London bombers 
was wearing a veil. However, the alleged 21 July bomber Yassin Omar tried to escape in 
a burka because he feared the police might shoot him. Several commentators, pressure 
groups and community organisation representatives appeared to be ignorant of the 
scholarly references, such as the position of the Quran on the veil. However, some may 
point out that these commentators are interpreting its use within a Western democratic 
society and therefore may not need to be informed although that may not be the case in 
a religiously-based society. 
Even before the start of the veil debate some commentators and writers of The Guardian 
and The Daily Telegraph pointed out that the British Muslim community is facing 
widely-acknowledged leadership problems and that the Muslim Council of Britain does 
not necessarily represent all Muslims. Nevertheless, both newspapers used MCB 
representatives as the most frequently consulted sources in the veil debate. In brief, the 
‘face veil’ was seen as a shield behind which a suspect might hide, although few 
criminals have used it to flee (see The Daily Telegraph, 20 December 2006). In general, 
for The Guardian however, it was regarded as a discarded tradition that is incompatible 
with modern secular traditions, leading to separation. On a fair note, “In the wake of the 
veil debate, mainstream Britain seems mature enough to respect people’s freedoms 
while rejecting any bar on cultural criticism. Thus the suggestion of banning the veil 
attracts little backing.” (The Guardian, 14 October 2006)  Notably, the debate on the veil 
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continues and returns repeatedly in that it connects Muslim women to terrorism and 
extremism, such as the British schoolgirls who went to join British ISIS jihadis in Syria 
(see The Daily Telegraph, 20 February 2015).  
This thesis adds that, in a Western society that values and cherishes ‘liberty’ and 
‘freedom’, the veil issue describes two fundamental points: First, the West has become 
secular and the ‘Islamic’ veil is incompatible with its ‘modern’ secular traditions. 
Second, the West is evidently sensitive to the ‘Islamic veil’, which shows that the secular 
West is fearful of Islam (Islamophobic) but does not feel the same about other religions. 
However, it is undeniable that Christian Nuns, orthodox Jews and Sikhs in the West still 
follow their religious and cultural practice of covering their heads. Thus, an exclusive 
debate on Muslim women’s veils shows that Islam is singled out and that the rise of 
Islamophobia is a real phenomenon (Al-Saji, 2010; Bullock, 2010; Zempi, 2014). 
Evidently, The Guardian supported and ran a campaign for Muslim women’s right to 
choose the veil but simultaneously its advocacy of a secularist approach and its 
branding of the veil as an outdated tradition tells us that it is not against Muslims but is 
slightly sensitive to a religion (Islam).  
(ii) British Mosques:  
Both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph mainly presented British mosques 
negatively. These newspapers associated mosques with growing extremism and 
radicalism and suggested that mosques are ideological warehouses that export violence 
and hatred. Overall, both newspapers offered mixed portrayals of British mosques in 
two sub-theme codes: (STC 24, “British mosques’ link with 7/7 bombers, meeting point, 
promoting extremism and radicalisation, problematic labels, non-English speaking 
imams, etc. (close-minded view)”) and (STC 25, “Mosques are promoting community 
cohesion etc. (Open-minded Views)”. Despite the two newspapers’ varied sets of 
opinions on mosques, the negative portrayals of mosques outnumbered the balanced 
views. The notion of mosques as places of community cohesion, which is an open-
minded view of Islam, accounts for only 1.09% of the reporting space in comparison to 
approximately 9% of the reporting space that links mosques with the 7/7 incident. In 
turn, much of the reporting on mosques in this dataset reflects closed views of Islam. 
On the positive side, both newspapers recognised that extremists were in fact banned 
from their local mosque committees on various grounds, including clashes with elders 
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and imams. They also accepted that mosques promote community cohesion by 
providing a space to different groups of Muslims such as Arabs, Asians, Africans and 
white Muslims. Additionally, both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph learned that 
mosques have been visited by government officials and other non-Muslim members of 
the community to foster social cohesion. Soon after the London bombings, most sections 
of the media including these two newspapers linked a few local mosques in Leeds and 
London with the bombers, suggesting that they had visited these places which turned 
them into suicide bombers. Since then, the government has described Leeds Makkah 
Mosque and Cambridge Mosque as ‘role models’, suggesting that these two mosques are 
modern.  
The dataset shows that most of the reporting associated mosques with the London 
bombers and other suspects, describing them as meeting places which they use to 
promote their ideology. The notable difference between the two newspapers was their 
position on and view of British Muslims’ place in society. In its editorial The Guardian 
wrote that “Britain also has one of the largest Muslim populations in Europe. This is not 
a problem, as we have been inclined to see it, but an asset” (The Guardian, 17 July 2005). 
But it also pointed out that “Real and lasting solutions have to come from Muslim 
communities themselves and need to be practical and immediate.” (ibid) In contrast, 
The Daily Telegraph adopted a rather strict viewpoint of British Muslims and their 
religious places such as faith schools, where it believed segregation and anti-Western 
thoughts prevail.  
Obviously, these interpretations also include the views of writers, commentators, 
government spokespersons and the general public, which began to see mosques as a 
problem. After the bombings, Tablighi Jamaat, a religious group of preachers, came 
under the spotlight mainly because the London bombers had been seen attending its 
gatherings. Jamie Doward wrote: “Tablighi Jamaat [is] an evangelical Islamic group 
which each year sends hundreds of young British Muslims to fundamentalist religious 
schools in Pakistan” (The Observer, 4 November 2006).  
In the wake of the 7/7 bombing, The Guardian’s and The Daily Telegraph’s 
interpretations of modernising British mosques emerged from a public and media 
debate suggesting that English-speaking local imams might better understand the needs 
of young British-born Muslims. According to Lord Nazir Ahmed, Britain has only 300 
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“homegrown” imams out of 2,000 who mainly deliver sermons in Arabic or Urdu (see 
The Guardian, 22 September 2005). It is often evident that ordinary imams are 
unqualified to pass verdicts on sensitive matters relating to religion.   
Prior to the London bombings, on 10 December 2004 The Guardian published an 
editorial entitled ‘Nationalising Islam’ which underlines the Western idea of Islam in the 
contemporary West which is facing radical and extremist Muslim threats. This editorial 
highlighted the French government’s intention “for imams to undergo university 
training in civil law, history, language and culture [which] is an important moment for 
Europe’s faltering attempts to try to engage with its Muslim citizens”. Further, it 
suggested that France takes its secular values as a “hallowed principle” that led to a 
controversial ban on wearing hijabs in schools and making mosques modern  places not 
necessarily  “to create a mosquée de France”. 
7.5- Engaging with the British Muslim Community:   
The sub-theme “engaging with British Muslims” appeared 23 times in The Guardian and 
The Daily Telegraph in their aggregate reporting on this topic. Of these, 8.39% of the 
reporting in this main theme supports the idea of establishing contacts with British 
Muslims. A total of 23 articles emerged in all forms of journalism including editorials, 
comment and debates, and news reports of both newspapers. Of these 23 types of 
journalism items, The Guardian alone published 22 articles urging policy-makers to 
strengthen interactions with British Muslims. This was indicative of The Guardian’s 
thinking on this subject although one of the editorials and a news story were based on 
Blair’s view that Muslims must accept that they have to play their role in tackling 
extremism. Overall, The Guardian’s contribution to the collective reporting was 12% in 
comparison to The Daily Telegraph’s 1.1% share in favour of engagement with British 
Muslims.  
However, it appeared that the absence of a central authority and a common Muslim 
representative body that might represent Muslims across Britain is a major hurdle to 
building a mutual consensus among Muslims regarding their problems. Michael Clarke 
thought that the Muslim Council of Britain and the Muslims Association of Britain are 
two mainstream British Muslim representative bodies in the eyes of the government, 
but in reality these organisations do not represent all Muslims (The Guardian, 25 August 
2005).  
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Clarke noted that these organisations’ leaders “look as if they were given more credence 
by the government than by parts of their own communities.” (ibid) Therefore, for Clarke 
the best way to reach British Muslims is through local leaders who can help engage with 
disaffected youth inside communities. (ibid) Clarke’s view is important, as the dataset 
detects that one of the serious problems within the British Muslim community is the 
division based upon the religious sects, the Brelwis and Whabbis, rather like Catholics 
and Protestants.  
Many of these suggestions show that some of the grievances and concerns of British 
Muslims are genuine. On the other hand, this narrative also proves that, despite the 
problematic circumstances associated with British Muslims, they do receive 
considerable positive media coverage. On the level of engagement, British Muslims lack 
a widely recognised leadership that can negotiate with the government. Another 
commentator, Madeleine Bunting, raised the same issue of recognised representation of 
British Muslims at the national level whilst attending The Guardian forum on British 
Muslims’ community in London (The Guardian, 21 November 2005). She pointed out 
that it fosters engagement and helps to reach inner communities that are largely 
unrepresented in politics and policy matters. (ibid) 
Bunting attended a gathering of 100 influential Muslims of different backgrounds who 
worked in seven different groups advising the government on matters relating to 
British Muslims (The Guardian, 18 July 2005).  She found a mixture of proposals, 
feelings and expectations among the participants who raised the same issue of a 
nationally recognised Muslim leadership. (ibid) However, The Guardian’s commentators 
were divided in their views on the representative body of British Muslims. For example, 
Clarke argued that the Muslim Council of Britain does not represent all British Muslims. 
Given Muslims’ media representation, he emphasises that “A legitimate and much-
needed debate among British Muslims about a distinctive expression of Islam in a non-
Muslim country has been hijacked and poisonously distorted.” (ibid) To solve this 
problem, Bunting called upon journalists to be careful when reporting Islam and feared 
the start of a new era of “McCarthyism.” (ibid) Bunting further stated that, “if we are not 
to be complicit, we need to be scrupulously responsible and conscientious in 
unravelling the complexity of Islam in its many spiritual and political interpretations in 
recent decades.” (ibid)  
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At this point, questions arise concerning the editorial view of The Guardian as opposed 
to the opinions expressed by individuals in The Guardian. The overall discussion shows 
that the media were divided on debates relating to British Muslims. Most importantly, 
The Guardian’s self-critical approach also testifies to the polemic structure of the media. 
Despite some positive representations of British Muslims, The Guardian continued to 
tag the phrase “Islamic” with criminals and radicals. However, it also continued to 
highlight Muslims’ genuine problems and raised a voice for their solutions (see The 
Guardian, 10 October 2005 and 16 August 2006). 
Overall, the reporting on this debate signals a mixture of thoughts and arguments in The 
Guardian, which published several comment pieces and articles. In comparison, The 
Daily Telegraph published just one personal view, by Labour MP Denis MacShane in 
which he emphasised the need for the British government to engage with the new 
generation of young British Muslims (The Daily Telegraph, 17 October 2006). MacShane 
said that such moderate Muslims must be contacted “before it is too late. From Margaret 
Thatcher, until very recently Tony Blair, political leaders have been in denial. It is time 
to wake up.” (ibid) In other words, MacShane suggested that the British government 
needs to rethink its policy of engaging with its young people, particularly British 
Muslims. (ibid) 
However, Bunting found that Martin Bright strongly opposed the government’s motives 
to enter into a dialogue or any sort of contact with any British Muslim organisation that 
is inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood (The Guardian, 16 August 2006). Bunting is right 
because such thinking contradicts the British value of “tolerance” that has been ignored 
whilst suggesting that the government should not talk to any organisation even though 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s presence in many places is political.  A notable feature of the 
reporting on engaging in debate is that The Guardian has shown a more sympathetic 
attitude to British Muslims, suggesting that they have became victims in the wake of 7/7 
of stop and search, suspicion and a bad press.  In this regard, another sub-theme shows 
that British Muslims are victims. The Guardian’s share of reporting on this issue appears 
to be 11% in comparison to The Daily Telegraph’s zero per cent.  
7.6- Re-emergence of “Britishness” Post-7/7:  
According to the dataset, overall, “Britishness” was a recurring sub-theme that appears 
in 39 types of reports and journalism articles in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, 
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accounting for a total combined share of 14.23%. It is significant that, of the 14.23% of 
reporting space, more than half of it was in the comment and debate section, making it 
an open public debate. The following table shows the types of journalism in both 
broadsheets that discuss and debate the idea of “Britishness”. Notably, of a total of 39 
items of all types reflecting different types of journalistic comment, The Daily Telegraph 
has only published two comment pieces, meaning that The Guardian has contributed 
about 95% of the reporting on the “Britishness” debate.  
Personal Views 3 
News reports  6 
Editorials  2 
Interviews  3 
Focus  1 
G2 Special reports  2 
Comment & debate  22 
Total  39 
  Table 7.7: The “Britishness” debate in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph.  
On 7 July 2004, exactly a year before the tragic incident of the London Bombings, the 
then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, delivered an annual lecture at the 
British Council. The next day, Brown’s long lecture appeared in The Guardian. He 
referred to two British writers, David Goodhart and Melanie Phillips. Based on these 
writers’ ideas, Brown suggested that “Britishness” is the best response to eliminate 
“conflict between the need for social cohesion and diversity” and “cultural difference”. 
In other words Brown argued that “Britishness” in the form of “shared values” might 
help build a cohesive society (The Guardian, 7 July 2004).  
A year later, British-born Muslim suicide bombers who were moderately integrated into 
British society shook the foundations of a multicultural Britain. The London bombings 
plunged Britain into a nationwide debate on “Britishness” mainly because of the British-
born-and-bred Muslim suicide bombers who had turned to violence. Obviously, the 
press reaction to the killing and maiming of innocent people was both careful and 
measured, insisting that the British way of life must be protected. 
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On 27 June 2007, Gordon Brown, the new Prime Minister, was preparing to mark the 
second anniversary of the 7/7 event which had brought British Muslims’ identity under 
scrutiny and jeopardised the idea of a multicultural society. Brown pledged a revised 
idea of “Britishness”, a belief that he argued would help to bind together British society, 
which was largely seen as “culturally separated”. In the words of David Cameron, the 
revised concept of “Britishness” emphasised “loyalty”, “citizenship” and “national day” 
celebrations, aiming to promote a strong sense of nationhood and reduce the separation 
in the post-7/7 society (The Observer, 10 June 2007). Given the complex nature of 
Britishness as a concept, the terms “loyalty”, “citizenship” and “national day” may well 
be redefined as the concept of “Britishness” develops.  
Three days later, The Guardian offered a policy-oriented editorial that raised three key 
points: identification of the problem, understanding the militants’ minds, and the 
solution to terrorism. It suggested that British democratic values might be the best 
shield against the “Islamic terrorism threat”, which has its roots in “cultural, political, 
economic, historical and religious factors that stretch back centuries in the Islamic 
world’s relationship with the West” (The Guardian, 30 June 2007). In the same vein, The 
Daily Telegraph editorial also dismissed the myriad loudmouthed complaints that 
terrorists often voice in the media to justify their violent atrocities (The Daily Telegraph, 
27 July 2005).  It further stated: “To blame the invasion of Iraq, or the occupation of the 
West Bank, or poverty, or racism, or Western decadence, is both intellectually and 
morally wrong” (ibid.). It argued that it is more logical to ask “why modern Britain is 
breeding so many anti-British fanatics.” (ibid) In summation, The Daily Telegraph then 
suggested that “Many countries try to codify their values in law... hence, in Britain we 
should install “non-negotiable components of our identity” (The Daily Telegraph, 27 July 
2005).  
Within the dataset I noticed that the idea of “Britishness” returned because of the 
British Islamists’ extremism threat. Since post-7/7 society is seen as less integrated, 
both newspapers reflected on what it currently means to be British. In particular, The 
Guardian asked a similar question, “What does it mean to be British”, on three different 
occasions (31 July 2005; 10 June 2007; and 9 June 2014). There were pressures on all 
sides to redefine “Britishness” to meet the changing circumstances.  
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Section II: Contextual Debates, Critical Analysis and Commentary:  
This section provides a narrative of 7/7 reporting in the context of interpretations, 
debates and critical analysis featuring the ‘British way of life’ in both The Guardian and 
The Daily Telegraph. It also explains the key points that both newspapers raised and 
discussed on this topic and how they differed in terms of the evidence they presented. 
Arguably, this section provides evidence that Islam is inherently modern because it is 
designed by the creator for all races and all times, and it is not misogynistic, contrary to 
the way it has been portrayed.  
7.7- The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph View of “Britishness” in Post-7/7 
Britain:  
The idea of “Britishness” appears to ebb and flow with every upheaval, be it political, 
social or economic. In some situations it may function well; for example “Britishness” as 
a theme was developed strongly in the recent Scottish referendum and it clearly 
overcame the idea of Scottish independence. The meaning of “Britishness” has been a 
long debate raised first by immigration in the 1940s and more recently by the rise of the 
Scottish Nationalists. However, the actions of the Muslim bombers simply added to the 
debate. It is important to note that the idea of “Britishness” is not a mere set of values 
but is in fact a complex notion. Some historians such as Keith Burgess see “Britishness” 
as something that is relatively fixed while other scholars such as Paul Ward (2004) 
argue that Britishness is constantly being redefined and is now what it was a century 
ago. Core values may be put forward, although they are often more the views of a 
particular generation than the whole of society; thus, it is not static but forever changing 
as British society develops and changes.    
The 7/7 incident opened a Pandora’s Box of questions such as the bombers’ loyalty to 
their country of birth. In turn, an infamous stereotypical perception of British Muslims 
as an “enemy within” returned to discussions and debates. But if, on one side, British 
Muslims were labelled an “enemy within”, there were also critics of Britain’s foreign 
policy and its role in Iraq, which paved the way for the bombers’ radicalisation (see The 
Guardian, 20 August 2006). For whatever reasons, the incident prompted many 
scholars, policy-makers, government officials, politicians and commentators to search 
for a mechanism that might bring different faith communities, particularly British 
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Muslims, together on one platform. In other words, the sense of nationhood or a society 
with shared values became much stronger than before.  
The editorial views of The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph showed their optimism 
about the British core values that can build loyalty and patriotism.  It could be argued 
that “tolerance” suggests that we (British) take pride in tolerating “other people’s” 
misconduct, shortcomings, cultural traditions, and religious beliefs and ideas, thereby 
indicating that the “other” is a constructed bad person. The other side of “tolerance” also 
suggests that we (British) are perhaps morally superior. However, the events of 7/7 
have been neither forgotten nor tolerated, as demonstrated by the anniversaries of the 
last ten years. The point here is not to forget the sufferings of the 7/7 victims but to 
argue that this concept is not simple as it focuses on particular sets of people who are 
supposedly “others”, be they good or bad.   
This debate is very complex because each declared British value is in some way part of 
many other cultures and traditions worldwide and therefore may not be considered a 
unique distinction. Because of the changing nature of British society, British values are 
constantly changing. Nevertheless, it is hard to put these values into practice; for 
example, forgiveness is an esteemed virtue in Christianity and Islam but some British-
born Muslims fail to demonstrate it or practise it. It is an ideal element of both religions 
but it is often not practised by their followers.  
The central idea of “Britishness” that emphasises a “shared identity” is not problematic, 
nor does it sound like failure. Indeed, it includes other cultures’ and faith communities’ 
core values to demonstrate that British society is based on commonly held values. 
However, some critics such as Gary Younge consider the idea of “Britishness” to be 
weak in a sense because it signals that the new focus of attention is the British Muslim 
community in the post-7/7period, a focus that had previously shifted from asylum 
seekers to Gypsies and eastern Europeans (The Guardian, 28 May 2007). Younge means 
that the idea of “Britishness” returns with every disturbance related to different sets of 
people or communities. He argues that the fear of the “other” is a driving force behind 
ideas that fulfil political objectives as it provides an “Other.” (ibid)  
There are always areas where actions do not match the ideals. For example, bombing 
innocent civilians is prohibited in religion, yet those Muslims perpetrated it. Similarly, 
bombing citizens in Northern Ireland did not equate with Christian values but it was 
278 
 
done. The point here is that hypocrisy is not exclusive to the West, the British or the 
Americans; to a certain extent it is global practice. George Monbiot admits that Britain 
has “a superb record of political liberalism and intellectual inquiry, giving us a public 
sphere open to ideas, religions and philosophy from across the world... This is true, but 
these values are not peculiar to Britain” alone, and it also “has an appalling record of 
imperialism...” (The Guardian, 9 August 2005).  
Prior to Gordon Brown’s administration, Tony Blair was also enthusiastic about the 
strength of British values for promoting social cohesion and building an integrated 
society. In March 2000 Blair disclosed his vision of “Britishness”, which was criticised in 
January 2002 following government proposals that members of ethnic minorities 
should learn the English language. Bair said: “Modernisation is the key. It has driven 
everything this government has done…To fail to modernise would be fundamentally to 
fail Britain. But we modernise according to our core values as a country” (The Guardian, 
28 March 2000).  Between August 2002 and November 2005, there were further 
proposals to compel immigrants to take lessons and pass a “citizenship test” that was 
designed to provide newcomers with knowledge of the British culture, traditions, 
history and national pride, which are British values (see The Guardian, 9 July 2007).  
In contrast, The Daily Telegraph editorial “Ten core values of the British identity” argued 
that the implementation of these British values could potentially prevent another 
terrorist attack and therefore the government should act upon its advice (The Daily 
Telegraph, 27 July 2005). This list includes “The English-speaking world” and “The 
British character” but, as Monbiot wrote, “These non-negotiable demands are not so 
different to those of the terrorists…” (The Guardian, 9 August 2005).  
In addition, British society has itself been evolving since World War II; for example, it 
has moved away from a joint family structure to an individualistic society. A case in 
point is the UK riots of 2011; these were seen by many as a new challenge to the ‘British 
way of life’ which some critics viewed as a “broken society” and “moral decline” (The 
Guardian, 15 August 2011; The Daily Telegraph, 14 August 2011). The overwhelming 
focus on the accomplishment of ‘British values’ and ‘modernity’ suggested that these are 
ideals for society at large. In other words, Islam is an incompatible, outdated and 
backward religion that is a cause of social problems. In fact, the concept of Umma itself 
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bears witness that Arabs, Africans, Asians and European Muslims of varied cultures can 
live by incorporating Islamic teachings while retaining their different cultures.  
However, the overall reporting reflected that perhaps the “British way of life’ idea is 
ideal and that British Muslims are on the losing end because they have very little to offer 
in return. Marginally, The Guardian mentioned British Muslims’ cultural values which it 
believed are based on Islamic laws but it largely ignored the essence of original Islamic 
teachings and societies that were built upon those values in Medina and Toledo. In 
comparison The Daily Telegraph discussion was mainly focused on Blair’s ideas and 
concepts of Britishness in the post-7/7 Britain, which were complex in their 
implications. For example, on the one hand Blair proposed tough laws to fight the 
terrorism threat while, on the other hand, restrictions on civil liberties contradict the 
values of freedom and human rights.  
7.8- Barriers to Integration and Cohesion in British Society:  
(i) The Veil Debate:  
The veil debate appears in a diverse and unique pattern in The Guardian and The 
Telegraph, reflecting signs of a divided society along different argumentative lines. The 
veil debate is significant because it brought together high-profile politicians, community 
and religious organisations’ leaders, senior political commentators and editors to 
discuss the sensitive nature of a highly relevant issue in British society. In the wake of 
7/7, the veil, which had never bothered the British public, suddenly became a source of 
fear and a sign of separation in the multicultural British society. Moreover, it became a 
security issue when the Imperial College of London, for security reasons, proposed a 
ban on all sorts of hoodies and the wearing of hijabs (The Guardian, 24 November 
2005).  
Possibly, given the terror threats at that particular time, such measures might have been 
taken elsewhere in the world to improve security and public safety. Prior to the London 
bombings, two Egyptian veiled women targeted a tourist bus in Cairo (1 May 2005). 
Surely the point here is that the bombings rendered the veil an issue. The case also 
indicates that the media on their own may not be powerful enough to shape public 
opinion but they are in fact part of an elite system that includes politicians and other 
actors such as public and religious organisations. 
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Before the 7/7 bombings, the British press discussed veil issues  after the Rushdie Affair 
(1989), which was related to integration and obviously not security. Christian Joppke 
(2009) noted that in 1989 Altrincham Girls School in Manchester had tried to ‘exclude 
two Muslim siblings who had refused to take off their headscarves in class’ (Joppke, 
2009, p.81). The veil issued reached its climax in 2006 when Jack Straw asked a Muslim 
woman teacher to remove her veil while attending his office. This sparked anger and 
anxiety among British-born Muslims. Only a tiny proportion of the British Muslim 
population wear the veil, which is both a religious and a cultural practice; however, it is 
not solely restricted to Muslims, as followers of other faiths also attach importance to it.  
The veil debate strengthens the idea that, even in peaceful situations, people’s opinions 
on and attitudes to subjects that have never posed any concerns radically change. 
Overall, The Daily Telegraph missed the fundamental theological points that are central 
to the veil debate, and without considering the whole context an ordinary person may 
not be able to understand the issue. For fairness and accuracy, it is important to 
mention here that there are four madhabs (scholarly interpretations/theological 
concepts) in Islam, not three. Secondly, the Quran offers two chapters (AL-Talaq 65 and 
An-Nisa 4) that discuss women’s roles, rights and their duties equally with men in 
society.  
These chapters provide details on issues such as women’s rights in property and 
remarrying and divorce, and they provide moral justifications and reasons relating to a 
series of topics such as a woman’s right to a family and education, and her right to 
expenses as a wife. Another key point that is missed in this debate is that the Quran also 
urges men to lower their gazes for moral reasons (see 24:30-31, An-Nur). The veil 
debate also lacks a discussion on veils in other faiths. This is essential because it 
suggests that modesty is valued not only in Islam but in all other faiths, including by 
Sikh women. In this sense, there was a contents and reference bias in the veil debate, 
suggesting that “Islam” is a key issue in secular society.   
Baran and Tuohy (2011) point out that, during the pre-Islamic period, in the “Arabia of 
570, women had few legal or social rights. Polygamy was practiced without limit; 
women could not receive inheritances or testify in legal proceedings; and infant girls 
were killed openly” (Baran and Tuohy, 2011, p. 38). These authors quote seven verses 
(2:187; 3:195; 9:71, 4:126; 4:129; 4:34; and 2:36) from the Quran and also Hadiths to 
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argue that Islam actually not only improves matters for women but acknowledges 
equality in many ways compared to other religions (ibid, 2011, p.40-41). They refer to 
the story of the Garden of Eden and quote the Quran verse 2, chapter 36, which says 
that Adam and Eve were both tempted by Satan, meaning that Islam rejects the sins of 
women alone. (ibid) The entire discussion on the veil appears to be a matter of politics 
since other major world religions approve of the veil. For example, in the book of 
Deuteronomy, Chapter 22, verse 5, I, Timothy, Chapter 2, verse 9, Rigveda Books 8 and 
10, and Hymns, 33/85, volumes 19/30, modesty in clothing is mentioned (Zakir Naik, 
lecture,  2010).   
In contrast, The Guardian defended individual freedom from veil-wearing women’s 
perspective even though it upheld secular values that contradict Islamic modesty at 
some points. Another point in The Guardian debate on the veil was that it criticised 
sections of the British media including The Daily Telegraph for their proposal to ban the 
veil. It continued to provide more details on face veils even after the heated debate had 
passed. Mona Chalabi investigated when several professional bodies including the 
General Medical Council and the National Union of Teachers told her that “They didn’t 
collect numbers on niqab wearing professionals and that to the best of their knowledge 
there had never been a case where niqab was mentioned as an issue” (The Guardian, 20 
September 2013). But this is just an expression of opinion and not the editorial view of 
The Guardian, which has a different position on the veil issue although it did recognise 
that the veil is a personal choice in a liberal society. Notably, The Guardian’s reporting in 
various forms continued to reveal such a biased attitude within the British press to 
British Muslims.  
The crux of the discussion is that the veil is incompatible with the norms of secular 
society. It has now become a security threat and should be abolished since it creates a 
barrier to integration. In sum, it is a piece of fabric that has turned into a political debate 
which ignores the fact that all other [orthodox] followers of different religions cover 
their heads, from Sikhs to Hindus and from Christian nuns to Jews to Buddhists. 
However, the press reports tell a completely different story, claiming that Muslim 
women have been singled out and demonised under the pretext of the veil.  
(ii)- British Mosques:  
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Both newspapers interpreted and presented British mosques as places that harbour 
imams who teach British-born children that Western culture and values are not Islamic. 
Moreover, British mosques are places where hatemongers preach ideologies that are 
anti-Western and are hubs for the spreading of extremism, fundamentalism, 
radicalisation and violence in society.  Furthermore, those 7/7 bombers were 
radicalised in religious schools in Pakistan. Now, two crucial aspects of the reporting on 
mosques were “Islamic ideology” and “anti-Western values”. Despite considerable 
differences in the interpretation, presentation and argumentation in the reporting of the 
two broadsheets, on this point they held similar views of mosques.  
Additionally, British mosques were presented as places where children are chastised, 
women and non-Muslims are unwelcome, segregation takes place, and imams deliver 
sermons in other languages which lead to divisions in society. Moreover, mosques 
should modernise in order to absorb British cultural values, review their curriculum, 
and welcome women and other people of all orientations. In brief, both newspapers 
raised significant points about how modern British mosques might engage with young 
British-born Muslims and help find solutions to problems such as extremism, 
radicalisation and fundamentalism. They also discussed how the idea of modern 
mosques could boost contacts between inner Muslim communities of Arab, African and 
European origins. The Guardian in particular raised a few questions about how the idea 
of modernity might transform post-7/7 British society and how it might help combat 
terrorism and security threats. How might mosques best serve inner communities and 
enhance community cohesion? What is the link between mosques and radicalisation 
and extremism and violence in the society? How might English-speaking Imams help 
improve the situation? And, above all, what is the place of Islamic religious schools and 
curriculum in British society?    
Despite a number of differences between the two newspapers’ reporting on mosques, 
they have shared a common belief that mosques are promoting anti-Western thinking 
that is damaging and a risk to British society as a whole; in other words, the rare 
becomes the common. These newspapers also referred to British television 
programmes such as Panorama and Channel 4’s under cover Dispatches that raised 
further concerns and caused hostile feelings among the British public to an extent that 
they blocked and declined the idea of building a new Tablighi Jamaat mosque in London, 
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which is largely considered a peaceful movement and is sometimes cherished on 
government levels in many non-Muslim countries.  
Both newspapers failed to acknowledge the difference between a mosque (place of 
worship) and those self-proclaimed hardliners whose interpreted ideology causes 
damage to British society. Of course, it is evident that brutal actions by radicals of other 
faith groups have not inspired a discussion of their holy places such as churches, 
temples and Gurdawaras (The Guardian, 27 June 2015). Because of this fragmentary 
reporting, the public at large, who had no contact with their local mosques, became 
afraid of these places to the extent that, in certain areas, local people blocked and 
declined the idea of building new mosques, such as in London (see The Daily Telegraph, 
25 September 2006).  
It is worth mentioning that Tablighi Jamaat operates in a completely different manner 
and is in fact a non-political missionary movement that mainly focuses on elevating 
individual spirituality and character-building. It aims to remind fellow Muslims of their 
moral and religious duties and responsibilities towards their fellow human beings and 
society. Several scholars have shed light on its activities in different societies across the 
world and consider it a movement that promotes harmony and peace (see Carasik, 
2013; Pieri, 2015). Doward’s report also mentions that “two of the 7/7 bombers, 
Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, attended Tablighi Jamaat mosques” 
and that, according to counter-terrorism sources, “it is more likely that radicalised 
young Muslims are attracted to Tablighi Jamaat than the other way round.” (ibid)  
Throughout, both newspapers established links between the bombers and religious 
schools even though it was evident in The Guardian investigative reporting that those 
bombers were also considerably Westernised in their ideas and lifestyles to the extent 
that some had girlfriends; this is not permissible in Islam, which forbids any sort of 
relationship outside marriage (see The Guardian, 9 April 2006 and 7 May 2006). 
Logically speaking, it was not Western values and democracy that moved Blair and Bush 
to invade Iraq, neither was it the particular teachings of the Quran that encouraged the 
London bombers to take their violent and inhuman action. Arguably, both actions 
transgressed the fine traditions of Christianity and Islam because, as discussed earlier, 
both sets of protagonists had made their own interpretations and had acted in “the 
name of God”. It was further noted in the above-mentioned reports that al-Qaeda was 
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not involved in 7/7, which tells us that the London bombing was more of a political 
complaint, even though the bombers’ means of complaining was appalling and wrong. 
(ibid)  
The impact of the distorted image of British and foreign mosques and the relatively 
negative representation of religious school (madrassas) in Pakistan which, according to 
these newspapers, had radicalised the 7/7 bombers resulted in calls to regulate these 
places or otherwise ban them. But one might say that Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini, Bush, 
Blair and secular dictators in the Muslim world, who never attended religious schools 
and were considerably modern and highly educated, have killed millions around the 
world. Several scholars have acknowledged that these dictators and rulers have no link 
with churches and mosques (see McKim, 2008, p.287; Nwaneri, 2012, p.85; Price, 2012, 
p.xxi).  
To be fair, these newspapers were reporting factual events and incidences; for example, 
Abu-Hamza and a few other radical hate-preachers have used mosques to spread their 
own interpretations of religion, which has also affected the British Muslim community. 
Both newspapers continuously pointed out that the alleged bombers and suspects used 
mosques as meeting points where they were introduced to one another, distributed 
pamphlets carrying radicalised material, and recruited and radicalised young British 
Muslims.  
The Guardian is surely right to suggest the need to appoint English-speaking imams in 
British mosques, as they are better able to reach out to young British Muslims. 
Furthermore, there is a need to increase contacts between Muslim and non-Muslim 
communities and arrange exchange visits to mosques. This is currently happening at 
Leeds Grand and Leeds Makkah mosque, which has been named the model mosque in 
the UK. In comparison to The Daily Telegraph, The Guardian’s coverage of mosques was 
more balanced because it acknowledged, albeit marginally, that mosques can play a role 
in strengthening social cohesion and integration. It was right to point out that British 
mosques are run by elderly men of the first generation who have fewer contacts with 
young British Muslims including women.  
Several Muslim and non-Muslim writers have also pointed out the problem of elderly 
control in mosques; some youngsters perhaps do not attend the mosques because these 
elderly people hold conservative views that do not appeal to young people (Dyke, 2009; 
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Maksood, 2005). In brief, both newspapers’ examinations of the 7/7 event suggest that 
these newspapers and their contributors believe that British Muslims need to be 
modern in their thinking and approach to life; they should incorporate Western ideas 
that should also be visible in British mosques in particular. On this point, both 
newspapers offer limited discussions and, of course, the ideas of Western modernity, 
which is mainly about the adoption of secular values, are contradictory and complex in a 
globalised world that has different cultural and structural dimensions of modernity 
(Eisenstadt, 2010, p.2; Shipeng, 2008, p.74).  
7.9-Are British Muslims Failing Modernity? 
The idea of “moderate Islam” in post-7/7 Britain means finding a way to adjust to the 
fight against the terrorism threat, which is often believed to have originated from the 
ideology of religion. For The Daily Telegraph, the idea of ‘moderate Islam’ is Sufi Islam 
that will “counter Islamic radicalization in Britain” which it  explained in the words of 
Haras Rafiq, one of the two co-founders of ‘The Sufi Muslim Council’ (SMC) of Britain 
which aimed at giving a “voice to the silent majority” (The Daily Telegraph, 20 July 
2006). In the same editorial it acknowledged that the Sufi Muslim Council has proved 
“that it speaks for the moderate, silent majority of British Muslims.” (ibid) Several 
scholars assume that the growing talk of “moderate Islam” relates to attempts to 
counter the radical ideology that is supposedly behind terrorism (see Charny, 2007; 
Cole, 2006; Muedini, 2015).  
However, The Daily Telegraph neither expanded on Sufism nor explained it in its 
comments or editorial sections to enhance ordinary readers’ and its own understanding 
of Sufi Islam. Historically, it is a well-documented fact that Sufism (Tasawwuf), which 
means the “inner, mystical, or psycho-spiritual dimension of Islam”, has been popular in 
the sub-continent during Muslim rule.  In brief, it could be described as “an aspect or 
dimension of Islam” while its followers’ ways of practising Islam or “Orders” (Tariqas) 
are very similar to those of Sunnis and Shias; yet, it is not considered “a sect of Islam” 
like these two divisions (see BBC, 8 September 2009). In contrast, a news report in The 
Guardian presented the views of the Muslim Council of Britain which dismissed the “Sufi 
Council of Britain’s” claim that “up to 80% of Britain’s 2 million Muslims come from the 
Sufi tradition, which is a mystical and personal interpretation of Islam and largely 
apolitical” (The Guardian, 19 July 2006). Obviously, the “silent majority” is a complex 
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cliché which not only lacks authentic evidence of “moderate Muslim” numbers but also 
fails to offer an agreed and logical definition of a “moderate Muslim”.  
One of the problems for these newspapers was how to reach out to the inner British 
Muslim communities that are not represented in the mainstream Muslim organisations. 
The reason is that none of the mainstream British Muslim organisations, think-tanks 
and other groups such as the mosque committees have contacts with the wider 
community to hear their opinions on the selection of official bodies responsible for 
running the affairs of these organisations. In fact, some of these organisations and think-
tanks are seen as controversial because they endorse administration “political agendas” 
and shape public opinion accordingly (Kundnani, 2008). These are evidently backed by 
government institutions even though the government claims that it offers its support to 
combat extremism within the Muslim community. Hence, the contested political 
procedure has resulted in many political and religious representative bodies of British 
Muslims being seen as controversial, which in turn suggests a serious problem with 
“British Muslim representation”.  
It would appear that the ideas of “moderate Islam” and “moderate Muslims” are weak 
concepts that contradict and undermine the basic Western value of individual liberty. I 
would also say that Islam is a complete way of life that is based on divine principles and 
values that are designed for mankind’s benefit and are universally applicable. The real 
problem is not religion but a few radical individuals who occasionally misinterpret 
sacred teachings for their own interests. To critics, this may give non-religious people 
the impression that, if mainstream religions such as Christianity and Islam can render 
their followers absolute and extreme, British society is justified in seeking to protect 
what it considers its own values of moderation, freedom and toleration.  
Simply put, religion can guide us towards what is better for us. For example, we all 
know that cigarettes cause cancer and therefore kill; this is even mentioned on the 
packs but it has not stopped millions from dying as a result of smoking and it may not 
stop current smokers. A widely quoted verse from the Quran says: “There is no 
compulsion in religion. Truth stands out clear from error: Whoever rejects evil and 
believes in Allah heareth and knoweth all things” (2:256); the Quran also says: “Say, ‘the 
truth is from your Lord’: Let him who will, believe, and let him who will, reject (it)” 
(18:29) (see Ruzgar, 2005, p.159).  
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The discourse on moderate and progressive Muslims within The Guardian and The Daily 
Telegraph reflects that modern Muslims are compatible with the secular West and, 
hence, ‘modern Islam’ according to these newspapers is an option in post-7/7 
challenges. For The Daily Telegraph, modern Islam is “Sufi Islam” and for The Guardian it 
is “British Islam’ a reformed face compatible with secular Britain. Notably, The Guardian 
ran a long debate on modernity and Islam which is still continuing (see The Guardian, 16 
July 2005; 5 October 2005; 16 March 2015 and 17 May 2015). However, in contrast to 
The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph narrative of ‘modern Muslims’, scholars have 
varied views on modern Muslims and modern Islam. For example, Rabasa et al. (2007) 
suggest that they are more ‘liberal-minded’ and hostile to the concept of “Islamic State”, 
which means that “liberal Muslims” approve of democratic government according to 
Islamic teachings but not a “dynasty”, such as the Saudi government (Rabasa et al., 2007, 
p.72). Other Muslims are “Islamists” with political agendas to pursue, such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood (Rabasa et al., 2007, p.75).  
The next category, “Moderate Muslims”, is difficult to define because scholars are largely 
divided on their description. According to Daniel (Ghasem) Akbari (2013), “Moderate 
Muslims” are quite similar to the Taliban who are fighting against the Americans 
because they want to liberate Afghanistan and set up a democracy (Akbari, 2013, p.51). 
Akbari also believes that “Moderate Muslims” in the West endorse the Afghan Taliban’s 
polices and prefer to support Islamic values rather than liberty and freedom; hence, 
“The difference is that moderates prefer to be supporters rather than perpetrators” 
(Akbari, 2013, p.51-52). Akbari’s narrative of “Moderate Muslims” is a limited and 
rather confused description that is reflective of American understanding; it talks only of 
“liberty and freedom” and fails to provide a scholarly discussion of “Islamic values”. The 
concept of Islamic values is not limited to a few morals and standards; in fact, it offers a 
complete guide to life based on Quran and Hadith principles. Here, Hadith denotes the 
sayings and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) on, for example, ways of 
eating, sleeping and conversing. Evidence shows that in Muslim societies women were 
participating in elections before European women in Switzerland and France were 
allowed to vote (see Mazrui, 1997). Evidently, despite a different approach to Islamic 
values The Guardian also published the views of a Muslim scholar Tariq Ramadan 
before the occurrence of the 7/7 event; he said that “Islam is not a culture but a body of 
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principles and universal values… Islam allows Muslims to adopt aspects of the culture 
they find themselves in, as long as it does not oppose any clear prohibition specified by 
their religion” (The Guardian, 21 January 2005).  
John L. Esposito’s narrative of “Moderate Muslims” is quite comprehensive and 
addresses the complexities involved in the discourse. Esposito acknowledges that it is a 
problematic term because there are no agreed criteria upon which we can decide who is 
a moderate Muslim, Christian, Jew or “a moderate Republican or Democrat” (Esposito, 
2011, p.147). Esposito raises a few significant questions in regard to the concept of 
“moderate”. For example, “Is a moderate Muslim one who accepts secularism and 
separation of Church and state? Or can a moderate believe in a state where no religion is 
privileged and rights of all (believer and non-believer) are protected?” (ibid) Further, 
Esposito asks whether “someone who promotes the equality of women and men but 
also opposes the wearing of hijab” can be a moderate Muslim. (ibid) In brief, Esposito 
claims that, in the West, “moderate” is often used to describe “so-called progressive or 
liberal Muslims and excludes conservatives or traditionalists as well as 
fundamentalists” (ibid, 2011, p.147-148).  
Thus, one might say that the idea of a “moderate Muslim” in fact promotes exclusion, 
particularly of opponents. Esposito also writes that authoritarian regimes in Muslim 
countries define “moderate” as someone who does not oppose their government’s 
policies (Esposito, 2011, p.147). Esposito states that Muslims living in the West are not 
opponents of Western values or way of life but, rather, “What we do, our policies and 
actions, not from our way of life” (The Guardian, 7 July 2006). Baker et al. (2013) also 
suggest that “moderate Muslims” is a loaded term but they find that, for the British 
press, “moderate Muslim” means a good Muslim; for example, Yusuf Islam, the musician 
formerly known as Cat Stevens, is a moderate face of British Muslims (Baker et al.,  
2013, p.165).    
(i)- Freedom of Speech:  
Both newspapers raised concerns in their editorials, news reports, comments and 
feature sections that British Muslims are over-sensitive in their views on freedom of 
speech in secular societies. These newspapers’ observations of British Muslims’ view of 
freedom of speech are based on a series of events such as the Rushdie Affair (1989) and 
the cartoon controversies (2005-2015). In regard to the cartoon controversy, a few 
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radical organisations and groups held protests in the first week of February 2006 which 
provided both broadsheets with a reason to discuss freedom of expression largely 
based upon the behaviour of those participants that was unacceptably aggressive and 
threatening. But the cartoon controversy upset the British and global Muslim 
community, which was sensitive to ‘freedom of speech’ in the context of the constant 
derogatory images of the Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) and not to the concept itself, as 
it is used in news reporting, scholarly writings, political discussions and debates.  
On the cartoon controversy and the resulting freedom of expression debate, The 
Guardian writer Karen Armstrong presented an analysis based upon the history of 
Muslims and pointed out that Muslim societies had long been practising it (The 
Guardian, 21 July 2007). Armstrong notes the paradox that one of Mulla Sadra’s most 
famous admirers was Ayatollah Khomeini, author of the fatwa against Salman Rushdie 
(ibid). In fact, long before Mulla Sadra in the Mughal’s Court, particularly Akbar, 
freedom of expression was a cherished value (Rai, 2010; Phillips and Gritzner, 2003, 
p.40).  
However, blasphemy has had little resonance in British society and there have been few 
examples of this in British law since the case of George Jacob Holyoake in the mid-
nineteenth century. Undoubtedly, those cartoon protestors themselves violated fine 
Islamic teachings by their intimidating and rude behaviour particularly to their fellow 
citizens and their country of birth, where the cartoons had been condemned in the press 
and by the government.  
Indeed, the behaviour of the protesters paved the way for discussions and debates in 
which various writers and commentators including these newspapers’ editorials began 
to view British Muslims as over-sensitive, backwards and incompatible with British 
values, including freedom of speech. There is always a trade-off in Britain between the 
freedom of expression and restrictions such as the blasphemy laws. The law is much 
more willing to take action on issues of racism than it is about blasphemy. Interestingly, 
Britain has a “Zero tolerance” policy on racism but insulting religious figures is not seen 
as an act of racism (see Hart, 2014; Kundnani, 2007; Mitchell, 2014).  
On this occasion, Anjem Choudhary, an organiser of the demonstration, refused to 
denounce the possibility of another attack on the scale of 7/7. Here, Choudhary’s 
extreme views are out of step with Islam’s basic teaching, which is tolerance, even 
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though, more importantly, Britain did not wage war on British Muslims; hence, to state 
that another attack is possible reflects his self-styled discriminatory position. Moreover, 
his threatening and inflammatory speech fuelled anger and further strengthened the 
stereotypical perception that British Muslims hate freedom of expression and are anti-
Western and anti-democratic. Given that the terrorism incident of July 7 resulted in the 
deaths of innocent people, these newspapers’ response to the protesters, particularly 
Choudhary, is valid.   
On the cartoon issue, The Daily Telegraph’s editorial viewpoint is quite considerate but 
somewhat disappointing in the sense that it gave a handful of radicals extraordinary 
coverage. It would appear that this pattern of reporting in both newspapers suggests 
that controversial and self-styled scholars receive more attention in press debates and 
discussions. More importantly, in this way ordinary people have less opportunity to 
gain a true and real insight into religious matters. The point is that such a selective 
representation pattern of self-styled scholars and hate preachers causes confusion and 
misguides ordinary readers on important issues and debates.  This also shows that 
radicals use media support to shape public opinions and debates and build an image of 
the entire community. However, it is also important to note that radical editors, 
government officials and representatives of right-wing organisations also influence the 
press. In other words, there may not be anything surprising about this as the press has 
to include a variety of opinions, even those with which it disagrees.  
The press operates on different levels; for instance, on issues contradicting secular 
traditions, Muslim scholars and their non-Muslim friends receive press criticism. This 
includes criticism of Jack Straw, Ken Livingstone and Rowan Williams for their 
sympathetic views on the ‘Prophet Muhammad cartoons’, ‘Yousaf al-Qaradawi’s visit to 
the UK’, and ‘Sharia’. It appears that those Muslims and their sympathisers who 
question the Israel-Palestine issue, Western policies and secular traditions and disagree 
with same-sex marriages were often presented by The Daily Telegraph as anti-Semitic, 
anti-West, extremists and Islamists, such as London Mayor Ken Livingstone (see The 
Daily Telegraph, 15 September 2005).   
Similarly, the criteria applied to progressive Muslim scholars or politicians’ press 
representation were different from those applied to their non-Muslim counterparts, 
who received more positive coverage. The criteria for politicians in debates change 
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according to the news values and public interests. There is a need for modernity in all 
walks of life including in Muslim schools and mosques. This means more open thinking 
and a readiness to accept secular traditions in their original sense. There exists a strong 
assumption among most commentators and writers of The Guardian and The Daily 
Telegraph that faith is a major barrier to integration.  
As illustrated earlier, the press portrayal of progressive Muslim politicians and scholars 
shows that debates on British Muslims are often framed from a powerful Western point 
of view which is somewhat surprising in a Western country that advocates equality and 
openness, which should be reflected in debates that also include voices of inner 
communities in particular. This sense of duplicity is not visible in academic writings as 
Jytte Klausen (2009) point outs that Europe is familiar with blasphemy laws, and even 
in countries where such laws do not exist “The media often refrain from printing things 
that are perceived as objectionable to religious people” (Klausen, 2009, p.87).   
Klausen talks of double standards in regard to blasphemy laws: “Advocates of the 
double-standard view argued that Christian sensitivities are readily recognized whereas 
Muslims’ feelings are ignored and derided” (ibid., p.87) He also cites the example of the 
same Jyllands-Posten paper that published the Prophet Muhammad caricatures but that 
“...a few years earlier had refused to publish defamatory cartoons portraying Jesus on 
the grounds that the images would offend readers.” (ibid, p.87) However, some may 
point out that Klausen has obviously led a sheltered life because the media often 
challenge the blasphemy laws of the Church of England. Moreover, some may also say 
that the Irish comedian Dave Allen, who often dressed up as a drunken Pope falling 
over, may have been insulting to many Christians and their religious values.  
Evidently, there are dual standards on both sides; on the one hand the West advocates 
“freedom of expression” and on the other it limits and misuses it for political gain, which 
is the politics of most regions of the world. Similarly, those radical protesters neglect the 
teachings and exemplary character of their Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) who has been 
sent as Rahmatul Alameen (blessing for mankind) and whose mercy and forgiveness 
touched his enemies (see Armstrong 2001; 2007: Brown, 2014). A key difference 
between The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph is that each has its own version of 
freedom of expression. For example, The Guardian published an interview with Sheikh 
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Qardawi at the height of a debate in which several British politicians and newspapers 
including The Daily Telegraph campaigned to ban him from the UK for his radical views.  
In short, one might say that freedom of expression is a delicate and sensitive 
phenomenon because, obviously, in a pluralistic society such as Britain it may not be 
easy to protect freedom of expression at all times given that there will always be some 
people or groups likely to be offended by language or images used in press reporting. 
The freedom of expression thesis is problematic because it is difficult to identify who 
will decide the limits on what can be said and what cannot, considering people’s faith, 
beliefs and ideas in a pluralistic society.  
(ii) Modernity: “Modern Islam”, “Moderate Muslims” and “British Islam”.  
Both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph emphasise that the threat of “Islamic 
terrorism” and growing radicalisation among British Muslims might be countered by 
forging an alliance with moderate Muslims. The broader discussions surrounding the 
idea of “modern Islam” and “moderate Muslims” in these newspapers engage policy-
makers, politicians and pressure groups, particularly liberal and secular-minded 
individuals together with some British Muslims. The mindset here is to work with the 
“moderate Muslims” since, if all that remains is Fundamentalism, there will be an 
increasing possibility of serious conflict that may result in more terrorism attacks. 
These contributors to the debate insist that the government should form an alliance 
with moderate Muslims to defeat terrorism and build a more cohesive society.  
The Guardian suggested that one possibility was to modernise British mosques, with the 
government encouraging appointments of British-born English-speaking Imams and 
ensuring that young British Muslims have a voice in mosque committees and affairs. In 
other words, the concept of modern British Islam mainly suggests those moderate 
Muslims who abide by secular British values, such as the acceptance of same-sex 
marriages and proposals for women-only mosques.  
Despite clear differences on a range of issues such as combating terrorism and 
radicalisation, however, The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph shared a common 
understanding of “modern Islam” and “moderate Muslims” in all types of journalism, 
particularly in their editorials, with only limited scope for alternative opinion. The 
shared perception is that British mosques should adopt modernity in terms of English-
speaking imams, provide more space to young British Muslims and seek to play an 
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important role in combating extremism and radicalisation among British Muslims. In 
their editorials and reporting, groups and individuals who approve of secular values 
were presented as modern Muslims, while those who hold contradictory views on 
sensitive issues such as same-sex marriages were portrayed as extremists, radicals and 
anti-Westerners.  
For Edward Said, the Muslim world and the West have failed to understand each other 
despite both recognising the need for knowledge and understanding. For Muslims ‘Seek 
Knowledge even you have to travel as far as to China’ is a prophetic teaching; 
meanwhile, in Europe since the Greek period the thirst for knowledge has remained a 
popular tradition (Said, 1997, p.144). Further, Said states that in the present arena 
regardless of technological advancements the two sides seem ignorant of each other’s 
cultures, which has fuelled the view of Islam as a threat to Europe and America. (ibid) 
Said believes the media is largely responsible for the fact that most people in America 
and West only link ‘unpleasant news’ such as individual acts of violence and extremism 
to Islam (Said, 1997, p.144). 
John Esposito assumes that, “For many, Islam was seen as incompatible with modernity, 
in particular with democratization and modernization” (Esposito, 2003, p.3). 
Considering the significance of the editorial, it is fair to say that The Daily Telegraph 
adheres to the “moderate Muslims” thesis with little understanding of Islam and the 
character of a true believer (Muslim) according to the Quran and Sunnah (see 
Appendix-J). Another important factor that is missing in the notions of “moderate 
Muslims” and “modern Islam” is an understanding of the basic concepts that make Islam 
compatible with races, eras and regions.  
Evidence shows that “Moderate” and “Progressive Muslims” are those who are more 
compatible with the secular traditions such as tolerance of homosexuality and abortion. 
But some may say that, since Western society is diverse, pluralistic and protean, it is not 
surprising that people hold such views. Evidently, Orthodox Jews and Christians 
disagree with a few elements of modern Western societies, such as same-sex marriages, 
while they follow certain dress codes, such as nuns. A Sikh’s beard is an important part 
of his faith; similarly, the wearing of a headscarf in many cultures and faiths is also 
essential practice. Evidently, a number of Christians and Jews in Europe and America 
are anti-abortionist. Moreover, a considerable number of orthodox Christians, Jews, 
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Buddhists and Sikhs and other members of faith communities disapprove of same-sex 
marriages, sex outside marriage and abortion; in other words, they hold similar views to 
those of Muslims (see Menocal, 2002; PewResearch Surveys, 18 June 2014 and 2 July 
2015; Peters, 2004). There is nothing surprising about this in pluralistic societies, as 
such differences are seen as individual freedoms and are not the source of serious 
clashes. 
Given the cultural variations within Muslim countries and regions, there are 
incompatible features among various Muslim nations, tribes and groups; for example, 
the ‘way of life’ of a Baloch, Pashtun, Punjabi and Sindhi are completely different, yet 
they follow the same religion. Similarly, there are variations in Western cultures and 
regions; for example, Yorkshire people’s traditions differ from those of Scots.  But there 
is less talk of these variations in The Daily Telegraph and The Guardian, perhaps 
suggesting that the “British way of life” is a uniform entity. Most talks on “British way of 
life” were largely based on the Western point of view. For example, “Justice” was a 
common theme in all sacred texts including the Quran before the birth of secularism 
(see Al-Hajj, 22:10; Ar-Rum, 30:29; Al-Anfal, 8:51). More importantly, the 99 names of 
Allah SWT (God) Al-Haq (The Truth) and Al-Adl (The Utterly Just) signify the 
essentiality of Justice. Hence, justice is a cherished and shared value of all faiths.   
Similarly, The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph did not discuss the theological concepts 
in Islam in regard to modernity, i.e. al-Ijma and al-Ijtihad and al-Qiyas, which exist in 
addition to Quran and Sunnah teachings. However, some might say that these 
newspapers rarely make even the slightest reference to the theology of Christianity and 
that newspapers’ role is to report events and reflect upon varied views. In fact the roles 
of the media are varied in circumstances and societies. They should not only report, 
inform and brief people about certain issues be it terrorism and security but should also 
enhance their knowledge of those issues facing society by offering investigative and 
quality journalism. Many media scholars and critics agree that the role of the media 
should be constructive, endorsing knowledge building, community cohesion, and 
educating society and so forth (see Saunders and Goddard, 2002; Baran and Davis 
2012).  
Based on the above underlying concepts, Islamic scholars, Jurists, muftis and Ulamas 
offer solutions to issues in the contemporary period. Several scholars have discussed 
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and debated these theological concepts, rulings and comparative views on modern-day 
issues with regard to Islam (see Esposito and J. DeLong-Bas, 2001; Mutahari, 2014; 
Ramadan, 2009). Furthermore, the discussion on modernity and moderate Muslims 
largely includes the views of those that are neither representatives of Islam nor 
publically recognised as scholars of Islam. In view of the wider definition of the terms 
‘modernity’ and the ‘traditional’, Andrew Rippin attempts to un-knot the complication 
involved in understanding both concepts, ‘modernity’ and ‘traditional’, which are 
referred to as Europe and Islam in scholarly texts. Rippin writes that ‘modernity is that 
which has created fundamental changes in behaviour and belief about economics, 
politics, social organisation and intellectual discourse…modern era enlightened, secular, 
rational, disenchanted, (i.e. the loss of magic), scientific” (Rippin, 1993, p.12-13). In 
contrast to the idea of modernity there is a concept of ‘traditional’ or ‘Traditionalists’ 
which is often linked to Islam and Muslims and is lesser in value (ibid, p.29).  
 From Rippin’s point of view, it is important to see ‘modernity’ as a worldwide 
phenomenon, not an exclusively ‘Western’ one. There are also a few problematic 
characteristics of ‘modernity’ involving ‘colonial, imperialist, missionary, Western 
invasion’ which are commonly seen in the Muslim world (ibid, p.14). Further, he 
explores and studies mainstream Islamic scholars in different periods of times and 
reaches the conclusion that ‘modernity’ is not restricted in Islam; in fact, Al-Gazali 
(1058-111), Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703-87), Shah Wali 
Ullah (1702-62), Jamal-ud-Din Afghani (1839-97), Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905), 
Rashid Rida (1865-1935), Sayyid Ahmed Khan  (1817-98), Muhammad Iqbal (1876-
1938) and Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) were all reformers, which suggests that the 
essence of modification already exists in Islam and it can be understood by these terms 
‘Mujaddid’or ‘Ijtihad’[2] (ibid, p.31). In brief, on modernity both newspapers’ views 
were largely based on secular thoughts even though Britain in principle is a pluralist 
society in which a number of religions and faith communities live side by side.  
7.10- Engaging with the British Muslim Community:  Problems and Grievances.  
Both newspapers discussed and debated post-7/7 British society in the context of 
British Muslims’ social cohesion and integration within wider society. Most of the 
reporting talked about problems within the British Muslim community; for instance, 
they have created social ghettos and live parallel lives rooted in their cultural and 
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religious beliefs/ideologies such as separate schools, veils, thus leading to 
radicalisation. Moreover,, these newspapers, particularly The Daily Telegraph, pointed 
out that British Muslims do not endorse ‘Freedom of Speech’ and criticism of their 
religion, which make them less integrated in mainstream British society. But The 
Guardian commentators and reporters presented the Muslim view, with regard to the 
cartoon protests, that freedom-of-speech boundaries should be drawn in order to avoid 
confusion and conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims (The Guardian, 5 February 
2006, 12 February 2006).   
On this topic, the narrative basically suggests that British Muslims are backward and 
incompatible with secular and Western traditions which endorse liberty and freedom. 
Subsequently, the key debate appears to have revolved around modernity and Islam, 
particularly the perception that Islam does not allow freedom or endorse democracy. In 
debates on Islam and Muslims, the media along with the polity too often omit the 
notions of freedom and liberty. Moreover, to an extent, both fail to differentiate between 
questioning matters of interest and disrespecting sacred texts such as the Quran and 
hadiths when discussing Islam and its teachings. There are several verses in the Quran 
that invite and encourage man to ponder upon the life around him (Al-Imran, 190; 
Ghashiyyah, 17 and 20; Ibrahim, 32 and 34). Other popular debates have centred on the 
veil (2006) and Sharia (2008) and currently these are reforming Muslims, their identity 
and place in secular Europe, radicalisation and extremism (Bryan, 2014; Jackson, 2009; 
Ramadan, 2008).   
One of the serious problems within the British Muslim community is the division based 
upon the religious sects Brelwis and Whabbis, like Catholics and Protestants. The 
absence of a central authority and a common Muslim representative body that could 
represent Muslims across Britain is a major hurdle to building a mutual census among 
Muslims over their problems. Indeed, there are problems within the British Muslim 
community, just like other communities. 
For instance, there is the an absence of a widely acknowledged leadership that is 
representative of wider Muslims community, a lack of English-speaking imams, and the 
presence of a sectarian divide , all of which were mentioned in these two newspapers. 
While discussing and debating the barriers to integration and social cohesion in post-
7/7 British society, The Guardian in particular was evidently focused upon human rights 
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and civil liberties in all the discussions and debates aimed at challenging extremism and 
radicalisation. Moreover, it acknowledged in comments sections that the government 
should select, promote and engage with like-minded British Muslims (see The Guardian, 
18 November 2005).  
In a series of comments, debates and opinion pieces The Guardian provided space to 
academics, politicians, commentators and writers of different political orientations who 
encouraged the government to engage with British Muslims in various ways. It 
acknowledged that British Muslims are in many ways forced to embrace aspects of 
secular society that alienate them. Further, in response to Blair’s 12-point proposal to 
combat terrorism, The Guardian editorial suggested that the government should not 
close down mosques or interfere in the religious matters of Muslims as this may 
alienate them (The Guardian, 6 August 2005). Some commentators offered useful 
suggestions for engaging with British Muslims that may also help to curb the problems 
of extremism and radicalisation (see The Guardian, 10 July 2005).  
Indeed, reflecting upon the post-7/7 situation The Guardian was right to suggest that 
religious freedom should be respected and that the government should refrain from 
interfering in British Muslims’ faith. Earlier, it had been a loudly-voiced grievance of 
Muslims that Western governments interfered in their faith and political matters. Of 
course the significance of such an approach was to restore British Muslims’ confidence 
and strengthen their beliefs in British core values, which are freedom, equality and 
tolerance.  
One commentator, Timothy Garton Ash, said that the best way to restore British 
Muslims’ confidence and resolve their grievances is to support genuine democratisation 
in the Middle East (The Guardian, 3 August 2006). This means that Britain should not 
back dictators and monarchs. In other words, Britain can win the confidence of Muslims 
by sharing the fruits of democracy. Further, the government must not adopt any policy 
to silence them by force because they may take up alternative tools that would harm 
society (The Guardian, 10 July 2005). Other commentators argued that the best way to 
reach young British people is to hear their grievances (The Guardian, 21 November 
2005). Indeed, open dialogue suggests individual liberty over the issues they are facing, 
which is the essence of a democratic society like Britain.  
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Several commentators in The Guardian approved of government plans to combat 
Islamophobia, train imams, create a national curriculum to engage with British Muslims, 
and hold road shows with influential Muslims. The third generation of young British 
Muslims is passionate to take up new roles within the community and is thirsting for 
education; hence, the government must take this opportunity and engage with such 
youth. Besides, many scholars suggest that improved community cohesion and 
integration are the best options to combat extremism and radicalisation in society (see 
Husband and Alam, 2011; Harris and Briggs, 2010; Kundanani, 2015). Post-7/7 British 
society faced a serious security challenge and divisions; hence, in this situation The 
Guardian’s suggestions were significant and wise because radicalisation, extremism and 
anti-social behaviour can be tackled at grass-roots levels and, for this, community 
support is essential.   
On the other hand, there is an urgent need to enhance political engagement and 
acknowledge and protect British Muslims, like other faith communities. Britain should 
engage with its own Muslims as well as those in the outside world by embracing and 
sharing the fruits of democracy. Further, instead of investing in the next generation of 
weapons against an unknown threat, the UK should invest in its Muslim communities. 
One way of restoring Muslims’ confidence and solving their grievances is to support 
democratisation in the Middle East (The Guardian, 12 August 2006). 
There is a need for more civil liberties and for enhancing political engagement and 
acknowledgement of Muslims, like other communities. More importantly, The Guardian 
states that if young people’s grievances are not heard but, rather, forcibly silenced, they 
will take up alternative tools. The Guardian also suggested that the third generation of 
young Muslims is passionate about taking up new roles within the community and 
thirsting for education. Denouncing Islamist scholars such as Al-Qaradawi will affect 
Muslim-non-Muslim relationships and limit Britain’s role in the Muslim world because 
of the Sheikh’s following among influential and ordinary Muslims.  
To some extent, it is evident that British Muslims are in many ways forced to embrace 
aspects of a secular society. However, Timothy Garton Ash, Karen Armstrong, Seumas 
Milne and Jonathan Freedland have written a series of comment pieces suggesting that 
the British government should improve its relationship with British Muslim 
communities. This shows the visionary approach of The Guardian which suggests that 
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the best way to tackle extremism and achieve a more cohesive society is to consider 
British Muslims as active partners in pursuing these objectives. 
7.11-Reflection on the Debates: Re-emergence of “Us” and “Them” Rhetoric.  
A reflection on the overall discussion in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph clearly 
indicates that the emergence of a new binary division between “The Non-Muslim Britain 
and West” and “The British Muslims or the Islamic world which is also ‘The Rest’” is in 
fact based on the London Bombings narrative, which further suggests that this clash will 
continue. Suddenly, British Muslims’ religious and cultural beliefs and norms, such as 
veils and mosques, became a source of suspicion, fear and threats. Admittedly, some of 
the concerns raised in the newspapers were genuine in that the 7/7 incident has made 
everyday life less safe and has shaken public confidence.  
On the macro level, the West seems concerned that its secular values are under threat 
even though considerable evidence shows that the suicide bombers were well-
integrated into the Westernised lifestyle rather than being conservative-minded people. 
Politicians and press made comparisons between an ideology of “hope and compassion” 
(the West/Britain) and an ideology of “hate” (Bombers/Islamic…), showing that the 
West has a defined doctrine that it is supreme and superior. In sum, the issues and 
debates surrounding freedom of speech, cartoon protests, mosques’ role in society, the 
veil, the need for moderate Muslims, and modernity arose because both broadsheets 
interpreted and presented the London bombings as an act that damaged every aspect of 
society; to an extent, this is a fair interpretation and description of events that might 
have been worse had, for example, the British press decided to publish the cartoon of 
the prophet.  
This research comprehends that the modern “British way of life” has a great deal to 
offer in the creation of a multicultural society that can prevail over problems such as 
extremism and radicalisation. Specifically, The Guardian built upon its argument for the 
adaptation of the ‘British way of life’ featuring its core values such as ‘humanity’ and 
‘tolerance’ which it believed might facilitate the creation of a more integrated society. 
But our current level of knowledge tells us that the “British way of life” with all its 
benefits is still imperfect. The point is that in a multicultural society every community 
has something valuable to offer, a notion that was missing from both newspapers’ 
reporting on 7/7. 
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 For the editors, writers, commentators and other contributors of these broadsheets, 
Islam is incompatible with the Western culture and values, while only a few Muslim 
contributors disagreed with this thesis. It is evident that the concepts of social benefits, 
policing, charities, health and safety and minorities’ rights all concur with Islamic 
teachings. Further, the concept of Sharia is not all about punishments and individual 
restrictions; in fact, these are secondary aspects that may not come into practice since, if 
the needs and wants of all people become the state’s responsibility, there may well be a 
reduction in crime committed as a result of poverty. This is where these two 
newspapers were incorrect because they concentrated mainly on parts of verses from 
the Quran that fitted into their context of the story but they omitted the explanations 
and historical contexts of those verses because they contradicted the claims these 
newspapers were making about jihad and radicalisation. The same could be said for 
those quoting excerpts from the Bible. Thus, it is largely to do with interpretation. 
7.12-Conclusion:  
The reactions and interpretations of The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph regarding 
the bombing incorporated a blend of assessments with specific emphasis on the concern 
that the British-born suicide bombers had threatened “The British way of life”. Initially, 
this assumption gained currency because Prime Minister Blair attached significant 
importance to the belief that the London bombers hated the British way of life and that 
the threat of extremists placed “our values” in great danger. Further, politicians and 
public representatives  used norms such as “human life”, “civilised people”, “our 
society”, “our values”, justice”, “hope” and compassion” in their speeches, all of which 
have symbolic meanings.  
Both newspapers extended these ideas by providing space to various politically-
oriented writers, contributors and regular columnists who shaped the debate. Although 
Blair initially made a clear distinction between “Us” (British people including Muslims) 
and “Them” (terrorist/extremists), the “Us” and “Them” rhetoric gradually changed in 
both newspapers. He began to urge Muslims exclusively to tackle extremism, suggesting 
that it was their problem and that they were all responsible, thereby designating them 
as new “Others”  who are not only incompatible with the British way of life but are also 
‘dangerous insiders’.  
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In addition, many other issues were exclusively linked to British Muslims, such as the 
veil debate and the cartoon controversy that brought the ‘freedom of speech’ rhetoric 
into the spotlight, suggesting that British Muslims are over-sensitive to the Western 
freedom of expression norm. Most writers, columnists and contributors continued to 
attach certain specific attributes to the ‘British way of life’ while both broadsheets’ 
editorials gave the term “Islamic” negative connotations such as extremism, radicalism, 
terrorism and fundamentalism, building an impression that this divide is between 
“good” [West-Britain]  and “evil” [Muslims-British Muslims].  
Most of the reporting in The Guardian indicated polemic views on the veil, including 
Muslim women’s voices, while The Daily Telegraph invited guest politicians including 
Conservative and Labour MPs to shed light on the veil from their constituencies’ 
perspectives. Overall, the veil appeared as a form of oppression rather than choice and 
was categorised under the “Civilised” vs. “Backwardness” rhetoric. Moreover, the 
overall reporting indicated that this on-going clash has different meanings in different 
situations and regions. Repeatedly, it reappeared with different impressions but the 
same old belief that the “Orient” other is incompatible with the West. The London 
Bombings brought it back in its worst form, i.e. the new home-grown “Orient” who is 
inherently “violent” and “dangerous” has now become “radicalised other” and a 
“traitor”.   
The reporting encompassing ‘Modernity’ and ‘Britishness’ indicated a consensus that 
British Muslims should adopt some aspects of modern British values because their 
Islamic values are incompatible with the British life, which is more secular. In fairness, 
The Guardian was suggesting that British Muslims and other groups should retain their 
identities; however, in a modern society all groups and all religions must intersect with 
one another. However, there has been a great deal of one-sided discussion on Islamic 
values. These were not discussed, nor were any well-known Islamic scholars such as 
Grand Moftis and Ullamahs consulted in these debates. Although, to some extent, British 
Muslims have received a sympathetic representation, a closed view of Islam still 
prevails because little space was allocated for a balanced debate. Given the political 
orientation of these two newspapers, i.e. generally left- and right-wing, which can still 
survive in a multicultural society, similarly two different cultures can also live together 
side by side. In the end, both the ‘British way of life’ and the ‘Islamic values’ have more 
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in common to celebrate than certain differences that can be negotiated and 
compromised.  
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Chapter 8- Reflection on Findings: The Re-Emergence of ‘Folk Devils and Moral 
Panics’.  
8.1- Introduction:  
The findings resulting from the thematic analysis of The Guardian and The Daily 
Telegraph reports on 7/7 refresh Cohen’s concept of ‘folk devils and moral panics’. Fifty 
years ago, a clash between British youth subcultures, Mods and Rockers, on Easter 
Monday on Brighton beach was branded a ‘moral panic’ in the British media, which 
identified these groups as folk devils and a threat to British society because of their 
behaviour. Cohen examines their media portrayals and claims that the British media 
exaggerated and distorted the incident. Later on Cohen adds a new introduction 
‘Symbols of Trouble’, in his 1980s edition that follows second edition published in 1987. 
Finally, Cohen offers third edition that was published in 2002, in which he offers 
‘reviewing uses and criticisms of the concept over the last thirty years.  
His assessment has proved factually accurate, as evidenced by The Independent’s 
investigative report, published on 4 April 2004: “Forty years ago pictures of Mods and 
Rockers shocked polite society. But were they staged by the press?” According to David 
Cooke, “There are famous photographs taken in Brighton where the photographer paid 
the lads a few shillings”, and finally those misrepresented “became hippies or freaks and 
wandered off to India, like I did”. Based on this historic illustration, a question arises 
about the future of young British Muslims, who often complain of being under-reported. 
Although it was a section of the same media that showed us what their colleagues had 
done and how it affected these young white people, Cohen finds that the media made 
the event appear much worse than it actually was. He stated that “headlines appeared to 
be ‘self-descriptive’ and consisted of distorting words and phrases such as ‘Wild Ones 
invade seaside - 97 arrests’; ‘Wild Ones rampage in High Street’; ‘Battle of Brighton and 
Day of Terror by Scooter Groups’” (Cohen, 1972; 1980, p.30-33).    
To a large extent, the 7/7 coverage was reminiscent of that applied to the Mods and 
Rockers in terms of the use of language, phrases and factual distortion, which put the 
whole Muslim community under surveillance and labelled them as “New folk devils” 
(Massey, 2012). Earlier on, according to Alexander (2000, 2004) the Bradford Asian 
youth were branded as “the New Asian Folk Devils” (cited in Massey, 2012, p.3). The 
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press worsened the situation because it stirred up feelings of fear, suspicion and hatred 
of Muslims in general. Ever since its first inception, several sociologist, criminologists 
and anthologists have applied Cohen’s (1972) idea of ‘moral panic and folk devils’ to 
examine various case studies across a wide range of subjects such as those most 
relevant to my own study, the wearing of the veil, sharia law, and terrorism (see Ilic, 
2016; O’Brien, 2016;  Jefferson, 2011 and  Welch, 2005).  
Both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph identified and presented the London 
bombers as “Islamists” driven by “misinterpretations of Islamic theology” and 
“poisonous ideology” that raised their profile as “al-Qaeda fanatics”, “Islamic radicals” 
and “Islamic terrorists”, even though they were more Westernised, educated and 
modern. Worryingly, such perceptions correlate to the entire British Muslim 
community, which became a “suspect community” and an “enemy within”, somewhat 
like the Irish Catholics (Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011; Spalek and Lambert, 2008). The 
“Suspect Communities” thesis has drawn attention from British scholars; for instance, 
Pantaziz and Pemberton (2009 and 2011) insist that it is real but Greer (2010) rejects 
their analysis, stating that his findings are based on conceptual, logical and empirical 
grounds. Nevertheless, the current scholarly debates corroborate the fact that Muslims 
do have a damaging media representation, like the Irish.   
We now return to the initial reporting, which sets the scene for broader debates and 
discussions around key topics including radicalisation, al-Qaeda cells, and law and 
order, subsequently producing three major themes: “security”, “terrorism” and 
“otherness”. Within these themes both newspapers specifically focus on “morals” and 
“Western values” and thus present the “West” as “good” and the rest, i.e. “Muslims”, as 
“evil”. This construction of “evil” Muslims connected with terrorism and radicalisation 
shows that the West holds superior values: freedom, justice, democracy, human rights, 
liberty, and equality. But the attackers [and the Muslims] presumably hate secular 
Western values; therefore, they are “cowards”, “dishonest”, “immoral” and “devils”. 
More importantly they (Muslims) use “evil ideology” that sanctions the killing of 
“Kafirs” or “non-believers”. Hence, the Western governments (non-believers) invade 
and occupy Muslim lands mainly because they are defending themselves. This idea was 
so widely publicised that it caused a moral panic among non-Muslims, who began to 
fear Muslims more than ever before.  
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Hayle (2013) explains this as the sociology of “evil” and argues that the media and other 
stakeholders use the label “evil” to mislead the general public about specific groups that 
they identify as opposite and hence see as a threat and as problematic ‘others’ (Hayle, 
2013, p.1126). To be precise, it is a feeling developed to prepare the public for the idea 
those certain groups or individuals in society are a threat to the social order. 
Historically, panics have often led to the persecution of problematic ‘others’, such as the 
burning of witches in fourteenth-century Britain, known as witchcraft panic (see Banks, 
2013; Goodare, 1998 and 2013; Walker, 2011). The next sections of this chapter will 
demonstrate the relationship between the 7/7 reporting and Cohen’s model, starting 
with the British Muslims’ religion and their beliefs and practices that cause moral 
panics.   
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Figure 8.1: Stanley Cohen’s Model of ‘Folk Devils and Moral Panics’ (Stages in the 
creation of Folk Devils and Moral Panics).  
The above model provides a possible structure of the emergence of the British Muslims 
as new “folk devils” and “moral panics” relating to them based on their faith. Both The 
Guardian and The Daily Telegraph claimed that Muslim religious schools and mosques 
spread radicalisation. For instance, on 24 July 2005, The Daily Telegraph stated that 
religious schools “espouse a fundamentalist and sometimes violent form of Islam”, while 
on 8 July 2007 it claimed that “radicals recruit youngsters outside mosques”. Likewise, 
The Guardian also discredited mosques and religious schools although occasionally, for 
instance on 5 November 2006, The Observer stressed that the London bombers had 
attended Tablighi Jamaat, which radicalised Muslims. Contrary to the media 
understanding, academic studies view this as a revivalist and peaceful movement that 
propagates character-building and self-purification following true Islamic teachings 
(see Ali, 2006; Siddiqui, 2012).  The next section will show the construction of moral 
panic in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph reporting of the 7/7 incident, which 
works in six stages according to Cohen’s concept that has been cited in several leading 
studies including Donna Killingbeck’s (2001). It also provides evidence that Cohen’s 
concept within the reporting of both newspapers helped situate the presence of the 
nexus of the four Ps:  political parties, pressure groups, the press, and public bodies 
(Chas, 2006, p.75). 
8.2- Explanation of Stages in the creation of ‘Folk Devils and Moral Panics’. 
There are five stages in the creation of ‘folk devils and moral panics’ that are as follow: 
(i)-Exaggeration and Distortion:  
Most articles, opinions, comment pieces and editorials were based on selective surveys 
and studies that limited the debate in terms of theoretical and empirical data. Inevitably, 
the facts and figures were distorted even though they were largely based on outside 
sources; however, since the press was selective, it produced distorted opinions. Within 
hours, The Daily Telegraph had advocated tougher laws to deal with terrorism, 
suggesting that the incident had deeply threatened security and that urgent renewal of 
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legislation was essential. In its article, “Bombings may open the door for tougher anti-
terrorism laws” published on 8 July 2007, it referred to the New York and Madrid 
attacks and urged the government to adopt resilient regulations to crack down on 
jihadists and extremists. A passage from the same report stated: “carnage in London will 
make a tougher response more likely than…to reduce the standard of proof in terrorism 
cases and to hold pre-emptive trials with secret evidence heard before vetted counsel. 
These have been denounced by civil liberties groups but the mood for tougher laws may 
now be difficult to resist...” On 1 January 2010, The Daily Telegraph wrote that, within a 
month of the 7/7 incident, the Blair government had announced a “12-point anti-terror 
plan” with the aim of suggesting that the “rules of the game are changing”. In 
subsequent years, the British government introduced “The Terrorism Act 2006” and 
“The Counter Terrorism Act 2008”, which extended police powers and prohibited the 
“glorification of terrorism”, thus limiting people’s liberty and causing fear of a 
continuous problem, which is terrorism (Wolfendale, 2007; McGovern and Tobin, 
2009).                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Several newspaper articles were aimed at persuading the government that there was a 
serious problem of social disorder and that greater control would be a solution. In doing 
so, The Daily Telegraph in particular published a series of articles as discussed earlier 
which present distorted facts and figures on different issues such as university students 
lured into extremism, which exaggerated the problem. Politicians and security heads 
such as Sir John Stevens, ex-Metropolitan Police chief, disclosed to the News of the World 
that he believed that “up to 3,000 British-born or British-based people had passed 
through Osama bin Laden’s training camps. Of these, he believed that there were now 
about 200 committed “home-grown terrorists willing and able to slaughter innocents 
for their perverted view of Islam” (The Guardian, 11 July 2005).  
Further, in reference to a senior intelligence source, The Guardian made it clear that 
[they] are not sure of the figures; however, based on senior intelligence sources it 
argued that in Britain there may be a “very small number of inner-core al-Qaida people”, 
perhaps around “30 or so members, with several hundred who have been to training 
camps or have fought in Afghanistan, Bosnia or Chechnya” (The Guardian, 11 July 2005). 
It continued by referring to a Foreign Office draft report “Young Muslims and 
Extremism” (2004) which stated that “Britain might now be harbouring thousands of al-
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Qaida sympathisers” (ibid). This is how politicians, pressure groups and the police 
continue to use the press to exaggerate the situation by presenting distorted and 
unreliable facts via all channels, including a quality-press newspaper such as The 
Guardian.  
Now consider another example from The Observer, which ran a lengthy article, ‘Channel 
tunnel is terror target’, on 24 December 2006, quoting police commissioner Ian Blair: “It 
is a far graver threat in terms of civilians than either the Cold War or the Second World 
War,’... ‘It’s a much graver threat than that posed by Irish Republican terrorism”. 
According to the same article, “Eliza Manningham-Buller, director-general of MI5, 
recently disclosed that UK intelligence services are monitoring more than 200 networks 
and 1,600 individuals in Britain…investigators had identified nearly 30 plots ‘that often 
have links back to al-Qaeda in Pakistan, and through those links al-Qaeda gives guidance 
and training to its largely British foot soldiers here”.  With various pieces of 
misinformation and distortion of facts and figures, such as on the Iraq War and current 
threats, Western secret agencies and their officials’ statements have always been of 
concern to critics (Curtis, 2003 and 2012; M. Aid, 2009; Monbiot, 2001).  
Earlier, The Guardian itself published an investigative report, “The making of the terror 
myth”, on 15 October 2004, which referred to a BBC2 three-part documentary The 
Power of Nightmares: The Rise of the Politics of Fear (2004), suggesting that the issues 
were being overplayed. This report was referred to in several leading studies on 
terrorism such as Bauman (2013) and Mukherji (2005). Take another passage from The 
Guardian which revealed that “About 50 Islamic extremist cells are ‘active’ in the UK, 
with about 300 extremists under constant surveillance… About 1,500 Britons are 
known to the police and security services as possible terror suspects, many registered 
on a database of radicalised individuals regarded as peripheral but susceptible to al-
Qaeda’s message of terror…” (The Guardian, 1 July 2007). Several scholars note that the 
press overstated the facts and figures relating to the 7/7 event (Davies, 2011; Hussain 
and Baggulay 2012; Petley and Richardson, 2013).  
As a result of the negative media portrayal of Islam and Muslims, particularly those 
stories linking Islam with terrorism, public opinion changed profoundly. Additionally, 
The Daily Telegraph published surveys conducted with its own readers or in specific 
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locations and then related the results to the Muslim population at large, such as “Islam 
poses a threat to the West, say 53pc in poll” published on 25 August 2005. It also 
claimed that “More than half of respondents felt that Islam posed a threat…A growing 
number of people fear that the country faces ‘a Muslim problem’ and more than half of 
the respondents to the YouGov survey said that Islam posed a threat to Western liberal 
democracy”. It is important to note that these figures mentioned in the above 
illustrations lack precision. Surely they also reflect a yes and no answer and given that 
the actions of bombers who were Muslim so this may not be surprising. 
Furthermore, in these citations the newspapers failed to quote the methods used by 
researchers and journalists to calculate the ratios. For example, The Daily Telegraph 
report published on 7 July 2007 carries the following data: “Professor Glees estimates 
that there are up to 200,000 potential martyrs, at universities at home and abroad, who 
are susceptible to recruitment. There are huge reservoirs to draw on, a potentially 
terrifying fact that the police and intelligence agencies must now ponder” (The Daily 
Telegraph, 7 July 2007).   
In his book Securitizing Islam: Identity and the Search for Security (2012), Stuart Croft 
raises concerns over the “securitising of the Muslim other” and their new identity as 
“radical others” with particular reference to Anthony Glees’ study, as mentioned above. 
Croft argues that Glees’ core themes of “campus radicalisation” and “Saudi and Muslim” 
sources for funding UK universities are in fact overplayed in terms of numbers (Croft, 
2012, p.236-239). Similarly, Dennis Hayes also challenges Glees’ work in a series of 
debates conducted under the topic of extremism in universities, organised by ‘debating 
matters’ during 2010. Notably, a series of tragic consequences resulted from the press, 
politicians, pressure groups and police overstating the facts. The misidentified 
shootings of a Brazilian man on 22 July 2005 and another man at Forest Gate on 2 June 
2006, the increasing number of stop and search incidents, and the high rate of hate 
crimes and number of individuals held on suspicion are a few notable examples of the 
immediate panic.  
According to a BBC report on 4 August 2005, “There were 269 religious hate crimes in 
the three weeks after 7 July, compared with 40 in the same period of 2004”. Since then, 
social settings have dramatically changed in Britain as The Guardian report noted: 
311 
 
“London bombings: the day the anti-terrorism rules changed: The controversial 
Terrorism Act 2006 passed after the 7 July bombings leads to increased arrests and 
convictions”. It consists of revealing data that show the upsetting effects on the lives of 
Muslims in London resulting from the 7/7 attack. In its article published on 7 July 2010, 
The Guardian stated, “There were about 280 arrests for alleged terrorism offences in 
2005/6, and although around 190 of those people were released without charge, the 
numbers of people charged and convicted also rose…Conviction rates on terrorism 
charges soared briefly after the bombings” (The Guardian, 7 July 2010).  Furthermore, 
the same report disclosed that, after the 7/7 incident, there were complaints of 
collusion in torture at home and abroad, and “After the allegations of British collusion in 
torture began to emerge, in 2008, there were fresh complaints from a number of young 
British Muslims…During the year that followed the attacks, police compiled 13,300 
witness statements and viewed 6,000 hours of CCTV footage” (The Guardian, 7 July 
2010).   
In addition, newspapers suggested that business in London, from the stock exchange to 
hotels and the tourist industry, suffered record high losses, and tourists from 
neighbouring European countries may not return. Consider a few headlines from The 
Guardian published on 8 July 2005: ‘World markets shaken by terrorism fears'; ‘High 
street was already struggling and now shoppers will think twice’; ‘City puts emergency 
plans into action and Tourist industry braced for downturn’. These indicate the 
elements of over-reporting; while realities on the ground showed that the event was 
exaggerated. Even now, it has been admitted at a high level that the threat was 
overstated. For example,  The Guardian reported: ‘Islamist terror threat to west blown 
out of proportion - former MI6 chief Richard Dearlove says extremists are now focused 
on Middle East and giving them publicity in the west is counter-productive’; this was 
published on 7 July 2014 on the occasion of the 7/7 anniversary.  
(ii)-Prediction:  
In this phase, the press speculates, publishes reports, articles, comment pieces, 
statements and interviews, and builds assumptions that similar events will occur in the 
near future. The 7/7 discussion circles around al-Qaeda networks, terror plots, police 
raids, suspect arrests, court trials and presumed terror threats that are presented as a 
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never-ending phenomenon. Within this period, new phrases such as “Bomb factory”, 
“Fertiliser Bombs” and “Hydrogen Peroxide Bombs” appeared in the press, adding to 
speculation that home-grown terrorists, presumably British Muslims, are the “enemy 
within” and are capable of making bombs at home. In addition, both newspapers ran 
articles quoting hate preachers, terrorists and government officials speculating on 
further atrocities with contact intervals. In particular, the London bombers’ pre-
recorded message that was first aired by Al-Jazeera Channel was re-broadcast and the 
extracts were printed in The Daily Telegraph and The Guardian with different emphases.  
The video message became a prominent feature of terrorism reporting in The Daily 
Telegraph, which it published on numerous occasions between 2005 and 2007 and even 
continues to do so today. For instance, its headline on 2 September 2005 read: “We are 
at war: I am a soldier”, in fact, the chosen words give a warning of further attacks. The 
Guardian also picked up the same headline, though it emphasised a particular extract: 
“I’m sure by now the media has painted a suitable picture of me, this predictable 
propaganda machine will naturally try to put a spin on it to suit the government and to 
scare the masses into conforming to their power- and wealth-obsessed agendas”. In 
addition, it raises concerns about the British press including The Daily Telegraph, which 
gave front-page coverage to the video message that The Guardian called a “Piercing 
headline”. It also highlights the bid in a message in which “Khan directly links Tony 
Blair’s foreign policy to the bombings he and three others carried out in the capital and 
that he promises that Britain will suffer more suicide attacks” (The Guardian, 2 
September 2005).  
In subsequent weeks and months, several incidents occurred that provided sound 
footings for the media and other actors who substantiated their predictions based on 
the 7/7 event. These events include a police raid on University College Hospital in 
search of a suspect and the arrest of an Asian man on 21 July 2005 in London. Notably, 
the suspects were released without charge, prompting Professor Jim Ryan to dismiss 
the   police claims and argue that the raids were based on an “absolute rumour” (BBC, 
2005). According to The Guardian report published on 7 November 2013, since the 7/7 
incident UK security agencies have disrupted 34 terror plots. On 21 July 2005, police 
disrupted four attempted bombings in London, causing fear and further strengthening 
the prediction of more panic attacks. In relation to this incident, The Guardian headline 
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was: “Panic as London is hit again; 3 tube stations and bus hit; Police: attacks intended 
to kill; Armed police enter hospital”. The article quotes the Mayor of London: “Those 
who remember the terrorist campaigns of the 1970s, 80s and 90s will remember there 
were bombing attacks often just weeks apart” (The Guardian, 21 July 2005). 
In the same vein, The Daily Telegraph attached importance to stories that came mostly 
from either security institutions or terrorist organisations: “Police flood trains with 
6,000 officers. Armed police patrol a London Underground station”, published on 29 
July 2005, suggesting that a long-lasting threat exists. Similarly, in some instances, The 
Guardian also published reports citing various key figures who predicted more terrible 
events resembling 7/7.  On 3 December 2006, The Observer quoted Sir Ian Blair who 
warns of “the threat of another terrorist attempt’ and believes that it is “ever present”, 
particularly at Christmas. He continues: “it is a far graver threat in terms of civilians 
than either the Cold War or the Second World War…it’s a much graver threat than that 
posed by Irish Republican terrorism”. In the same article, the newspaper claimed that 
“American security sources told The Observer that the threat was ‘sky high’”.     
Such predictions continued to emerge in both newspapers at regular intervals, quoting 
government officials and other sources. On the occasion of the failed Glasgow Airport 
bombing attempt on 30 June 2007, both newspapers speculated on further terror 
attacks mainly based on politicians’, police and peers’ warnings and quotations. Take, 
for example, two passages from articles in The Guardian published on 1 July 2007 and 8 
July 2007: “The attack was seemingly inept but it wreaked huge disruption for weekend 
travellers. Some 35,000 passengers were expected to pass through Glasgow Airport… 
immediately closed and all flights were suspended...There was a knock-on effect on 
flights around the country and several airports moved to step up security” (The 
Guardian, 1 July 2007) and “Currently almost 100 terror suspects are awaiting trial in 
UK courts in about 40 separate cases and the number will rise… the ‘UK is a centre of 
intense activity’ and that there is a ‘very real possibility’ that al-Qaeda and groups linked 
to it are planning a nuclear attack” (The Guardian, 8 July 2007).  
These paragraphs from two articles suggest that, using the press space, security chiefs 
and other officials were inciting panics. Although there is no denying that a problem 
existed, as the earlier illustration proved, most of the time the facts were exaggerated 
and distorted. Similarly, The Daily Telegraph’s reporting of the incident on 30 June 2007 
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also predicted more attacks in future: “The Prime Minister Gordon Brown has called on 
the British public to remain vigilant and warned of tough decisions ahead following an 
apparent suicide bomb attack on Glasgow airport, which came just one day after two car 
bombs were located in London” (The Daily Telegraph, 30 June 2007). Later on, occasions 
such as the anniversaries of 9/11 and Madrid were reported with the view that similar 
events would hit Western capitals at short intervals.  
(iii)-Symbolisation:  
Cohen suggests that “the mass communication of stereotypes depends on the symbolic 
power of words and images. Neutral words such as place-names can be made to 
symbolize complex ideas and emotions; for example, Pearl Harbour, Hiroshima, Dallas” 
(Cohen, 2002, p.27). The appellation of the event as ‘7/7’ and the selection of cohesive 
and iconic photographs of the wrecked number 30 bus, a masked women being escorted 
away in Edgware Road, and Professor John Tulloch with his face covered in blood 
published in the British media echo Cohen’s idea of symbolisation in practice. These 
iconic pictures and the name ‘7/7’ became symbolic of the London bombings. One might 
say that these pictures were correct representations of the event but it is also evident 
that wounded British Muslims were not pictured in either newspaper.  
 In addition, the press published images of the perpetrators in Arab gowns and used 
labels such as “Beeston Crew”, “London Bombers”, “Suicide Bombers”, “ringleader”, 
“terrorist gang”, “bomb factory” and “bomber’s daughter”, all of which are descriptive 
and explanatory. The places where they lived and their associations emerged as icons of 
hate and as ‘devil’ places. For example, The Daily Telegraph linked Hamara Centre with 
al-Qaeda and other extremist ideologies, as explained earlier (see The Daily Telegraph, 
15 and 17 July 2005). This trend in The Daily Telegraph’s reporting continued to the 
extent that, on a few occasions, The Guardian objected to The Daily Telegraph’s 
symbolising of British universities as centres of radicalisation and extremism, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter.  
Consider the next day’s reporting of the 7/7 incident which carried headlines and labels 
such as “Attack on London” and “Day of Terror”, indicating that London (as a capital) 
was perhaps being attacked by a foreign nation. On the other hand, the incident was 
expounded with reference to the New York Bombings (9/11) and the Madrid Bombings, 
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creating further suspicion and hatred of Muslims. For some, however, it may not be 
surprising as it was a few Muslims who carried out the attacks.  
Consider, for example, The Daily Telegraph story “Memories are stirred as Madrid 
shares the pain”, while the opening sentences read: “Atocha station is Madrid’s Ground 
Zero, its equivalent of the hole where the Twin Towers stood, just as March 11 was 
Spain’s September 11…Yesterday a sense of solidarity with London was evident in 
Madrid” (The Daily Telegraph, 8 July 2005). Obviously, this sort of reporting fuels fear 
and hatred of “devils”, who are identified as “Muslims”, and creates further divisions in a 
multicultural society.  
Now take a paragraph from a report published on 8 July 2005, in The Guardian, 
“Madrid’s vanished horror: The bombings poisoned the political atmosphere and 
deepened the social divide”, which states: 
Explosions on jam-packed trains during rush hours with no 
prior warning, horrific results in terms of deaths, maimings 
and injuries, chaos and panic in a major European capital 
city… resemblances between the 3/11 terrorist attacks in 
Madrid and the 7/7 attacks in London are so obvious that 
comment appears superfluous (The Guardian, 8 July 2005).   
Hence, it invokes emotional and physical solidarity with Madrid. To an extent it may not 
be surprising, given that the killing of innocent people was mourned. Whether or not 
these headlines are part of the demonisation of Muslim groups, they are also part of the 
memorialisation of the victims. However, the headline also carried a warning of a 
different political scenario as well as a social divide, meaning the breakdown of a 
society. In the months following 7/7, the term “Londonistan” received significant 
attention and space in both newspapers’ comment sections as well as in their reporting. 
That is, they described “London” as a symbolic place that nurtures “Islamic terror”, 
referring to various studies such as that by Melanie Phillips. These reports and articles 
take into account French accusations that the Paris Metro attack in 1995 was planned in 
London, which is why they coined the term “Londonistan”. In this way, misleading and 
evidently weak headlines and reports were produced to create an unambiguously 
negative portrayal of Islam and Muslims.  
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(iv)- Reaction:  
The reaction category mainly consists of opinion and attitude themes that are further 
classified into three categories: orientation, images and causation. These combine to 
form press, government, politician and public reaction to a sudden event that disturbs 
the overall social structure of a society. Following the 7/7 incident, one of the key 
features of the press reporting was its initiative to stir up public feelings and push the 
government to take firm actions. Of course, the immediate reactions of the newspapers 
were to press the government to introduce tough laws and ban disreputable 
organisations, even though the press itself had once given them massive coverage, such 
as al-Muhajiroun leader Anjem Choudhary. Consider two short paragraphs from reports 
published in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph on 22 July 2006 and 3 September 
2006. The Guardian highlights: 
Earlier this year the Guardian identified two groups which 
appeared to be essentially the same as al-Muhajiroun. They 
were al-Ghurabaa, and al-Firqat un-Naajiyah, or the Saved 
Sect, which is also to be banned... Other groups may not be 
on the list now, but will be kept under review (The 
Guardian, 22 July 2006).  
In the main photograph in this article, the caption read: “Muslim demonstration 
organised by Anjem Choudhary, former righthand man to the al-Ghurabaa founder. 
Photograph: David Levene/Guardian”. Here, the “Muslim demonstration” with the 
rowdy behaviour of a handful of members of a banned radical group was linked with the 
whole Muslim community. Hence, the event was used to blame and stereotype the 
British Muslim community and presented them as an “enemy within”. Some may argue 
that surely, it is presented accurately but perceived by the readers in a different way 
according to their bias; one could have a similar presentation of Christian extremist 
body-like those of the Waco tragedy in America. That does not mean that all Christian 
groups are going to fight authority and commit suicide.     
In contrast, in its coverage of a series of protests since the 7/7 incident, such as British 
students’ protests against tuition fee rises, and British National Party and anti-BNP 
protests, The Guardian did not use the connotation “Christian protestors”. However, one 
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may also presume that all students and BNP people may not be praticising Christians. 
Thus, the use of the term “Muslim demonstration” suggests a negative and biased view 
of Muslims to readers. On the other hand, The Daily Telegraph recorded the cartoon 
protest in six of its news reports published between 2 February 2006 and 9 February 
2006 using cynical headlines and connotations such as these damaging phrases: “Flame 
of Islamic fury”; “Incitement to murder”, “Bomber”; and “100,000 Muslims to vent anger 
in London at cartoon protest”. Further, in one of its reports The Daily Telegraph stated:  
                         To its credit, the Government shows no signs of 
capitulation. But to its detriment, it is signally failing to take 
on the preachers of hate in Britain…The Government’s 
failure to act against preachers of this kind of poison merely 
perpetuates and encourages them… It was the failure to act 
decisively against the preachers of hate that helped to 
incubate Islamic terrorism in Britain… (The Daily Telegraph, 
3 September 2006).  
On a broader level, it is noted that the long-term effects of the 7/7 reporting appeared in 
the initiation of debates on religious identities and their role and place in ordinary 
people’s lives, assuming that it was religion that misguided the London bombers. This 
particular thinking opened up debates such as those on the veil and Sharia in 2006 and 
2008, which lasted for months and became a focal point in academia and the mass 
media. Hence, this paved the way for the press, politicians, pressure groups and peers to 
discuss and debate the religion and beliefs of one deviant group according to their own 
perceptions. These situations led to the start of the veil controversy that later spread 
throughout Europe and resulted in the Burka ban in France in 2011 and the veil ban in 
2009. In Britain, The Daily Telegraph published poll results such as “Poll reveals 40pc of 
Muslims want sharia law in UK” (The Daily Telegraph, 19 February 2006) and “Islam 
poses a threat to the West, say 53pc in poll” (The Daily Telegraph, 25 August 2006). This 
trend continued in the period that falls outside this thesis, such as “We too should ban 
the burka” (The Daily Telegraph, 13 April 2011) and “We’re not far off a British burqa 
ban” (The Daily Telegraph, 14 April 2011). In February 2008, the British media largely 
misrepresented the Sharia debate, which ended up in controversy and ultimately 
caused a moral panic (Bano, 2008; Wilson, 2010). Importantly, according to the 
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statistics such statements about Burka-wearing women in Britain were not true (see 
The Guardian, 20 September 2013).  
Obviously, all these debates stemmed from 7/7, an event that was presented as a moral 
panic. For instance, the veil was never seen as an issue before the London bombings. 
The same year, 2006, saw several new pieces of legislation such as the “Identity Card 
Act 2006” and “The Terrorism Act 2006”. In the same year, for the first time in Britain’s 
history its reputed educational institutions were linked with radicalisation. It is also 
important to remember that Europe killed thousands of suspected witches as the result 
of a panic (Briggs, 1998; Levack 2006; Roper, 2006). In brief, overall the government 
introduced precautionary measures at airports, railway stations, hospitals and other 
public places, surveillance dramatically increased, and stops and searches after 7/7 
reached record high levels. For example, The Guardian revealed the following on 17 
August 2005; “Unpublished figures from July 7 to August 10 showed that the transport 
police carried out 6,747 stops under anti-terrorism laws, with the majority in London” 
(see Statewatch, 2005).   
(v)-Warnings:  
The warning phase ascertains that a similar event may occur again and that it may be 
worse. The 7/7 incident is regarded as a disaster because it happened without any prior 
warning, as in the case of IRA bombings. Therefore, the press attempted to persuade the 
general public that they should be prepared for any sudden threat. Both newspapers 
cited American and Canadian security sources on several occasions to validate that the 
threat of another attack was genuine. In an article The Daily Telegraph wrote that, “Ever 
since the September 11 atrocities in America in 2001, there have been warnings that an 
attack on London was ‘inevitable’. There have been predictions of chemical or biological 
attacks and exercises have been carried out on the Underground to try to counter them” 
(The Daily Telegraph, 8 July 2005). The same article further suggested that “Today’s 
Islamist terrorist could be a foreigner or home-grown but he will be of an ethnic and 
religious background that makes infiltration difficult by white police agents and 
requires better intelligence from the community in which he lives” (ibid.) In other 
words, it proposed a scenario in which every Muslim should spy on their fellow Muslims 
at home, in public and in the workplace. In the same vein, The Guardian also published 
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articles suggesting that a similar event may recur based on warnings by terrorists and 
police; however, it rejected the idea of people spying on one another.  
Based on views in neighbouring European nations, The Guardian ran a detailed article 
published on 28 July 2005 under the headline: “Fearful Europe steps up security: 
Vulnerable countries act quickly to bring in new powers” The news report stated: 
The Italian senate yesterday approved a bill to give the 
armed forces powers normally reserved for the police, 
allowing soldiers to search suspects and vehicles. It was the 
latest in a series of measures endorsed since July 7 in a 
country that fears it could be the next terror target. A poll 
published this week by the daily Corriere della Sera found 
85% of Italians fear a terror attack within weeks or months 
(The Guardian, 28 July 2005).  
The same article stated that France, Belgium, Germany, and Eastern European nations 
such as Poland had passed Bills to increase police and security officials’ power to arrest 
without charge and that these countries had increased their surveillance measures. 
Furthermore, these countries believed that they may be hit within weeks or months. 
This sort of warning features regularly in both newspapers on the occasion of the 7/7 
anniversary and on major occasions such as Christmas, Royal Weddings, Papal visits 
and the Olympic Games when police, press, and politicians talk of possible terrorist 
attacks coming mainly from Muslims. However, given what has happened, to some 
extent this approach is perhaps not surprising. Soon after the 7/7 bombings, the press, 
politicians, pressure groups and police and security officials joined forces to raise 
concerns about a perceived threat to the social order. Evidently, this was politicised as 
the entire Muslim community came under surveillance and were seen as potential 
suspects, further strengthening the already well established “Us and them” divide.  
This “suspicion” and otherness consequently developed into a scenario in which fear 
prevails. In addition, the construction of the notion of “evil” leads to hostility towards 
and concern about a particular group (Muslims) who became new “folk devils” in the 
sense that they pose a threat to a peaceful society. The “Good” vs. “Evil” dichotomy 
appears to be the core message that creates a moral panic by labelling one group 
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(Muslims) as radical extremists and a potential threat. Moreover, politicians stress the 
link between a religious “ideology” and the London bombings. In this way, the religion 
of Islam as a whole is seen as a threat to the secular West. In addition, foreign links were 
instantly established and facts and figures were left unchecked. This rushed reporting 
causes fear and suggests that the perceived threat of terrorism is perpetual.  
Moreover, both newspapers published interviews with politicians, government officials, 
and members of victims’ families on the 7/7 anniversaries, suggesting that the 
significance of the event is also a reminder that it will never be forgotten. Van Dijk 
refers to six major media studies (including Galtung and Ruge, 1965, and van Dijk, 
1983d) and writes that “Much of the news is not so much about happenings or events, 
but about what other people, typically the powerful and the elite, say or write” (Van 
Dijk, 1987, p.41). On the whole, his notion of news is correct because it is based on 
evidence that shows that big organisations, political groups and parties and other elite 
institutions including government and non-government organisations use the media to 
deliver their message (ibid). In this way, dominant sources routinely gain access to 
news production (Fishman, 1980; Tuchman, 1979; Van Dijk, 1987).  
Arguably, post-7/7 there has emerged a new kind of “folk devil”, a “suicide bomber” 
who is inspired by an “evil ideology”, meaning interpretations of Islamic teachings that 
eventually became “Islamic terrorism”. Evidently, some politicians, police, pressure 
groups and sections of the press identify some radical young British-born Muslims as 
security threats. Realistically however, a high level of terrorist actions and threats and 
actions by radical groups will fuel the situation. In turn, pejorative expressions such as 
“Londonistan” and “Walthamstan” associated the capital and its inner area with Asian 
British-born Muslims’ radicalisation. All the stages found in the work of Cohen begin to 
create moral panics relating to British Muslims’ beliefs and traditions. A significant 
aspect of Cohen’s concept that is further developed in later scholarly work is the 
emphasis upon a nexus of powerful elites that unite to push these ideas, including the 
press.  
In the step-wise process, Prime Minister Blair started off by saying that the “Rules of the 
games have changed”; subsequently, pressure groups, police and politicians began 
demanding tougher laws such as increasing police powers to stop and search and the 
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detention of terror suspects without charge for 90 days. Further, the Blair government 
introduced a 12-point anti-terror plan including “Consultation on a new power to close 
a place of worship used as a centre for fomenting extremism” and “Review of citizenship 
ceremonies” and “banning Hizbut Tahrir…” (The Guardian, 5 August 2005).  MI5 and 
police chiefs appeared more frequently in the news, stating that they had stopped more 
terror attacks; this was true in the case of 21/7 and the failed attempt at Glasgow 
airport in 2007.   
In the light of these developments, some British mosques were linked with extremism, 
particularly the peaceful reform movement Tablighi Jamaat mosque in Dewsbury 
because one of the bombers was from Dewsbury and he had been seen praying there. 
But that does not mean that if anyone who prays in Tablighi Jamaat mosque would be 
their member. In the context of mosques, there began a debate on whether there should 
be British Imams, whether young people should have greater roles on committees, and 
whether there should be separate mosques for women. In particular, The Daily 
Telegraph published a survey and studies describing how young British-born Muslim 
students are being radicalised in mosques and universities. It used negative phrases 
such as “hotbed of Islamic extremism” that further increase fear and hatred of British 
Muslims. In a number of articles, The Daily Telegraph refers to Professor Anthony Glees’ 
studies that claim that 20 British institutions are recruitment centres for young British 
Muslim students who are targets of hate preachers and extremists (see The Daily 
Telegraph, 13 August 2006; 17 October 2006 and 8 July 2007). It is important to note 
that this report was inaccurate which has been already discussed elsewhere in this 
thesis. Even now The Daily Telegraph has not changed its stance that extremism and 
radicalisation among British Muslims students take place in British universities (see The 
Daily Telegraph, 13 April 2008; 3 January 2010; 6 June 2011, 22 and 23 August 2014; 17 
September 2015 and 6 January 2016).   
In contrast, The Guardian disclosed: “Universities urged to spy on Muslims”, suggesting 
that The Daily Telegraph was panicking over the issues. This is a crucial point because, 
on the basis of Glees’ claims, The Daily Telegraph created a panic of growing radicalism 
and extremism in British universities. To indicate how Cohen’s concept might best be 
situated in this thesis, one might consider a Guardian story on 3 December 2008 which, 
although it falls outside the research period, is highly relevant. Cambridge University 
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scholar June Edmunds’ research shows that the matter was exaggerated on the basis of 
“flimsy” findings by Glees that British universities are “hotbeds of Islamic radicalism” 
(The Guardian, 3 December 2008). This example further strengthens the idea of Cohen 
and his successors: in every society panics come and go, and they are created by a nexus 
of a few powerful elites. Hence, it is evident that Cohen’s concept is truly relevant to 
British Muslims’ representation stemming from the tragic 7/7 event.  
In brief, based on a thematic analysis of inclusive reporting on 7/7, this thesis concludes 
that both newspapers mainly use political language to essentialise, demonise and 
sensationalise the 7/7 event. All these elements were employed to cause a moral panic 
that works in a coordinated manner. The nexus of four key players - the press, 
politicians, pressure groups and police - essentialise the event as a Muslim problem. In 
addition, policy-oriented research institutions published reports and surveys that 
overemphasised the perceived notion of the threat of another attack. These references 
then received massive attention in newspapers in all types of journalism such as news 
reports, columns and comment pieces. However, on the ‘Muslim problem’ the attitude 
and approach of The Guardian was clearly different from The Daily Telegraph because it 
also published follow-up investigative reports and challenged some aspects of distorted 
reporting, for example on Muslim students becoming radicalised in the universities (see 
The Guardian, 8 November 2005). Thus, in comparison to The Daily Telegraph, The 
Guardian was less inclined to accept elites’ (the nexus of four Ps as explained above) 
views on the subject.  
Arguably, the three categories of language used by these broadsheets to deal with 
British Muslims and Islam - essentialism, demonisation, and sensationalism - can be 
better understood from the following Venn diagram. For example, where essentialism 
and demonisation overlap, the press presents particular individuals such as terrorists 
(7/7 bombers) as “evil doers”, and where essentialism and sensationalism overlap, the 
press coverage portrays the 7/7 event as demonstrating the “shocking true nature” of 
the actors involved. Finally, the space where the three circles overlap is a central 
cosmos for the press reporting on “Islamic extremism”, “Islamic radicalisation” and 
“Islamic terrorism”.  
At this point, one finds these broadsheets’ purported loyalty to Enlightenment values, 
although they actually demonstrate their scant allegiance to Enlightenment rationalism.  
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Islamic 
Extremism 
 
Venn diagram 8.1: Key Categories in the 7/7 reporting of The Guardian and The Daily 
Telegraph.   
Consequently, Muslims have become visible as new “Folk Devils” while the press 
interpretation of terrorism as a product of religious ideology raises further concerns 
about the Islamic faith, ultimately leading to a moral panic. Most importantly, political 
and non-political events have occurred regularly, allowing the panic to continue in one 
way or the other. For example, the veil controversy leads to hate preachers, the al-
Qaeda network and failed bomb plotters, all of which combine to sustain the security 
threat. On the whole, it is evident that news-gathering sources play an important role in 
defining and reshaping the debates about the British Muslim question that is at the 
centre of the 7/7 reporting. Both broadsheets rephrased political statements to signify a 
uniform approach to and common mindset on the 7/7 incident among all key players, 
including political elites, the press itself, pressure groups and police and security 
institutions. Besides, The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph decoded policy and general 
Evil People 
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statements via key figures, particularly in their headlines, to present their own points of 
view on issues such as the veil.  
In sum, the two newspapers clearly differed in their approach and attitude to the 7/7 
event. The essential difference between these newspapers was that The Guardian 
continued to challenge bias and distorted reporting by the press including, The Daily 
Telegraph, on British Muslims’ issues in its investigative reports, features and editorials. 
This includes The Daily Telegraph stories of British Muslim students becoming 
radicalised in the British universities, the cartoon controversy, and coverage of 
protestors and arrests of suspects. A classic example is The Guardian article published 
on 8 July 2005 under the headline: 
                    700 arrests; 17 convictions that reveal that more than 700 people 
have been arrested under the Terrorism Act since September 11, 
but half have been released without charge and only 17 convicted. 
Only three of the convictions relate to allegations of Islamist 
extremism (The Guardian, 8 July 2005).  
In short, The Guardian continued to publish follow-up stories and investigative reports 
that evidently challenged its competitor press, politicians and public bodies in some 
cases; this approach, in comparison to The Daily Telegraph, limits its role in creating the 
panic of “new folk devils”, the British Muslims.    
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Chapter 9- Conclusion:  
The evidence suggests that both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph have dealt with 
all terrorism in a condemnatory manner, be it the IRA and Protestant Paramilitary 
bombings and killings in the United Kingdom or the events of 7/7. However, both 
newspapers have been much more conscious, in their contrasting ways, of the religious 
element in the events of 7/7 in a way that was never evident in the case of the ‘troubles’ 
in Northern Ireland. Indeed, their emphasis up “Islamic terrorism” and “Muslim 
bombers” has taken the treatment of terrorism to a new and different level of religious 
association and created a new ‘folk-devil’ of the Muslims in Britain. 
This thesis began by asking a fundamental question: How did The Guardian and The 
Daily Telegraph present British Muslims in the wake of the 7/7 bombings? A thematic 
analysis of the reporting on 7/7 in The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph over a period 
of two years (8 July 2005-7 July 2007) indicated a blend of opinions, accusations, 
suggestions, and complaints from the three main parties involved in discussions and 
debates over the incident: the press, the authorities and British Muslims.  
Clearly, the 7/7 event stemmed from a political manifestation in that case it was based 
on grievances against the British government’s policy in Iraq. Arguably, the press 
interpreted and presented the event as a religious problem because it looked at it 
through the prism of the 7/7 bombers self-interpreted version of religious ideology that 
is named as an “evil ideology”. It is argued that this clash is mainly between “radical 
Islamists” and Western political elites who have political vested interests in the Middle 
East, predominantly a Muslim region. In this regard, the Western elites evidently have 
contacts with radicals whom they have supported on numerous occasions, including the 
Taliban fighters and Middle East-based extremist groups in Libya and Syria. Thus, this 
clash has produced a terrorism threat that may well persist for years to come.  
The two broadsheets began with a number of assumptions, thoughts and arguments; for 
example, al-Qaeda was behind the London bombings, the 7/7 bombers were radicalised 
in mosques and madrassas (Islamic religious schools) in Pakistan, and it was an “evil 
ideology” that brainwashed a few young British-born Muslims and caused them to 
attack their country of birth. With the passage of time, as these newspapers further 
probed into the 7/7 events, some of these initial assumptions changed, a few remained 
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the same and various opinions further strengthened while certain initial thoughts 
disappeared, such as the call for an independent inquiry into the 7/7 event.  
Gradually, the security narrative developed strong opinions in both The Guardian and 
The Daily Telegraph, which was pushing the government to hold an independent public 
inquiry into the 7/7 incident. In particular, The Guardian believed that there were many 
unanswered questions in the government narrative of the bombings. Initially, such 
demands came from politicians and representatives of public and religious bodies but 
then the bombers’ victims and relatives of the deceased joined this call, which was an 
eminently reasonable request. However, the demands for an independent inquiry into 
the 7/7 event slowly died down, surprisingly even in The Guardian, which had shown 
huge interest in following up investigative reports related to the 7/7 event.  
In regard to explanations of ideology,  
In regard to explanations of ideology that is rooted in Wahhabism which allegedly 
endorses violence both The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph allocated plenty of space 
to discuss the attack’s religious aspects and connections which were related exclusively 
to Islam, but they spent very little time examining the ideology that encouraged state 
actors to embark upon arguably the most controversial war of all time base on the false 
assumptions about the existence of WMD. However, both newspapers, particularly The 
Guardian, acknowledged that the “Islamist” radical ideology is the terrorists’ own 
interpretation of Islam just as previous terrorists have misinterpreted their religious 
beliefs, such as the Catholics.       
The use of the words “radical Muslims” separates them from the rest of the British 
Muslim community. In this way, in fact, both newspapers made it clear that they were 
condemning only those 7/7 perpetrators and indeed not the entire Muslim community. 
Further, the phrase “Islamist” refers to just a few British radical Muslims’ political 
motives, including the possible establishing of a caliphate. However, these newspapers 
both used the words “Islamic” and “Islamic terrorism” to describe those bombers and 
other British radicals who describe concepts and values related to the religion of Islam. 
Arguably, to an extent this shows that these newspapers were targeting Islam and 
accused it of promoting the present form of terrorism. On radicalisation and terrorism, 
both newspapers, particularly The Daily Telegraph, accused the religion more than it 
questioned the political landscape and the role of state in the growth of radicalisation. 
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Another significant point is that radicalisation among a few British Muslims was 
frequently presented as an outcome of religious “ideology” although there may have 
been other factors that were often discussed and raised in academic studies. 
Surprisingly, little space was allocated to balancing the debate on ideology, which was 
predominantly on “Islamic ideology”, although to an extent both newspapers admitted 
that it is an “evil ideology” of radical fragments in society. At the same time, the notion 
of “in the name of God” in association with Bush and Blair was discussed in The 
Guardian comment pieces and news items but not in The Daily Telegraph, which 
suggested that news is not simply information but is in fact “constructed and framed” 
and a product of “the media and the government” (see Patterson, 1998, p.17; Cook, 
1998, p.3).  
In the ideology debate the focus of attention was mainly on “Muslim radicals” and 
“Muslim extremists” but neither newspaper investigated and discussed the ideology 
behind the Western elites led by Bush and Blair who also acted “in the name of God”. In 
other words they were also doing their God’s duty to invade Iraq for whatever reason. 
To be fair, The Guardian differentiated between radical fractions within the British 
Muslim community and ordinary Muslims. Although The Daily Telegraph reporting 
occasionally indicated that not all Muslims are radicals, it argued that radicalisation and 
extremism are predominantly a Muslim problem in Britain.   
Thus, Islam as a religion emerged as a “victim” in the sense that a few self-appointed, 
self-styled individuals, be they radicals, hate-preachers or controversial so-called 
experts on Islam, interpreted it, discussed and debated it, and finally represented it in a 
way they considered correct. Finally, these aforementioned individuals proposed a 
“modernised” Islam as a way of addressing contemporary problems of society including 
radicalisation and terrorism. Unfortunately, in doing so, these individuals in particular 
and, to an extent, the press itself occasionally quoted a few verses from the Quran 
without explaining their significance, historical context, meaning and relevance to 
present-day situations. This misleading and biased approach to a sacred text without 
scholarly consultation and checks indicated a constructed myth. However, some may 
say that the same would be true of the newspaper analysis of Christian religion which 
these broadsheets would be very unlikely to examine.  
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Until the start of this thesis, previous studies description of an ‘Orient’ showed rather 
consistent identicalness in his character that was inheritably “violent”, “dangerous”, 
“other”, and sort of an “enemy within” originally at distance land be it the Middle East or 
in Asia. But the 7/7 event interpretations within both newspapers have transformed 
our previous ‘Orient’ with a new one that is different in many ways. Today, our Orient is 
a part of inner communities who is reasonably well-educated, modern, open in a sense 
of believing in mix-cultural marriage, revert Muslim, born and bred Asian which is a 
shock and new challenge. Hence our Orient is not traditional but “home-grown” and 
“Islamist radical” who is at same time Asian, white English and Black. This is another 
reminder of an identical moral panic that is also based upon youth-cultural behaviour 
but in its changing face that is radicalisation. So the strength of this thesis is based upon 
indicating a new Orient within a specified period of time in both newspapers and also 
the hypothesis that newness in terrorism in post-7/7 media settings in Islamic.   
Undoubtedly, terrorism in its all forms and in all regions should be denounced, as both 
broadsheets did. But as they did so, it occasionally appeared as though these 
broadsheets did not appreciate that Islamic terrorism should be treated like other forms 
of terrorism and should not be associated with a particular religious group. The two 
broadsheets offered different perspectives on the 7/7 event and its connections with 
the Iraq War. Consequently, the overall debate on terrorism in both broadsheets’ types 
of journalism clearly showed that press coverage works like a “thermometer”: it shoots 
up during incidents of terrorism and extremism and cools down to normal when 
nothing is happening that involves British Muslims or Muslims at the international level. 
Such style of coverage has been indicated before by Edward Said’s notion of “latent 
stereotypes”. 
In addition, the reporting of both newspapers on the fight against terrorism revealed a 
straightforward difference in their opinions on the methods and approaches to deal 
with terrorism. In explaining the ways of fighting the challenge of terrorism, the 
editorial position of The Guardian remained largely the same throughout in its all forms 
of journalism including comment pieces, features and special investigative reports. It 
argued that individual freedom and liberty cannot be sacrificed because of the terrorism 
threat as there may be alternative ways of dealing with it. Briefly, in ten editorials 
during the period 8 July 2005-7 July 2007, The Guardian conveyed a message of four 
main themes: liberty, freedom, humanity and community bonding. These are also 
329 
 
proclaimed symbolic features of The Guardian’s own values and ethics upon which its 
journalism is based. 
In contrast, eight of The Daily Telegraph’s editorials delivered a measured message 
wrapped up in four points: terrorism is all in the name of Islam; terrorists and fanatics 
must be defeated with tough laws, boldness and courageous policies; it would be 
mistake to believe that “fundamentalist-inspired terrorism can be stopped” even if the 
West accepts that it was “caused” by the Iraq war; and terrorism is a problem for radical 
Muslims and, therefore, the best option is to engage with moderate Muslims and 
eliminate any contacts with radicals. Further, in its editorials The Daily Telegraph 
argued that terrorists aspire to impose their version of laws upon us (British society). 
There is “no common ground between their vision of the future and ours” and, 
therefore, Britain must not compromise or negotiate with them.  
On the reasons behind the 7/7 attack, both newspapers maintained their same initial 
stance throughout. Although the coverage of the 7/7 incident in both broadsheets 
suggests that there were several different reasons for the attacks, a key factor remained 
Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq even though the two newspapers had different views on 
this matter. Eleven years on, The Guardian still maintains that the driving force behind 
the London Bombers’ radicalisation was Britain’s controversial role in Iraq. Further, it 
has insisted in its editorials and comment pieces that one day British politicians who 
allied themselves with the Americans and invaded Iraq upon a false assumption of the 
existence of “weapons of mass destruction” will regret it.  
In contrast, The Daily Telegraph supported the view of the then British government 
headed by Blair who joined Bush in his wars on Iraq and Afghanistan as part of military 
campaigns in the “war on terror”. The crux of the terrorism debate in The Guardian and 
The Daily Telegraph indicated that the current face of terrorism is a product of religious 
ideology that has roots in the Wahhabi version of Islam dating back to eighteenth-
century Arabia. 
In other words, the representations of British Muslims were somewhat associated with 
their faith and culture. In the wake of the 7/7 event, it is fair to say that British Muslims 
do have a problematic press representation. However, it is also honest to bring up the 
press view that British Muslims are lacking a nationwide community representation 
that might be consulted and negotiated with on matters important to British Muslims. 
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For these newspapers, urging British Muslims to adopt certain aspects of “Britishness” 
as a man-made model is like endorsing it as a perfect idea.  
However, in reality British society has witnessed social problems such as riots, anti-
social behaviour and racism, and these continuing challenges suggest that “Britishness” 
or “the British way of life” is not watertight but evolving. Both newspapers criticised 
Saudi Arabia for funding a few British mosques and viewed it as “intervening” and a 
cause of the increasing radicalisation in Britain. But at the same time, they were 
cautious about “intervening” in British Muslims’ faith, arguing that it was more like a 
“British Islam”.  
The representations of British Muslims during this two-year period In the reporting of 
both broadsheets scarcely improved from their existing image as “illiterate”, “violent”, 
“dangerous others” from pre-7/7 Britain to “radicalised others”, “traitors”, “internal 
security threat” and “incompatible” during and after the failed 21/7 plot and following 
the failed Glasgow airport terminal attacks on 30 June 2007. The two broadsheets 
offered different reflections on the events of 7/7 although they both raised issues about 
the conflict between the ‘West’ and the ‘Rest’ and the concept of “Orientalism”.  
Thus, the contemporary “Orient”, i.e. the “British Muslims” residing within Europe who 
were previously described as inherently “old-fashioned”, “backward”, “dangerous”, 
“violent”, and a “threat”, has became the  “enemy within” and has posed an “internal 
security risk”. Manifestly, the well-known notion of “otherness” is routinely visible in 
the aftermath of the 7/7 reporting and in debates and discussions surrounding Muslims’ 
place, functioning and future in multicultural British society. 
Perceptibly, religion was a dominant feature of the “British way of life” notion which 
brought the old “Us” and “Them” rhetoric. Nevertheless, this binary division which is 
based upon religion was slightly different in that it was the self-interpreted “evil 
ideology” of the radicals that presented a new challenge to the British way of life. On 
this point, both broadsheets suggested that “modern Islam” and “moderate Muslims” 
are the solution to curb this threat.  
However, modernity had different meanings and manifestations in The Guardian and 
The Daily Telegraph; for the former it meant “secular nature” and for the latter it was 
“Sufi Islam”.  At this particular moment, the reporting on the 7/7 bombing also indicated 
331 
 
the presence of Hall’s hypothesis of “the West” and “the Rest” which described “the 
West” as “scientifically advanced”, “powerful”, “modern”,  “civilized”, “democratic”, and 
“secular” in comparison to “the Rest” which is “under-developed”, “backward” and 
“conservative”. 
This thesis clearly identifies the presence of Cohen’s concept of ‘folk devils and moral 
panics’ as indicators of British Muslims’ representation in The Guardian and The Daily 
Telegraph. The crux of the 7/7 reporting demonstrated the presence of ‘Folk Devils and 
Moral Panic’ concepts and its salient features: exaggeration, symbolisation, reaction and 
warning in a systemic manner. In a way both newspapers spent fewer efforts in 
investigating beneath the surface to find whether or not those surveys, opinion polls, 
studies, statements and quotes those were incorporated were authentic and reliable. 
Further, self-styled and self-appointed individuals were presented as experts and 
scholars on Islam. 
Furthermore, the moral panics occur as a result of a nexus of powerful elites, i.e. the 
four “P’s” (press, politicians, pressure groups and police). Several scholars have 
enriched Cohen’s ideas; for example, Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda (1994), 
Arnold Hunt (1997), and Ronald Burns and Charles Crawford (1999) identified a nexus 
of politicians, press and pressure groups that work together to create moral panics. 
Later on, Chas Critcher (2006; 2008) reminded us that Cohen identifies four sets of 
agents as crucial to the development of a moral panic: the mass media, moral 
entrepreneurs, the control culture and the public (Critcher, 2008, p.1129). In the end, it 
is the “sociology of evil” that identifies and props up ‘moral panics and folk devils’ and, 
to Cohen, “More moral panics will be generated and other, as yet nameless, folk devils 
will be created” (Cohen, 1987, p.204).  
Conclusively, British Muslims emerged as new “Folk Devils” because they have 
threatened the peaceful way of life of the British people and risked their safety. The 
distorted image of Islam signalled the manifestation of a closed view that Islam is a 
threat and a security risk to the West. This potentially negative description may be 
harmful to a society that is struggling to deal with disenfranchised British Muslim 
youths who are becoming radicals and extremists.  
At that very moment, both newspapers were operating in a tense, shocking and 
challenging environment in which the chances of an occurrence of human error in such 
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a situation was possible, and this may have contributed to the production of a rather 
distorted image of British Muslims and Islam. Perhaps equivalent events in the Muslim 
world would have produced similar reactions on the grounds of the perpetrators’ 
religious affiliations. However, these quality broadsheets have a manifest code of ethics 
and, above all, reporting on another terrorism event was a test of their fairness and the 
professional essence for which they stand. However, our expectations of the press as a 
mirror of reality and a messiah are weak because, as noted, it reports events and issues 
in association with other players including the press itself, politicians, pressure groups, 
the police and public bodies.  
During the two-year research period, some significant changes took place within The 
Guardian and The Daily Telegraph reporting. Both newspapers shifted their priorities 
and focus of attention from the immediate reaction to the event, which was a call for 
tougher laws and increased security to prevent further terror attacks, to the anti-
Muslim backlash and government proposals for new terror laws to counter terrorism. 
Also, both newspapers changed their positions on a number of matters while 
maintaining the same stance on issues that occurred during the coverage, such as 
terrorism legislation, cartoons, the veil and Britishness.  
At first, The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph both criticised British security 
institutions for their failure to stop the dreadful event of the London Bombings. The 
newspapers branded this failure an “intelligence blunder” and a “scandalous error” and 
blamed the British security institutions for their failure to prevent the 7/7 incident. 
However, following the 21/7 incident, both changed their view of the security 
institutions because the police and MI5 had managed to foil terror plots, particularly the 
21/7 plot, for which these newspapers recognised and admired the security 
institutions’ efforts. In The Daily Telegraph’s reporting in particular, a direct link 
between Islam and terrorism was established using the banner of “evil ideology”. There 
was no change in The Daily Telegraph’s view that terrorism is a product of religious 
ideology. Although The Guardian continued to refer to 7/7 as “Islamic terrorism”, it also 
incorporated some opposing views of Muslim representatives who stated that Islam has 
nothing to do with terrorism.   
On a series of issues, including the response to 7/7, the two newspapers emerged as 
bitter rivals, demonstrating the intellectual divide within British society, quite apart 
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from their opposing political views of the event. Hence, a scenario developed that 
brought the two newspapers face to face, suggesting that they were fighting a battle of 
ideas. An example is The Guardian’s portrayal of the Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, 
as liberal, open-minded and logical. In comparison, The Daily Telegraph considered him 
a friend and associate of “homophobic Islamic preacher al-Qaradawi” (15 September, 
2005; 4 March 2006).  
Significantly, the findings of this thesis reveal the comprehensive presence of the “folk 
devils and moral panics” concept in the post-7/7 press coverage of British Muslims, as 
explained in detail earlier. It is pertinent to revisit the history of moral panics and 
consider their long-lasting impacts on British society. Evidently, the “mods” and 
“rockers” did not ultimately bear the burden of stigmas and stereotypes with which 
they were generally tagged by the British press. Some of them mutated into self-exiled 
hippies or ‘freaks’ in India whilst the vast majority did not. The moral panic raised by 
the bombings in 2005 and the post-7/7 press coverage of British Muslims raised 
differing interpretations within the broadsheet press largely read by the middle classes 
of Britain.  
On the one hand The Guardian emphasised the liberal values of its readers by seeking 
social integration as a solution to the problems raised by the bombings within British 
society. Its editorial policy was to view the events as a product of the Iraq war, although 
it offered a platform for many writers and commentators who held differing opinions. 
The Daily Telegraph took a more institutional and establishment approach which 
suggested that the issue was more one of religion and an association with Islamic or 
Muslim groups. The fact is that these newspapers were reporting to different types of 
audiences and in the process often skewed their reporting, editorials and commentary 
to their perceived readership. 
As a result, events and explanations were often distorted and rendered inaccurate by 
commission and omission. However, this is probably true of most reporting in Western 
democracies, just as it is for newspaper reporting in Eastern and Islamic nations, where 
it is directed, cramped and confined by religious imperatives. In the end, the failure of 
the British broadsheet press to appreciate the finer points of the ‘Muslim Terrorist’ 
debate was a product of the need to respond to the horrific events of 2005 in ways 
which perhaps met the expectations of their readership.  
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Given that the terrorism threat may well continue, it would be useful, in the interests of 
a wider global public audience and readership, were the press to also incorporate the 
views of mainstream recognised religious authorities and liaise with well-established 
religious institutions such as Al-Azhar in Egypt, Darul Uloom in Pakistan, Darul Uloom 
Al-Arabiya Al-Islamiyyah in the UK, Darul Uloom Deoband in India and various Islamic 
studies departments in major UK universities. Since both newspapers admitted that 
community bonding is essential to counter terrorism, it seems highly desirable to avoid 
misperceptions and misunderstandings of British Muslims or other faith groups that 
might lead to confrontations.  
In the end The Guardian’s proposal to enter into dialogue with radicals and all strands of 
British Muslims could potentially bring together some common aspects of Islamic and 
British values such as respect for law, charity and humanity. More specifically, The 
Guardian and The Daily Telegraph suggested that a strong sense of “community 
bonding” would be the best way to combat radicalisation and terrorism. However, this 
stance hides the fact that they held very different views on why the bombings occurred 
and how Muslims in British society should be treated. 
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Appendix B (i).Example of thematic coding process 
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Appendix-B- (ii). Example of thematic coding process: 
 
 
 
396 
 
Appendix-B-(iii)-A selected sample of initial coding sheet of The Telegraph/The 
Guardian:  
Code-1- The British Terrorists Mindset, beliefs and family backgrounds:  
Sub-code i) They hate our way of life (British) 
ii) They hate their country of birth (enemy within)…  
Code-2-The role of Religious Ideology in extremism and terrorism 
Sub-code-(i) “Wahhabi terrorism”/Catholic “terrorism”   
ii) 7/7 bombers acted on the name of Islam (a perverted ideology)…  
Code-3- Causes of the 7/7: Security negligence or failure? 
Sub-code- (i) MI5 knew London bombers identities and previous crime records before 
the attacks 
ii) MI5 and police could not be blamed for the 7/7 security failure  
Code-4- Terrorism Threats to Britain’s Inland Security.   
Sub-code-(i)  Radicalism Islamists gets foreign support/Islamic terrorism threat  
ii) Foreign links/actors foreign visits e.g Pakistan, Gulf and France 
iii) Police and security and law enforcement agencies are working to prevent terrorism 
threat…  
Code-5- British Muslims: accusations, grievances and their problems.   
Sub-code (i) British Muslims have created social ghettos  
ii) Considering Muslims viewpoint (sympathetic view) 
Code-6- British Security Institutions (MI5/Police): Responsibilities and Failures:    
Sub-code(i)  Networks/Cells (e.g. al-Qaeda) linked to the 7/7  
ii) Londonistan: Islamist extremist had trouble-free movement in London…   
Code-7- Britain’s Role in American led-wars in Iraq and Afghanistan Caused 
Radicalization among British Muslims:  
i) Britain role in Afghanistan and Iraq boosts feeling of anger among British Muslims  
ii) Western policies and interventions has created chaos in Iraq and Afghanistan…  
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Code-8-Islamaits want to Establish Sharia Law and Caliphate  
Sub-code-(i) Islamists want to replace Sharia law with the existing British law 
ii) Militants ambitions are to take over Britain   
iii) Hizb ut-Tahrir ideology of establishing a caliphate  
v) AL-Qaeda wants to establish an empire (caliphate)  
Code-9- Britain’s role in the Middle East and its impact on British Muslims   
Sub-code (i) Israel-Palestine Conflict  
ii) Critics says that Britain’s Iraq War policy (weapons of mass destruction) was 
controversial and a human disaster  
iii) London Bombers would had done this any way so it is not a reaction of Iraq policy  
Code-10-US and Them Rhetoric  
i) British way of life vs. Muslims way of life (British values)  
ii) Open society vs. closed society.. 
Code-11- Demand for an Independent Public Inquiry of the 7/7 Event:  
i) 7/7 victims and their family members call for an independent inquiry… 
Code-12- British Government Counter-Terrorism Policy and its Impact on British 
Muslims.  
Sub-code (i) Winning hearts and Minds, (home and abroad) appointing more Muslims 
overseas to engage with the Muslim world… 
Code-13- Community Bonding: British Muslims and Non-Muslims Share Common 
Values:   
Sub-code (i) Common/shared values/understandings/of British life 
ii) Collective efforts could protect and strengthen disaffected British Muslims and non-
Muslims youth from being fall into extremism… 
Code-14- Islamophobia in post-7/7 Britain:  
Sub-code-(i) Fear of Islam, for example growing Muslim population  
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ii) Hatred and panic of Islam using caricatures, films, books. Novel, anti-Quran 
campaigns etc.  
Code-15- Press Portrayal of Beeston (Leeds) linking with 7/7 Bombers:  
Sub-code-(i) Hotbed of Islamic terrorism.  
ii) Beeston name equals to terror making it hard for people to get jobs…  
Code-16- Government Policies of Combating Extremism and Terrorism: British 
Muslims Participation and Concerns.  
Sub-code-(i) Integration and Cohesion (integration is two way street)…  
Code-17- Human Rights Act: Britain’s Commitment and Violations in Post 7/7 
Period.   
Sub-code-(i) Human rights issues such as assurance that suspect/detainees will not be 
tortured.  
ii) Detention powers allow holding foreign suspect for 90 days without charge raises 
concerns over human rights  
iii) Stop and search and spying raise questions on privacy and civil liberty in post-7/7 
Britain… 
Code-18- London Bombers Description in British Press:  
Sub-Code (i) Suicide bombers 
ii) Radicalization of Young Muslims 
Code-19- Terror Plots/Terror Networks: 
Sub-Code (i) July 21 bomb plot/ Suicide bombers   
ii) Doctors/noble profession 
Code-20-Moderate Muslims and the Idea of British Islam:  
Sub-code (i) Moderate Muslims can play leading role in combating extremism and 
radicalization…  
Code-21- Hate Preachers:  
i) Abu-Hamza/ Finsbury mosque radicalized youngsters and spread hatred of Britain  
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ii) Anjem Chaudhary (hate preacher) views on British government anti-Muslim 
polices…  
Code-22- British Press Portrayal of ‘Islam’:  
Sub-code(i) ‘Islamism’ (‘totalitarian’ threat that destroy western democracy etc.)  
ii) Political Islam…  
Code-23-Histrocial Context of Terrorism in Britain:  
Sub-code (i) Combating militant Irish republicanism…  
Code-24- Islamists/Radicals Mindset and their Interpretations of Religion:    
Sub code-(i) They live in seventh century (autocracy rule)…   
Code-25-Post-7/7 British Society  
Sub code (i) The idea of multiculturalism is weakening.  
ii) Londoners show strength after bombings  
iii) The idea of Britishness takes new shape…  
Code-26- Blair vs. Brown:  Power Struggle, Policies and Strategies:   
i) Tony Blair: as (hard working, defends Britain’s interests at home and abroad, 
deporting of hate preachers,…(Positive) 
ii) Gordon Brown: representation in the press as (expectation of foreign policy 
revivalist, Future Challenges... (Positive) 
Code-27- Court Trials of Suspects and Alleged Terrorists (21 July 2005).   
Sub-code (i) Suspects  
ii) Evidence presented in the court (CCTV footage/videos/photos/documents etc.)  
Code-28- Terrorism Legislation: Recommendations, Criticism and Proposals: 
Sub code (i) “Glorification” of Terrorism meaning (Encouraging terrorism)/ incite to 
murder, etc. 
ii) Muslims view of new anti-terror laws, 90 days detentions as unjust.  
Code-29- Freedom of Speech:  
Sub-code (i) British Muslims do not endorse criticism of their religion (close-minded)  
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ii) Considering the British Muslims sentiments British press did not publish cartoons,  
Code-30- Reporting British Muslims:  
Sub-code (i) Newspaper corrections without offering an apology (misrepresenting facts 
and figures)  
ii) Prophet Mohammad (P.B.U.H) cartoon controversy and British media role 
(positive)…   
Code- 31- Spokesperson as a News Source of information on British Muslims 
issues:   
Sub code (i) Government officials  
ii) Academics critical of Muslims (Closed views of Islam and Muslims)…  
Code-32- Role of the British Mosques in post-7/7 Britain:  
Sub code (i) Mosques promoting extremism and radicalization 
(ii) London bombers attended mosques in London and Leeds Beeston area…  
Code- 33- Debates and Interviews relating to British Muslims:  
Sub-code (i) Muslim scholar views regarding Muslim issues (positive aspects) 
ii) Non-Muslim scholar views regarding Muslim issues (positive aspects)… 
Code 34- Engaging with the British Muslim community:  
Sub-code (i) Britain should engage with British Muslim by embracing and sharing fruits 
of democracy  
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Appendix-C 
Thematic Map or Codebook for Sub-Themes/Codes:  
Code No     Sub-Themes  
(STC-1) “London bombings provide British Government with a reason to revisit the 
terrorism legislation”  
(STC-2) “Terrorists’ ideology e.g. ‘Wahhabism’ etc. is to destroy and replace Western 
democratic values with their interpretations of ‘Islamic law’”  
(STC-3) “Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq cannot be blamed for the London Bombings” 
(STC-4) “Islamist extremists and white imperialist racists are two identical 
troublemakers”   
(STC-5) “Islam and terrorism cannot be separated”  
(STC-6) “British Islamists, Sheikh Omar Bakri and his associates such as al-Qaradawi 
and Abu Izzadeen, are anti-Western hate preachers who must be denounced and 
banned”  
(STC-7) “Islamists’ real intention is to expand caliphate founded by Sharia Law, 
ayatollahs and imams” 
(STC-8) “Islamist grievances against the West are irrational and wrong”  
(STC-9) “Britain had provided financial assistance to radicals and Islamists and had 
developed relationships with their organisations”   
(STC-10) “Britain’s foreign policy in the Middle East, Iraq and Afghanistan radicalised 
the London bombers and created a feeling of anger among the younger generation of 
British Muslims” 
(STC-11) “Many young British-born Muslims became radicalised during their visits 
to Pakistan, the country of their parents, which exports terrorism”   
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(STC-12) “UK-based sleeper cells/networks have links to al-Qaeda and religious 
schools in Pakistan that espouse fundamentalism” (Home-grown terrorism)  
(STC-13) “Political process is the best strategy to counter terrorism in Iraq and beyond” 
(STC-14) “Britain needs tough laws to deal with modern Islamists’ terrorism threat, 
which is global” 
(STC-15) “British Muslim organisations view Tony Blair’s anti-terrorism laws as 
undemocratic, unjust and aimed at demonising the whole Muslim community” 
 (STC-16) “The Terrorism Bill proposes to increase suspects’ detention period for up to 
90 days, which will weaken Britain’s commitment to the Human Rights Convention”  
(STC-17) “MI5/Police operations to prevent the Islamist terrorism threat at home and 
abroad, i. e. suspect arrests, investigations, bravery etc”   
(STC-18) “British Muslims demand a public inquiry into the 7/7 event” 
(STC-19) “Blair and his Government officials blame British Muslims and their leaders 
for not doing enough to combat terrorism and suggest that it is Muslims’ problem” 
(STC-20) “Londoners showed strength after bombings”       
(STC-21) “Non-Muslims, including politicians and 7/7 victims, demand a public inquiry 
into the 7/7 event” 
(STC-22) “7/7 bombers were known to MI5” 
(STC-23) “The 7/7 event reflects security agencies’ failure”  
(STC-24) “British mosques linked with 7/7 bombers, meeting points, promoting 
extremism and radicalisation, problematic labels, non-English-speaking imams, etc. 
(close-minded view)”  
(STC-25) “Mosques are promoting community cohesion, etc. (Open-minded view)”  
(STC-26) “Islam preaches peace and harmony and has no link with terrorism, etc. 
(Open-minded view)”  
(STC-27) “Islam is linked with terrorism, extremism, radicalisation, women’s issues, etc. 
(Closed-minded view)”  
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(STC-28) “British Muslims’ anger and resentment is a result of Western hypocritical 
and hostile policies in the Middle East and elsewhere in the Islamic world”   
(STC-29) “Hate preacher Anjem Chaudhary’s statements, etc”  
(STC-30) “Radical Islamist individuals, groups and organisations such as al-Qaeda; 
HizubutTahrir, al-Muhajurin etc inspire anti-Western activities inside Britain and 
abroad”  
(STC-31) “British Foreign Office had accommodated and sponsored radicals and their 
organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood” 
(STC-32) “British Government promotes the idea of British Islam/Modern 
Islam/moderates (Sufi Islam, Council of Imams etc) to counter Islamic radicalism”   
(STC-33) “Radical Islam and Militant Muslims are also a challenge to Muslim regimes; 
therefore, the West must make an alliance with modern Muslims”  
(STC-34) “Britain’s military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq were based on 
construction and a peace-keeping mission that aimed to destroy al-Qaeda and radical 
Islam”   
(STC-35) “Critics say that Britain should not participate in American-led ‘pre-emptive 
wars’ and should distance itself from the ‘war on terror’” 
(STC-36) “Most Islamist terrorists were well-educated, social, integrated, football 
lovers who belong to wealthy families”   
(STC-37) “Many young British Muslim students turned to radicalisation at the 
universities, which are centres of ‘Islamist extremism’, ‘Islamic McCarthyism’ and ‘fertile 
recruiting grounds’ for extremists” 
(STC-38) “British Muslims have a set of grievances and resentment that include 
Government’s double standards, non-Muslim extremists, ignoring Muslims’ sufferings, 
interfering in Muslims’ religion, supporting dictators, faith schools, being labelled as the 
‘enemy within’, disloyal’, ‘anti-Semitic’, bad press etc.”  
(STC-39) “British Muslims have created social ghettos and live segregated and parallel 
lives rooted in their cultural and religious beliefs/ideologies, such as separate schools, 
veils, which lead to radicalisation”   
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(STC-40) “Representing Livingstone as hate preacher Qaradawi friend who hates gays, 
Jews, etc. closed views, anti-Semitic”  
(STC-41) “Hate preachers, Abu Hamza, Finsbury Park Mosque promote anti-Western 
feelings and radicalisation”  
(STC-42) “Muslim terrorism/Islamic terrorism threat continues to the next generation 
in the form of nuclear, biological attacks etc”  
(STC-43) “Terrorists are the common enemy for British Muslims and non-Muslims, so 
community bonding could defeat terrorism”  
(STC-44) “British Muslims do not endorse ‘Freedom of Speech’ and criticism of their 
religion, for example the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) cartoons”   
(STC-45) “British politicians and law lords divided over ‘glorification of terrorism’ 
legislation”  
(STC-46) “Britishness is our culture; our British values must be adopted”  
(STC-47) “Backlash to the 7/7 incident: Muslims’ feelings of being persecuted, stop and 
search, suspect arrests, resembling Jewish treatment, families of 7/7 bombers being 
harassed, veil attacks, derogatory links, e.g. Beeston, etc.”    
(STC-48) “Court Trials of Suspects and Alleged Terrorists reflect the fact that home-
grown radicals are involved in attacking their country of birth”   
(STC-49) “Engaging with Muslims includes government initiatives such as road shows, 
reaching out in the community, combating Islamophobia, listening to Muslims’ 
leadership etc.” 
(STC-50) “Mistaken Identity issue in post-7/7 Britain such as non-Muslim arrests, 
shootings etc.’”   
(STC-51) “Blair government has shown double standards in tackling terrorism, i. e. 
‘Islamic militancy’ vs. IRA” 
(STC-52) “British Muslims are victims, for example bad press etc.” (Sympathetic view) 
(STC-53) “History shows that every country, region and era has had its own terrorists 
and extremist groups who used their religious ideologies to create mayhem, including 
Jews, Christians, Buddhists and Hindus”   
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(STC 54) “Problems within the Muslim community, for instance widely acknowledged 
leadership, imams and mosques, sectarian divide etc.”  
(STC-55) “Beeston/Leeds areas’ media portrayal and links to troubles, bad labels”  
(STC-56) “British security institutions’ inhuman treatment and torture of suspects, 
deportations, refusal of asylum, trials in other countries raising concerns over human 
rights issues”    
(STC-57) “Blair government’s strict measures relating to anti-terror laws, banning 
extremist websites, and repressing opposing voices are unwise and undemocratic”.  
(STC-58) “Government select, promote and engage with like-minded British Muslims” 
(STC-59) “Freedom of speech boundaries should be drawn in order to avoid confusion 
and conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims” 
(STC-60) “Events such as the burning of the Quran, and disrespecting Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH) increases Islamophobia and hatred of Muslims and Islam, thereby 
increasing resentment among British Muslims”  
(STC-61) “Public (7/7 victims) complaints about the compensation process”  
(STC-62) “Jack Straw veil controversy fuels Islamophobia in British society”  
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Appendix- D-(i): Process of mixing identical sub-themes and codes, leading to the 
emergence of three main themes.  
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Appendix-D-(ii): The process of mixing sub-themes to produce three main themes. 
These are interconnected within the data and are as follows: “Home-grown ‘Islamist 
terrorism’ Threat”; “Britain’s foreign policy risks its Internal Security”; and “British 
Muslims are incompatible with British Way of Life”. The following bar chart shows the 
three main themes in this data in sequence.   
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Appendix E:  Example of Duplicate Articles: Jason Burke’s article published twice 
in The Guardian.  
(i) 
Newspaper The Guardian 
Type of Press 
Coverage 
Comment  
Headline 
The Violence that lies in every ideology  
Author 
Description/Affiliatio
n  
Jason Burke (South Asia Editor/Foreign Correspondent) 
Type of Source  Duplicate/also published on 22 July 
Date 17 July 2005 
Length  1,217 words 
Link http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/jul/17/july7.religio
n1 
 
(ii)  
Newspaper The Guardian 
Type of Press 
Coverage 
Comment  
Headline Ideology’s violent face 
Author 
Description/Affiliati
on  
Jason Burke (South Asia Editor/Foreign Correspondent)  
Type of Source  Duplicate/also published on 22 July 
Date 22 July 2005 
Length  1,141 words 
Link http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jul/22/islam.reli
gion 
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Appendix E-(ii)- Example of Discarded articles
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Appendix (F): The Telegraph’s Editor’s Code of Practice.  
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Appendix-(G)- The Guardian’s Editorial Code can be seen at:  
https://www.theguardian.com/info/2015/aug/05/the-guardians-editorial-code 
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Appendix:  (i) Leveson Inquiry  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140122145147/http:/www.levesoninqu
iry.org.uk/ 
(ii)  Leveson inquiry can be found at:  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140122145147/http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/hc1213/hc07/0779/0779.pdf 
(iii)(Editor’s Code of Practice-IPSO-Independent Press Standards Organisation)  
(https://www.ipso.co.uk/IPSO/cop.html) 
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Appendix- A (i): Examples of familiarisation with data initial notes, marking, 
concepts etc.  
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Appendix- A (ii): Familiarising the data.  
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Appendix- A (iii): Familiarising the data.  
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Appendix B (i).Example of thematic coding process  
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Appendix-B- (ii). Example of thematic coding process: 
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Appendix-B-(iii)-A selected sample of initial coding sheet of The Telegraph/The 
Guardian:  
Code-1- The British Terrorists Mindset, beliefs and family backgrounds:  
Sub-code i) They hate our way of life (British) 
ii) They hate their country of birth (enemy within)…  
Code-2-The role of Religious Ideology in extremism and terrorism 
Sub-code-(i) “Wahhabi terrorism”/Catholic “terrorism”   
ii) 7/7 bombers acted on the name of Islam (a perverted ideology)…  
Code-3- Causes of the 7/7: Security negligence or failure? 
Sub-code- (i) MI5 knew London bombers identities and previous crime records before 
the attacks 
ii) MI5 and police could not be blamed for the 7/7 security failure  
Code-4- Terrorism Threats to Britain’s Inland Security.   
Sub-code-(i)  Radicalism Islamists gets foreign support/Islamic terrorism threat  
ii) Foreign links/actors foreign visits e.g Pakistan, Gulf and France 
iii) Police and security and law enforcement agencies are working to prevent terrorism 
threat…  
Code-5- British Muslims: accusations, grievances and their problems.   
Sub-code (i) British Muslims have created social ghettos  
ii) Considering Muslims viewpoint (sympathetic view) 
Code-6- British Security Institutions (MI5/Police): Responsibilities and Failures:    
Sub-code(i)  Networks/Cells (e.g. al-Qaeda) linked to the 7/7  
ii) Londonistan: Islamist extremist had trouble-free movement in London…   
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Code-7- Britain’s Role in American led-wars in Iraq and Afghanistan Caused 
Radicalization among British Muslims:  
i) Britain role in Afghanistan and Iraq boosts feeling of anger among British Muslims  
ii) Western policies and interventions has created chaos in Iraq and Afghanistan…  
Code-8-Islamaits want to Establish Sharia Law and Caliphate  
Sub-code-(i) Islamists want to replace Sharia law with the existing British law 
ii) Militants ambitions are to take over Britain   
iii) Hizb ut-Tahrir ideology of establishing a caliphate  
v) AL-Qaeda wants to establish an empire (caliphate)  
Code-9- Britain’s role in the Middle East and its impact on British Muslims   
Sub-code (i) Israel-Palestine Conflict  
ii) Critics says that Britain’s Iraq War policy (weapons of mass destruction) was 
controversial and a human disaster  
iii) London Bombers would had done this any way so it is not a reaction of Iraq policy  
Code-10-US and Them Rhetoric  
i) British way of life vs. Muslims way of life (British values)  
ii) Open society vs. closed society.. 
Code-11- Demand for an Independent Public Inquiry of the 7/7 Event:  
i) 7/7 victims and their family members call for an independent inquiry… 
Code-12- British Government Counter-Terrorism Policy and its Impact on British 
Muslims.  
Sub-code (i) Winning hearts and Minds, (home and abroad) appointing more Muslims 
overseas to engage with the Muslim world… 
Code-13- Community Bonding: British Muslims and Non-Muslims Share Common 
Values:   
Sub-code (i) Common/shared values/understandings/of British life 
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ii) Collective efforts could protect and strengthen disaffected British Muslims and non-
Muslims youth from being fall into extremism… 
Code-14- Islamophobia in post-7/7 Britain:  
Sub-code-(i) Fear of Islam, for example growing Muslim population  
ii) Hatred and panic of Islam using caricatures, films, books. Novel, anti-Quran 
campaigns etc.  
Code-15- Press Portrayal of Beeston (Leeds) linking with 7/7 Bombers:  
Sub-code-(i) Hotbed of Islamic terrorism.  
ii) Beeston name equals to terror making it hard for people to get jobs…  
Code-16- Government Policies of Combating Extremism and Terrorism: British 
Muslims Participation and Concerns.  
Sub-code-(i) Integration and Cohesion (integration is two way street)…  
Code-17- Human Rights Act: Britain’s Commitment and Violations in Post 7/7 
Period.   
Sub-code-(i) Human rights issues such as assurance that suspect/detainees will not be 
tortured.  
ii) Detention powers allow holding foreign suspect for 90 days without charge raises 
concerns over human rights  
iii) Stop and search and spying raise questions on privacy and civil liberty in post-7/7 
Britain… 
Code-18- London Bombers Description in British Press:  
Sub-Code (i) Suicide bombers 
ii) Radicalization of Young Muslims 
Code-19- Terror Plots/Terror Networks: 
Sub-Code (i) July 21 bomb plot/ Suicide bombers   
ii) Doctors/noble profession 
Code-20-Moderate Muslims and the Idea of British Islam:  
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Sub-code (i) Moderate Muslims can play leading role in combating extremism and 
radicalization…  
Code-21- Hate Preachers:  
i) Abu-Hamza/ Finsbury mosque radicalized youngsters and spread hatred of Britain  
ii) Anjem Chaudhary (hate preacher) views on British government anti-Muslim 
polices…  
Code-22- British Press Portrayal of ‘Islam’:  
Sub-code(i) ‘Islamism’ (‘totalitarian’ threat that destroy western democracy etc.)  
ii) Political Islam…  
Code-23-Histrocial Context of Terrorism in Britain:  
Sub-code (i) Combating militant Irish republicanism…  
Code-24- Islamists/Radicals Mindset and their Interpretations of Religion:    
Sub code-(i) They live in seventh century (autocracy rule)…   
Code-25-Post-7/7 British Society  
Sub code (i) The idea of multiculturalism is weakening.  
ii) Londoners show strength after bombings  
iii) The idea of Britishness takes new shape…  
Code-26- Blair vs. Brown:  Power Struggle, Policies and Strategies:   
i) Tony Blair: as (hard working, defends Britain’s interests at home and abroad, 
deporting of hate preachers,…(Positive) 
ii) Gordon Brown: representation in the press as (expectation of foreign policy 
revivalist, Future Challenges... (positive) 
Code-27- Court Trials of Suspects and Alleged Terrorists (21 July 2005).   
Sub-code (i) Suspects  
ii) Evidence presented in the court (CCTV footage/videos/photos/documents etc.)  
Code-28- Terrorism Legislation: Recommendations, Criticism and Proposals: 
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Sub code (i) “Glorification” of Terrorism meaning (Encouraging terrorism)/ incite to 
murder, etc. 
ii) Muslims view of new anti-terror laws, 90 days detentions as unjust.  
Code-29- Freedom of Speech:  
Sub-code (i) British Muslims do not endorse criticism of their religion (close-minded)  
ii) Considering the British Muslims sentiments British press did not publish cartoons,  
Code-30- Reporting British Muslims:  
Sub-code (i) Newspaper corrections without offering an apology (misrepresenting facts 
and figures)  
ii) Prophet Mohammad (P.B.U.H) cartoon controversy and British media role 
(positive)…   
Code- 31- Spokesperson as a News Source of information on British Muslims 
issues:   
Sub code (i) Government officials  
ii) Academics critical of Muslims (Closed views of Islam and Muslims)…  
Code-32- Role of the British Mosques in post-7/7 Britain:  
Sub code (i) Mosques promoting extremism and radicalization 
(ii) London bombers attended mosques in London and Leeds Beeston area…  
Code- 33- Debates and Interviews relating to British Muslims:  
Sub-code (i) Muslim scholar views regarding Muslim issues (positive aspects) 
ii) Non-Muslim scholar views regarding Muslim issues (positive aspects)… 
Code 34- Engaging with the British Muslim community:  
Sub-code (i) Britain should engage with British Muslim by embracing and sharing fruits 
of democracy  
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Appendix-C 
Thematic Map or Codebook for Sub-Themes/Codes:  
Code No     Sub-Themes  
(STC-1) “London bombings provide British Government with a reason to revisit the 
terrorism legislation”  
(STC-2) “Terrorists’ ideology e.g. ‘Wahhabism’ etc. is to destroy and replace Western 
democratic values with their interpretations of ‘Islamic law’”  
(STC-3) “Britain’s foreign policy in Iraq cannot be blamed for the London Bombings” 
(STC-4) “Islamist extremists and white imperialist racists are two identical 
troublemakers”   
(STC-5) “Islam and terrorism cannot be separated”  
(STC-6) “British Islamists, Sheikh Omar Bakri and his associates such as al-Qaradawi 
and Abu Izzadeen, are anti-Western hate preachers who must be denounced and 
banned”  
(STC-7) “Islamists’ real intention is to expand caliphate founded by Sharia Law, 
ayatollahs and imams” 
(STC-8) “Islamist grievances against the West are irrational and wrong”  
(STC-9) “Britain had provided financial assistance to radicals and Islamists and had 
developed relationships with their organisations”   
(STC-10) “Britain’s foreign policy in the Middle East, Iraq and Afghanistan radicalised 
the London bombers and created a feeling of anger among the younger generation of 
British Muslims” 
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(STC-11) “Many young British-born Muslims became radicalised during their visits 
to Pakistan, the country of their parents, which exports terrorism”   
(STC-12) “UK-based sleeper cells/networks have links to al-Qaeda and religious 
schools in Pakistan that espouse fundamentalism” (Home-grown terrorism)  
(STC-13) “Political process is the best strategy to counter terrorism in Iraq and beyond” 
(STC-14) “Britain needs tough laws to deal with modern Islamists’ terrorism threat, 
which is global” 
(STC-15) “British Muslim organisations view Tony Blair’s anti-terrorism laws as 
undemocratic, unjust and aimed at demonising the whole Muslim community” 
 (STC-16) “The Terrorism Bill proposes to increase suspects’ detention period for up to 
90 days, which will weaken Britain’s commitment to the Human Rights Convention”  
(STC-17) “MI5/Police operations to prevent the Islamist terrorism threat at home and 
abroad, i. e. suspect arrests, investigations, bravery etc”   
(STC-18) “British Muslims demand a public inquiry into the 7/7 event” 
(STC-19) “Blair and his Government officials blame British Muslims and their leaders 
for not doing enough to combat terrorism and suggest that it is Muslims’ problem” 
(STC-20) “Londoners showed strength after bombings”       
(STC-21) “Non-Muslims, including politicians and 7/7 victims, demand a public inquiry 
into the 7/7 event” 
(STC-22) “7/7 bombers were known to MI5” 
(STC-23) “The 7/7 event reflects security agencies’ failure”  
(STC-24) “British mosques linked with 7/7 bombers, meeting points, promoting 
extremism and radicalisation, problematic labels, non-English-speaking imams, etc. 
(close-minded view)”  
(STC-25) “Mosques are promoting community cohesion, etc. (Open-minded view)”  
(STC-26) “Islam preaches peace and harmony and has no link with terrorism, etc. 
(Open-minded view)”  
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(STC-27) “Islam is linked with terrorism, extremism, radicalisation, women’s issues, etc. 
(Closed-minded view)”  
(STC-28) “British Muslims’ anger and resentment is a result of Western hypocritical 
and hostile policies in the Middle East and elsewhere in the Islamic world”   
(STC-29) “Hate preacher Anjem Chaudhary’s statements, etc”  
(STC-30) “Radical Islamist individuals, groups and organisations such as al-Qaeda; 
HizubutTahrir, al-Muhajurin etc inspire anti-Western activities inside Britain and 
abroad”  
(STC-31) “British Foreign Office had accommodated and sponsored radicals and their 
organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood” 
(STC-32) “British Government promotes the idea of British Islam/Modern 
Islam/moderates (Sufi Islam, Council of Imams etc) to counter Islamic radicalism”   
(STC-33) “Radical Islam and Militant Muslims are also a challenge to Muslim regimes; 
therefore, the West must make an alliance with modern Muslims”  
(STC-34) “Britain’s military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq were based on 
construction and a peace-keeping mission that aimed to destroy al-Qaeda and radical 
Islam”   
(STC-35) “Critics say that Britain should not participate in American-led ‘pre-emptive 
wars’ and should distance itself from the ‘war on terror’” 
(STC-36) “Most Islamist terrorists were well-educated, social, integrated, football 
lovers who belong to wealthy families”   
(STC-37) “Many young British Muslim students turned to radicalisation at the 
universities, which are centres of ‘Islamist extremism’, ‘Islamic McCarthyism’ and ‘fertile 
recruiting grounds’ for extremists” 
(STC-38) “British Muslims have a set of grievances and resentment that include 
Government’s double standards, non-Muslim extremists, ignoring Muslims’ sufferings, 
interfering in Muslims’ religion, supporting dictators, faith schools, being labelled as the 
‘enemy within’, disloyal’, ‘anti-Semitic’, bad press etc.”  
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(STC-39) “British Muslims have created social ghettos and live segregated and parallel 
lives rooted in their cultural and religious beliefs/ideologies, such as separate schools, 
veils, which lead to radicalisation”   
(STC-40) “Representing Livingstone as hate preacher Qaradawi friend who hates gays, 
Jews, etc. closed views, anti-Semitic”  
(STC-41) “Hate preachers, Abu Hamza, Finsbury Park Mosque promote anti-Western 
feelings and radicalisation”  
(STC-42) “Muslim terrorism/Islamic terrorism threat continues to the next generation 
in the form of nuclear, biological attacks etc”  
(STC-43) “Terrorists are the common enemy for British Muslims and non-Muslims, so 
community bonding could defeat terrorism”  
(STC-44) “British Muslims do not endorse ‘Freedom of Speech’ and criticism of their 
religion, for example the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) cartoons”   
(STC-45) “British politicians and law lords divided over ‘glorification of terrorism’ 
legislation”  
(STC-46) “Britishness is our culture; our British values must be adopted”  
(STC-47) “Backlash to the 7/7 incident: Muslims’ feelings of being persecuted, stop and 
search, suspect arrests, resembling Jewish treatment, families of 7/7 bombers being 
harassed, veil attacks, derogatory links, e.g. Beeston, etc.”    
(STC-48) “Court Trials of Suspects and Alleged Terrorists reflect the fact that home-
grown radicals are involved in attacking their country of birth”   
(STC-49) “Engaging with Muslims includes government initiatives such as road shows, 
reaching out in the community, combating Islamophobia, listening to Muslims’ 
leadership etc.” 
(STC-50) “Mistaken Identity issue in post-7/7 Britain such as non-Muslim arrests, 
shootings etc.’”   
(STC-51) “Blair government has shown double standards in tackling terrorism, i. e. 
‘Islamic militancy’ vs. IRA” 
(STC-52) “British Muslims are victims, for example bad press etc.” (Sympathetic view) 
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(STC-53) “History shows that every country, region and era has had its own terrorists 
and extremist groups who used their religious ideologies to create mayhem, including 
Jews, Christians, Buddhists and Hindus”   
(STC 54) “Problems within the Muslim community, for instance widely acknowledged 
leadership, imams and mosques, sectarian divide etc.”  
(STC-55) “Beeston/Leeds areas’ media portrayal and links to troubles, bad labels”  
(STC-56) “British security institutions’ inhuman treatment and torture of suspects, 
deportations, refusal of asylum, trials in other countries raising concerns over human 
rights issues”    
(STC-57) “Blair government’s strict measures relating to anti-terror laws, banning 
extremist websites, and repressing opposing voices are unwise and undemocratic”.  
(STC-58) “Government select, promote and engage with like-minded British Muslims” 
(STC-59) “Freedom of speech boundaries should be drawn in order to avoid confusion 
and conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims” 
(STC-60) “Events such as the burning of the Quran, and disrespecting Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH) increases Islamophobia and hatred of Muslims and Islam, thereby 
increasing resentment among British Muslims”  
(STC-61) “Public (7/7 victims) complaints about the compensation process”  
(STC-62) “Jack Straw veil controversy fuels Islamophobia in British society”  
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Appendix- D-(i): Process of mixing identical sub-themes and codes, leading to the 
emergence of three main themes.  
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Appendix-D-(ii): The process of mixing sub-themes to produce three main themes. 
These are interconnected within the data and are as follows: “Home-grown ‘Islamist 
terrorism’ Threat”; “Britain’s foreign policy risks its Internal Security”; and “British 
Muslims are incompatible with British Way of Life”. The following bar chart shows the 
three main themes in this data in sequence.   
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Appendix E:  Example of Duplicate Articles: Jason Burke’s article published twice 
in The Guardian.  
(i) 
Newspaper The Guardian 
Type of Press 
Coverage 
Comment  
Headline 
The Violence that lies in every ideology  
Author 
Description/Affiliatio
n  
Jason Burke (South Asia Editor/Foreign Correspondent) 
Type of Source  Duplicate/also published on 22 July 
Date 17 July 2005 
Length  1,217 words 
Link http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/jul/17/july7.religio
n1 
(ii)  
Newspaper The Guardian 
Type of Press 
Coverage 
Comment  
Headline Ideology’s violent face 
Author Jason Burke (South Asia Editor/Foreign Correspondent)  
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Description/Affiliati
on  
Type of Source  Duplicate/also published on 22 July 
Date 22 July 2005 
Length  1,141 words 
Link http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jul/22/islam.reli
gion 
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Appendix E-(ii)- Example of Discarded articles
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
433 
 
 
Appendix (F): The Telegraph’s Editor’s Code of Practice.  
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Appendix-(G)- The Guardian’s Editorial Code can be seen at:  
https://www.theguardian.com/info/2015/aug/05/the-guardians-editorial-code 
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Appendix:  (i) Leveson Inquiry  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140122145147/http:/www.levesoninqu
iry.org.uk/ 
(ii)  Leveson inquiry can be found at:  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140122145147/http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/hc1213/hc07/0779/0779.pdf 
(iii)(Editor’s Code of Practice-IPSO-Independent Press Standards Organisation)  
(https://www.ipso.co.uk/IPSO/cop.html) 
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Appendix -(J): Understanding of ‘Sunnah’:  
Sunnah is the second most important source of authority reflecting the practical 
teachings of the Quran. It is the way the Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H) lived his life and 
set examples for mankind based upon his noble character, which the Quran describes as 
follows: “Indeed, in the messenger of Allah a ‘good example (uswatun hasana /      
    )’ has been set for the one who seeks Allah and the Last Day and thinks constantly 
about Allah." (Qur'an 33:21). It also says: “There has been a good example (uswatun 
hasana /          ) set for you by Ibrahim and those with him...” (Qur'an 60:4). It was his 
great moral character that raised his profile in the Quran and, hence, Muslims and non-
Muslims were asked to follow him as a role model (Hart, 1978, p.3): “O you who have 
believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and do not invalidate your deeds” (47:37).  
In short, to understand the Quran and Sunnah, one needs to study Prophet 
Muhammad’s (P.B.U.H) life in Makkah and Medina, which consisted of Ibadat (Worship) 
and Muamalat (interactions/dealings with others in a society). That is why it has been 
said that Islam is a complete way of life, meaning that it includes guidance and laws to 
deal with everyday affairs in life. Crucially, Sharia, which is mistranslated and 
misunderstood in Europe, is a way of life led by Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H); not only 
is it compatible with contemporary Britain but also most of Britain’s laws are 
compatible with the Sharia. For instance, the concepts of equal opportunities, justice, 
self-respect, morals and manners, health and safety rules, customers’ rights, social 
system, everyday affairs such as right-hand driving, eating habits, charity systems, and 
other forms of governance  are all part of Sharia teachings (Askari, 2014).  
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